Supplementary memorandum from Devonport
Management Limited
Minimum skill levels: A note on the breakdown
of the minimum number of personnel in each key skill area necessary
to sustain core skills [Q17]:
These numbers are based on the resources needed
to support a single stream of SSBN refuelling/refits (which will
be the submarine refit load when Devonport completes the current,
final Trafalgar class refit on HMS Triumph in early 2008) in parallel
with a single defuelling and lay-up workload on end-of-life SSNs:
250 mechanical fitters, 140 electrical fitters,
150 fabricators, 30 welders, 15 nuclear welders, 50 marine pipe
fitters, 150 health physics/radiological/environmental support
staff, 200 test and commissioning engineers, 140 refuelling and
fuel handling personnel of all types, 400 infrastructure/plant
management, technical and safety case specialists and 300 planning
and programme management staff.
Note that within the large groups such as fitters
there are very many instances of sub-sets of typically two to
four individuals who have unique experience in, say the strip,
survey, rebuild and commissioning of particular equipments and
systems within the submarines.
There are other personnel involved in support
to overall site operations, etc, but these have not been detailed
in the above answer.
Decommissioning: A note on the number
of people required to decommission the current Vanguard submarines
if a decision was taken to abandon the deterrent and how those
numbers compare to current employment levels at Devonport [Q19]:
These numbers are based on the experience with
SSN defuelling and lay-up preparation, but do not include any
work to take the submarines beyond the stage where they are prepared
for long term storage afloat (ie it does not allow for complete
scrapping and disposal):
440 defuelling and lay-up preparation staff (includes
all planning, project and management team), 50 health physics/radiological/environmental
support staff, 100 plant management and technical specialists
and 50 infrastructure maintenance personnel.
Naval Base Review: A note on the scale
of what is involved in the Review, how the Review relates to the
deterrent decision, and how DML is consulting with the MoD on
the Review [Q47]:
The Review is looking at the options for reducing
the scale of Naval Base infrastructure to re-establish the balance
between operational base port capacity/costs and the current requirements
of the Royal Navy.
The way in which the Review relates to the deterrent
decision is explained in my written evidence—[136]
"A decision not to replace the deterrent
would have a fundamental effect on the maritime element of the
DIS [and the Naval Base Review] through:
— a potential impact on the operational
and support strategies for the existing deterrent system;
— knock-on effects into the planned
Astute procurement programme (the SSN force is partly committed
to supporting the SSBNs); and
— changed priorities in respect of
build and support yards [and Naval Bases] that are required to
deliver the other elements (ie, non SSBN-related) of military
capability in the naval sector.
Conversely, a decision to replace the current
deterrent system would make the existing UK submarine-related
engineering skill-base and infrastructure essential in maintaining
availability of the current and future SSBNs and the SSNs that
support their deployment.
A positive decision on a future submarine-based
deterrent must, in turn, influence decisions about where and when
other naval build and support work is carried out—a good
example is Devonport where the availability of surface ship support
work will be vital during the inevitable periods of low submarine
throughput that the future upkeep programme contains, if submarine
affordability is not to be seriously impaired.
There is also therefore a very important interaction
with the current Naval Base Review where, for instance, the resultant
surface ship base porting strategy will influence the availability
of ship maintenance work in Fleet Time at Devonport.
Hence a positive decision to replace the current
deterrent with a new submarine-based system will generate a "pivot
point", centred on the UK's sovereign submarine build and
support infrastructure, around which a wide range of other maritime
industrial base issues [as well as Naval Base strategy] should
be determined if the affordability and availability of overall
naval capability is to be optimised."
DML is providing a wide range of cost and other
data to the Naval Base Review team relating to the various options
that are being considered. Much of this is being supplied and
justified through direct discussions with RN and civil service
personnel who work in Devonport Naval Base.
ASTUTE KEY
SUPPLIER FORUM
DML is not actually a supplier into the Astute
programme and I assume that this is why my company is not a member
of this group.
DML's input to the Astute design has been limited.
However, DML has extensive knowledge of the current classes of
RN submarines and their in-service support, knowledge which is
relevant to the development of the Astute class support strategies.
DML is fully engaged in the work streams that
are considering the requirements for future nuclear submarine
capability and associated designs.
24 November 2006
136 The text in [square brackets] is additional to
the written evidence text but is relevant to the specific question
asked. Back
|
