Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
MR BILL
JEFFREY CB AND
MR TREVOR
WOOLLEY
24 OCTOBER 2006
Q20 Chairman: Was he saying it to
us but not to you?
Mr Jeffrey: I am giving you the
picture as I understand it to be now, which is some months later
than your visit.
Q21 Mr Hamilton: To a layman like
myself who has a steep learning curve in relation to what happens
in the Armed Forces, I would have thought that, although activities
have started to increase somewhat, preparedness is something that
has been considered over the past few years. Surely, the relatively
quiet period in Afghanistan for about four years would have allowed
us to prepare for what we knew would come at some point or other.
I find it disquieting to sit here and listen to one report in
the press from officers on the ground and hearing from them when
we meet them in Afghanistan. They are telling us privately that
they are rather concerned about what is happening in the air.
We went to one area and found that they were taking parts from
one aircraft to maintain another. As someone who used to work
for the National Coal Board, a big nationalised industry, I know
that that was exactly why people scavenged from one place to assist
another in order to save money, but potentially it did not cost
lives and it was not at the front line, as at the present time.
Taking away all the comments in the papers, anyone looking at
it in a balanced way would find it very disconcerting. How do
you overcome that? You have had five years to get to a position
where you should now have a slick operation.
Mr Jeffrey: There are aspects
which logistics support in particular have improved over that
period. I know that this Committee's predecessor devoted a lot
of time to that. The supply of logistic materiel into theatre
in all the reports that I see is very much improved from several
years ago. As to readiness, I acknowledged earlier that the levels
as assessed in our annual report on the measure of our ability
to generate force elements from peacetime to immediate readiness,
for example, have been declining. That is a consequence of deployment
to the extent we experience at the moment. I do not disguise the
fact that our state of readiness for the future is less good than
it has been.
Q22 Mr Borrow: For several years
one of my big concerns as far as concerns the MoD is the tendency
in the military culture to tell the officer above what you think
he wants to hear. When the Secretary of State and Prime Minister
have to make key decisions to send troops to Afghanistan and/or
Iraq and take part in international operations there they need
to do it on the basis of honest and complete advice as to what
the real situation is. For years my concern has been that as it
goes up the Chain of Command everybody says that it is a little
better than it actually is. The Ministers who have to make these
key decisions do so in an optimistic scenario rather than a realistic
one. The past few months have confirmed my worst fears that Ministers
are not being given honest and true information as to what things
are like on the ground. Do you think I am wrong in making that
assumption?
Mr Jeffrey: I certainly believe
it is very important—a lifetime of government service in
a different part of the forest has made me feel very strongly—that
Ministers should take decisions based on an entirely cool and
realistic assessment of the implications of those decisions. I
have spent 12 months in the MoD and have got to know the military
culture better during that period, particularly that of the very
senior military officers whom I respect greatly. I do not believe
that they are doing other than giving Ministers their best assessment
of the position as they see it. That is not to say that that position
may not subsequently change. Life is like that. But I do believe
that people are giving their honest assessment of the position
and the prospects. It is the prospects which are sometimes the
difficult bit to get right.
Q23 Mr Jones: You say that logistics
have improved, but I argue that part of logistics involves getting
people from A to B. Clearly, what has been described—I have
seen it first hand—is not satisfactory. Further, are you
aware that if you are to mess people around in terms of long flights,
delays etc it will have an impact on their quality of life, not
only in terms of their return to families in the UK and so on
but the way they view the Armed Services? It has always bugged
me that if ordinary soldiers have to put up with these conditions
clearly senior officers do not. I understand that we have an executive
jet on standby all the time in the Middle East which is at the
disposal of senior officers. What is that costing the MoD? Could
we divert some of that money into the provision of decent flights
for people who want to get out?
Mr Jeffrey: I do not know the
answer to the direct question, but we can certainly try to provide
it. I do not question for a moment that when things do go wrong
and there is a shortcoming of service of the kind to which Mr
Lancaster referred, or there is delay, the impact on our returning
troops is serious. Obviously, it goes beyond the inconvenience
of being delayed; it impacts on their view of the organisation
and their general wellbeing.
Q24 Chairman: Will you write to us
about that?
Mr Jeffrey: We will.[2]
Mr Jones: Can you please supply us with
the costs and tell us who uses these jets?
Q25 Willie Rennie: When we were in
Afghanistan I got the distinct impression that the commanders
there would ask only for what they thought they could get and
adapted their operations to fit that. Therefore, at the end of
the day they would not ask for something that would never be delivered.
That chimes with your remark that commanders on the ground always
want more. Do you think there is a curtailing of requests in that
regard?
Mr Jeffrey: What I said was not
that commanders always wanted more but they could undoubtedly
always use more. I cannot say whether there is a tendency to,
as it were, self-censor. Certainly, Ministers would look to commanders
on the ground to give a clear assessment of what they needed to
do the job.
Q26 Mr Jones: If I may turn now to
PSA target 5, which is the recruitment, training, motivation and
retention of sufficient military personnel, in the Committee's
report on the UK operations in Iraq the MoD said it was confident
that our Armed Forces were not overstretched, but there is a clear
perception, whether it be in Parliament or the media, that our
Armed Forces are overstretched. Do you still believe that they
are stretched, or are they now overstretched?
Mr Jeffrey: One can play with
words.
Q27 Mr Jones: No, you are going to
tell us how it is.
Mr Jeffrey: The assessment is
that our Armed Forces are stretched but not overstretched. As
I said earlier, it is certainly the case that at the moment the
operations particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan are of such scale
and intensity as to exceed the planning assumptions on which we
are currently operating.
Q28 Mr Jones: Given the new openness
of the MoD in explaining things as they are, what is your definition
of "stretched" as opposed to "overstretched"?
Mr Jeffrey: The word "overstretched"
implies that what we are doing now is not sustainable. We do not
believe that to be the case, but we do not question the fact that
the Armed Forces in terms of size of deployment and in particular
the percentage of the Army that is deployed either on operations
or other military tasks is running at about 25%. If one takes
the other Services into account, it is somewhat less than 20%.
These are historically high figures. That is why we use the word
"stretched", but that is not to say it is unsustainable.
Q29 Mr Jones: How close are we to
overstretch?
Mr Jeffrey: I think that is very
hard to say. As we get into next year there is every prospect
that we will see some easing of the position. We shall almost
certainly be drawing down in the Balkans to some extent; we shall
see the end of Operation Banner in Northern Ireland which will
make available another three battalions, as I understand it; and
we can see some draw-down, though it is now a matter of some speculation
depending on progress, in Iraq. Therefore, there is the prospect
as we get into next year that the position will become somewhat
less stretched than it is now.
Q30 Mr Jones: Personally, I am no
clearer given your definition of "stretched" and "overstretched".
Perhaps I may help you with one definition or measure that could
be used. Your memorandum says that the Harmony Guidelines were
exceeded by 15.1% in March 2006 and 14.5% in June 2006. Does this
reflect different parts of the Army in different ways? Can you
give some indication of which parts of the Army are under pressure?
Mr Jeffrey: The first point to
make is that the guidelines are just that; that is what we try
to meet rather than, as it were, strict regulations. Different
parts of the Services reflect different conditions.
Q31 Mr Jones: Of what use are they
if they are just guidelines?
Mr Jeffrey: They are what we are
trying to achieve.
Q32 Chairman: When did you last achieve
it?
Mr Jeffrey: I do not know the
answer to that question, but I can certainly find out.[3]
At the moment, the guideline for the Navy is that it should not
exceed 660 days deployed in 36 months. Our first quarter report
for 2006-07 shows that fewer than 1% of naval staff were exceeding
that figure. That was unchanged from the published report last
March. For the Army the guideline is 415 days in 30 months. Our
most recent figure was that 14.5% of Army personnel exceeded that
figure, which was unchanged since December last. For completeness,
the most recent report for the Air Force showed 3.9% exceeding
the guideline of 2.5% which, on the face of the figures, was slightly
better than the March figure. Within these totals for the Army
in particular undoubtedly there are some units which are—
Q33 Mr Jones: But of what use are they
if they are just guidelines? What would make you sit up at your
desk in the MoD when you reached a certain point in those guidelines?
Is there anything that would ring alarm bells with you?
Mr Jeffrey: Failure to observe
these guidelines in itself rings alarm bells and directs our attention
to the areas which are proving hardest to meet.
Q34 Mr Jones: But if you want a definition
of "stretched" and "overstretched" surely
these are a good guideline in that process, are they not?
Mr Jeffrey: Yes, they are.
Q35 Mr Jones: Therefore, what is
your definition under these guidelines of "overstretched"?
Mr Jeffrey: What they do is give
an indication of the fact that when our Armed Forces are deployed
in theatre—
Q36 Mr Jones: The question is quite
clear. We did not get a very clear answer when you were defining
"stretched" and "overstretched". Therefore,
you must have some measurement of it. Are these not the nearest
things to be able to measure "stretched" and "overstretched"?
What I am asking is: under these guidelines what is your definition
of "stretched" and "overstretched"?
Mr Jeffrey: I cannot answer the
question with the degree of precision that you imply. These are
a definite indication of how stretched the Armed Forces are at
any one time, but in the end we retain them in order to deploy
them when Ministers so decide.
Q37 Mr Jones: I appreciate that,
but when you are advising Ministers, for example, that you can
deploy in a certain area because there is the capacity to do it
you must have some measurement of that. I accept that perhaps
"stretched" and "overstretched" are superfluous
words and you have to be able to quantify it. Are these not the
mechanisms by which it can be quantified? What you are trying
to tell me is that they are not; they are just guidelines. Surely,
you must be able to get to a point where you can say that a guideline
has been breached to the extent of x and that means we
are stretched or, in this case, overstretched; otherwise, the
guidelines are a complete waste of time, are they not?
Mr Jeffrey: They certainly draw
our attention not just to how many guidelines are not being observed
but the areas where there is the greatest problem. For example,
it is evident from the figures that we need more air crew.
Q38 Mr Jones: Obviously, I am not
getting very far, but what measures do you use to define whether
our Armed Forces in different areas are rather stretched or overstretched
if you do not use these guidelines?
Mr Jeffrey: I say that we do use
them.
Q39 Mr Jones: Tell me what would
be your definition in these guidelines of "stretched"
and "overstretched" so you can say to a Minister, "We
have got to the point here where we are overstretched and we cannot
undertake any more operations"?
Mr Woolley: I think the point
is that these measure degrees of stretch and are used to inform
Ministers when decisions are taken by them on the level of forces
to be deployed on operations.
2 See Ev 30, para 2. Back
3
See Ev 31. Back
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