Memorandum from The Royal Academy of Engineering
INTRODUCTION
1. The Royal Academy of Engineering is pleased
to respond to the House of Commons Defence Committee's second-stage
inquiry into the future of the strategic nuclear deterrent focusing
on the UK manufacturing and skills base. This response has been
compiled from a number of contributions from Fellows of the Academy,
all of whom have in-depth knowledge of the subject and many years'
experience working in the field. In particular, it includes input
from Fellows who were directly involved in the design and manufacture
of nuclear powered submarines and input from Fellows involved
in the civil sector who have provided support across both military
and civil programmes.
2. The response concentrates on three main
areas: the UK submarine construction industry; the Atomic Weapons
Establishment (AWE), Aldermaston; and the relationship between
civil and military nuclear fields.
3. The Academy would be pleased to provide
oral evidence or supplementary evidence if this would be helpful
to the Committee
UK SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
4. Submarine design, engineering, project
management and construction represent an area of substantial complexity
when compared with other engineering projects. There are particular
challenges arising from the extremely constricted space of the
hull envelope requiring particular skills in Computer Aided Design
(CAD) and planning as well as advanced dimensional control issues
resulting from the need for modular construction.
5. Thanks to a more or less continuous design
and build programme of nuclear submarines from Dreadnought in
the 1960s to the four Vanguards in the 1980s and early 1990s,
almost all our submarines were built to time and cost. However,
a change in government policy in the late 90s, which led to contracting
out the design and build of submarines, along with a gap in the
submarine programme, has resulted in a major decline in the skills
required. Although many of the decisions taken during the 90s
were well intentioned, the reality is that they failed to address
the steps required to build on Vanguard expertise and maintain
a national nuclear submarine capability and they resulted in very
large financial overspends and delays. The important lesson is
that continuity of both design teams and construction activity
is vital if major cost and time overruns are to be avoided. This
lesson is also valid in the civil sector where both utilities
and vendors recommend construction of a series or fleet of one
design to maintain capability and reduce costs. It is reported
that the current issues with Finland's fifth nuclear reactor under
construction at Olkiluoto are at least in part due to the industry
relearning key project management and nuclear specific construction
skills. France is choosing to proceed with the new follow on unit
at Flamanville as a means to maintain skills and continuity of
expertise.
6. In order to deliver affordable submarines
to the Royal Navy within a sustainable business environment it
must be recognised that the complexities of a nuclear submarine
programme require a strategic approach from the MoD. This strategy
should cover all aspects of design, procurement and manufacture
with particular attention paid to the system integration capabilities,
management and skills specific to submarine design such as CAD
and safety. All these aspects have their own associated problems
and considerations but they are all equally important as well
as being interdependent on each other. Competition alone is not
sufficient to achieve results. What is needed is an integrated
strategy involving all the interested parties from government
and industry.
7. The recent decision to adopt a Defence
Industrial Strategy (DIS) is a positive move towards addressing
these issues and is welcomed. However care must be taken to avoid
some of the mistakes made in the 1990s. In particular, efforts
must be made to ensure the UK has the intellectual capabilities
to undertake the necessary research along with the ability to
manage such large scale and complex projects.
8. The DIS is also crucial if the UK is
to maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent. However, if a decision
is taken not to replace Trident, this would call into question
the future of all the nuclear submarines in the fleet.
9. It is also important to continue our
collaboration with the US Department of Defense on the missile-related
aspect of the submarine design, although increased industrial
involvement may cause some security concerns. This must primarily
be a government to government activity which has the potential
to help in all aspects of the submarine programme.
10. With regard to the rationalisation of
nuclear capabilities, it is important that expertise is maintained
in the various centres currently active in the UK. These include
the new build facility at Barrow, the refit facility at Devonport
and the Royal Navy docks at Faslane as well as related sites such
as the Rolls Royce nuclear reactor establishment at Derby and
the experimental centre at Haslar. It is possible that future
submarine deigns will not require specialised refit facilities,
however, for the present these must be retained in order to maintain
the Vanguard class submarines.
AWE, ALDERMASTON
11. The Government's investment programme
at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) Aldermaston is welcomed.
It is seen as essential if we are to maintain the UK's nuclear
weapons design and manufacturing capability not only for future
systems but also for the maintenance and stewardship of our existing
weapons stockpile.
12. It is recognised that the design and
manufacture of nuclear weapons is a particularly specialised field
and limited to a small number of countries. Continued investment
is therefore seen as important to maintain the UK's political
position within the UN.
13. The importance and success of UK/US
collaboration on AWE programmes is also recognised and needs to
be continued on the basis of scientific and technical knowledge
in a wide range of capabilities.
NUCLEAR SKILLS
BASE
14. Over the last 20 years there has been
a massive reduction in the R&D associated with the civil nuclear
sector. The privatisation of the electricity supply industry and
the demise of the UKAEA as a research organisation removed a cornerstone
of the R&D supply chain which impacted heavily on the academic
sector in the UK. This affected the skill base available to serve
both military and civil sectors particularly in the area of reactor
technology where skills are most at risk. The problem is compounded
by Government's failure to deliver on its commitment to fund modest
UK participation in relevant international R&D projects such
as Generation IV, an initiative specifically designed to bolster
both industry and academic skills. Capabilities most at risk and
relevant to both civil and military sectors include, core physics
and fuel technology, materials performance, water chemistry, criticality,
thermal hydraulics and transient analysis, systems engineering
and safety performance. Links between the civil and naval sector
need to be encouraged through enhanced funding of generic research.
This is particularly relevant in academia where important work
on the fundamental understanding of mechanistic processes such
as irradiation assisted corrosion and radiation damage can be
carried out.
15. As a result of the aforementioned decline,
the skills required in the design, build, operation and disposal
of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Plant (NNPP) are in short supply and
increasingly expensive. Similarly, the number of Suitably Qualified
and Experienced People (SQEP) is limited and seen as a concern
within the nuclear defence industry, although efforts have been
made to counteract this situation. Overall, the decline of the
civil nuclear programme has forced the military nuclear programme,
and in particular the nuclear submarine programme, to develop
and fund its own expertise and personnel in order to remain operational.
16. Ultimately, a strong civil industry
is very much in the interests of the military, and this may become
the case in the future. However, with the prospect of a new generation
of nuclear power plants it is possible that skills and knowledge
from the military nuclear field, already in short supply, will
be lost to the civil nuclear industry in the short term.
17. Therefore, if we are to maintain the
civil and defence capabilities of the UK, it is vital that we
increase the level of investment for education in nuclear engineering
and safety and recognise the interdependence of universities,
industry and defence establishments.
4 October 2006
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