AFG2 06

 

Memorandum from Dr Shirin Akiner

 

Debates on Afghanistan generally focus on current developments within the country. The aim here is to broaden the geographic and chronological parameters.

 

1. The NATO/ISAF Mission: Goals and Reality Checks

The list of tasks that NATO/ISAF has assumed, or is urged to assume, is daunting. Some of the key issues are considered here.

1.1 Reconstruction

This is a dangerous euphemism: 'reconstruction' implies that the situation in Afghanistan is analogous to post-war Europe and that an injection of aid will set the country back on track to stability and prosperity. The reality is very different. In 1978 Afghanistan was one of the least developed countries in the world (e.g. adult literacy 8%, average life expectancy 42 years). Twenty five years later, there had been scant improvement. The task today is not reconstruction but construction, starting from a base line that is on a par with countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger.

1.2 State-building and Nation-building

Prior to the 1990s there was a clear sense of statehood and nationhood in Afghanistan, albeit crosscut by local identities and allegiances. Today, after the shattering experience of civil war, the dual process of state-building (establishing institutions of governance and state management) and nation-building (creating a cohesive national identity) must be re-launched. Yet for this project to succeed, it must be perceived as authentic. Calls for NATO/ISAF to be involved should be treated with caution: even if there is the will and competence, the results are likely to be at best superficial, at worst, divisive.

Some progress has been made in state-building: an array of newly formed institutions is now in place (though it remains to be seen whether they acquire real significance or are mainly cosmetic). Nation-building, however, has scarcely begun. In a fragmented, multi-ethnic, multi-confessional society it is immensely difficult to create unifying symbols and narratives. Yet it is a strategic necessity, since without the articulation of a strong national identity the country could well disintegrate. Constitutional arrangements to accommodate the disparate segments of society (e.g. a federative system) may be a partial solution, but of themselves are unlikely to be sufficient.

1.3 Security and the Afghan National Army (ANA)

Assessments of the current security situation vary greatly, but if there is the political will to give NATO/ISAF adequate resources, it will probably accomplish its immediate objectives. For the longer term, the aim is to hand over responsibility for national security to the ANA and other state paramilitary forces (police etc.). Yet training alone will not equip them for this task: to function effectively, armed forces need a shared ethic, underpinned by common values and purpose. If this is lacking, neither training nor money will secure loyalty. Rather, there is a heightened risk that they will switch sides or become 'guns for hire'. Thus, inculcating a sense of patriotism grounded in a non-sectarian national identity is a not only a political issue, but also a security issue.

1.4 Governance and Leadership

Promoting good governance is another NATO/ISAF priority. In a formal sense, there is certainly scope for improving the performance of local structures. The underlying problem, however, is that governance and leadership are closely intertwined. Personal authority, based on an individual's ability to command respect, trust and allegiance is, for better or worse, a crucial factor. President Karzai has many good qualities, but they tend to be appreciated abroad more than at home. Moreover, there is a widespread rumour that he (along with several other senior officials) holds a foreign passport. This may be untrue, but it reflects the perception that he is a transitory figure. He is still relatively new to office and may yet prove to be a leader in the mould of the visionary King Amanullah. At present, however, his ability to act as a genuinely inspirational figure in the re-creation of state and nation is limited.

 

2. Towards a Sustainable Economy?

In 2004, economic aid worth $8 billion was pledged by bilateral and multilateral donors. There is an expectation that this is helping to lay sound economic foundations. This is not necessarily so. Some of the problems are highlighted below.

2.1 Aid and Debt

Inevitably, donor fatigue will set in sooner or later. Donations will be replaced by loans and credits, thereby adding to an already substantial external debt. Illegal drugs apart, the country has few natural resources. Mineral reserves are limited, extraction and transportation costs high. Handicrafts and agricultural products will scarcely be sufficient to support a modern economy. It is hard to see how, in a competitive global market, Afghanistan will attract the investment necessary to generate jobs and development. Yet without this, it risks joining the ranks of highly indebted poor countries.

2.2 Creating an Appropriate Infrastructure

Many of the new infrastructural projects are driven by prestige rather than economic rationale. They are expensive to construct and given the extreme environmental conditions, will incur high maintenance costs. Unless they are incorporated into an integrated national development strategy, they will become expensive white elephants, serving no useful purpose but diverting funds from essential low-key projects.

2.3 Demographic Pressures

Almost 45% of Afghanistan's population is under 15 years of age - only the Gaza Strip and a few African states have a similar age structure. In 2006, the population numbered just over 31 million; by 2015 it is set to reach 35.5 million, by 2025, 45 million. Thus, each year over 500,000 additional people join the queue for food, housing, jobs and medical care. Unless their needs can be met, widespread poverty will not be eradicated.

2.4 Alienation of the Middle Class

The gap between the average earnings of Afghans and expatriates is vast. There is a smaller, but nevertheless large gap between salaries for Afghans in the public sector and those employed by foreign organisations. Differentials such as these have two consequences: a) the public service sector cannot attract good calibre local staff and is thus unable to function effectively; b) the middle class - the very group that in the past constituted the core of the progressive, pro-reformist sector of the population - has been marginalised and alienated.

 

3. Regional Perspectives

3.1 Neighbouring States

Afghanistan is bounded by six states - in the west Pakistan and Iran, in the east China, in the north Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Pakistan is both the principal trade and security partner, and a source of security threats. The involvement of the other states is very low. Directly or indirectly, the Western-led coalition has made it clear that they are not welcome. Yet all these states have a vested interest in regional security and could make a substantial contribution to the stabilisation and recovery of Afghanistan. In particular, many Uzbek and Tajik technical specialists worked in Afghanistan during the 1980s - their expertise is valuable and should be utilised.

3.2 Security Assessments

The states that are most at risk from instability in Afghanistan are Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In autumn 2001 they were unequivocal in their support for Operation Enduring Freedom. They believed that this would eradicate the triple threats of drug trafficking, terrorism and religious extremism and open the way to economic cooperation. This has not happened. Rather, the security threats have increased. Concomitantly, confidence in NATO has fallen.

3.3 Regional Organisations and Transport Networks

Over the past decade regional organisations (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Eurasian Economic Community and the Economic Cooperation Organisation) have been actively promoting trade and investment. An expanding network of roads, railways and pipelines now links member states together, providing access to new markets and driving economic growth. Yet Afghanistan, geographically at the heart of the region, remains outside these developments, partly because of the uncertain security situation, but more especially because of the exclusive nature of NATO/ISAF policies.

 

4. Looking Ahead

NATO/ISAF has embarked on an open-ended mission. The goals are aspirational rather than specific, hence it is difficult to set benchmarks by which to judge progress, let alone to devise an exit strategy. Yet at some point there has to be a pause for reality checks: What is the vision for Afghanistan's future? How is it to be achieved? Will it be self-sustaining? These questions can only be answered by thinking through the consequences of different courses of action.

4.1 'Life in the Zoo' or 'Return to Natural Habitat'?

Metaphorically speaking, Afghanistan is currently experiencing 'life in the zoo' - nurtured and protected by external sponsors. Let us suppose that there is no ceiling to the provision of aid and that it will flow unabated until Afghanistan has been lifted out of the category of 'least developed countries' into that of 'low' or even 'medium' developed countries. What then? Is it to remain indefinitely an expatriate enclave or is to be re-integrated into the region - to continue the metaphor, 'to return to natural habitat'?

4.2 Spreading Democracy: 'Oil Slick Theory'

There is a school of thought that believes that NATO/ISAF can create an outpost of democracy in Afghanistan, which will then spread like an 'oil slick on water' throughout the region. Yet the very metaphor reveals the weakness of this argument: oil spreads on water because it is a continuous, uniform mass. Afghanistan's neighbours are anything but uniform in history, culture or traditions, thus this is surely a vain hope.

4.3 Can NATO/ISAF aid constructive re-integration?

The longer that Afghanistan's isolation continues, the more difficult it will be to re-integrate it successfully into the region. Yet without this integration there can be no sustainable economic development. Regional security would also be enhanced by regional cooperation. Thus it is of vital importance that Afghanistan should be encouraged and supported to establish close ties with neighbouring states.

There are many obvious areas for cooperation, including cross-border trade and transport, border security, counter-narcotics operations and management of cross-border rivers. A range of bilateral and multilateral structures exist which could facilitate such contacts. A new initiative which could prove useful is Kofi Annan's proposal to create a UN Centre for Conflict Prevention Diplomacy in Turkmenistan. A neutral venue, this could be used to mobilise a virtuous synergy between NATO/ISAF and regional bilateral and multilateral players.

 

5. Conclusions

In the epigraph cited above, Clausewitz emphasises the importance of defining objectives and resisting unrealistic adventures. There is much that NATO/ISAF can achieve in Afghanistan, but if mission creep is allowed to take hold, efforts will be dissipated and counter-productive, leading to resentment and disappointment for all concerned.

 

22 March 2007