Select Committee on Defence Second Report


2  Annual Performance Report

3. The Annual Performance Report provides a summary of performance against the 2004 Spending Review Public Service Agreement (PSA) Objectives and Targets.[2] There are three overarching objectives: Achieving success in military tasks at home and abroad; Being ready to respond to tasks that might arise; and Building for the future. The three objectives are supported by six targets, set by the 2004 Spending Review, which run until March 2008. In addition there is a value for money target which runs in part until March 2008 and in part until 2010. For these targets the MoD provides an interim assessment only.

4. A further value for money target ran until March 2006 and, at the time of this report's publication, the MoD's performance was being validated.[3]

5. A summary of MoD's performance in 2005-06 is provided in the table below.
PSA Target Achievement
Objective I: Achieve success in the military tasks that we undertake at home and abroad
1. Achieve the objectives established by Ministers for Operations and Military Tasks in which the UK's Armed Forces are involved, including those providing support to our civil communities. On course
2. Improve effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant contribution (Joint target with DFID and FCO). On course
Objective II: Be ready to respond to the tasks that might arise
3. Generate forces, which can be deployed, sustained and recovered at the scales of effort required to meet the Government's strategic objectives. On course
4. Play a leading role in the development in the European Security agenda, and enhance capabilities to undertake timely and effective security operations by successfully encouraging a more efficient and effective NATO, a more coherent and effective ESDP operating in strategic partnership with NATO, and enhanced European defence capabilities (Joint target with FCO).  On course
5. Recruit, train, motivate and retain sufficient military personnel to provide the military capability necessary to meet the Government's strategic objectives. On course

Objective III: Build for the future
6. Deliver the equipment programme to time and cost. On course
Other targets
7. 2002 Spending Review Value for Money Target: Increase value for money by making improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of the key processes for delivering military capability. Year-on-year output efficiency gains of 2.5% will be made each year from 2002-03 to 2005-06, including a 20% output efficiency gain in the DLO.

8. 2004 Spending Review Value for Money Target: As part of Spending Review 2004, the Department agreed that it would realise total annual efficiency gains of at least £2.8 billion by 2007-08, of which three quarters will be cash releasing. As part of this programme the MoD will by 31 March 2008: Reduce its civilian staff by at least 10,000; Reduce the number of military posts in administrative and support functions by at least 5,000; Be on course to have relocated 3,900 posts out of London and the South East by 2010.

To be determined




On course

Source: Ministry of Defence

Achieving military objectives

6. PSA target 1 is to achieve the objectives set for the Armed Forces' operations and military tasks, both overseas and in the UK. During 2005-06, UK Forces were deployed on military tasks in 28 locations around the world. Operational deployments included major deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans as well as contributions to United Nations peacekeeping missions.[4] The Annual Report provides information about the activity of the Armed Forces in these deployments.[5]

7. Other tasks within PSA target 1 include the maintenance of the UK military deterrent, the security of the UK's overseas territories and support to civil authorities in response to civil emergencies.[6] The Annual Report notes that the number of requests from civil authorities for the MoD to provide support during 2005-06 declined markedly compared to previous years.[7]

8. The Annual Report judges that it is on course to meet PSA target 1 but gives no information of the performance indicators against which it makes this judgment. We asked the MoD how it measured performance of its operations and military tasks. The MoD told us that that the assessment is made by the Defence Management Board (DMB) based on an assessment of quarterly reports from commanders in the field and military staff at Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).[8] The MoD's submission noted that:

The aggregate assessment—based on the reports from the relevant Commanders—is that we are meeting our Military Strategic Objectives, despite significant challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan in particular.[9]

The PUS acknowledged that this "is inevitably a subjective judgment to an extent".[10]

9. We asked the PUS if we could see a copy of the quarterly report and to provide us with summaries of future quarterly reports.[11] He told us "we can certainly provide a summary or some relevant information of that sort".[12] These summaries were not forthcoming. The MoD's subsequent submission stated that:

We have considered whether we can provide a classified summary of the underpinning analysis of the success of operations contained within the Defence Balanced Scorecard. Taking into account the unavoidably subjective nature of the process and the sensitivity of details of operations, we have concluded that doing so would raise too high a risk of inhibiting the free and frank provision of advice to Ministers and the DMB that is particularly important in this area.[13]

10. We strongly regret the MoD's refusal to supply us even with a classified summary of the information against which it assesses the success of its military operations. This makes it impossible for us to assure the House of the validity of its assessment. The Annual Report is strong on describing what the Armed Forces have been doing but weak on explaining how this is judged to have contributed to the achievement of its objectives. We hope that the MoD is right in assessing that it is on course to achieving its military objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan but the Annual Report does not provide us with the evidence to support this assessment. We accept that there are limitations to what can be said in public but do not believe that this absolves the MoD from the responsibility to provide a proper account of its performance against this key target. We recommend that, in future Annual Reports, the MoD publish clear performance indicators against which performance against target 1 is to be judged. If it cannot provide evidence for its performance against the target, the MoD must accept that, in this form, it is not a sensible target for PSA and Annual Report purposes.

Conflict prevention

11. PSA target 2 is a joint target with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Development (DfID) "to improve the effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict".[14] Performance against the target is assessed according to twelve performance indicators: the situation in 12 areas of operation. Nine indicators are reported as being on course and three reported as experiencing slippage.[15] The performance indicators reported as being on course are Afghanistan, Balkans, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, UN peacekeeping (two separate indicators) and African peacekeeping. Slippage is reported in the Middle East Peace Process, Nepal and Sudan.[16]

12. These performance indicators are, in each case, a statement of what the UK would like the situation to be in each area of operations by the end of 2007-08. The indicator for Afghanistan, for example, relates to the establishment by the end of 2007-08 of "Accountable and democratic structures for Afghanistan's governing institutions",[17] progress against which would be influenced by the wide range of international organisations in Afghanistan and not least the Afghans themselves. It is clearly beyond the ability of the UK Government alone to deliver these aims. As our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee have observed, performance is influenced by a range of external actors.[18] It is useful to have a joint peacekeeping target given the joint nature of the Government's undertaking in many areas of operations. But the performance indicators in target 2 are too outcome-oriented to be very effective as a measure of the MoD's performance.

Readiness

13. PSA Target 3 relates to the MoD's ability to generate air, naval and army forces as required for deployments.[19] The MoD notes that measuring and aggregating readiness is complex and that it uses a variety of matrices including manning levels, equipment support and collective training.[20]

14. The MoD uses two performance indicators to assess target 3. The first indicator—"By 2008, ensure more than 73% of force elements show no serious or critical weakness against their required peacetime readiness levels"—was achieved two years early, with 77% of force elements showing no serious or critical weakness.[21] The figures for the first quarter of 2006 show a deterioration in force readiness to 69% in April-June 2006. The MoD attributes the deterioration in force readiness to the continued high level of operational commitment.[22]

15. The second performance indicator is "By 2008, ensure more than 71% of force elements show no serious or critical weakness against the ability to generate from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness for deployment on operations".[23] The readiness target was achieved in the second and third quarters of 2005-06 but was missed by 1% in the fourth quarter.[24] The MoD's submission states that in the first quarter of 2006-07, 69% of force elements showed no serious or critical weakness against the ability to generate from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness for deployment on operations.[25]

16. The MoD's performance against its force readiness targets has deteriorated in recent quarters on account of the current level of operational deployments. In the circumstances this is understandable. Over 30% of units are showing serious or critical weaknesses against both their peacetime readiness levels and their ability to generate from peacetime readiness to immediate readiness for deployment. This gives us cause for concern.

17. The Annual Report does not provide a statistical breakdown of readiness by Service but does identify particular Service weaknesses. In the Army, there were weaknesses in the Army's "ability to provide a further High Readiness Brigade sized grouping to the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces second echelon for any additional contingent operation had this been required".[26]

18. In the Royal Navy there were two critical weaknesses which contributed to undermining force readiness: shortages of Merlin helicopter spares and specialist manpower and shortages of amphibious support shipping. The MoD told us that programmes were now in place to address these weaknesses.[27]

19. In the Royal Air Force (RAF) there were critical weaknesses in the readiness levels of Hercules C130, Nimrod MR2, Nimrod R1, Sentry E3D and air transport aircraft owing to upgrade and maintenance programmes, periods of poor serviceability and specific manning imbalances.[28] Critical weaknesses were also identified with the RAF Regiment which experienced manning shortages of approximately 20% as well as a significant breach of harmony guidelines. Manning balance is not expected to be restored to the RAF Regiment until 2011-12.[29]

HELICOPTERS

20. We were surprised that the list of weaknesses provided by the MoD made no mention of the shortage of helicopters. During our visits to Iraq and Afghanistan in the Summer of 2006, Service personnel told us of their concerns about the number and condition of battlefield helicopters available to them. In Afghanistan, it was emphasised that battlefield helicopters were key to the successful outcome of operations because they enabled the speedy manoeuvre of personnel, machinery and supplies over long distances which would otherwise not be possible owing to the risk of attack and poor condition of the road network.

21. In Iraq we were told that there were insufficient numbers of all types of serviceable helicopters available to commanders and that those that were available were overused.[30] In both theatres we were told that helicopters had to operate in extremes of weather and terrain to which some older types were not suited.

22. When we questioned the PUS about the availability of helicopters in both theatres, he noted that the Secretary of State for Defence, Rt Hon Des Browne MP had, in July 2006, announced the provision of more support helicopters and an additional Hercules C130 for Afghanistan.[31] The PUS added that "although commanders on the ground could always do with more, there was now sufficient [helicopters] for purpose". [32]

23. We asked the MoD to consider greater use of commercially contracted helicopters in theatre. In response, the MoD's submission stated that senior commanders continue to judge that deployed forces were receiving adequate helicopter support but that the leasing of commercial aircraft would remain under consideration.[33]

24. We remain concerned at the availability of serviceable battlefield helicopters, especially support helicopters, in Iraq and Afghanistan. We welcome the MoD's response that the potential use of private lease helicopters would remain under consideration. In Afghanistan the MoD should first press NATO partners to provide additional helicopter support.

AIR TRANSPORT

25. The availability of air transport is a matter which we have raised before.[34] During our visits to Iraq and Afghanistan in the summer of 2006 we witnessed at first hand some of the frustrations experienced by Service personnel whose return home had been delayed owing to failures of aircraft. A day or more delay is particularly unwelcome when it cuts into two weeks' leave.

26. We questioned the PUS about the reliability of the airbridge from Iraq and Afghanistan to the UK.[35] The PUS told us that he recognised that the airbridge had experienced significant shortcomings but noted that the MoD was considering how airbridge reliability could be improved.[36] The MoD's memorandum states that the fitting of Defensive Aid Suites to the Tristar, to be completed by May 2007, will greatly improve the resilience of the airbridge.[37]

27. We are concerned about the reliability of the airbridge between operational theatres and the UK, which has implications both for morale and for operational effectiveness. If the MoD is committed to the expeditionary approach, it must ensure that it has sufficiently reliable transport aircraft to deliver its troops to theatre. We look to the MoD to provide the case to the Treasury for a significant increase in investment in the transport fleet.

28. The MoD's second submission states that two HS 125 aircraft had been based in the Middle East since January 2003.[38] Their purpose was described by the MoD as "to provide rapid, secure and flexible inter and intra-theatre transport to high value personnel as determined by operational priorities not the rank of passenger".[39] The MoD submission put the marginal costs of operating one HS 125 aircraft (excluding fixed costs relating to personnel, depreciation and cost of capital) at:

  • 2003-04: £376,000;
  • 2004-05: £364,000; and
  • 2005-06: £380,000.[40]

NATO and ESDP

29. PSA target 4 is a joint MoD / FCO target to "play a leading role in the development of the European Security agenda and encouraging a more efficient and effective NATO, a more effective European Security and Defence Policy…and enhanced European defence capabilities".[41]

30. The performance indicators used by the MoD are:

  • a more efficient and effective NATO;
  • a more coherent and effective ESDP operating in strategic partnership with NATO; and
  • enhanced European defence capabilities.

The MoD's performance against this target is assessed as "On Course".

31. We intend to hold an inquiry in 2007 into the future of NATO and European defence in depth beginning in early 2007. This will provide an opportunity to consider the MoD's effectiveness in this area.

Recruitment and retention

32. PSA target 5 relates to the MoD's performance in "recruiting, training, motivating and retaining Service personnel".[42] The MoD must maintain sufficient levels of personnel in each Service so that it can provide the resources to meet its military commitments. The MoD's performance against this objective is assessed as "On Course".

MANNING BALANCE

33. The first supporting performance indicator is to "achieve manning balance", defined as between -2% and +1% of the total manning requirement.[43]

34. MoD performance since 2004 is shown in the table below:
Percentage of overall requirement
1 April 2004 1 April 20051 April 2006
Royal Navy / Royal Marines 96.895.1 96.3
Army97 98.398.8
RAF98.5 10199.2

Source: Ministry of Defence

35. As at 1 April 2006, there was a 3.7% shortfall in the Royal Navy / Royal Marines; a 1.2% shortfall in the Army; and a 0.8% shortfall in the RAF.[44] Only the Royal Navy / Royal Marines failed to achieve manning balance as defined by the MoD. However, by July 2006, the RAF had fallen to a deficit of 4.4%, reflecting a programme of reduction in personnel as part of the restructuring of the RAF in April 2006.[45] The manning requirements had been reducing in line with the plans set out in the July 2004 Defence White Paper, Future Capabilities.[46]

36. Looking to the future, we asked the MoD to provide information about the trained requirement for each Service against anticipated levels in April 2007 and April 2008.[47] For 2007, the MoD forecast a shortfall of 4.1% and 3.2% for the RAF and Royal Navy respectively but forecast an improvement in the situation in 2008 following the implementation of managed redundancy programmes in both Services.

37. The MoD broadly achieved manning balance in 2005-06 but this is largely explained by the fact that the manning requirement had been reducing. The crucial question is whether the manning requirement is sufficient.

38. To assist its planning, the MoD periodically develops Defence Planning Assumptions. Last updated in 2004, they currently assume that the MoD should be able to support one medium-scale and two small-scale operations concurrently.[48] Since 2001, the Armed Forces have been operating well above these assumptions and the MoD expects that it will continue to do so into 2007.[49] Manning requirements have not been adjusted to reflect this level of activity. This has resulted in our Armed Forces being asked to achieve more demanding military objectives with fewer resources.

39. We note that the Armed Forces have been operating at levels well above the Defence Planning Assumptions. The manning requirement has not been adjusted to take this into account. The MoD can no longer rely on the current level of operational deployments being a temporary aberration: it should revise its manning requirement upwards to fit the realistic need.

RECRUITMENT

40. The recruitment of sufficient numbers of personnel is a key performance indicator to achieving manning balance. The Annual Performance Report states that:

2005-06 was a difficult year for recruitment, especially for the Naval Service and the Army. The Armed Services continue to face stiff recruiting competition in the face of high levels of employment.[50]

In 2005-06, the total intake into the Services was 18,060 personnel. Of this 3,940 joined the Royal Navy / Royal Marines, 12,690 joined the Army and 1,430 joined the RAF. The Annual Report identifies particular difficulties in recruiting Naval Service Officers (90% of target recruited) and Other Rank Army personnel (84% of target recruited).[51] The RAF met its recruitment targets in 2005-06 but this coincided with a period of planned reduction of RAF personnel.[52]

41. The National Audit Office (NAO) report on recruitment and retention states that the MoD spent £145 million on recruitment in 2004-05.[53] It is critical of the management information which underlies the MoD's decision-making on recruitment initiatives—a criticism which has been accepted by the MoD.[54]

VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW

42. The MoD describes Voluntary Outflow as "the number of Service personnel voluntarily leaving the Forces before the end of their agreed term".[55] The voluntary exit rates for each Service is shown in the table below.
Target As at 31.3.06 As at 31.3.05 As at 31.3.04
RN / RM Officers 2.0%2.8% 2.5%2.5%
RN / RM Ratings 5.0%6.0% 6.4%5.7%
Army Officers 4.1%4.3% 3.9%3.7%
Army Soldiers 6.2%5.5% 5.7%5.3%
RAF Officers 2.5%2.5% 2.4%2.1%
RAF Other Ranks 4.0%4.8% 3.8%3.7%

Source: Ministry of Defence

43. The MoD explains the increase in RAF Other Ranks volunteering to leave the Service in 2005-06 as caused by the faster processing of voluntary applications for redundancy during the planned redundancy programme.[56] It explains the above target voluntary outflow rates for Royal Navy / Royal Marine Officers and Ratings, and Army Officers as "partly a reflection of employment opportunities outside the Services".[57]

44. The NAO conducted a survey in 2006 to identify the reasons given by former Service personnel for leaving the Armed Forces.[58] Over 50% of former Service personnel gave "the inability to plan life outside work" as the most important reason for leaving, closely followed by "better employment prospects in civilian life". The response "Too many deployments" scored under 30%.[59]

45. While overall exit rates have risen slightly over the last two years, there is no evidence that reported overstretch has led to a mass exodus. Nevertheless there is a risk that pressures rise to a point at which Service personnel—or their families—feel that enough is enough. The MoD must monitor closely any indications of retention problems arising.

46. The NAO report noted that the MoD is using financial and non-financial methods to improve retention.[60] Such methods include fixed sum payments to personnel in return for them committing to a defined "Return of Service" period. The NAO report noted that the offering of such payments has been "an effective short-term fix to stabilise outflow and improve manning in some trades".[61] We welcome the MoD's decision to introduce financial initiatives to aid retention.

47. On 10 October 2006, the Secretary of State for Defence announced a new tax-free flat-rate operational bonus for Armed Forced personnel serving in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Balkans.[62] This would amount to just under £100 a week, or for a six-month tour £2,240, roughly equivalent to the amount of tax paid over a six month operational tour by junior ranks. The bonus would be backdated to 1 April 2006. The bonus will cost around £60 million a year, funded by new money from the Treasury. The Secretary of State told the House in October that details of eligibility would be published shortly: these are still awaited. We welcome the MoD's decision to pay an operational bonus to Armed Forces personnel and trust that it will be annually uprated.

MANNING PINCHPOINTS

48. Underlying the overall manning balance, there are areas within each Service where there are insufficient personnel to meet specific skill requirements. These areas are described by the MoD as "manning pinchpoints".[63]

49. The Annual Report gives examples of manning pinchpoints by Service.[64] For the Royal Navy, the Report identifies shortages in Petty Officers, Nuclear Marine Engineering Watchkeepers and Royal Marine Other Ranks. For the Army, the report identified 24 manning pinchpoints including in the Royal Artillery and infantry.[65] For the RAF, manning pinchpoints were identified in Junior Officer Pilots, Fighter Controllers and Medical Officers.[66]

50. The MoD provided us with a list of the pinchpoint trades for all three Services as at 31 March 2006.[67] Some trades, including Army Movement Controllers and RAF Technicians, were not now considered to be a pinchpoint. Overall, more trades had been added to the list than had been removed. New additions included Royal Navy Mine Clearance operatives, and RAF Police.[68] The NAO report on recruitment and retention in the Armed Forces identified 88 manning pinch points as at 1 July 2006.[69]

51. While the overall manning balance may be within acceptable levels, the number of trades experiencing shortages of personnel has increased since 2004-05. Although we have received no evidence that our Armed Forces are operating with anything other than their usual professionalism, the growing number of manning pinchpoints risk impacting on long-term effectiveness.

52. In our report on the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, we expressed particular concern at the recorded shortfall of medical personnel of 20%.[70] The Government's response to our report stated that the MoD was addressing the shortfall in medical personnel through pay incentives to aid retention and by utilising civilian agency contractors on operations when shortfalls remained.[71] On 9 October 2006, the Secretary of State outlined the recommendations of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB) with regard to Service medical personnel.[72] Mr Jeffrey told us that the AFRB recommendations, which included "golden hello payments", would be implemented. He added that the MoD would from 1 November make a "consolidated payment of £6,500 to medical and dental officers".[73]

53. We welcome the decision of the MoD to implement the recommendations of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body to increase the pay of medical personnel. We consider the decision to remove the disparity between the pay of Service medical personnel and their civilian counterparts to be helpful in addressing shortfalls in this key skill area. We look to the MoD to address other manning pinchpoints in a similarly imaginative way.

SEPARATED SERVICE AGAINST HARMONY GUIDELINES

54. A further key supporting performance indicator for PSA target 5 is to "achieve levels of individual Separated Service against harmony guidelines".[74] All three Services have harmony guidelines designed to allow personnel to have sufficient time to recuperate from operations and for unit formation and personnel training and development. The MoD Annual Performance Report identifies the performance of the three Services against harmony guidelines as at 31 March 2006:[75]
Guidelines Performance
Royal Navy / Royal Marines In any 36 month period, no one to exceed 660 days separated service. At 31 March 2006 less than 1% of the Royal Navy had exceeded the guidelines
Army In any 30 month rolling period no one to exceed 415 days separated service. At 31 March 2006, 15.1% of the Army personnel on current trained strength had exceeded the guidelines
Royal Air Force Not greater than 2.5% of personnel exceeding more than 140 days of detached duty in 12 months. At 31 March 2006, 4.6% of the RAF had exceeded 140 days of detached duty in the last 12 months.

Source: Ministry of Defence

55. All three Services breached their guidelines to some degree. The Army recorded the biggest breach and the Royal Navy was the smallest. The Annual Report states that the situation in the Royal Navy and the Army may be understated due to the weaknesses in their respective information systems, and that this was being addressed by the introduction of the Joint Personnel Administration programme.[76]

56. The NAO report on retention and recruitment identifies concerns that the information systems might underestimate the true level of Separated Service for two reasons: short absences are not always recorded ; and each Service differs in the way it records data.[77]

57. The MoD attributes the breaching of harmony guidelines to having had to sustain commitments, since 2001, at the limit of its Defence Planning Assumptions.[78] This, according to the MoD, has "inevitably limited its ability to meet harmony guidelines".

58. We are concerned that the Royal Navy and Army information systems which record individual Separated Service are inadequate. We look forward to the speedy and effective implementation of the Joint Personnel Administration programme.

TRAINING

59. The Annual Report recognised that the current level of deployments had impacted on the MoD's ability to provide collective training.[79] In 2005-06, 14% of training exercises were cancelled (compared to 20% cancelled in 2004-05).[80] Mr Woolley told us that while there had been no reduction in pre-operational training, there had been a reduction in training for contingent operations,[81] and the BATUS[82] training facilities in Canada were not being utilised fully. [83]

60. The MoD's second submission provided a breakdown of the reasons for the cancellation of contingent operations:

  • 30 exercises were cancelled due to operational commitments
  • 13 exercises were removed on the grounds of cost
  • 10 exercises were cancelled by other nations
  • 5 exercises were cancelled in response to changing priorities or rescheduling.[84]

61. It is clear that the current level of commitments is impacting on training. Over time this will impact on military effectiveness and in the Armed Forces' ability to "fight the next war" which could present entirely different challenges. In view of the crucial importance of training to the quality of our Armed Services, this is of the deepest concern to us. We expect the MoD to address the shortfall in the provision of training for contingent operations as a matter of urgency.

STRETCHED OR OVERSTRETCHED?

62. The Annual Report states that the proportion of regular Armed Forces deployed to support military operations and tasks increased from 18% in the first quarter of 2005-06 to just under 20% in the last quarter of the year.[85] This upward trend continued into the first quarter of 2006-07 with 20.2% of regular forces undertaking operations or military tasks.[86] The MoD anticipates the numbers deployed will remain "broadly constant" at these levels until February 2007 when the approximately 1,000 strong, UK-led, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) hands over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to a new, composite command.[87]

63. In our report on UK Operations in Iraq, we considered whether the current level of commitments was sustainable and concluded that "the Armed Forces can tolerate short-term pressure but sustained breaches of harmony guidelines will damage the Services' operational capability".[88] On 11 July 2006, the Secretary of State told us "I do not accept that we are overstretched; I accept that there is stretch".[89]

64. In October 2006, General Sir Richard Dannatt, Chief of the General Staff, was reported as saying that the Army was "running hot" and "stretched to capacity".[90] In a wide-ranging interview, General Dannatt spoke of the importance of the "Military Covenant" between Service personnel and the Government and his concern that this would potentially be undermined over the longer-term if current levels of commitments were maintained.[91] Our impression is that he was reflecting a view widely held in the Armed Services.

65. We asked the PUS whether he considered UK Armed Forces were overstretched. Mr Jeffrey responded they were "stretched but not overstretched".[92] He noted that the proportion of Service personnel deployed on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were at historically high levels but did not regard the situation as unsustainable. When we asked what the difference was between Forces being stretched and overstretched, Mr Woolley replied that "making a simple distinction …is unhelpful".[93] Mr Woolley went on to acknowledge, however, that, at the current level of commitments, the UK would not have sufficient resources to engage in a further major deployment.[94]

66. Nearly one fifth of Armed Forces personnel were deployed on operations and military tasks in 2005-06 and this level has been maintained into the first quarter of 2006-07. While it is anticipated that there will be a force drawdown in Iraq during 2007, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are at vital stages and success in either operation is not assured. The level of demand on our Armed Forces could well continue throughout 2007 and beyond. The possibility of significant additional resources being deployed to Afghanistan, in particular, remains real. The current level of deployments poses a significant risk to the MoD achieving success in its military objectives.

67. Whether UK Armed Forces are stretched or overstretched is a matter for continued debate. What is certain is that they are operating in challenging conditions in insufficient numbers and without all the equipment they need. With problems of undermanning continuing, there is a clear danger that the Armed Forces will not be capable of maintaining current commitments over the medium-term.

68. To some extent this strain on our Armed Forces reflects the inability of some NATO allies to generate forces. This is regrettable and raises a question over whether this new direction for NATO is sustainable. Minister should make strong representations to those allies to ensure they understand the implications of failure of the Alliance.

Civilian staff

69. As at 1 April 2006, the MoD employed 103,930 Full Time Equivalent Staff.[95] This represents a reduction since 1 April 2005 of 4.2%. To meet its efficiency targets the MoD plans to reduce the number of civilian workers by a further 8,320 staff by March 2008. The MoD Annual Report states that the MoD "is making every effort to minimise and where possible avoid compulsory redundancies".[96] It plans to do so through reduced recruitment and voluntary early release. The reduction in civilian personnel will result from the merger of the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) and the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO). The merger of the DPA and DLO is considered in our report on Defence Procurement.[97] In our report on the MoD Annual Performance Report 2004-05 we expressed our support for the MoD's drive for greater efficiency but noted the likely impact on civilian jobs. We looked to the MoD to undertake the appropriate consultation with organisations which represent its civilian staff.[98] We restate our support for the MoD's efficiency programme and the need for MoD to proceed in consultation with staff representatives, particularly those staff employed by the DPA and DLO.

Diversity

70. The Annual Performance Report states that "despite continuing efforts, we continue to find recruiting proportionately from UK ethnic minority groups to the Armed Services difficult".[99] Although overall Service black and ethnic minority representation (including Commonwealth recruits) increased to 5.5% at 1 April 2006 (from 5.3% at 1 April 2005), none of the Services met its individual Service target for black and ethnic minority recruitment. By Service, the black and ethnic minority intake was: RN 2.0% (target 3.5%, 2004-05 2.3%); Army 3.6% (target 3.9%, 2004-05 3.7%); RAF 1.5% (target 3.6%, 2004-05 1.5%). The Services have a target of 8% black and ethnic minority representation by 2013.

71. If it were not for the recruitment of black and ethnic minority Service personnel from the Commonwealth, the situation would look even worse. Figures provided by the MoD show that 1.1% were recruited from Fiji and 0.5% from Jamaica.[100]

72. Recruitment of ethnic minorities at officer level in all Services has barely increased over recent years. On 1 April 2003, black and ethnic minority personnel represented 2.5% of officers, on 1 April 2006 the figure was 2.4%.[101] By Service, the figures for the Royal Navy and Army remained steady; for the RAF, representation fell.[102]

73. When we asked the MoD why the Services had failed to reach this target for ethnic minority intake, Mr Jeffrey replied that:

It's not for the want of trying. We need to think quite hard about how we impact on that part of the population…whether it is to do with perceptions about the Armed Forces being a good organisation to join I do not know.[103]

Mr Jeffrey insisted that the Service Chiefs were personally committed to achieving increased black and ethnic minority representation in the Services.

74. We are very disappointed by the MoD's poor performance against its diversity targets. The UK Armed Services should reflect the people it serves and despite years of good intentions, the MoD has failed to achieve this. In addition the MoD seems to have little grasp of the reasons behind its failure to recruit black and ethnic minorities in sufficient numbers. We look to the MoD to give the issue of black and ethnic minority recruitment greater priority and recommend that it conduct research into why the Royal Navy and RAF in particular are failing to recruit sufficient numbers of ethnic minorities. We also recommend that the MoD learns from the experience of other organisations such as the Police who have increased their intake of ethnic minority personnel over recent years.

75. The Annual Report states that women comprise over 9% of UK Regular Forces and over 9.5% of the total intake.[104] It does not provide a breakdown of these figures by Service or by rank. We asked the MoD for information on the number of senior officers who were women. The table below shows the numbers of female senior officers as at 1 April 2006:
Rank (includes RN and RAF equivalents) 2005
2006
Female % Female Female % Female
Major General and above (2* and above) 00 30.6
Brigadier (1*) 41.1
Colonel 393.2 413.4
Lieutenant Colonel 1704.1 1804.5

Source: Ministry of Defence

76. When the Secretary of State for Defence gave evidence to us on 11 July 2006, he told us:

The evidence suggests that women are progressing through the officer ranks in greater number than before and that there has been a notable increase in the proportion of women at officer rank below one star.[105]

77. Recent increases in the number of women entering the Services are welcome, and we accept that it will take time for this to impact on the number of women in senior ranks. The MoD should monitor the situation closely to ensure that there are no barriers to the career progression of able Servicewomen. We recommend that in future the MoD include in the Annual Report a table giving statistics for women in the Armed Forces by Service and by rank.

78. During 2005-06, the MoD undertook a survey designed to reveal the nature and extent of sexual harassment in the Services. The survey found that 99% of Service women who responded had been in situations where sexualised behaviours (jokes, stories, language and material) had taken place in the previous year. 15% reported having had a 'particularly upsetting experience' and 67% reported having had such behaviours directed at them personally.[106] The MoD recognises that it has a serious problem with sexual harassment and on 26 May 2006, it agreed an Action Plan with the Equal Opportunities Commission to "prevent and deal with sexual harassment in the Armed Forces".[107]

79. We note the alarming levels of recorded sexual harassment experienced by women in the Services. We also note the MoD's determination to address the problem. We look to the MoD to make significant progress in reducing the incidents of sexual harassment in the Armed Forces and intend to monitor this issue closely.

80. The proportion of women and black and ethnic minority senior civil servants in the MoD increased in 2005-06.[108] The number of disabled people who were senior civil servants declined slightly. At all other levels of the MoD civil service the proportion of women, disabled people and black and ethnic minorities increased. The targets for civil servants were missed in all three categories at all levels of the civil service (apart from women at B1 grade).[109]

81. Mr Jeffrey noted that because the MoD was reducing its number of employees, increasing the diversity of its staff was "not straightforward".[110] He also recognised that the MoD had been traditionally a white male organisation but pointed out that as of July 2006, 46% of fast-stream intake were women and 11.4% were black and ethnic minority.[111]

82. We are disappointed that the MoD continues to miss its diversity targets in relation to civilian personnel.

Defence Procurement

83. PSA target 6 relates to the MoD's performance in delivering the equipment programme to time and cost, which was assessed as "On Course". The MoD met all three supporting Performance Indicators relating to this Target.[112] Table 3 in the Annual Report provides details of the Defence Procurement Agency's achievements against PSA target 6 and also against its five Key Targets which are set by Ministers. In 2005-06, the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) met, for the first time, all its Key Targets.[113]

84. We examine the performance of the DPA's performance against PSA target 6 and Key Targets in our Defence Procurement 2006 report. We also examine in that report the progress on a number of key defence programmes and four smaller-size equipment projects, and the merger of the DPA and the DLO which was announced in July 2006.[114] The future focus of the new Defence Equipment and Support Organisation will be on the through-life support of equipment and there is a case for the MoD's PSA targets reflecting this. However we recommend that the MoD continue to report separately on its performance on equipment procurement so that year-on-year performance can be monitored.

Value for Money

85. The MoD has two Targets relating to Value for Money and Efficiency: 2002 Spending Review Value for Money Target; and 2004 Spending Review Efficiency Target.

2002 SPENDING REVIEW VALUE FOR MONEY TARGET

86. The 2002 Spending Review Value for Money Target requires the MoD to achieve "year-on-year output efficiency gains of 2.5%...each year from 2002-03 to 2005-06, including through a 20% output efficiency gain in the DLO".[115] There are five supporting performance indicators relating to this target. One of these, relating to the cost of training, has been discontinued. The MoD's performance against this target is assessed as "to be determined". The MoD believes, that subject to confirmation and validation, the overall target has been met.[116]

87. In our report on the MoD's 2004-05 Annual Report and Accounts, we examined the MoD's claimed efficiency savings of £400 million relating to logistics and asked whether this figure had been validated.[117] MoD subsequently informed us that some of the operating costs savings could not be validated. The MoD reported that its validation concluded that "there was evidence to substantiate at least £280M of benefits" and that "while the reduction from the initial estimate was disappointing, it demonstrated the rigour of the process to ensure that our efficiency savings are fully supported by evidence". MoD has improved the guidance on what can be claimed as efficiency and how to measure it and expected to complete the validation of the 2002 Spending Review Value for Money Target by the autumn of 2006.[118] We are pleased to learn that the MoD has made improvements to its method of measuring claimed efficiency savings: it is important that reported savings are based upon robust data.

2004 SPENDING REVIEW EFFICIENCY TARGET

88. The 2004 Spending Review Efficiency Target requires the MoD to "realise annual efficiency gains of at least £2.8 billion by 2007-08, of which three quarters will be cash releasing". As part of the programme the MoD has, by 31 March 2008, to reduce its civilian staff by at least 1,000; reduce the number of military posts in administrative and support functions by at least 5,000; and be on course to have relocated 3,900 posts out of London and the South East by 2010. By 31 March 2006, the MoD reported that between £1.323 billion and £1.398 billion of efficiencies had been delivered. The efficiencies achieved by 31 March 2006 were provisional and subject to final validation. The MoD's performance against this target was assessed as "On Course".[119]

89. The MoD provided us with the results of the validation of the efficiency savings relating to the 2004 Spending Review Efficiency Target. The validation showed that the £662 million achieved in the year related to the Defence Logistics Transformation Programme (DLTP), which was much higher than the £500 million to £575 million which had been expected. As a result, the overall level of efficiency achieved in the year was £1.485 billion, substantially higher than the £1.323 billion to £1.398 billion provisional figure in the published report. The MoD told us that the validation had "shown that there has been a substantial improvement in the level of evidenced benefits but there was still room for further improvement in some areas".[120] We congratulate the MoD for exceeding the efficiency gains expected in 2005-06 relating to the 2004 Spending Review Efficiency Target. We look to the MoD to continue to improve the way efficiency savings are measured, evidenced and validated to ensure that reported efficiency savings are accurate and complete.

90. In our Defence Procurement 2006 inquiry we examined the merger of the DPA and the DLO which was announced in July 2006. The merger will result in substantial job losses. The collocation of the DPA and the DLO is expected to release some £200 million over a 25 year period. The future planned efficiency gains for procurement and logistics do not take account of the merger of the DPA and the DLO. The merger is expected to deliver more effective and efficient working, but the MoD considers that it is too early to predict the efficiency gains.[121] The MoD subsequently told us that the overall efficiency target of £2.8 billion will not change as a result of the merger of the DPA and the DLO. Any efficiency gains from the merger achieved in 2007-08 "would be held as contingency against the 2004 Spending Review target. We expect any efficiencies achieved from 2008-09 onwards would score against new targets for the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review".[122] We would expect the merger of the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation to result in efficiency gains. We look to the MoD to announce the likely scale of these efficiency gains and monitor whether they are delivered.

Agencies

Agency status

91. During 2004-05, the MoD had 20 Defence Agencies, and five Trading Funds which in this year's Report are listed as a class apart. These are listed in the table below:
Defence Agencies
Armed Forces Personnel Administration Agency

Army Training and Recruiting Agency

British Forces Post Office

Defence Analytical Services Agency

Defence Bills Agency

Defence Communications Services Agency

Defence Estates

Defence Medical Education and Training Agency

Defence Procurement Agency

Defence Storage and Distribution Agency

Defence Transport and Movements Agency

Defence Vetting Agency

Disposal Services Agency

Duke of York's Royal Military School

MoD Police and Guarding Agency

Naval Recruiting and Training Agency

Pay and Personnel Agency

Service Children's Education

RAF Training Group Defence Agency

Veterans Agency

Trading Funds
ABRO (Army Base Repair Organisation)

Defence Aviation Repair Agency (DARA)

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL)

Met Office

UK Hydrographic Office

92. In our report on the MoD's Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, we noted a reduction in the number of defence agencies and concluded that:

In principle, we support MoD's policy of rationalising the number of Defence Agencies, particularly those very small agencies where the costs of retaining agency status can be high. However, for some agencies there may be a strong case for retaining agency status and we expect MoD to review each agency on a case by case basis.[123]

The Government's response stated:

We keep our organisational structure under review to ensure that it remains efficient and effective. We have reduced the number of agencies in the Department in recent years as we have rationalised and improved Departmental processes. There is no specific policy to remove agency status across the board and each case is examined on its merits, with the burden of proof resting on demonstrating that the benefits which will result from the removal of agency status are greater than those of retaining it.[124]

93. The Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 state that from 1 April 2006 agency status was removed from three Service Training Agencies (the Army Training and Recruiting Agency, the Naval Recruiting and Training Agency and the RAF Training Group Defence Agency). The Pay and Personnel Agency became part of a new People, Pay and Pensions Agency.[125] In July 2006, the MoD announced that the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation were to merge: it has been decided that the merged organisation (Defence Equipment and Support) will not have agency status.[126]

94. On 10 October 2006, the Chief of Defence Procurement told us why the MoD had decided not to give the new Defence Equipment and Support organisation agency status:

An agency, however hard it tries, tends to develop over time a rather inward-looking culture … over time you get a certain amount of benefit by agency status and you then have to decide on your evaluation whether or not you are going to take the next step into trading fund status, whether or not you are going to remain as an agency, or whether or not, frankly, agency status is beginning to be counter-productive.

He argued that:

A top-level budget arrangement, which is what the new organisation will be, is now capable of being given the same precision in terms of objectives that any agency would get, the same budgetary disciplines, and to a large extent the same delegated powers to deal with its personnel management issues.[127]

95. The PUS told us that it was quite likely that more defence agencies would lose their agency status.[128] He pointed out that some of those whose agency status had been removed recently—the Queen Victoria School, for example[129]—had very small budgets.

96. We accept that the arguments for giving parts of the Ministry of Defence separate agency status are finely balanced, and we are not opposed to the removal of agency status from small agencies. But we have two concerns. First, it would worry us if the trend against agencies was a symptom of a wider centralist tendency in the MoD, denying managers the freedom to manage effectively. Secondly, we are concerned that it may lead to a loss of transparency, if the ex-Agencies no longer produce separate annual reports and accounts.

97. The PUS assured us that it was no part of the MoD's purpose to reduce parliamentary scrutiny. In the case of the Defence Equipment and Support organisation, the MoD had not decided whether it would continue to produce a free-standing annual report, but he accepted the need for "a full and informative account of the business and activities" of the organisation as a basis for scrutiny.[130] We address the reporting of the DE&S organisation in our report on Defence Procurement 2006.[131] More generally, we recommend that ex-Agencies continue to publish an account of their annual activities. The MoD must ensure that the apparent trend against agency status does not lead to a loss of information and accountability.

AGENCY PERFORMANCE

98. In our report on the Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, we recommended that the MoD change the way in which the performance of Defence Agencies was reported in the Annual Report and Accounts, so that it was easier to assess whether their performance was improving.[132] The Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06 contains tables—separately for Agencies and for Trading Funds[133]—which helpfully show the overall performance for the three years since 2003-04 and the change in performance for comparable targets between 2005-06 and the previous year. The report also includes a short report of the year's activities of each of the Agencies and Trading Funds.[134] We commend the Department for the improved presentation of agency performance data in the Annual Report.

99. The tables in the Annual Report and Accounts show that there continues to be wide variety in the number of targets set for agencies (from 34 for Service Children's Education to 4 for the Army Training and Recruiting Agency) and in their performance (from 100% of targets achieved by the British Forces Post Office, the Defence Bills Agency, the Defence Communications Services Agency, the Defence Procurement Agency, the Defence Storage and Distribution Agency, the Pay and Personnel Agency, the Veterans Agency and the Met Office to only 25% achieved by the Army Training and Recruiting Agency).[135] While the appropriate number of targets may vary according to the nature of an Agency's responsibilities, we look to the MoD to ensure greater consistency in the number of targets set for Agencies and the level of challenge which they present.

100. During the past year, we have examined in detail the performance of a number of agencies and trading funds: the Defence Procurement Agency;[136] the Defence Aviation Repair Agency;[137] the Met Office;[138] Service Children's Education.[139] We have also given consideration to the work of the Duke of York's Military School[140] and the UK Hydrographic Office.[141] We are currently inquiring into the work of DSTL. We intend to continue our programme of scrutiny of the work of Defence Agencies on a regular basis.


2   HC (2005-06) 1394, pp 12-23 Back

3   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 22 Back

4   Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan Back

5   HC (2005-06) 1394, pp 27-35 Back

6   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 20 Back

7   Ibid. Back

8   Qq 5-6 Back

9   Ev 18, para (c) Back

10   Q 2 Back

11   Q 6 Back

12   Ibid. Back

13   Ev 30, para (1) Back

14   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 14 Back

15   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 14 Back

16   Ibid. Back

17   Ibid., Annex C, p 254 Back

18   Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2005-06, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004-05, HC 522. Back

19   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 15 Back

20   Ibid., paras 32, 39 Back

21   Ibid., p 15 Back

22   Ev 18, para (3) Back

23   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 16 Back

24   Ibid., Figure 5, p 40 Back

25   Ev 18, para (3) Back

26   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 40, p 41 Back

27   Ev 19, para (c) Back

28   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 41, p 40; Ev 19, para (d) Back

29   Ev 21, para (d) Back

30   Defence Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2005-06, UK Operations in Iraq, HC 1241, paras 64-68 Back

31   HC Deb, 26 July 2006, col 74WS Back

32   Q 10  Back

33   Ev 34, para (10) Back

34   HC (2005-06) 1241, paras 69-75 Back

35   Qq 12-15 Back

36   Q 13 Back

37   Ev 20 Back

38   Ev 31, para (2) Back

39   Ibid. Back

40   Ibid. Back

41   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 17 Back

42   Ibid., p 18 Back

43   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 18 Back

44   Ibid. Back

45   National Audit Office, Recruitment and Retention in the Armed Forces, HC 1633-i, Nov 2006, para 1.8 Back

46   Ministry of Defence, Delivering Security in a Changing World, Future Capabilities, Cm 6269, July 2004 Back

47   Ev 20, para (4) (a)  Back

48   Small scale operation: 500-1,000 personnel. Medium scale operation: 3,5000-5,000 personnel and large-scale operation: 10,000-20,000 personnel.  Back

49   Ev 18, para (b) Back

50   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 281, p 139 Back

51   Ibid. Back

52   Ibid. Back

53   HC (2005-06) 1633-i, p 31 Back

54   Oral evidence taken before the Committee Of Public Accounts on 15 November 2006, HC (2006-07)43-i, Q 12 [Mr Jeffrey]. Back

55   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 282, p 140 Back

56   Ibid. Back

57   Ibid. Back

58   HC (2005-06) 1633-i, paras 2.1-2.24 Back

59   Ibid., p 21 Back

60   HC (2005-06) 1633-i, para 2.25 Back

61   HC (2005-06) 1633-i, para 2.28 Back

62   HC Deb, 10 October 2006, col 175  Back

63   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 279, p 138  Back

64   Ibid., para 279 Back

65   Ibid. Back

66   Ibid. Back

67   Ev 28-30 Back

68   Ibid. Back

69   HC (2005-06) 1633-i, para 1.14 Back

70   Defence Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2004-05, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, HC 822, para 18  Back

71   Defence Committee, Seventh Special Report of Session 2005-06, Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2005-06, HC 1293, para 6  Back

72   HC Deb, 9 October 2006, col 190W  Back

73   Q 67 Back

74   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 20 Back

75   Ibid. Back

76   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 182, p 99 Back

77   HC (2005-06) 1633-i, para 5 Back

78   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 180, p 99 Back

79   Ibid., Preface, p 7 Back

80   Ibid., para 44, p 42 Back

81   Q 55 Back

82   British Army Training Unit Suffield Back

83   Qq 53-54 Back

84   Ev 31, para (2) Back

85   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 26 Back

86   Ev 18, para (a) Back

87   Ibid., para (b) Back

88   HC (2005-06) 1241, para 79 Back

89   Oral evidence taken before the Defence Committee on 11 July, HC (2005-06) 1458, Q 25 Back

90   Daily Mail, Sir Richard Dannatt: A very honest General, 10 October 2006 Back

91   Service personnel making personal sacrifices while serving their country in return for being treated commensurately by the Government for this sacrifice.  Back

92   Q 28 Back

93   Q 41 Back

94   Q 41 Back

95   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 292, p 144 Back

96   Ibid. Back

97   Defence Committee, First Report of Session 2006-07, Defence Procurement 2006, HC 56  Back

98   HC (2005-06) 822, para 25 Back

99   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 283, p 141 Back

100   Ev 36 Back

101   HC (2005-06) 1633, Appendix 6, p 55 Back

102   Ibid. Back

103   Q 70 Back

104   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 286, p 142 Back

105   HC (2005-06) 1458-i, Q 84 Back

106   HC (2005-06) 1394, para 286, p 142 Back

107   Ibid.  Back

108   HC (2005-06) 1394, Table 26, p 145 Back

109   Ibid. Back

110   Q 72 Back

111   Ibid. Back

112   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 21 Back

113   Ibid., p 79 (Table 3) and para 137 Back

114   HC (2006-07) 56 Back

115   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 22 Back

116   Ibid. Back

117   HC (2005-06) 822, paras 41-43 Back

118   HC (2005-06) 1394 paras 231-232 Back

119   Ibid., p 23 Back

120   Ev 35, para (13) Back

121   HC (2006-07) 56, paras 30-33  Back

122   Ev 35, para (13) Back

123   HC (2005-06) 822, para 56 Back

124   HC (2005-06) 1293, para 32 Back

125   HC (2005-06) 1394, p 260 Back

126   HC Deb, 3 July, col 27 WS Back

127   HC (2006-07) HC 56, Q 130 Back

128   Q 109 Back

129   The Queen Victoria School lost agency status on 1 April 2005 Back

130   Qq 111-112 Back

131   HC (2006-07) 56, para 64 Back

132   HC (2006-07) 56, para 64 Back

133   HC (2005-06) 1394, pp 260, 259 and 263 Back

134   Ibid., pp 260-265 Back

135   Ibid., p 259 and 263 Back

136   HC (2006-07) 56 Back

137   Defence Committee, Third Report of Session 2005-06, Delivering Front Line Capability to the RAF, HC 557 Back

138   Defence Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2005-06, The work of the Met Office, HC 823 Back

139   Defence Committee, Eleventh Report of Session 2005-06, Educating Service Children, HC 1054 Back

140   Ibid. Back

141   HC (2005-06) 82 Back


 
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Prepared 13 December 2006