Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
MR BILL
JEFFREY CB AND
MR TREVOR
WOOLLEY
24 OCTOBER 2006
Q40 Mr Jones: We are getting to "degrees
of stretch". Can you answer my question? What level do you
reach in terms of the Harmony Guidelines when you say that the
Armed Forces are stretched or overstretched?
Mr Woolley: I think the point
is that it is a question of the level you reach where you take
a different decision about the level of commitment that you are
prepared to undertake.
Q41 Mr Jones: What is your definition
of "stretched"?
Mr Woolley: These measure degrees
of stretch. I am not sure that making a simple distinction between
"stretched" and "overstretched" is helpful.
Mr Jeffrey: To take an extreme
example, the measures for the intervals between deployments give
a sense of how stretched the Armed Forces are. If there was now
a proposal for us to engage in a further major deployment I am
fairly certain that Ministers would decide that they would not
be able to do so, and they would do that by reference to the fact
that on these measures the Armed Forces are already fully stretched.
Q42 Mr Crausby: Is it not overstretched
to the point where we are about to be defeated? In those circumstances,
is it not unlikely that anybody would ever admit to overstretch
without resigning? Therefore, is there not an incentive never
to admit to overstretch but just to refer to it in terms of "stretched"
and "more stretched"?
Mr Jeffrey: I do not think it
is about incentives. I come back to what I said earlier. These
are important pieces of management information about the deployment
of the Armed Forces and the extent to which its present heavy
deployment reduces intervals that we would like to see between
the deployment of individuals and units. They enable Ministers
to make judgments about, for example, whether to deploy any more.
Q43 Mr Jones: They cannot. You cannot
give me the definition of "stretched". My fear is that,
as Mr Borrow said, there is a "can do" culture up the
ranks until it gets to your desk. People never want to say to
Ministers that they cannot deliver something. Clearly, General
Dannatt had an opinion on this in the past few weeks. It would
be interesting to ask him for his definition of "overstretched"
and how he came to that conclusion. Clearly, from what he says
he has some clear views as have others we have met lower down
the Chain of Command.
Mr Jeffrey: I do not think General
Dannatt was saying that the Army was overstretched.
Q44 Mr Holloway: To pursue the points
raised by Mr Jones and Mr Borrow about senior commanders, do you
believe there is a problem with what has been described as "short-tourism"
where someone goes, say, to Iraq for six months and spends the
first two months learning about what is going on, the middle two
months dealing with it and the last two months getting their story
right for his report to PJHQ? Therefore, there is one graph for
Iraq overall which is descending into chaos and insecurity and
another graph every six months where people say how wonderfully
they and their troops have done. Is there not a problem there
in terms of misreporting? There is a specific example, which we
will not go into in this forum, where that has happened.
Mr Jeffrey: I do not recognise
that general picture you describe. It is certainly the case that
very senior officers are deployed for the sorts of periods you
mention. I have talked to commanders in the field who would say
there is some advantage in turning over as regularly as that because
it brings a fresh pair of eyes to the situation. It is also the
case that these are assignments that are as testing for commanding
officers as for troops on the ground and one would not want them
to be too protracted.
Q45 John Smith: As I understand it,
it is not just a question of increasing numbers of our troops
being deployed more regularly; it is also a question of a higher
proportion of them experiencing what I believe to be unprecedented
front line battle conditions. Is any assessment being made of
the impact of that front line battle experience of our troops
on their morale and effectiveness?
Mr Jeffrey: It is. The Armed Forces
look very carefully after the event at experience of deployments
of this kind and would certainly address issues of the kind you
identify.
Q46 Mr Jones: In terms of the impact
which breach of the Harmony Guidelines has on our Armed Forces,
particularly in relation to retention we have heard first hand
that the more people are deployed on a regular basis the greater
the pressure on them at home, etc. Have you looked at, or measured
the effect of, breaches of these guidelines and continued operations
on retention?
Mr Jeffrey: We are not complacent
about it at all for the very reason you give, that people at home
are often a very important and strong influence. As a matter of
fact, our voluntary outflow rates from all three Services have
not changed much over the past few years. There is a very slight
increase over the past year of .3% for officers and .2% for other
ranks. While we are not complacent about it, it suggests that
some of the media reporting to the effect that people would be
leaving in droves, for example, is not borne out by the facts.
Q47 Willie Rennie: We have talked
in general about the Harmony Guidelines, but there seem to be
two: the unit guidelines and the individual ones. Have you been
referring to the individual or unit guidelines, or is it a combination
of both?
Mr Jeffrey: I have been referring
to the individual guidelines. I remarked upon them a little earlier,
but you are quite right to say that we address this by unit. As
you would expect, there are some significant variations depending
on the function of the unit.
Q48 Willie Rennie: Do you have figures
for that?
Mr Jeffrey: They are in the annual
report, and I can certainly try to pull them out.
Q49 Chairman: Could you please write
to us and set out the Harmony Guidelines and the extent to which,
broken down by branch, for example the infantry, they are being
exceeded? Can you also write to us to show how that compares with
the Defence Planning Assumptions—you have said that people
are being deployed more heavily than the defence planning assumptions—and
when those assumptions were last complied with?
Mr Jeffrey: I will certainly do
so.[4]
Q50 Mr Jenkins: In addition, could you
say what is needed to bring it back within the guidelines and
what the cost would be?
Mr Jeffrey: Obviously, Mr Jenkins'
point depends on deployment at the time, but we shall certainly
try to address it.
Mr Jenkins: You now have an historical
base on which to work for the past year or two. You know where
the pinch points are and the Harmony Guidelines are being breached.
What procedure do you have to adopt to overcome that situation?
It might require a bit more manpower and capital.
Q51 Willie Rennie: There are two
additional matters. Can you break it down by unit and the Harmony
Guidelines and also do it over time so we can track how it has
changed over the years?
Mr Jeffrey: We will certainly
do that.[5]
Q52 Mr Lancaster: I suppose that one
thing I have learnt this morning is that the principal difference
between stretch and overstretch is that one is a politically acceptable
term and one is not. Overstretch is causing other problems within
the British Army at the moment. You acknowledge that in your report
when you say that we are not carrying out the degree of collective
training that we would like to do. Can you give some specific
examples?
Mr Jeffrey: It is certainly the
case that a combination of forces being deployed—although
they are becoming more experienced at it they are not doing training—and
the fact that much training is directed towards preparing them
for deployment means there is less routine training going on than
would normally be the case. As I said earlier, my military colleagues
refer to that as the "seed corn" issue. Are we doing
enough to keep people as well prepared and well trained as we
would like them to be? I think the answer to that is that we are
doing less than we would wish as a consequence of the levels of
deployment at the moment. I am trying to think of examples.
Mr Woolley: We are not doing as
much training at British Army Training Unit Suffield (BATUS) as
we have done in previous years.
Q53 Mr Lancaster: That has now been
slashed to the bone. I understand that next year it is less than
50%.
Mr Woolley: It may be of that
order.
Q54 Mr Lancaster: It is of that order.
Mr Woolley: That is recognised.
Q55 Mr Lancaster: It is the same
for Kenya as I understand it. That is having a major impact on
our forces. There is now an impact on their post-tour leave; people
are not getting what they are entitled to, so I understand, and
the traditional building-up exercises like at BATUS and Kenya
are not happening at formation level. Therefore, we are not giving
them the collective training that is necessary before they go
back on operations. That will have a lasting impact, will it not,
on their ability to operate?
Mr Woolley: There is no cutback
in pre-operational tour training, but there is a reduction in
training for contingent operations. A decision has been made that
the priority in the current circumstances must be to focus on
current operations and, therefore, the training that is taking
place is focused very much on those units that are about to deploy
on current operations. Because of the very high level of commitment
of the Army on operations it is not possible to utilise BATUS
fully in the way we would have liked to do in the past.
Q56 Mr Lancaster: You said there
had been no cutback on pre-deployment training. Is that also the
case for OPTAG which is the immediate pre-deployment training
that all people deploying on operational theatres undergo?
Mr Woolley: My understanding is
that there has been no reduction in that.
Q57 Mr Lancaster: Perhaps you would
check that.
Mr Woolley: We can certainly check
it, but that is my understanding.[6]
Q58 Mr Borrow: There has been quite a
lot in the media in the past few weeks about Servicemen and women
returning from Iraq and Afghanistan who are in need of medical
services allegedly not receiving proper care and not being treated
in the way in which the British people would expect them to be
treated. Would you like to comment on that?
Mr Jeffrey: The first point I
make is that we believe our medical personnel both at the front
line and in the UK to be of very high quality. We also believe
that the standards of clinical care both at the front line and
at the major facilities in this country, particularly Selly Oak
in Birmingham, are high. Certainly, one issue that has arisen
in recent weeks, which we have been very keen to address, is the
extent to which the facilities at Selly Oak are sufficiently responsive
to the need for members of the Armed Forces in these circumstances
to feel that they are being cared for in an environment which
is supportive in a military sense. We recognise that we need to
provide a more military environment at Selly Oak. There is already
a significant military staff presence, but we have recently increased
it. There is at the moment a process taking place for the establishment
of a military-managed ward which will be done very closely with
the NHS. We believe that that is the best way to tackle it. If
we try to go back to the days when there were separate military
hospitals not as closely in touch with leading edge thinking in
the NHS as they are now we will lose out. What we are keen to
do is get the best of both worlds by having services that are
fully integrated with the best of the NHS but provide a more military
environment for those who need to make use of them.
Q59 Mr Borrow: Are you saying that
there is legitimate criticism in the sense that if there was a
dedicated ward at Selly Oak for military personnel run in a military
way it would make Servicemen and women returning feel more comfortable
and in a better environment, but in terms of clinical care you
do not believe there is any legitimate criticism to be made?
Mr Jeffrey: We believe that the
clinical care is of the highest standard. It is also the case
that I do not think we can ever hold out the prospect of returning
Servicemen and women being in wards where everyone else is military,
not least because sometimes the nature of the treatment that they
require, for example a specialist burns or brain damage unit,
is best provided in a specialist ward. But what we are trying
to achieve in the main facility at Selly Oak is a more military
environment and a greater degree of military management, and we
are doing so in very close co-operation with the local health
service trust.
4 See Ev 31. Back
5
See Ev 31. Back
6
See Ev 32, para 5. Back
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