Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence


Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence

SUSTAINING CORE SKILLS AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  The Ministry of Defence recognises the importance of maintaining an affordable and viable submarine design and manufacture capability. Our position was set out in some detail in the Defence Industrial Strategy, which stated that "for the foreseeable future the UK will retain all of those capabilities unique to submarines and their Nuclear Steam Raising Plant, to enable their design, development, build, support, operation and decommissioning".

  At the same time, however, the Defence Industrial Strategy highlighted serious concerns at the efficiency of the organisation of the submarine-building industry and the need for rationalisation. As a consequence, work is proceeding to help industry deliver an indigenous industrial base that remains affordable for the procurement and maintenance of submarines and which sustains critical capabilities. It is our aim that significant behavioural and structural improvements should be achieved across the MoD as client, and the industrial parties strategically involved, ie BAE Submarines at Barrow, Rolls-Royce and Associates, Devonport Management Ltd (DML) and Babcock Naval Services. In this context, the Government will require industry commitment to team working, provision of qualified, skilled and empowered personnel, continuous improvement in design for best through life cost, and improved supply chain management.

  The submarine industry is currently heavily engaged in the programme to design and build the Astute class of submarines. Three vessels have been ordered but the eventual size of the attack submarine flotilla has yet to be decided. Work on the Astute programme has done much to restore and sustain key skills in the submarine industry, although this has come at some cost. The break between the Vanguard and Astute programmes in the hitherto continuous process of designing nuclear-powered submarines in the UK was a significant contributor to the cost increase in the Astute programme. As the design element of the Astute programme gradually decreases, the potential risks to future submarine programmes (should any be required) will increase. Diverting surface ship design and construction work can help to reduce some risks but skill fade will occur if submarine-specific skills are not kept alive. This applies to submarine design and construction skills, not just specifically to nuclear-related skills.

  The maintenance of core skills and capabilities has also been a key issue with respect to the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). In a written statement to the House of Commons on 19 July 2005, the then Secretary of State for Defence, John Reid, announced plans for additional investment at AWE amounting to an average of an additional £350 million per annum over the period up until 2007-08.  Funding beyond that point has yet to be determined. This programme will ensure that the effectiveness and safety of the existing Trident warhead stockpile can be maintained throughout its intended in-service life in the absence of live nuclear testing under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It will also ensure that we retain a minimum capability to design a successor for the existing warhead, should one be required and keep our options open in the meantime.

  The programme falls into three broad categories: upgrading a range of research facilities to underpin the science that enables AWE to underwrite the safety and performance of the warhead; refurbishment of some of the key infrastructure on the sites; and investment in sustaining core skills within the Establishment. To achieve this, major investment in manpower and facilities will be necessary including the replacement of many of the major science, manufacturing and assembly facilities at AWE's two sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield. Details of the programme were set out in the memorandum sent to the Defence Committee by the Ministry of Defence in November 2005.

THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY AND THE LINK TO TRIDENT REPLACEMENT

  The Defence Industrial Strategy stated that the UK would retain all those capabilities unique to submarines, including the Nuclear Steam Raising Plant, "for the foreseeable future" (B2.18). It also stated that the submarine design programme would ensure options for a successor to the current Vanguard class deterrent would be kept open in advance of eventual decisions (B2.63).

  As we have made clear in the Defence Industrial Strategy, we would expect that any commitment by the Government to a long-term submarine build programme would be matched by a commitment by industry to rationalise and reduce costs. There is much to be gained from cooperation and rationalisation between the build entity (principally BAES at Barrow-in-Furness), the two support entities (Devonport Management Ltd and Babcock Naval Services at Faslane) and the Nuclear Steam Raising Plant provider (Rolls Royce), together with the Ministry of Defence as the customer/operator.

  Potential benefits from such cooperation and rationalisation include the removal of overcapacity and overlapping competencies, avoidance of duplication, application of common processes, spread of best practice, more efficient procurement, supply chain management and sharing of knowledge and information across the enterprise—all leading to behavioural change and the potential for significantly improved enterprise performance and affordability. Transformed commercial arrangements are required to incentivise and deliver these benefits. Cooperation of this type is already being pursued to improve affordability and performance for in-service submarines and for the Astute programme.

  In considering the future of the submarine industry we also need to take account of the requirement to service our current commitments (Astute class build, and support and disposal for Swiftsure, Trafalgar, Vanguard and Astute classes).

THE NUCLEAR SKILLS BASE IN THE UK

  The Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) has a strength in depth in nuclear science and engineering which is rare elsewhere in the UK. The average age of the workforce at AWE had been increasing, as the generation recruited to meet the initial requirements of the Chevaline and Trident programmes reached the end of their careers. There was therefore a requirement to recruit new members of staff to ensure that the core skills within AWE are sustained. Other new staff will be required to assist the infrastructure sustainment programme and also to operate the new facilities as they come on stream. AWE has therefore been undertaking a programme of recruitment: last year a total of 415 new staff were recruited, including 94 scientists, 196 engineers and 49 technical support personnel. It plans to recruit in the order of 90 scientists, 150 engineers, and 50 technical support personnel this year and similar numbers in 2007-08.

  The areas of expertise are diverse, and will include chemistry, computer science, materials science, nuclear physics, chemical engineering, manufacturing, metallurgy, electrical and electronic engineering, mechanical engineering, assurance, laboratory support, and IT/telecommunications. To date, this recruitment process has proceeded very well, with sufficient numbers of high quality staff being brought into the Establishment. The availability of sufficient suitably trained graduates has in part resulted from the fact that AWE, along with other institutions, including the civil nuclear industry and Universities, has developed new educational courses in this area, up to and including doctorate level.

  Nuclear expertise in the civil nuclear industry does not currently underpin the defence nuclear knowledge and skills base to any significant degree. Although there is some interchange in specialist areas, there is limited cross-fertilisation between the sectors. One reason for this is that the UK Atomic Energy Authority has not developed Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) technology (which is used in nuclear-powered submarines) for civil use: only Sizewell B is a PWR, but it incorporates a commercial Westinghouse design. There is some exchange of engineering and scientific knowledge, particularly in the field of metallurgy, but this is limited by security constraints, type of plant and differences in operation (propulsion versus power generation). The remaining civil nuclear sector is now focussed on providing handling and disposal facilities for radioactive material.

  The limited supply of suitably qualified engineers and scientists is more of a problem. With the end of the Vanguard Class build programme in the late 1990s and a reduction in research and testing and forward design work, Rolls-Royce Submarines (which manufactures the nuclear propulsion system installed in Royal Navy submarines) reduced the number of engineers and scientists it employed. More recently, as activity has picked up again with the Astute Class build programme, a chronic shortage of high quality engineers and scientists emerging from UK universities has led to key skills shortages within the company. This UK skills gap affects many engineering disciplines, but the lack of physics graduates is proving to be particularly difficult to overcome. The 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement with the United States means that only UK nationals can be employed on the naval nuclear propulsion programme. Therefore, Rolls-Royce Submarines has now developed links with UK universities and is developing links with schools in order to promote the necessary skills.

23 October 2006





 
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