Examination of Witnesses (Questions 180-189)
DR KATE
HUDSON AND
DR DOMINICK
JENKINS
21 NOVEMBER 2006
Q180 Mr Jones: What do you base
that on?
Dr Hudson: What I was just saying
about the scale of development there which AWE itself has likened
to Terminal 5, the new laser and so on.
Dr Jenkins: I have to enter into
an area which is of great obscurity but at the same time of real
importance, which is that the evidence, it seems to me, is not
that Aldermaston has just been sitting around developing capacity.
Actually, there is already track record. A nice remark was made
by John Brown, the former Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory,
where he said, "You cannot just have this conversation about
warheads. It has to be about delivery systems and even military
command and control. These things are part of an inter-related
system. That is what people forget". The importance of that
is that since the end of the Cold War we have seen an upgrading
of the Trident nuclear missile system, the technical characteristics
of which make it more conceivable that it could be used, so that
involves single missile warheads, it involves re-targeting systems
and a dual yield. The point here is that suddenly in 2000 Aldermaston
says, "Yes, we have done it". "With high accuracy,
targeting and an option of two warhead yields [Trident] can now
operate in both strategic and sub-strategic roles". The point
is that it is not simply an issue of what Aldermaston may be about
to do, but also that Aldermaston has already been in a way—and
it is a semantic question—producing a new weapon; hence
that suggests that we have also got to be concerned, for example,
when we discover from an advertisement in PhysicsWeb that the
new scientists that are being hired will be making prototypes.
At what point does making a prototype turn into making a new weapon?
Mr Havard: That is the point I wanted
to get to. You say that taking a multi-warhead and producing just
one single warhead on it and improving its target capacity so
that it can be dropped with much more accuracy is a new weapon.
That is what you have just said. The truth of the issue is that
for a period of time the UK has effectively been reducing the
capacity of its nuclear weaponry. We used to have tactical nuclear
weapons. We do not have them any more. There are various ways
in which we have said we will have fewer warheads on them. Whether
you make them any safer by having fewer warheads is a different
debate, but what you are saying now is that they have produced
this capacity so you can drop a less lethal nuclear weapon with
more accuracy than you could before in the form of a Trident missile,
so they have improved it to that extent. That is what you are
saying.
Q181 Chairman: Is that what you
are saying?
Dr Jenkins: What I am saying,
and here I stand on what the Director of Los Alamos says, is that
what matters is the whole system, and in terms of what we have
done, we have made a weapon which states across the world will
see as more usable against them and that is deeply distasteful.
Mr Havard: That is a debate. What is
clear is that the Government has not hidden any of this. As you
say in your own memorandum, in the history section of the report
in 2000 it made very clear that this potential that you have just
described had now meant that Trident could be used in a sub-strategic
way rather than in a strategic way, and I think this whole question
of their ability to provide those options to the Government is
hardly a secret because the Government has admitted it is doing
it, has told the public it is doing it, so nothing that you are
telling me is particularly a secret or new, and it is consistent
with the Government's position—
Chairman: Dai—
Q182 Mr Havard: Hang on a minute;
I am going to finish this sentence. The potential for Aldermaston
was always to be to keep that potential there, to have that ability
to do that. Whether you think it is right or wrong is a different
debate, but do not try and pretend to me that in some way it is
some sort of X-file that has come out of somewhere and it is a
conspiracy. It is not. It might well be wrong but it is not a
conspiracy.
Dr Jenkins: The Government has
said different things at different times, and it said to this
Committee that this investment was required "irrespective",
and then John Reid talked about the purpose, so it would appear
that the Government's clear intention was to say, "This is
simply for maintaining the existing warhead", and we are
raising doubts about this.
Chairman: I think it was for maintaining
the existing skills.
Q183 Mr Jones: It is an important
point because I accept that you are trying, as Dai said, to portray
a great conspiracy theory when there is not, because actually
what it says in the memorandum, and I will read it again to you—there
is a film at Aldermaston—"It will also ensure that
we retain a minimum capability to design a successor for the existing
warhead, should one be required, and keep our options open".
Would not the Government, can I put it to you, be failing if it
did not put this investment in? I accept you do not want any investment
at all, but if we did not put investment in now the argument we
are going to have on whether or not we replace the nuclear deterrent
would be academic because we would not have the skills and the
expertise to do it.
Dr Jenkins: What I think would
be appropriate, because, as I say, this is an area of obscurity
and secrecy, would be for the Committee—
Mr Jones: No, it is not secrecy. I do
not accept that.
Q184 Chairman: Hold on. Let Dr
Jenkins continue.
Dr Jenkins: The parliamentary
question put down by Norman Baker MP asks, "What is the lower
yield of the Trident nuclear warhead now? Has it been developed
into a mini nuke?", and the reply is, "This is a matter
of national security".
Q185 Mr Jones: Well, of course
it is.
Dr Jenkins: At a time when the
Government has itself said that there is no direct military threat
to the UK, then we need to know the facts.
Mr Jones: No, but what you are trying
to portray—
Q186 Chairman: Dr Hudson, you
have an answer you were trying to give.
Dr Hudson: I just wanted to make
an additional point. It is quite clear that our organisations
are opposed to the replacement of Trident for a very wide number
of reasons. Our specific concern about the situation at Aldermaston
is that irrespective of normal functionings and stockpile stewardship
and so on, which obviously the Government under its current policies
is required to do, and quite sensibly so given the safety considerations
and so on, nevertheless we have been promised by the Government
a full public and parliamentary discussion and debate about the
future of the nuclear weapons system and whether it is appropriate
or not for Britain to maintain such a system for its future security
and so on. This parliamentary Committee I understand is part of
that discussion and process and looking at the issues. If the
Government has already taken a decision and therefore what is
happening at Aldermaston is the enactment of that decision then
it seems the wrong way round and we have concerns that that is
what is taking place at Aldermaston. Nothing anyone has said has
yet convinced me that that is not the case.
Mr Jones: I accept that nothing I am
going to say or anyone is going to say is going to convince you,
but what would be wrong would be any government saying they were
going to go into an open public debate about the replacement Trident
when they realised that if they had not put the investment in
(which everyone has been quite clear about because it has not
been secret in any way, shape or form in terms of policy), in
other words that if they took a decision without this investment
in skills etc. or in Aldermaston to replace Trident, they could
not do it because they would not have the capacity to do it. I
think you are going to enter into a debate which is open and transparent,
which I think this is, and I think the MoD have been quite clear.
What you are trying to do, which I accept you are entitled to
do, is whip up the conspiracy theory et al to try and damage
the debate, which I do not think is very helpful in terms of your
case, to be honest, which I do respect.
Q187 Chairman: I do not think
that is what you have been saying.
Dr Hudson: I am not suggesting
there is a conspiracy theory. I just hope that there is no intention
to pre-empt the decision, which I hope will be taken by Parliament.
Chairman: I think you have stimulated
the Committee so much that we will go on, if we do not stop pretty
much now, until about teatime, and we cannot because the Minister
for Defence Procurement is coming before us. Do you want to ask
a nice, emollient question to round it off, David?
Q188 Mr Hamilton: Do you seriously
think, if there were an ulterior motive by the Government, that
during the debate—and it was myself who asked the Prime
Minister about a vote in the House of Commons and now all we need
to find out is whether it will be a free vote, but that is a separate
issue—if there were conspiracy theories going about that
would not come out during the debate that we are going to be having
in the House of Commons, and do you think that that is going to
make a difference to MPs? I am just to trying to think of a scenario.
If the Government say, "We have proceeded with this investment
so much that that is why we should make a decision to accept a
new nuclear deterrent", do you honestly think that MPs will
vote according to the amount of money they will spend potentially?
It just does not work out.
Dr Jenkins: I would like to put
this in a historic context. It has been said by people like Lord
Solly Zuckerman or Dr David Owen, speaking about his time as minister,
that Aldermaston scientists have manipulated political decisions,
have gone ahead with the development of systems without proper
oversight. All this has been said by people of that calibre. We
have the historic Chevaline decision. The issue may not simply
be one for Downing Street and that is why I would very much hope
that this Committee will first question senior scientists and
engineers at Aldermaston, secondly, seek independent technical
advice because this is a technical issue, and thirdly, go to where
the best expertise can be found for opposing points of view, which
is the United States, and call on the people of the very highest
calibre from inside the nuclear weapons establishment to advise
it in this issue.
Q189 Chairman: Thank you both
very much indeed. I have said that you will have the opportunity
to come and talk to us about treaty obligations. If after this
morning you want to come back you would be most welcome.
Dr Hudson: I would love to.
Chairman: Thank you very much indeed
for your evidence this morning. As I say, you have stimulated
us enormously and we have enjoyed it.
| 
