Memorandum from Dr Dan Plesch
I do not wish to reiterate the evidence that
I and other witnesses have given regarding the independence of
the system and the industrial base that supports it. However this
memoranda is intended to be taken in the context of, and to build
upon, that evidence.
1. In its response to the Committee's report,
the MoD made no effort to counter arguments that I and other witnesses
made concerning the lack of independence of the system and the
industrial base that supports it beyond making a general claim
against evidence given to the Committee. The MoD confined itself
to arguing that command and control was independent. This may,
by implication, lead to the conclusion that the MoD concedes that
there is no independence of procurement, even for warheads.
2. Sir Michael Quinlan has, in evidence
to the committee, argued that there is a difference between independence
of procurement and of operation. He agrees that there is no independence
of procurement, and does not appear to make an exception for warheads.
3. If the previous points lead us to the
conclusion that there is no independence of procurement, then
the next question to be asked is how far, if at all, one can say
that there is a distinct UK industrial base supporting nuclear
weapons and their delivery systems?
4. In this regard I suggest that Committee
might ask what are the provisions of the Mutual Defence Agreement
(MDA) and its amendments regarding the sharing by the UK with
other states of technology supplied by the US. And further, what
provisions there are for the physical withdrawal of that technology
if the MDA ceases to operate. Clearly some technologies such as
reactors and submarine and missile launch-tube technologies have
been transferred, but could they be operated independently or
with third parties?
5. The point is not to encourage or discourage
continuation of support for the MDA, but to obtain a clear assessment
of its terms and conditions and the impact they have on a realistic
assessment of British defence industrial capacity.
6. In the past there was an assumption that
there were British bombs. Indeed, as one former JIC chair put
it, "I always thought the warheads were independent."
It is now a matter of public record that the US is required in
warhead design, nuclear parts, non-nuclear parts, machine tools,
management, arming-fusing-firing and related computer software.
7. Since Nassau, there has been an assumption
that despite reliance on the US to supply SSBN and SLBMs, there
was, in reserve, a British aircraft capacity. Will this remain
after the introduction of the Joint Strike Fighter?
8. My own view is that a consideration of
the industrial base for the strategic nuclear deterrent leads
to the conclusion that it is not British, certainly not in the
sense that any other state regards such capability as national.
9. From this emerges further reinforcement
for my central argument made in previous evidence that the British
enjoy the self-delusion of independent nuclear status at the price
of losing strategic independence of policy. In this respect, the
2003-04 negotiations on the MDA renewal are key matters that the
Committee might enquire into.
10. If it has not already done so, the Committee
might ask Robert S Norris for a copy of documents that he and
his colleagues at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington
DC hold that pertain to US-UK nuclear weapons collaboration, and
similar enquiries might be made of the National Security Archives
project of George Washington University, also in Washington DC.
3 October 2006
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