Memorandum from Greenpeace UK
Greenpeace's submission looks at the Government's
investment programme at AWE Aldermaston. In Annex C of its November
Memorandum to the Defence Select Committee, the Ministry of Defence
wrote about the investments that the Government is now making
in AWE that:
"The additional investment at AWE is required
to sustain the existing warhead stockpile in-service irrespective
of decisions on any successor warhead."
And then Defence Secretary John Reid told Parliament
on 19 July 2005 that:
"The purpose of investing some £350
million over the next three years is to ensure that we can maintain
the existing Trident warhead stockpile throughout its intended
in-service life."
In our evidence to the Committee (attached)
we give reasons for doubting that this is in fact the case:
The quantum leap in the capacity
of technology now being put in place at Aldermaston, and the hiring
of a new generation of scientists, engineers and technicians,
does not make sense if the purpose is to maintain the safety and
reliability of the existing warheads;
There is considerable a tension between
statements by AWE itself that the purpose of this investment program
is both to maintain the safety and reliability of existing warheads
and to develop its capacity to build a new nuclear weapon with
out testing, AWE statements that most of the scientific effort
at AWE is focused on problems associated with building a new nuclear
weapons, and the Government's emphasis that these investments
are for maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing
stockpile;
Leading US nuclear weapons scientists
argue that a science-based stockpile stewardship programme is
not what is needed to maintain the safety and reliability of existing
warheads. They argue that, to the contrary, this is best done
by engineering-based inspection and remanufacture. Most seriously,
they argue that if science-based stockpile stewardship leads to
alterations in warheads, or new warhead design, this will lead
to uncertainties about their functioning and this will create
political pressure for a return of nuclear testing. This is a
particularly serious concern at present as the USA has recently
carried out a test, named "Unicorn," to ready the Nevada
test site for a return of nuclear testing should that be ordered
by the President.
There is also the serious concern that the cost
of the facilities now being developed at AWE Aldermaston may turn
out to be far larger than currently anticipated. Take the Orion
Laser now being built. The precedent set by the US facility, the
National Ignition Facility is not reassuring. Its cost has escalated
from $1.2 billion to $4.5 billion and is still climbing.
This program of investment raises two linked
concerns.
Undermining Deliberative Democracy
and the Sovereignty of Parliament. The Government's investment
programme is undermining deliberative democracy and the sovereignty
of parliament. The proper procedure should be an open and informed
debate first, then a decision by parliament on whether to go ahead
with the investments necessary to make a bomb, and finally the
investments. Instead, the evidence strongly suggests that we have
an "Alice in Wonderland" situation of investments first,
official decision second, and public debate and parliamentary
vote last of all.
Undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These investments
directly threaten treaties that Britain has signed. Greenpeace
believes that if the UK and other nuclear weapon states continue
to flout the deal they made with the international community first
in 1968, when they signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), and again in 1996 when the 1996 when they signed the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty in part fulfilment of their NPT obligation to
negotiate disarmament, then the system of international cooperation
will fail.
The two issues are linked because Parliament's
ratification of the NPT and the CTBT made it a guardian of these
treaties and a duty to ensure that the UK does not undermine them.
In the light of the evidence set out in our submission to the
inquiry, Greenpeace strongly urges the Defence Select Committee
to conduct a thorough inquiry into the real purpose of the investments
now being undertaken at AWE Aldermaston.
In particular we would strongly urge the Committee
to use its powers of investigation to question nuclear weapons
scientists, engineers and technicians at AWE Aldermaston and that
it will also invite those leading US nuclear weapon scientists
who have questioned the need for science-based stockpile stewardship
to maintain the existing deterrent and raised very serious concerns
that science-based stockpile stewardship will lead to a return
of nuclear testing to give written and oral evidence to the committee.
As these are issues of some technical complexity
it would make sense for the Committee to secure independent counsel
with a knowledge of this area, two persons who might be able to
assist the Committee in this way in the UK are Professor Donald
MacKenzie at the Science Studies Unit, the University of Edinburgh
(widely regarded as one of the top international experts on the
sociology of science and technology and who conducted in-depth
studies of nuclear weapons expertise in the US), and Dr Graham
Spinardi also at the Science Studies Unit (whose particular expertise
is the Trident nuclear missile system).
There is much that needs to be cleared up here
and the Committee is in a unique position to gather and probe
the UK and US expert evidence needed to find out the truth.
THE GOVERNMENT'S
PROGRAM OF
INVESTMENT IN
AWE ALDERMASTON
1. The Government will spend more than £1
billion over the next three years on upgrading AWE Aldermaston
and Burghfield.[46]
The actual money for the upgrades, however, will almost certainly
be larger. Similar US projects have typically ended up being many
times their predicted costs. For instance the US National Ignition
Facility laser costs have escalated from $1.2 billion to $4.2
billion and is still climbing.[47]
2. The Government has stated that its current
program of investment in Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston
is "necessary" to maintain the safety and reliability
of the UK's existing nuclear warheads "irrespective"
of any decision to make a new nuclear weapon. AWE's statements
that a central purpose of the current investment program is to
ensure that that it can build a new nuclear weapon programme,
and the scientific and technical details of the facilities being
developed and scientists, engineers, and technicians being hired
make the this claim very hard to believe. When combined with statements
by independent US nuclear scientists and top US nuclear weapons
scientists that the kinds of facilities being developed at AWE
Aldermaston are not necessary at all to maintain the safety and
reliability of the nuclear deterrent, the Government's claim becomes
incredible.
3. Ten years after all five declared nuclear
weapon states signed the Compehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
the US nuclear weapons scientists raise a further issue. They
argue that any attempt to improve existing nuclear weapons, or
to make new ones, using the kind of exotic technologies being
developed at Aldermaston will, inevitably, lead to uncertainty
about the performance of nuclear warheads and this will create
political pressure for a return of nuclear testing. The fact that
the UK does not possess its own test site means that it could
not carry out such tests on its own. AWE's warhead development,
however, will be done in close cooperation with the giant American
nuclear weapons laboratoriesLos Alamos and Sandia in New
Mexico, and Lawrence Livermore in Californiaand there are
already serious concerns that their developments of new warheads
will lead to a return to nuclear testing.
4. The entry into force of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty is a major foreign policy goal of the UK. The
UK should not, therefore, cooperate in any US-UK warhead development
work which may lead to nuclear testing. The seriousness of this
issue is underscored by the fact that, with the Unicorn sub-critical
nuclear test, the US is bringing the Nevada test site into an
advanced state of readiness for a resumption of nuclear testing.
The upgrading of Aldermaston may also lead to a resumption of
nuclear testing by another route. The use of exotic technologies
to design and build a new nuclear weapon will lead other countries
to ask: "Why should we continue to respect the CTBT when
the UK is using exotic technologies, and its access to US expertise
and facilities to develop a new nuclear weapon without testing?"
THE UPGRADING
OF ALDERMASTON'S
CAPACITY TO
BUILD A
NEW NUCLEAR
WARHEAD
5. The quantum leap in AWE Aldermaston's
capacity to design and build a new nuclear weapon, and the hiring
of a new generation of scientists, engineers, and technicians
now underway strongly suggest that a major purpose of current
investments is a nuclear weapon development programme.
6. The Blue Oak and Larch Supercomputers:
Supercomputers are used by nuclear weapons laboratories to simulate
in great detail the detonation of a nuclear weapon and can be
used as a tool to improve nuclear weapon design. Aldermaston plans
to purchase two new supercomputersknown as Blue Oak and
Larch. They will improve its capacity to model nuclear weapons
explosions nine hundred times.[48]
The Blue Oak computer, with a power of just under three teraflops,[49]
was installed in 2002. Then in 2006 an order was placed for
Larch, a £20 million computer with a peak performance of
40 teraflops. If it were in service today, Larch would be the
most powerful computer in Europe.
7. The Core Punch Hydrodynamic Facility:
Hydrodynamic testing allows nuclear weapons laboratories to gather
test data previously only available from underground nuclear tests.
Specifically it is used to study the behaviour of plutonium and
other nuclear materials under the pressure of high explosives.
For example, it is used to examine how the primary stage of a
nuclear warhead implodes under the pressure of its detonating
high explosive. The term "hydrodynamic" is used because
under the high pressures produced in these experiments, solid
materials flow like liquids. AWE is planning to build a brand
new hydrodynamic testing facility, known as the Core Punch Facility.
This will have the capacity to make measurements an order of
magnitude more precise than the existing hydrodynamic facility.[50]
8. The Orion laser: AWE plan to
build a new laser called Orion that is 1,000 times more powerful
than its current "Helen" laser. Lasers are used
to simulate conditions found within a nuclear detonation on a
minute scale. They enable scientists to study the processes of
nuclear fusion and boosting, and construct predictive models for
nuclear explosions. Multiple laser beams are focused on targets
containing deuterium and tritium. These targets are heated and
compressed sufficiently for fusion to occur. The technical term
for this is "inertial confinement fusion". Data from
the Orion laser will supplement that received from the vast new
US laser, known as the National Ignition Facility (NIF). In 1999
the UK committed £29 million to NIF, for British tests on
the facility.
9. Sub-critical testing Sub-critical
tests are exactly the same as nuclear tests, except that when
the atomic bomb is detonated it has insufficient fissile material
in its core for a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction to build
up. Data from the tests are then fed into supercomputers to model
how a nuclear weapon would work. AWE Aldermaston and the US Los
Alamos National Laboratory undertook their first joint sub-critical
underground nuclear explosion, Vito, on 14 February 2002 at the
US Nevada nuclear test site. A second, Krakatau, was carried out
on 23 February 2006. The Ministry of Defence has insisted
that it is using these tests solely to test the safety and reliability
of the Trident warhead. However sub-critical tests are regarded
as extremely provocative, as the data can be used to model new
nuclear weapons designs. Indeed in March 2006 the Sunday Times
reported that results of the Krakatau sub-critical test will be
used to help both US and Aldermaston scientists to design a new
warhead.[51]
10. New laboratories for materials testing
It is proposed that new facilities will be built at Aldermaston,
and possibly also at Burghfield, for research into material science.
This research will look not only at how individual materials behave
but also at how components of a nuclear warhead may interact.
Additionally AWE plans to build a new explosives handling facility,
as well as a facility for uranium and tritium.
11. Hiring a New Generation of Scientists,
Engineers, and Technicians. As well as building these new
facilities, Aldermaston is also having a huge recruitment driveto
hire a new generation of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians.
During the period July 2005 to March 2006, Aldermaston recruited
90 scientists, 250 engineers, 57 technical support staff, and
98 business services staff. By contrast, it lost only 180 staff.
It now plans to recruit a further 700 staff by the end of March
2008, in roughly the same proportion.[52]
Of particular interest are plans to increase the number of scientists
with expertise in hydrodynamics testing from 70 to 95 over the
next three years. The only real use for hydrodynamic expertise,
according to Greg Mello, the Director of the Los Alamos Study
Group, is for designing a new nuclear weapon.
12. Increased US-UK nuclear weapons
cooperation. We are also seeing the kind of increased co-operation
between the UK and US that might be expected if a nuclear weapon
programme was underway. In 2004, the UK government prepared the
way for the scientific and technical co-operation with the US
necessary to develop a new nuclear weapon by renewing the Mutual
Defence Agreement. This agreement provides for technical co-operation
between the US and the UK on the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the government has authorised officials to begin
talks with the US and with defence companies about a successor
to Trident. In recent years there has also been a significant
increase in co-operation between Aldermaston and the giant US
nuclear weapons laboratories, including a rough doubling in the
number of meetings between Aldermaston scientists and their US
counterparts.[53]
Answers to Parliamentary Questions confirmed that UK and US nuclear
scientists are currently on 16 joint working groups,"nuclear
weapons engineering" and "nuclear weapon code development"
being prominent among them.[54]
The level of intimacy between the US and UK nuclear weapons laboratories
is also reflected by the fact that the Ministry of Defence has
appointed a top US nuclear weapons scientist, Don Cook, to manage
Aldermaston.
All about safety and reliability?
13. When questioned, the UK Government has
repeatedly claimed that investments in AWE are necessary irrespective
of any decision to develop a new nuclear warhead. For instance
on 19 July 2005 then Defence Secretary John Reid stated that:
"The purpose of this investment of some £350 million
over each of the next three years is to ensure that we can maintain
the existing Trident warhead stockpile throughout its intended
in-service life."[55]
Also in its November Memorandum to the Defence Select Committee
the Ministry of Defence stated that: "This additional investment
at AWE is required to sustain the existing warhead stockpile in-service
irrespective of any decision on any successor warhead."[56]
14. The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)
itself however takes a different view. In 2002 it stated that
"The capability to build a successor (to trident) will have
to be achieved without conducting nuclear tests. This poses
considerable scientific and technical challenges. We are therefore
developing a complex science-based program at AWE that will
require special facilities across a variety of disciplines."[57]
On the AWE website Dr Clive Marsh, AWE's Chief Scientist also
states: "Our research & development work splits into
two main but inter-related areas. The first is the requirement
to maintain the current Trident stockpile. The second is to develop
our overall warhead design and assurance capabilities, including
the ability to provide a new warhead lest our government should
ever need it as a successor to Trident. Most of our research
is conducted in this capability area."
15. Leading US nuclear weapons scientists,
who have been at the heart of US science policy and nuclear weapons
physics, also believe that such facilities are unnecessary simply
to maintain the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons.[58]
They include: Ray Kiddera Senior Nuclear Weapons Designer
at Lawrence Livermore and advisor to the Senate Armed Services
Committee; Norris Bradbury former Director of Los Alamos; Carson
Marksformer Head of Los Alamos Theoretical Division; Physicist
Jonathan I Katz, who was a member of the elite JASON group of
eminent scientists formed to give high-level science advice to
the US government; and Richard Garwinwho not only headed
research at IBM's Thomas J Watson Research Centre, but has also
been a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee and
the Defense Science Board.
16. These scientists have repeatedly argued
that the maintenance of existing US nuclear weapons stocks (weapons
which were the subject of repeat nuclear tests before a testing
moratorium was imposed in the US) is best done via engineering-based
inspection and re-manufacture.
17. In essence inspection and re-manufacture
involves detaching and checking each of the thousands of individual
parts that make up a nuclear weapon and its subsystems. If there
are any problems or signs of deterioration the part is simply
replaced by an identical part. Stocks of identical parts are created
through re-manufacturing parts according to their original specifications.
As long as the basic weapon design, particularly the plutonium
pit in the warhead itself, is not changed then this method will
continue to work.
18. This engineering approach (sometimes
referred to as curatorship) is the way that the US stockpile was
maintained during the Cold War. The small number of nuclear tests
that were done to check the safety and reliability of the stockpile
showed that the method worked. Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani
of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research conducted
an extensive survey of past flaws with US nuclear weapons. They
concluded that existing procedures for maintaining their safety
were entirely adequate and that science-based stockpile stewardship
was notas claimed by the weapons laboratory directorsneeded
for this purpose.[59]
19. Two reports commissioned by the US Department
of Energy from the JASON group, an elite body of US scientists
set up to give high-level advice to the government, reinforce
the point that unless nuclear weapons are modified or re-designed,
an engineering approach is adequate: "The primaryif
not the solenuclear weapons manufacturing capacity that
must be provided for in an era of no nuclear testing is the remanufacture
of copies of existing (tested) stockpile weapons . . . the ultimate
goal should be to retain the capability of remanufacturing SNM
[special nuclear materials] components that are as identical
as possible to those of the original manufacturing process and
not to "improve" those components. This is especially
important for [plutonium] pits."[60]
THE COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN
TREATY
20. These developments will increase pressure
for a return to nuclear testingthereby undermining UK efforts
to get the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to enter into
force, and the international norm of not testing which emerged
from the long moratoria on nuclear testing during the 1990s and
the fact that no country has tested since 1998. The concerns expressed
by leading scientists about the "virtual" design and
testing of new nuclear weapons rather than simple remanufacture
of old designs is also inextricably linked to the issue of nuclear
testing. The creation of completely new nuclear weapons through
the use of advanced computer modeling and laboratory experiments
will inevitably lead to reduced confidence in the reliability
of those weapons because the conditions created by the use of
powerful lasers or hydrodynamic tests are very different to those
created by an actual nuclear explosion. It will only be a matter
of time before politicians and the military begin to create pressure
for a return to full-scale nuclear testing to make sure their
new weapons "really work".
21. As Sidney Drell, US nuclear weapons
physicist and long-time advisor to the US government put it: "If
anybody thinks we are going to be designing new warheads and not
doing testing, I don't know what they are smoking. I don't know
of a general, an admiral, a president or anybody in responsibility
who would take an untested new weapon that is different from the
ones in our stockpile and rely on it without resuming testing."[61]
And Jonathan I Katz has also commented: "Nuclear weapons
are not well enough understood to permit the development of new
weapons, or the modification of those we now possess, without
tests at substantial (multi-kiloton) nuclear yield. Despite 50
years of experience, including large numbers of tests at full
nuclear yield, we do not have sufficient confidence in our design
tools. It is unlikely that any future work without nuclear testing
could give us that confidence".
22. So the new hi-tech developments being
built at Aldermaston are not only unnecessary if the aim is simply
to maintain the UK's existing weapons, they also undermine the
CTBT and NPT, and set Britain on the road towards resuming full-scale
nuclear tests. Worryingly, the US administration, which often
supplies the UK with nuclear test data, seems to be already preparing
to resume testing. On 16 September 2003 the US Senate voted to
spend $45 million over three years, to reduce the time needed
to prepare the Nevada Test Site for underground nuclear tests
from 24-36 months to 18 months.
23. The upgrading of Aldermaston threatens
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) through another route.
Readers of George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty Four will not be surprised
that this is being done in the name of respecting the CTBT. Thus
AWE insists that it is developing the scientific capacity and
the exotic technologies it needs to make a new nuclear weapon
so that it can comply with the CTBT ban on nuclear testing! In
a strictly legal sense AWE may be right that it is complying with
the CTBT which only commits its signatories not to carry out nuclear
tests. These developments are, however, completely against the
disarmament and non-proliferation purposes of the treaty.
24. The negotiating record of the CTBT and
its preamble show that it is intended as a non-proliferation and
a disarmament measure. At the 1995 Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) Review Conference the non-nuclear nations insisted that
they would only agree to the indefinite extension of the Treaty
demanded by the US and other nuclear states if the declared nuclear
weapon states deliver on their obligations under Article 6 of
the NPT to negotiate nuclear disarmament. In particular the non
nuclear states insisted that they would only agree to indefinite
extension of the NPT if the declared nuclear weapon states agreed
to negotiate a CTBT by 1995 as part of their NPT Article 6 commitment
to negotiate disarmament. The CTBT is, therefore, part of the
grand bargain at the centre of the NPT whereby the declared nuclear
weapon states agree to negotiate disarmament and the non-nuclear
states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons.
25. The disarmament purpose of the CTBT
is clearly set out in the preamble to the Treaty which states
that the State Parties to the Treaty recognize that: "The
cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other
nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced
new types of nuclear weapons, constitute an effective measure
of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its form."
The preamble concludes by emphasising the disarmament purpose
of the CTBT. All the States Parties who sign the Treaty, it emphasises,
recognize that "an end to all such nuclear explosions will
thus constitute a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic
process to achieve nuclear disarmament."
26. More broadly, AWE's invocation of the
letter of the CTBT to justify a program of investments which goes
directly contrary to its disarmament purpose is out of step with
the majority of the world's nations. As Hans Blix's timely report
on Weapons of Mass Destruction underscores, the majority of the
world's nations continue to see themselves as stakeholders in
a jointly managed system of treaties and organizations for disarmament,
arms control, verification and the building of security. Crucially,
they do "not accept a de facto perpetuation of a licence
for fiveor morestates to possess nuclear weapons
and they resist measures that would expand the inequality that
exists between the nuclear haves and have-nots. Renouncing nuclear
weapons for themselves, they wish to see steps that will lead
to the outlawing of nuclear weapons for all."[62]
27. The future use of high technology to
develop a new bomb is only one way that Aldermaston is seeking
to get round the CTBT. This is especially grating to the majority
of the world's states because they do not have access to the immense
financial and technical resources needed to upgrade or develop
nuclear weapons in this way. There is, therefore, a danger that
they will come to accept the Indian Government's claim that the
Treaty is simply as means for perpetuating a global system of
nuclear apartheid.[63]
28. Equally threatening to the CTBT is the
fact that AWE Aldermaston, and its US counter-parts, are already
working to get round the CTBT by adopting a systems approach which
enables them to transform the capabilities of a nuclear weapon
without actually having to develop an entirely new warhead. Since
the end of the Cold War the US and the UK have developed Trident
so as to make it more "usable" against a non nuclear
state. The rationale set out by the UK Government is that Trident
can be used to secure the UK's "vital interests" (trade,
investment, alliances, and access to raw materials such as oil)
and to destroy chemical or biological weapons before they could
be used against UK troops fighting overseas.[64]
29. The UK has upgraded Trident to carry
out these tasks. These developments have been guided by the fantasy
that a highly precise, low yield, Trident strike would be able
to destroy military targets without disproportionate civilian
casualties. To accomplish this vision the UK has deployed missiles
with only a single warhead, acquired a new targeting system from
the US, and given Trident a low yield capacity. Aldermaston's
development of the upgraded system was quietly slipped out in
the history section of its 2000 Annual Report which announced:
"With high accuracy, targeting and an option of two warhead
yields, [Trident] can now operate in both strategic and sub-strategic
roles."[65]
30. Trident's two yields may mean that Trident
can now function as a mini-nuclear weapon (ie have a yield below
five kilo-tonnes). The Ministry of Defence, however, has refused
to tell MPs whether or not it has actually done this.[66]
The UK is now being asked by the US whether it wants upgrades
to Trident which take its transformation into a "usable"
nuclear weapon further.[67]
Specifically, the UK is being asked whether it wants a new guidance
system which will use satellites to steer a new Trident re-entry
vehicle to within metres of its target and whether it wants a
new contact fuse which will allow a smaller warhead to be used
to destroy hardened military targets.
31. The systematic development of the whole
Trident weapon system, then, is providing the US and the UK with
a way of making the major part of the US and UK nuclear arsenal
more usable against non-nuclear nations while nominally respecting
their commitments to nuclear disarmament under the NPT and to
not to test under the CTBT.
9 October 2006
46 Ministerial Statement by the Secretary for Defence,
John Reid, Hansard, Column 59WS, 19 July 2005. Back
47
Marylia Kelly, "National Ignition Facility Update,"
INESAP Bulletin 21, http://www.inesap.org/bulletin21/bul21art33.htm Back
48
"The Way Ahead: AWE Annual Report 2002," (AWE, April
2003 ): 4. Back
49
A teraflop is a unit of computing speed, equal to one trillion
floating point operations per second. Back
50
Ibid: 5. Back
51
Michael Smith, "Britain's Secret Nuclear Blue Print,"
Sunday Times, (12 March 2006). Back
52
Written Answer, Hansard, 3 July 2006, to question by Mike
Hancock MP. Back
53
Nicola Butler and Mark Bromley, "Secrecy and Dependency:
The UK Trident System in the 21st Century," (BASIC, 2001):
21. Back
54
Ibid: 20. Back
55
Ministerial Statement by the Secretary for Defence, John Reid,
Hansard, Column 59WS, 19 July 2005. Back
56
The Future of the UK's Strategy Nuclear Deterrent: Written Evidence
from the Ministry of Defence, HC835 (The Stationary Office, 30
June 2006): Ev 5. Back
57
The AWE Site Development Plan 2002, (AWE, July 2002):3. Back
58
Ray Kidder, "Problems with stockpile stewardship",
Nature, 386 (17 April 1997); Richard L Garwin, "The Maintenance
of Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles Without Nuclear ExplosionTesting,"
24th Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Forces in Europe, September 1995;
Jonathan I Katz, "Curatorship vs Stewardship," http://www.physics.wustl.edu/-katz/curator.html;
Frank von Hippel, "The Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship
Program," Journal of the Federation of American Scientists
(FAS Public Interest Report, January/February 1997), http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/fasvonhippel010297.htm;
Hugh Gusterson, "Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship: A
Debate About the Future of Weapons Science," (MIT, October
1997), http://web.mit.edu/sts/SSBS/ ; and Robert Civak, Managing
the US Nuclear Weapons Stockpile: A Comparison of Five Strategies,"
(Tri-Valley CAREs, July 2000). Back
59
Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani, "The Nuclear Safety
Smokescreen: Warhead Safety and Reliability and the Science Based
Stockpile Stewardship Program," (IEER, 1996). Back
60
S Drell et al "Science Based Stockpile Stewardship,"
JSR-94-345 (The MITRE Corporation, November 1994): 81; Greg Mello,
"Ask Few Questions, Get Few Answers: The JASONs" "Science
Based Stockpile Stewardship," (Tri-Valley CAREs, February
1995), http://www.lasg.org/archive/1995/jasons.htm; & Greg
Mello, "No Serious Problems: Reliability Issues and Stockpile
Management," (Tri-Valley CAREs, February 1995), http://www.lasg.org/archive/1995/noprob.htm Back
61
Quoted in Robert W Nelson, "If it Ain't Broke: the Already
Reliable US Nuclear Arsenal," Arms Control Today,
(April 2006). Back
62
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Arms, (The Blix Report), (The Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission, June 2006): 25. Back
63
Prafy Budwau and Achin Vanaik, "New Nukes: India, Pakistan
and Global Disarmament," (Signal Books, 2000), see especially
Chapter 3 and Appendix 2. Back
64
"Why Britain Should Stop Deploying Trident," (Greenpeace,
2006); Paul Rogers, "Determining Britain's role in the Long
War," International Affairs, 82.4 (July 2006); Frank
Barnaby, "The Future of Britain's Nuclear Weapons: Experts
Reframe the Debate," (Oxford Research Group, 2006). Back
65
AWE Annual Report 2000, (AWE, June 2001): 14. Back
66
Norman Baker, Hansard, column 1221W, 22 May 2006. Back
67
"The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the
Strategic Context," HC 986, (Stationary Office, 2006): ev
117-118. 9 October 2006. Back
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