Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)

MR BILL JEFFREY CB AND MR TREVOR WOOLLEY

24 OCTOBER 2006

  Q20  Chairman: Was he saying it to us but not to you?

  Mr Jeffrey: I am giving you the picture as I understand it to be now, which is some months later than your visit.

  Q21  Mr Hamilton: To a layman like myself who has a steep learning curve in relation to what happens in the Armed Forces, I would have thought that, although activities have started to increase somewhat, preparedness is something that has been considered over the past few years. Surely, the relatively quiet period in Afghanistan for about four years would have allowed us to prepare for what we knew would come at some point or other. I find it disquieting to sit here and listen to one report in the press from officers on the ground and hearing from them when we meet them in Afghanistan. They are telling us privately that they are rather concerned about what is happening in the air. We went to one area and found that they were taking parts from one aircraft to maintain another. As someone who used to work for the National Coal Board, a big nationalised industry, I know that that was exactly why people scavenged from one place to assist another in order to save money, but potentially it did not cost lives and it was not at the front line, as at the present time. Taking away all the comments in the papers, anyone looking at it in a balanced way would find it very disconcerting. How do you overcome that? You have had five years to get to a position where you should now have a slick operation.

  Mr Jeffrey: There are aspects which logistics support in particular have improved over that period. I know that this Committee's predecessor devoted a lot of time to that. The supply of logistic materiel into theatre in all the reports that I see is very much improved from several years ago. As to readiness, I acknowledged earlier that the levels as assessed in our annual report on the measure of our ability to generate force elements from peacetime to immediate readiness, for example, have been declining. That is a consequence of deployment to the extent we experience at the moment. I do not disguise the fact that our state of readiness for the future is less good than it has been.

  Q22  Mr Borrow: For several years one of my big concerns as far as concerns the MoD is the tendency in the military culture to tell the officer above what you think he wants to hear. When the Secretary of State and Prime Minister have to make key decisions to send troops to Afghanistan and/or Iraq and take part in international operations there they need to do it on the basis of honest and complete advice as to what the real situation is. For years my concern has been that as it goes up the Chain of Command everybody says that it is a little better than it actually is. The Ministers who have to make these key decisions do so in an optimistic scenario rather than a realistic one. The past few months have confirmed my worst fears that Ministers are not being given honest and true information as to what things are like on the ground. Do you think I am wrong in making that assumption?

  Mr Jeffrey: I certainly believe it is very important—a lifetime of government service in a different part of the forest has made me feel very strongly—that Ministers should take decisions based on an entirely cool and realistic assessment of the implications of those decisions. I have spent 12 months in the MoD and have got to know the military culture better during that period, particularly that of the very senior military officers whom I respect greatly. I do not believe that they are doing other than giving Ministers their best assessment of the position as they see it. That is not to say that that position may not subsequently change. Life is like that. But I do believe that people are giving their honest assessment of the position and the prospects. It is the prospects which are sometimes the difficult bit to get right.

  Q23  Mr Jones: You say that logistics have improved, but I argue that part of logistics involves getting people from A to B. Clearly, what has been described—I have seen it first hand—is not satisfactory. Further, are you aware that if you are to mess people around in terms of long flights, delays etc it will have an impact on their quality of life, not only in terms of their return to families in the UK and so on but the way they view the Armed Services? It has always bugged me that if ordinary soldiers have to put up with these conditions clearly senior officers do not. I understand that we have an executive jet on standby all the time in the Middle East which is at the disposal of senior officers. What is that costing the MoD? Could we divert some of that money into the provision of decent flights for people who want to get out?

  Mr Jeffrey: I do not know the answer to the direct question, but we can certainly try to provide it. I do not question for a moment that when things do go wrong and there is a shortcoming of service of the kind to which Mr Lancaster referred, or there is delay, the impact on our returning troops is serious. Obviously, it goes beyond the inconvenience of being delayed; it impacts on their view of the organisation and their general wellbeing.

  Q24  Chairman: Will you write to us about that?

  Mr Jeffrey: We will.[2]

  Mr Jones: Can you please supply us with the costs and tell us who uses these jets?

  Q25  Willie Rennie: When we were in Afghanistan I got the distinct impression that the commanders there would ask only for what they thought they could get and adapted their operations to fit that. Therefore, at the end of the day they would not ask for something that would never be delivered. That chimes with your remark that commanders on the ground always want more. Do you think there is a curtailing of requests in that regard?

  Mr Jeffrey: What I said was not that commanders always wanted more but they could undoubtedly always use more. I cannot say whether there is a tendency to, as it were, self-censor. Certainly, Ministers would look to commanders on the ground to give a clear assessment of what they needed to do the job.

  Q26  Mr Jones: If I may turn now to PSA target 5, which is the recruitment, training, motivation and retention of sufficient military personnel, in the Committee's report on the UK operations in Iraq the MoD said it was confident that our Armed Forces were not overstretched, but there is a clear perception, whether it be in Parliament or the media, that our Armed Forces are overstretched. Do you still believe that they are stretched, or are they now overstretched?

  Mr Jeffrey: One can play with words.

  Q27  Mr Jones: No, you are going to tell us how it is.

  Mr Jeffrey: The assessment is that our Armed Forces are stretched but not overstretched. As I said earlier, it is certainly the case that at the moment the operations particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan are of such scale and intensity as to exceed the planning assumptions on which we are currently operating.

  Q28  Mr Jones: Given the new openness of the MoD in explaining things as they are, what is your definition of "stretched" as opposed to "overstretched"?

  Mr Jeffrey: The word "overstretched" implies that what we are doing now is not sustainable. We do not believe that to be the case, but we do not question the fact that the Armed Forces in terms of size of deployment and in particular the percentage of the Army that is deployed either on operations or other military tasks is running at about 25%. If one takes the other Services into account, it is somewhat less than 20%. These are historically high figures. That is why we use the word "stretched", but that is not to say it is unsustainable.

  Q29  Mr Jones: How close are we to overstretch?

  Mr Jeffrey: I think that is very hard to say. As we get into next year there is every prospect that we will see some easing of the position. We shall almost certainly be drawing down in the Balkans to some extent; we shall see the end of Operation Banner in Northern Ireland which will make available another three battalions, as I understand it; and we can see some draw-down, though it is now a matter of some speculation depending on progress, in Iraq. Therefore, there is the prospect as we get into next year that the position will become somewhat less stretched than it is now.

  Q30  Mr Jones: Personally, I am no clearer given your definition of "stretched" and "overstretched". Perhaps I may help you with one definition or measure that could be used. Your memorandum says that the Harmony Guidelines were exceeded by 15.1% in March 2006 and 14.5% in June 2006. Does this reflect different parts of the Army in different ways? Can you give some indication of which parts of the Army are under pressure?

  Mr Jeffrey: The first point to make is that the guidelines are just that; that is what we try to meet rather than, as it were, strict regulations. Different parts of the Services reflect different conditions.

  Q31  Mr Jones: Of what use are they if they are just guidelines?

  Mr Jeffrey: They are what we are trying to achieve.

  Q32  Chairman: When did you last achieve it?

  Mr Jeffrey: I do not know the answer to that question, but I can certainly find out.[3] At the moment, the guideline for the Navy is that it should not exceed 660 days deployed in 36 months. Our first quarter report for 2006-07 shows that fewer than 1% of naval staff were exceeding that figure. That was unchanged from the published report last March. For the Army the guideline is 415 days in 30 months. Our most recent figure was that 14.5% of Army personnel exceeded that figure, which was unchanged since December last. For completeness, the most recent report for the Air Force showed 3.9% exceeding the guideline of 2.5% which, on the face of the figures, was slightly better than the March figure. Within these totals for the Army in particular undoubtedly there are some units which are—

  Q33 Mr Jones: But of what use are they if they are just guidelines? What would make you sit up at your desk in the MoD when you reached a certain point in those guidelines? Is there anything that would ring alarm bells with you?

  Mr Jeffrey: Failure to observe these guidelines in itself rings alarm bells and directs our attention to the areas which are proving hardest to meet.

  Q34  Mr Jones: But if you want a definition of "stretched" and "overstretched" surely these are a good guideline in that process, are they not?

  Mr Jeffrey: Yes, they are.

  Q35  Mr Jones: Therefore, what is your definition under these guidelines of "overstretched"?

  Mr Jeffrey: What they do is give an indication of the fact that when our Armed Forces are deployed in theatre—

  Q36  Mr Jones: The question is quite clear. We did not get a very clear answer when you were defining "stretched" and "overstretched". Therefore, you must have some measurement of it. Are these not the nearest things to be able to measure "stretched" and "overstretched"? What I am asking is: under these guidelines what is your definition of "stretched" and "overstretched"?

  Mr Jeffrey: I cannot answer the question with the degree of precision that you imply. These are a definite indication of how stretched the Armed Forces are at any one time, but in the end we retain them in order to deploy them when Ministers so decide.

  Q37  Mr Jones: I appreciate that, but when you are advising Ministers, for example, that you can deploy in a certain area because there is the capacity to do it you must have some measurement of that. I accept that perhaps "stretched" and "overstretched" are superfluous words and you have to be able to quantify it. Are these not the mechanisms by which it can be quantified? What you are trying to tell me is that they are not; they are just guidelines. Surely, you must be able to get to a point where you can say that a guideline has been breached to the extent of x and that means we are stretched or, in this case, overstretched; otherwise, the guidelines are a complete waste of time, are they not?

  Mr Jeffrey: They certainly draw our attention not just to how many guidelines are not being observed but the areas where there is the greatest problem. For example, it is evident from the figures that we need more air crew.

  Q38  Mr Jones: Obviously, I am not getting very far, but what measures do you use to define whether our Armed Forces in different areas are rather stretched or overstretched if you do not use these guidelines?

  Mr Jeffrey: I say that we do use them.

  Q39  Mr Jones: Tell me what would be your definition in these guidelines of "stretched" and "overstretched" so you can say to a Minister, "We have got to the point here where we are overstretched and we cannot undertake any more operations"?

  Mr Woolley: I think the point is that these measure degrees of stretch and are used to inform Ministers when decisions are taken by them on the level of forces to be deployed on operations.


2   See Ev 30, para 2. Back

3   See Ev 31. Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2006
Prepared 13 December 2006