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AFG2 05 REV
Revised memorandum from Dr Michael Williams
Dr. Michael Williams is a NATO expert, currently engaged in strategic concepts and planning evaluation examining civil-military relations in Afghanistan.
Executive Summary (1) NATO has made a valuable contribution towards improving the stability, security and development of Afghanistan. Despite the progress made, however, the current situation is less than ideal. Primary areas where the Alliance has failed to deliver adequately included: (a) failure to agree on a standard mandate for NATO operations; (b) provision of adequate numbers of fighting forces and supporting equipment; and (d) a failure to effectively harness the 'comprehensive approach'. A lack of international funding for the mission and a reluctance/inability to address the external factors affecting the security situation in Afghanistan have also hampered the mission. These shortcomings are exacerbated by the fact that the international community is largely absent from Afghanistan. NATO has been handed the entire responsibility for a mission that it never accepted. NATO should be only key actor among many in Afghanistan, not the sole provider of security, reconstruction and development.
Strategic Ambiguity (2) The overriding issue with NATO's involvement in Afghanistan is that the nature of the mission has never been agreed upon by all the Allies. The International Security Assistance Force, operated by NATO, is charged with 'assisting' the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) with the maintenance of security throughout the country.'[1] This should consequently enable the GOA and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to operate across the country. NATO has defined security very broadly, and as such ISAF encompasses substantial reconstruction and development tasks, in addition to military campaigns. This has led the public to believe that NATO is responsible for rebuilding Afghanistan and it has meant that UNAMA has not played a major role in country. NATO allies are themselves quite divided over how maintaining security should be achieved. Certain members feel that the primary object is reconstruction and development and have sold the mission to their publics as a 'peace-keeping and development' operation. Consequently, they do not want to engage in combat. Other members, while believing that reconstruction and development are essential to long-term security and stability in Afghanistan, believe that kinetic operations, particularly in the south and east of Afghanistan, are essential to support development objectives. The lack of consensus on this point has meant that allies have been (a) reluctant to contribute fighting troops and equipment and (b) have failed to standardise a 'NATO approach' to the country, instead utilising different combinations of military power and development in an entirely uncoordinated manner. There is also a real threat that NATO is seeking to impose a Western system of government in Afghanistan, which is not a practical or achievable objective.
Manpower and Equipment (3) As of 13.2.07 there were approximately 35,460 allied soldiers in Afghanistan. The largest contingent consists of 14,000 US troops. The other large contributors are Britain (5200), Germany (3000), Canada (2500), the Netherlands (2200) and Italy (1950). The remaining 7,000 troops are provided by an additional thirty-one countries with smaller contingents including 1,000 French soldiers, 800 from Turkey and 550 from Spain. The current number of troops may seem like a large number, but in reality it is quite low.
Table 1: Comparison of Peak International Troop Deployment Strength[2] Location Peak Number of Int'l Troops Int'l Troops Int'l Troops per km per person
Kosovo 40,000 1 per 0.3km 1 per 50 Bosnia 60,000 1 per 0.85km 1 per 66 East Timor 9,000 1 per 1.6km 1 per 111 Iraq 155,000 1 per 2.8km 1 per 161 Somalia 40,000 1 per 16km 1 per 200 Liberia 11,000 2200 (MEF) 1 per 8km 1 per 265 Sierra Leone 18,000 1 per 4km 1 per 300 Haiti 20,000 1 per 1.5km 1 per 375 Afghanistan 20,000 (OEF) 6,000 (ISAF) 1 per 25km 1 per 1,115
(4) This chart dates from 2004 and thus does not reflect the most current ISAF troop levels, but even with the additional troops now in Afghanistan, the ratios are among the worst. There is one international soldier per 1,123 persons. There is no escaping the fact that if one applies low levels of economic assistance and military forces to a reconstruction operation in a post-conflict society, the results will be low levels of security, slow economics growth and a lack of public confidence in the ability of the GOA/NATO to deliver. This last factor may ultimately undermine the ability to deliver on the first two issues. There are several causes for the low levels of NATO troops in country. Chief contributors such as the US and UK are overstretched, but they have in recent months increased their military manpower in Afghanistan. The more fundamental problem is that the unresolved issue as to the exact nature of the mission, coupled with a failure to understand the gravity of the security situation in Afghanistan, means many larger allies have not deployed adequate numbers of troops and equipment. Smaller allies lack sufficient expeditionary resources - but contributions by the Danes, Macedonians, and Estonians illustrate that they are committed to the operation. One must keep in mind; however, than an inability to send more troops does not mean that some NATO members do not value the mission. Italy for example cannot send additional troops, as the government is already under pressure for the current deployment. The Germans also have serious issues in this area. The recent deployment of six Tornado aircraft for reconnaissance was met with stiff resistance. Given Germany's strategic culture this should not be a surprise and the country has become much more involved in military action since 1991, so perhaps it is best to accept that this process does take time. Maintaining cohesion and fair burden sharing are inevitable challenges when using an alliance meant for Cold War territorial defence on an expeditionary mission far from home. Alliance transformation will take time, but the lack of sufficient manpower and enablers was a serious problem for ISAF IX under the command of UK General David Richards.
(5) Between May 2006 and February 2007 ISAF faced several serious military challenges. After Operation Medusa General Richards was not able to maintain sufficient troop presence to ensure that areas cleared of Taliban during the operation remained Taliban free. There were also times during the UK led-ISAF IX that General Richards was hard-pressed to avoid defeat in what was largely a conventional battle. Had it not been for the close air-support, it is very well possible that ISAF may have lost battles to the Taliban. General Richards would have fared much better had a strategic reserve been on hand. While manpower is the primary consideration in effective counter-insurgency operations, adequate equipment is required. ISAF has also been short of key enablers. Heavy lift capacity (both fixed wing and rotary), combat support, logistics have all been lacking throughout the mission. Additional troops, without enablers, are in many ways an empty donation. While NATO troops are required, a key factor in long-term success is the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Neither organisation is fully competent enough to handle the security situation alone, but the ANA is increasingly working alongside ISAF forces. This is progress, but they must not be rushed into extreme combat situations before they are ready. Such moves may ultimately erode the long-term development of the ANA. The ANP is significantly less developed than the ANA and has largely failed to provide adequate policing to increase the writ of government in Kabul.
Comprehensive Approach (6) Despite the large percentage of the ISAF mission that has been consumed with kinetic operations, the approach to providing long-term security and stability has been defined as one that encompasses reconstruction and development, as well as military operations. This is known as the 'comprehensive approach'. To be effective this approach must utilise not only the military and civilian capabilities of governments, but also of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), such as CARE and Christian Aid, as well as International Organisations (IO) such as the World Bank. While theoretically sound the current strategy has been less than optimally implemented. There exist several schisms in what is supposed to be a unified Western/International effort.
(7)Within NATO there are two levels of difficulty. First, the defence ministries, development agencies and foreign ministries of most NATO member states do not adequately communicate with each other. Reports from Afghanistan indicate that there are good people-to-people relationships between MoD, DFID and FCO representatives, but those relationships do not extend upwards back to Whitehall. In addition to intra-governmental schisms, there is a failure to coordinate across NATO amongst the various national missions operating in Afghanistan. The primary tool for provision of security, reconstruction and development is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). PRTs harness a national government's economic, military, development and foreign affairs assets to provide comprehensive security and development assistance in a specific region of Afghanistan. The PRT, while useful, has two major failings.
(8)First, there is no standard product. Every national PRT has a different mandate. Some focus on security, others development and reconstruction. Some do both. Others are obsessed with protecting their own forces and do very little at all. Furthermore, the money from each PRT comes directly from a national capitol, which means that the PRT answers to Berlin, Washington, London or Ottawa, rather than COMISAF and Kabul. Within PRTs the military side reports through ISAF, but the civilian side does not. This means that the civilian side is more susceptible to national influence, because of purse strings, than the military sides run by the ISAF commander. Some PRTs consult with the Government in Kabul and local populations about what projects are needed and engage the community. Others just blindly build schools in a random development grid, which then go unused. In the worse cases they end up as Taliban bases that need to be destroyed at a later date. ISAF IX attempted to rectify some of these deficits establishing a PRT Handbook, standardised reporting requirements and greater investment in common training for PRT staff, but more progress is needed. Brussels must establish a NATO norm for PRT deliverables. At the same time Brussels needs to provide ISAF with enough devolved power to be effective on the ground. Different institutions operating in Afghanistan take decisions at different levels; the most effective generally are those with a high degree of devolved authority.
(9)Second, PRTs have largely failed to harness the NGOs that operate in Afghanistan. This does not mean that NGOs should be subordinate to ISAF, but there must be better coordination between NGOs and ISAF civilian and military forces. NGOs worry that PRTs unnecessarily duplicate the NGO mission and that the reconstruction element of the PRT confuses Afghans as to the difference between PRTs and NGOs. This is important, for whereas the military relies on armoured vehicles and guns for security, NGOs rely on the full consent of the people. If the population becomes hostile NGOs are very soft targets. NGOs also feel that the military places too much emphasis on quick-fix projects to win 'hearts and minds' and not enough time and effort is spent on long-term development projects. Most NGOs have consequently decided to have nothing to do with PRTs. This is not good for NATO or Afghanistan. The NGOs criticisms are valid ones that have yet to be adequately addressed or rectified.
(10) To rectify some of these civil-military issues it would make sense to split Afghanistan into three types of zones: High-Conflict, Low-Conflict, Minimal-Conflict. In High Conflict Zones (HCZ) such as Lashkar Gah and Kandahar the military would be the major presence, engaged in mainly kinetic ops, with quick relief reconstruction to support the campaign. Low-Conflict Zones (LCZ) in Bamyan, Ghazni and Gardez would be engaged by PRTs that would have a balance between military and development components. PRTs could handle insecure situations, but would not be engaged in heavy combat operations. Finally, Minimal-Conflict Zones (MCZ) in areas such as Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz and Herat would be engaged by NGOs with only minimal military patrols and no-PRT presence. This would avoid NATO supplanting NGOs and it would allow for better allocation of NATO forces hopefully enabling delivery of security, development and better governance from Kabul.
International Funding (11) It is useful to compare Kosovo to Afghanistan to see how little funding that country has received. In the first four years after major fighting concluded in Kosovo the province received $1.8 billion in international aid for a population just under 2 million. In the four years since the ousting of the Taliban from power in 2001 Afghanistan was pledged $15 billion but only received some $4.7 billion. The population of Afghanistan is 29 million. Therefore, whereas the people of Kosovo received some $900 per head, Kabul has received $162 per head. Kosovo, located in Europe with a legacy of development in an industrialised country, was not nearly as decrepit as Afghanistan. Two hundred years as a buffer state between the Russian Empire and the British Empire, followed by occupation and conflict under Soviet control from 1979 to 1988, then a civil war, followed by Taliban rule and finally the US-led invasion in 2003 has left Afghanistan in ruins. The level of international funding has never been enough and more recent contributions (i.e. US, Canada) while helpful, still do not adequately match the development challenges in Afghanistan.
Neighbouring States (12) The bulk of this report has focused on the internal facets of Afghanistan's security and reconstruction, but it is worth noting that the ISAF mission will not be a success without the assistance of Afghanistan's neighbours. No matter the number of western troops deployed, the amount of money donated or the development projects completed - there will be no security in Afghanistan without the support of neighbouring states. It is next to impossible to suppress well-established insurgencies that enjoy 'external support and neighbouring sanctuary.' At the moment ISAF is engaged in securing the Afghan frontier, but it is not proactively addressing the threat from the other side of the border in Pakistan. The UK and its NATO allies must address the issue of Pakistan head on.
Conclusion (13) NATO is not failing in Afghanistan, but it is a long-way from a successful end-point. The Alliance has assumed a massive task, which will require adaptability, patience and a long-term commitment. NATO can succeed in Afghanistan if ISAF is provided with the resources and time required for such a daunting undertaking. It should not be surprise that western militaries have been slow to adapt to the reality of conflict in Afghanistan. Conflict is no longer linear - aid, military operations and diplomacy all need to occur simultaneously in places like Afghanistan. This type of conflict is still very new to the West. It will take time to adapt. It is crucial; however, the NATO gets the equation correct in determining the proper-mix of civilian vs. military activities. This is not to excuse the fact that NATO failed in part to extend effective governance away from the Kabul and major cities, into the countryside, particularly in the South. This is not surprising in some ways given the nature of the situation in Southern Afghanistan, but it means that as renewed violence threatens, local populations are still waiting from promises to be delivered and have little incentive to risk their lives. They may not turn against NATO, but they will not go out of their way to support the Alliance either. To rectify this situation the Alliance must recommit itself to the mission. It must ensure that adequate troop numbers and key enablers in place. The Alliance must address the gaps in the comprehensive approach, standardise PRTs and more effectively coordinate with other international actors. Without such changes there is little hope for sustained success in Afghanistan.
29 March 2007 [1] UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 (2001), 1510 (2003), and 1623 (2005). [2] M. Bhatia, K. Lanigan and P. Wilkinson "Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan" Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2004. |