Memorandum from the Nuclear Information
Service
SUMMARY
This submission argues that much of the investment
programme underway at AWE Aldermaston in 2004-08 is not relevant
to the objective of maintaining the key skills and infrastructure
necessary for the design and manufacture of nuclear warheads and
the stewardship of the UK's existing warhead stockpile. Current
company acquisitions mean that AWE is to be managed by Unites
States' companies with implications for disarmament prospects,
financial, legal, safety and political issues. With regard to
nuclear submarines, the long-term consequences of creating, decommissioning
and storing nuclear waste must be factored into any decision.
Further, the submarine building capacity at Barrow-in-Furness
should not rely only on a military application and BAE Systems
should be supported to diversify into the renewable energy sector.
1. Investment at AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield
1.1 Aldermaston Developments
The 2005 AWE Aldermaston Site Strategy Development
Plan is a grandiose scheme, despite modifications to reduce the
number of construction projects contained in the original 2002
proposals. The Plan promotes an industry-led vision of a nuclear
weapons' "garden city" estate, rather than a maximum-security
military site. It seems as though money is no object.
1.2 Escalating costs at AWE appear to be
driven by the military industrial complex, both here and in the
USA. The AWE management consortium, AWE Management Limited (AWEML),
controls the AWEplc operating company's workforce and consists
of Lockheed Martin Ltd, BNFL and Serco Ltd. BNFL's sell-off of
its one-third interest in AWEML is expected to go to a company
in the USA and Serco has joined Bechtel, the giant US construction
company to bid for UK nuclear decommissioning contracts.1 Lockheed
Martin is a wholly American-owned company whose UK subsidiary
now owns INSYS, formerly Hunting Engineering, an AWE consortium
member from 1993-2000.
1.3 Clearly there are significant profits
to be made out of AWE. In the first years of privatisation, 1993-2000,
financial incentives for projects completed ahead of time were
shared between Hunting Brae and the MoD. But now, in addition
to company profits and in the case of Serco, shareholder dividends,
a profit-sharing scheme for AWEplc staff also requires funding
from the public purse. In reference to its stake in AWEML, Serco's
recent report to shareholders states:
"Growth in the first half [of 2006] was
driven by the continued expansion of our joint venture with BNFL
and Lockheed Martin to operate the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment.
Since it commenced in 2002, the contract has seen substantial
growth, which was boosted further by a three-year uplift from
July 2005, valued at £350 million to Serco."
Serco Group plc 2006 Interim Report
1.4 At a day-to-day level, AWE plc has a managing
director and four senior managers who are US citizens with 87
subcontractors from US corporations.2
1.5 "Orion" Laser
A significant building project underway in 2006
at AWE Aldermaston is that of the "Orion" laser facility.3
It is advertised by AWE and MoD as being a high-powered 12-laser
configuration facility, which academics also will want to use
to test materials under extreme heat. However, the scientific
community is not agreed that this high-powered laser system is
necessary in order to maintain existing Trident warheads.4
1.6 In the USA, a project to build a vast
192-laser facility, the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, has run into the sand
with little prospect of Senate funds being approved to complete
it. NIF sought to overcome the effects of the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, but has been dogged by failures and probably has become
out-dated before completion.5
1.7 According to AWE, cooperation between
AWE and the US Labs. has been stepped up in recent years6 and
nuclear weapons manufacturers in the USA will have access to the
Orion laser under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. Apart from
political pressures, with US firms in the driving seat of management
at AWE, it must be assumed that development of US nuclear weapons
will get preferential access over UK universities. Worse, from
a UK point of view, it may be that the US's need for a facility
such as "Orion" will lock us into nuclear weapons development,
with little option to respond to current trends pointing away
from having nuclear weapons in the UK armoury. The acquisition
of the new laser will fuel the nuclear arms race. MoD could hardly
sanction US testing of warhead materials at AWE while Britain
concentrated only on Decommissioning and Verification!
1.8 AWE Recruitment
Current advertisements for scientific posts
at AWE usually require a willingness for applicants to travel
to the USA. This applies to the posts of "Task Leader/Laser—Orion
Project" and also to "Lead Systems Engineer". The
later also is required to "Attempt to influence MoD thinking
in respect of warhead system options."
Lead Systems Engineer
Discipline: Engineering Location: Aldermaston Salary:
£41,000 to £55,000
Responsibilities
— Ensure that appropriate technical
standards are maintained across the Programme.
— Develop a systems approach within
the project team.
— Attempt to influence MoD thinking
in respect of warhead system options.
— Represent the technical programme
at senior levels within AWE, including the TPG.
Extract from AWE website jobs list7
1.9 Safety at AWE is paramount. While it is reasonable
to have confidence in AWEplc and the regulators to ensure high
standards of nuclear safety, the distance from financial decision-makers
in the USA is worrying. Accountability to concerned citizens and
the local community will be hard to trace.
2. Decommissioning Skills at AWE
2.1 A good deal of decommissioning has been
achieved by AWE staff during 1996-2006 with the consequent development
of a valuable skills base. The AWE Aldermaston site is a mixture
of new, old and very old facilities. Highly contaminated glove
boxes and other weapons production infrastructure has been changed
into nuclear waste that either remains on site, in the case of
Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) or has been transported by road
to the Drigg site at Sellafield as Low Level Waste (LLW). Much
remains to be done. Out-of-use buildings scheduled for decommission
and facilities reaching the end of their life in the coming years
will need expert attention. The technical and managerial skills
needed to achieve safe decommissioning; packaging and storage
of nuclear waste must be maintained into the foreseeable future.
These skills have been gained and developed from the skills-base
employed in weapons production. Conversely, skills and knowledge
maintained during decommissioning would be readily available should
they be needed for production in future.
3. Verification Techniques: Innovation and
Experts
3.1 The five-year AWE Verification Research
Project in 2000-05 has developed the technical knowledge for "the
verification of warhead dismantlement and for arms control monitoring
of a nuclear weapons complex."8 The Project reported to NPT
Prep-Coms. and to the 2005 Review Conference, attracting international
interest. The study of "obstacles to verification" has
application for both the IAEA and for new weapons' production.
In 2004 the key AWE researcher moved back into weapons production
armed with the experience of how to design sensitive systems to
be protected from a verification regime should it ever apply to
AWE. The project report concludes:
"While considerable technology exists to
support verification of a disarmament programme, much still needs
to be done in a number of areas to develop and prove these. New
technologies continue to emerge requiring further detailed assessment
of their potential application to this field."
"From the outset of the programme the United
Kingdom had identified the four key areas to be addressed as authentication,
dismantling, disposition and monitoring the weapon complex."
"For the future, the United Kingdom will
continue to monitor and evaluate technological developments with
relevance to verification but in terms of the processes and procedures
needed to underpin any verification exercise, it is felt that
a more focused approach should now be adopted addressing specific
areas and issues."
| Conclusions. Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Final Report to the UN NPT Review Conference on studies into the verification of nuclear warheads and their components. May 2005
|
3.2 The role of verification experts is an integral part
of any disarmament process and as such would give AWE an international
task (and income). For this role of providing Confidence Building
Measures to be acceptable, Britain would need to declare itself
a non-nuclear weapons state and be open to inspection, once the
existing stockpile of warheads had been dismantled.
4. Civilian Nuclear Industry
4.1 The establishment of the Nuclear Decommissioning
Authority will ensure that the government itself employs nuclear
physicists who are essential practitioners in the scientific community.
Whatever decisions are made on nuclear new build in the coming
years, the waste storage sector will always be in business, developing
and maintaining the expert skills and techniques to handle nuclear
materials.
5. Scientific Higher Education Sector
5.1 University research projects linked to AWE's needs
will doubtless remain in place, and follow the available funding.
But it is MoD, rather than international/US commercial interests,
that should commission such work.
5.2 Collaborative projects between academics and AWE
to use the new laser will give rise to concern if they are specifically
related to testing warhead materials. Such research is likely
to fail the legal justification test if its purpose is to undermine
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Education institutions
should not be led down this route, where their legal standing
might be compromised. While the same point applies to MoD, government
may be more prepared to contest any legal challenge.
6. Submarine Construction Industry
6.1 In relation to the submarine construction industry
based at Barrow-in-Furness, there is an assumption that it must
be MoD investment that is required to keep the manufacturing base
alive during a gap in military orders. However, alternative projects,
funded by a different Ministry should not be ruled out. There
are possibilities of research and development in renewable energy
and other projects that in the end could benefit international
security and the submarine industry. In June this year, the local
press in Barrow published an article headed, "Barrow Jobs
Joy at Brown's Trident Pledge". The following letter was
published in response:
"Job Security in Barrow-in-Furness
Job security in Barrow is essential—as it is in every town
in the country. However, building nuclear submarines will not
secure jobs in the long term and will do nothing to ease the real
threats to our security. Barrow could be a world leader in defending
us against climate change, contribute to global security and benefit
from financially security. The workforce has skills and technology
at its fingertips to research and build massive submersible turbines
to harness the power of the sea for renewable energy. Is it beyond
engineers to design and develop a system to transfer wave power
from the surface to seabed installations from where it can be
cabled ashore? The trouble with Trident is that there is always
an end to the jobs. The next generation wants secure jobs into
the future, and supplying an international market with renewable
energy systems is the means to get them. Trident is old thinking.
If ever there was a time to press for new thinking in political
and economic investment in Barrow, this is it."
Di McDonald
North West Evening Mail 23/06/06
6.2 Ship builders take no responsibility for the nuclear
waste they create in building nuclear submarines. The consequences
of creating, decommissioning and storing more nuclear waste must
be born by the government and in the end, by the citizens of the
UK. No solution has yet been found for the safe storage of decommissioned
and existing submarines.9
6.3 The submarine building capacity at Barrow-in-Furness
should not rely only on a military application and government
should support BAE Systems financially to diversify into the renewable
energy sector.
7. Conclusion
7.1 Current and projected investment in AWE is at an
unreasonable level, given that the Aldermaston Site Strategy Development
Plan is to build facilities to design, test and produce unusable
weapons. A stop should be put to this waste of the country's precious
resources, and a plan adopted for AWE that serve the nation's
needs. Attempts by industry to influence MoD decisions should
be resisted. AWE should be returned to UK hands for financial,
political and military reasons. Nuclear warheads are not commodities,
and many would ague that they are not assets either. Decommissioning
would maintain the technical skills-base for the future and Verification
that of the weapons' scientists. The "Orion" Laser building
now under construction will provide materials testing facilities
that will drive nuclear weapons' research and development scientists
into illegal activity if its purpose is to undermine the CTBT.
REFERENCES
1. The Independent Newspaper 23/07/06.
2. John Reid, Minister of State, Hansard Parliamentary Record
21/11/06 20051558W.
3. See: http://www.nuclearinfo.org/sites/awe for a view of
the site and projected building.
4. What Next for Aldermaston? Scottish CND 12 June 2006.
5. See: http://www.trivalleycares.org/newsletters/cwjul05.asp
6. Parliamentary Answers 22 February 2005. [216675]
There have been 180 visits to the United States by personnel from
[AWE].
[T]here were 128 visits by US personnel to AWE. Personnel from
AWE visited 29 facilities in the United States during the 12 months
ending January 2005. These were: National Nuclear Security Administration,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories
Livermore, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Honeywell Kansas City
Plant, Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NWSC Seal Beach,
Savannah River Site, Y-12 Oak Ridge, Pantex, Titan Corp, Mission
Research Corporation, Brookhaven, Laser Technology Inc., ITT Colorado,
ITT Washington, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Lockheed Martin
Missiles and Space, Air Force Research Laboratory, Visidyne Nevada
Test Site, Naval Research Laboratory, ITT Crystal City, New York
Port Authority, LLE Rochester, Washington Group International,
Princeton New Brunswick Laboratory, Manufacturing Sciences Corp,
Oak Ridge Remote Sensing Laboratory.
7. AWE website: https://careers.awe.co.uk/wd/plsql/wd_pds?p_web_page_id=30297
8. Discovery No 7 AWE journal, July 2003.
9. MoD ISOLUS Project.
29 September 2006
| 
