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AFG2 08
Memorandum from The British and Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group
Executive Summary
1. Increasing insecurity is now the greatest concern for ordinary Afghans in many parts of the country. Over the past six months, levels of violence have been at their highest since 2001. Purely military responses are clearly an inappropriate response to Afghanistan's challenges. However, calls from some policy-makers for reconstruction to be driven by quick-wins and 'hearts and minds' objectives are also problematic.
2. NGOs can only operate in insecure provinces on the basis of neutrality, independence and good relations with local communities. Across much of Afghanistan, associations, whether real or perceived, with a contested military operation and central government compromise our legitimacy and acceptance among local populations.
3. The UK Government should support the adoption of country-specific civil-military relations guidelines. In-country mechanisms for dialogue between the military and civilian actors should also be strengthened to ensure higher-level engagement and follow-up on commitments made. Civil-military relations structures should promote effective dialogue between military and civilian actors, recognising their different mandates and comparative advantages. Any public references to these initiatives must be sensitive to the risks attached to perceptions of associations between the military and civilian agencies.
4. The UK strategy for its NATO IX deployment to Helmand constitutes an attempt at a more appropriate approach to coordination across political, military and aid strategies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the bad practice of past ISAF and Coalition forces appears to have reduced. For example, more emphasis is placed on coordination with local and international civilian agencies to facilitate civilian-led reconstruction. However, our sources indicate that the Helmand deployment's leadership structure and policy-making mechanisms contain certain weaknesses, including continued military dominance of decision-making. As a consequence, sources suggest that the military went beyond the agreed strategy in Helmand, generating various problems of over-stretch and inter-departmental coordination. An independent evaluation is required to assess whether the strategy and its implementation have been effective.
5. UK aid policy towards Afghanistan is imbalanced in its emphasis on state-centred aid modalities. While NGOs appreciate the need to build the capacity of the Afghan Government, this emphasis has led to a 'service delivery gap' emerging in sectors and areas beyond the central government's capacity to deliver or political and geographic reach. This has been compounded by reduced funding available from the EU to frontline NGO livelihoods programmes.
6. Short-term and military-led approaches to counter-narcotics are ineffective. Emphasis should be placed on tackling root causes of the opium trade, and local and civilian leadership of these efforts.
Military and civil-military relations issues
Civil-military relations: Promoting force protection and 'hearts and minds'?
7. In Afghanistan, as elsewhere, military approaches to civil-military coordination (CIMIC), both Coalition and NATO, emphasise force protection and hearts and minds objectives, often described in terms of 'building consent'. The notion that aid, and quick impact projects (QIP) in particular, contribute to building that consent has become something of an orthodoxy among some military officers and policy-makers. The operational experience of BAAG member agencies in Afghanistan suggests that the military approach to CIMIC has often proved ineffective, or even counter-productive, in terms of both military and civilian objectives. Instead of facilitating military-implemented or funded QIPs, civil-military relations capacities should rather focus on promoting effective coordination between the military and the full spectrum of civilian actors, emphasising their comparative advantages and different mandates.
8. Many of the QIPS funded or implemented by international forces are unsustainable. These failed QIPs, driven by tactical military objectives, have contributed to the disillusion - and diminishing 'consent' - of local populations. The potential for CIMIC strategies to build local consent has been compromised due to the following factors:
a. Short-term horizons framed by tactical planning and six-month troop rotation timeframes; b. Technical ineffectiveness of military CIMIC capabilities (eg. wells dug in inappropriate locations due to salinity or water-table sustainability concerns); c. High costs of construction projects undertaken by the military (e.g. estimates suggest that schools built with US PRT money have cost two to three times more than the normal price of $50-60,000). d. Lack of priority or capacity attached to ensuring effective hand-over and follow-up in terms of project maintenance; e. Lack of genuine trust and good relations with beneficiary communities and local power-holders leading to a lack of local ownership of projects; f. Intelligence-led analysis of local politics and QIP targeting, combined with a lack of contextual understanding of development-related political dynamics resulting in a tendency to 'do harm' in terms of local power relations and conflict dynamics; g. Military QIPs building the expectations of local populations beyond the capacity of military CIMIC to deliver, which results in ever-decreasing returns in terms of building consent.
9. While to date there has been no thorough evaluation of the developmental value of UK PRT aid projects, a joint-donor evaluation report of assistance given by five European countries to Afghanistan since 2001, which included the UK, stated that these projects 'could have been delivered more cheaply and efficiently by other aid providers' and that 'time pressure for delivery during short assignments promotes a "just do it" approach with limited concern for long-term impacts and sustainability.'[1]
10. Long histories of 'aid culture' and military intervention in Afghanistan ensure that local actors are more experienced in 'hearts and minds' strategies than most ISAF soldiers on the ground. During the Soviet occupation, small mobile columns consisting of military forces and civic action specialists, such as medics, were dispersed across the country.[2]
11. Economic incentives, such as military-funded or -implemented QIPs, cannot change deeply-held political, social and cultural beliefs, attitudes and identities. Political limitations to 'hearts and minds' strategies arise from the prevailing climate of fear, suspicion and cynicism after decades of weak or oppressive government and brutal external intervention. Local populations receive information about the nature of the government and international forces from many sources, including widespread insurgent propaganda. Judgements are also formed on the basis of personal experience. Thus, the US Government is frequently portrayed as having undue influence over President Karzai and government policies. Government corruption and the tactical deals struck between the international military and corrupt or brutal governors, local officials or warlords are also widely discussed and resented. Accounts of Coalition forces wrongly accusing and detaining innocent individuals as suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda members are well-known. Reports of brutal and culturally-insensitive practices during search operations by Coalition forces, such as bursting into womens' quarters, also resonate strongly.[3] However defined, CIMIC, reconstruction and assistance cannot compensate or substitute for the absence of a political settlement or security.
12. A study of local perceptions of peace operations suggests that for some communities in Afghanistan, as elsewhere, assistance is welcome regardless of the donor's military identity or political objective.[4] For some non-Taliban aligned communities, accepting and participating in aid projects with political significance in the Afghan context, such as school buildings, has become a gesture of defiance against the insurgency.[5] For others, risks outweigh the benefits, causing reluctance to accept military-associated aid or aid by any international actor in some instances. Over 200 schools, both civilian and military-funded, have been attacked by insurgents in the past year, and an increasing number stand unused for fear of being targeted.[6] Indeed, aid more generally represents a small component of most Afghans' coping strategies in times of conflict and transition. Predominant strategies include communal cooperation on rehabilitation, or sending sons to Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere to work and post remittances. According to one project participant: 'Villagers are watching which way the weather is going. People are nervous. They want to make sure that today's alliances will not disadvantage them tomorrow. They hear from the Taliban: "NATO will be gone within a year or so, and it will be us that rule then. Just you wait."'
UK civil-military relations strategies in Helmand
13. In preparing the UK deployment to Helmand, there was an attempt to pursue a more strategic approach to civil-military relations across military, aid and political spheres. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) facilitated an inter-departmental process to develop the UK Government strategy for Helmand. In general, this process and the PRCU's role is viewed as helpful, and yet the implementation of the strategy has proved problematic in certain key regards.
14. According to informants both within Government agencies and external contacts, the military did not keep to the inter-departmental Helmand strategy. According to our sources, this divergence, in part, involved the military conducting operations outside of agreed priority areas; thereby compounding the problem of military over-stretch. This has been partly attributed to the authority delegated to the military force commander (Brigadier Ed Butler) and tactical imperatives that arose on the ground. This led to considerable political pressure on aid agencies to 'back up' the military by implementing QIPs in temporarily-secured areas in order to deliver 'hearts and minds'. Military spokespeople made repeated critical remarks in both public and closed fora regarding the alleged absence of DFID, UNAMA and NGOs in southern Afghanistan. In fact, this rhetoric was based on flawed assumptions regarding the potential for QIPs to win 'hearts and minds'. Furthermore, this rhetoric ignored the reality that NGOs, local and international, do operate in southern Afghanistan. The basis for NGO operations in southern Afghanistan is outlined further below, and is, indeed, undermined by public calls for aid agencies to align with military 'hearts and minds' operations.
15. The Department for International Development (DFID) allocated Development Advisors to manage a 'Provincial Stabilisation Programme' that aims, in part, to provide 'under the radar' funding for NGOs to operate on a low-profile basis in the province.[7] The programme's objective is to support reconstruction and alternative livelihoods through projects that will not attract insurgent targeting, unlike QIPs publicly associated with the PRT. DFID has also sought to discreetly consult NGOs on the security and political obstacles limiting their ability to operate in southern Afghanistan. The objective is to explore options for addressing these constraints through behind-the-scenes action. This strategy, in intent at least, is perceived by several BAAG member agencies as an improvement on the earlier CIMIC practice of some NATO and Coalition contingents.
16. A separate UK Helmand PRT Quick Impact Project (QIP) budget has also been established. Allocations are decided by the Helmand Executive Group (HEG), an inter-departmental committee described by one officer as a 'joint effects targeting board'.[8] As such, there has been a deliberate effort to exert civilian - DFID and Foreign Office - leadership over the process. The criteria for allocating DFID QIP funds adopt a similar framework to that used in the Balkans; namely that expenditure should reflect an integrated approach to development and security issues, combining developmental outcomes with secondary 'force protection' or 'hearts and minds' objectives. However, officers involved have questioned the degree to which QIP efficacy - particularly in terms of project impact on consent at the community level - can either be analysed, monitored or evaluated at the aggregate level in senior-level committees, such as the HEG.[9]
17. The UK Government should consider undertaking an independent evaluation of the contribution of integrated civil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan. International forces, including PRTs, have an inevitably political character and so must relate to local powerholders as well as operate in accordance with their mandate, which emphasises strengthening central government authority across the country. Several PRTs have sought to facilitate linkages between central and provincial-level governance in Afghanistan. Different NATO PRTs contain a varied mix of civilian expertise to provide support on these political and diplomatic aspects, while PRT Commanders assume a political representative role at the provincial and local levels. NATO leadership has also been instrumental in establishing the Afghan-led 'Policy Action Group' (PAG) initiative to reenergise coordination on reconstruction and security at central and provincial levels. The constraints, challenges and efficacy of different approaches to this aspect of civil-military relations have only just begun to be evaluated, for instance by the Norwegian Government in Faryab province. One possible best practice model is the Canadian PRT 'Confidence in Government' programme through which the PRT facilitates and provides security for central state representatives to visit and negotiate with provincial and local-level representatives - an unprecedented occurrence in some districts.
18. Although the ISAF southern Afghanistan strategy since 2006 resembles - in intent - a more joined-up and civilian-led approach than exercised in past years, several officials involved have raised concerns regarding continued military dominance of decision-making processes. This can be compounded by variables in military culture - so that paratroopers are more likely to emphasise military preeminence than line infantry. Stabilisation and reconstruction require increased civilian leadership and capacity to provide the necessary context understanding; political analysis and engagement with local power-holders and communities. Notwithstanding the political acumen of certain individuals within the military, the military intrinsically lacks these capacities and qualities. Indeed both their capabilities and their strategic, operational and tactical imperatives militate against effectively navigating and affecting change in local politics. For example, a significant component of the military CIMIC support capability consists of technical experts, for example engineers, who analyse local needs and promote QIP strategies reflecting that technical worldview. Yet, as experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates, building wells or pumps because local power-holders identify that as the priority does not equate to an effective political or reconstruction strategy.
Civilian 'space', NGO aid programmes and civil-military relations
19. 89 aid workers have been killed since 2003, as compared to a very small number who were targeted during the preceding 14 years. The few agencies continuing to operate in the south and east either benefit from long-established programmes in specific locations, which enable them to negotiate a degree of protection from local communities, or they opt to take considerable risks. The Afghan NGO, Afghan Health and Development Services, has had a significant number of its staff killed in its efforts to provide health services to the camps for internally displaced people to the west of Kandahar.
20. In general, agencies do not perceive a consistent or over-arching trend of targeting of NGO workers across much of the country - otherwise the attack rate would be much higher. However, in the current situation of instability and factionalised violence, the 'community acceptance' approach no longer holds in a consistent fashion.
21. In insecure areas across Afghanistan, NGOs can only operate on the basis of neutrality, independence, low visibility and the acceptance of local communities. The notion of 'humanitarian space' captures the moral, political and operational dimensions of our capacity to operate safely and effectively in such a chronically insecure situation. Ironically, the concept of 'humanitarian space' provides a kind of correlate to the military concept of 'campaign authority'. It is every bit as apparently abstract and ideological, and yet every bit as real and important to the sustainability and legitimacy of operations on the ground.[10]
22. By 'blurring the lines' between aid and military operations in hostile environments, military approaches to CIMIC can undermine the 'space' for civilian NGOs. This is counter-productive not only in terms of development or humanitarian objectives, but also in terms of political objectives relating to stabilisation and reconstruction. By emphasising force protection and high-visibility or quick impact projects associated with their presence, military approaches to funding or implementing assistance programmes compromise the neutrality and independence of aid programmes. Regardless of whether an individual aid agency has actually associated with the military, perceptions and rumours are sufficient to compromise an aid agency's acceptance in a given area. Yet NGOs (operating independently on the basis of community acceptance and neutrality) can contribute indirectly to 'stabilisation' through low visibility community-based development that could, over time, be scaled-up once security is improved.
23. Some commentators commonly reject the 'humanitarian space' argument, claiming these concerns are dated in the context of the Global War on Terror. In contrast, humanitarian NGOs do not dispute that insecurity in Afghanistan arises from multiple factors, including economic criminality and NGO-targeting irrelevant of association or distance from international forces. However, this does not alter our basic concern regarding the security consequences of military involvement in assistance. Indeed, the very complexity of political and conflict dynamics in Afghanistan refutes the notion of a homogenous insurgency targeting humanitarian agencies in a uniform fashion. In southern Afghanistan, for example, one BAAG members' local partner was approached by representatives of tribes aligned with the Taliban and told: 'Your aid is good for the local community and may continue. However, if you or the programmes you implement become associated with the NATO forces, then you will make yourselves a target.'
24. International and national military forces have, without regard to the consequences for the image of NGOs, entered their compounds or, as has happened on at least two occasions, have taken these over. The most recent example of this was the entry of US forces into the Afghanaid office in Nuristan during March 2007 and their insistence that this was to be their operational base in the area. This occupation of an NGO office was taken forward without prior consultation with local authorities and without the consent of the NGO in question. Another NGO has closed its programme in Helmand as a direct result of such an incident. Once NGOs have been perceived to be associated with the military, their neutrality and legitimacy are undermined.
25. To be effective and sustainable, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance should be led and implemented by local or international civilian agencies. In line with international guidelines on civil-military relations, the UK Government should only support the use of the military in aid operations as a 'last resort' when civilian agencies are unable to respond due to capacity or security constraints. UNAMA should be strengthened in terms of political backing, human and financial resources to support aid coordination across the country, particularly in the southern provinces. In the most insecure provinces, international forces may be required to implement relief programmes in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law. However, it is unclear what benefits are secured by the military implementing quasi-development projects, such as dams or schools, which become instant targets in insecure regions.
26. Several BAAG agencies participate in the Afghanistan 'NGO civil-military relations working-group', which is jointly hosted by ACBAR (a national NGO network in Afghanistan) and UNAMA in Kabul. The group is attended by NATO ISAF and Coalition representatives. Its objectives are to facilitate dialogue between the military and civilian agencies in order to address concerns regarding 'bad practice' (eg. military CIMIC activities that impact negatively on aid programmes), and share information of relevance to NGO safety and security. Critical to the on-going sustainability of this working-group is its facilitation through a neutral, third-party actor (ie. UN OCHA). Equally important is the group's careful demarcation as a forum for appropriate dialogue, rather than information-sharing that can be perceived as alignment or intelligence-sharing with the military.
27. The 'NGO civil-military relations working-group' suffers from two major limitations:
a. Inconsistent participation from both military and NGO sides; b. Failure on the military side to follow-up and implement commitments made.
In terms of inconsistent participation, the military appears to lack the will to consistently send representatives of an adequate seniority. Many NGOs simply lack the staff capacity to engage in such processes. In terms of poor follow-up, examples include the on-going problems with military occupation of NGO compounds and military funding of QIPs in an uncoordinated fashion. These issues have been repeatedly raised in the group, and yet 'bad practices' persist.
28. In view of these trends, NGOs have two specific recommendations: a. The UK Government should support an initiative to develop country-specific civil-military relations guidelines that are explicit about good and bad practice in CIMIC. Such an initiative should draw on the lessons learned from UN-facilitated country-specific CIMIC guidelines in Iraq and Afghanistan. b. The UK Government should support an initiative to establish an additional, higher-level forum for civil-military relations on a quarterly basis. This forum should include a delegation of NGO Country Directors, more senior representatives from UNAMA and senior military representatives. This would supplement the current operational-level dialogue in the NGO civil-military relations working-group
UK donor funding, aid effectiveness and reconstruction
29. Current donor aid policy for Afghanistan places significant emphasis on state-building; linked to wider political and military objectives of stabilisation and political transition. While many development NGOs support the objectives of promoting a democratic, effective and accountable state, they are concerned that current aid policies are imbalanced. Donor policy emphasises central 'state-building' at the expense of providing basic services to populations in regions outside of the capacity of government to deliver and its political or geographic reach. This has led to what the Overseas Development Institute terms a 'service gap': when relief assistance is phased out but state capacity is insufficient to ensure the provision of services.[11]
30. At present, government-aligned aid programmes are targeted by insurgents across much of Afghanistan. Schools, hospitals and other public service institutions have been attacked for their symbolic value as representing government authority and state-citizen relations. As a consequence, the Select Committee and other stakeholders should exercise serious caution in discussing these issues and confidentiality regarding BAAG's remarks on NGO roles in programmes associated with the central government.
31. DFID, in particular, has drastically reduced UK funding available for NGO programmes. This follows DFID's decision to place an overwhelming emphasis on channelling aid through state-centred mechanisms. While the rationale for this allocation strategy is partly legitimate (ie. the need to build effective state capacities), it is also partly driven by unstrategic imperatives, including the pressure to reduce DFID staff numbers and transaction costs. This is also partly shaped by the broad trend in DFID aid policy in non-conflict contexts towards larger-scale disbursements channelled through direct budgetary support to recipient governments.
32. The UK emphasis on channelling aid through the Afghan Government is placing the programmes and, in some cases, the ongoing survival of NGOs at risk. UK NGOs, including smaller, Afghanistan-focused NGOs such as Afghanaid, can offer distinct comparative advantages, in terms of their institutional memory and long-term good relations with local communities. These comparative advantages, if lost due to cuts in UK funding to NGOs, will be hard to recover in future.
33. NGOs can and do play important roles in building government capacity. Many of the Government of Afghanistan's national priority programmes, such as the National Solidarity Programme, depend on the capacity and expertise of NGOs to implement them, under the coordination of the central authorities. These best practices should be built on, while recognising that in some insecure areas programmes associated with the Government are targeted. In view of this, innovative approaches to funding NGO programmes and joint NGO-government programmes should be explored; recognising and managing the risks attached. The potential for joint programmes with line ministries and local authorities should also be supported. The main priorities should be to fill service gaps where they exist, and to link such programmes to efforts to build government capacity over time.
34. NGOs are also concerned that the geographic distribution of humanitarian and development assistance is, in part, influenced by military imperatives. DFID and other donors are proactive in dialogue and funding with NGOs in provinces that feature their national PRT, while engagement in other provinces is less evident. While increased attention on the PRT provinces is partly inevitable, this should not be at the expense of resources for other provinces. Indeed, while it proves difficult to spend assistance in the southern provinces because of the prevailing insecurity, programmes in other parts of the country are currently under-funded. One provincial governor in northern Afghanistan recently remarked that local populations in that province might need to initiate violence and increase poppy cultivation in order to attract the necessary funds for reconstruction.
35. Private military companies (PMC), often in consortia with other private sector actors, are looking to increase their involvement in aid programmes in Afghanistan. In the words of one industry representative, the PMC sector wants 'to raid the humanitarian space in Afghanistan'. This is of concern to NGOs in terms of the principles and practice of aid. PMC involvement in the delivery of aid programmes, indeed any armed provision of assistance, is based on security provided through armed deterrence, rather than acceptance. As such, it undermines the basis for humanitarian access negotiated through the humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality. In view of this, NGOs do not believe that PMCs present an effective strategy for reconstruction in Afghanistan.
Civilian protection, human rights and international humanitarian law
36. ISAF and Coalition military operations are causing numerous civilian deaths and injuries and damaging property and other civilian infrastructure. The rate of strikes by the US Air Force in South of Afghanistan is far higher than in Iraq - for example, there were 750 in just one month (May) last year. President Karzai has made a number of calls in the past for the US-led coalition to exercise greater care when conducting air-strikes. International forces in Afghanistan should abide by the spirit and the letter of international humanitarian and human rights law.
37. The NATO approach to detention is to hand over detainees within a few days (72 or 96 hours). Human rights agencies, including Amnesty International, have raised concerns about handing over detainees to a country that might use torture or mistreatment. According to their sources, the handovers are now mainly to the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and it is likely that some of these detainees will be tortured. Some ISAF troop-contributing countries have established monitoring mechanisms to keep track of what happens to the detainees. However, concerns have been raised about access to detainees, reliability of monitoring mechanisms and access to redress if the monitoring agency finds cases of abuse.
38. The US continues to hold Afghan detainees in Guantanamo and Bagram. There are 'plans' to handover these to Afghan authorities and place them in the high detention facility at Pulicharki refurbished by the US. US detention practices in both Guantanamo and Bagram raise concerns both in terms of human rights and local Afghan perceptions of the international community's commitment to a just resolution to Afghanistan's challenges.
Counter-narcotics
39. The international community is increasingly concerned by Afghanistan's opium economy, which has evident implications for security and stability. Some parliamentarians, the media and other commentators in donor countries push for a 'quick fix' to poppy cultivation. However, a short-term approach to counter-narcotics would be ineffective and counter-productive. Our operational experience, that of local partners and the communities we work with, suggest that an effective strategy must involve holistic and properly sequenced assistance to tackle problems of security, governance and development: 'One cannot speak of creating legal livelihoods until there is a legal and legitimate context within they can function.'[12]
40. Political pressure for NATO military forces to become involved in counter-narcotics operations, in particular eradication programmes, should be opposed.[13] Sustainable and consent-based strategies should be led by local and civilian authorities, with a particular emphasis on effective action by the police and judiciary. Due to the recent substantial growth in opium poppy production - last year's harvest was the largest on record - the US government has been exerting pressure on other NATO countries to involve their troops in counter-narcotics operations. This is a policy already pursued by US troops operating under the OEF mission. Although such an approach was resisted initially by other countries, a communiqué issued by NATO in December 2005 gave the green light for ISAF to support to the Afghan government's counter-narcotics effort. Over the last year there have been a number of incidents where ISAF or US OEF troops have provided logistical support and 'second-tier' security for opium eradication by the Afghan police and military. Involving ISAF troops in counter-narcotics work is wrong for several reasons. Firstly, it diverts overstretched military resources away from the main task of providing security. Secondly, experience from South America shows that using troops to eradicate drug crops tends to undermine the role of legitimate civilian authorities (e.g. the police and the courts) in dealing with the problem and carries a high risk of human rights abuses and conflict escalation. Thirdly, it associates ISAF with an eradication policy that is not working and is damaging to the livelihoods of poor farmers.
41. The premise that farmers can be strong-armed into abandoning opium cultivation is flawed. Eradication and cultivation-bans alienate the very communities we need to work with. For example, in Thailand, after early failed experiments in eradication, the Thai Government waited until more than a decade of development efforts had produced sufficient economic alternatives before resuming eradication.[14] Recent experience in Afghanistan suggests that eradication merely displaces production to new regions. Furthermore, in some regions, such eradication programmes have been used to target political opponents or economic competitors; thereby contributing to weak and corrupt governance.[15] This contributes to local-level conflict and further erodes support for counter-narcotics efforts and the Government of Afghanistan. Eradication should only be implemented when the state is capable, trust in communities has been built, and poor people have access to economically-attractive, legal livelihoods.
42. The opium economy in Afghanistan is a deeply rooted and complex phenomenon, which requires a long-term and multi-faceted response. Critical factors include inequitable and exploitative patterns of land tenure, share-cropping arrangements, and credit/debt systems. Many small farmers simply have no viable alternatives; their access to land, credit and livelihoods depends on participating in poppy cultivation. The first measure of success for programmes dedicated to fostering alternatives to opium poppy cultivation must be the quality of life of poor farmers and their families.
Recommendations
Regarding civil-military relations:
43. The UK Government should support an initiative to develop country-specific civil-military relations guidelines that are explicit about good and bad practice in CIMIC. Such an initiative should draw on the lessons learned from UN-facilitated country-specific CIMIC guidelines in Iraq and Afghanistan.
44. The UK Government should support an initiative to establish an additional, higher-level forum for dialogue on civil-military relations issues; possibly on a quarterly basis. This senior forum should include a delegation of NGO Country Directors, more senior representatives from UNAMA and senior military representatives. Its purpose would be to ensure greater follow-up and political engagement on issues raised in the operational-level discussions of the NGO civil-military relations working-group, co-hosted by UNAMA and ACBAR.
45. The UK Government should commission independent research on the following key aspects of current NATO strategy in Afghanistan: the inter-departmental strategy, leadership structure and decision-making mechanisms for the UK deployment to Helmand; the contribution of integrated civil-military operations, such as PRTs, to improved governance in Afghanistan; and the contribution of military-funded or implemented quick impact projects to actually building 'consent' in terms of force protection or stabilisation.
46. UK forces should abide by the spirit and the letter of international humanitarian and human rights law. Specific concerns regarding the conduct of US Coalition and NATO ISAF operations should be addressed, with particular attention to issues of detention and use of 'rendition' practices and interrogation at US facilities; and the detention and hand-over of prisoners to Afghan national authorities.
Regarding aid policy:
47. The UK Government, and specifically DFID, should review and change course in its current aid policy for Afghanistan. An imbalanced emphasis on state-centred aid modalities to deliver 'state-building', although legitimate as an objective in-itself, has led to the emergence of a 'service gap'. Particular attention should be paid to the NGO capacity to provide basic services and livelihoods support for populations outside of the capacity and political or geographic reach of government to deliver. DFID should identify creative mechanisms to provide funding to NGOs for frontline services, such as support to consortia funding, use of 'local funds' arrangements, joint programming and increased DFID staff capacity to manage NGO funding.
48. Decisions on aid allocations should be made according to levels of humanitarian need and the potential for sustainable reconstruction; and not driven by the geographic focus of military operations.
Regarding counter-narcotics;
49. Political pressure for NATO military forces to become involved in counter-narcotics operations, in particular eradication programmes, should be opposed.[16] Sustainable and consent-based strategies should be led by local and civilian authorities, with a particular emphasis on effective action by the police and judiciary.
50. Counter-narcotics strategies should rely on an appropriately sequenced combination of economic development within the communities on the one hand and eradication and law enforcement efforts on the other. The first measure of success for programmes dedicated to fostering alternatives to opium poppy cultivation should be the quality of life of poor farmers and their families.
[1] A Joint Evaluation: Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan from Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and UK, Danish International Development Agency (Danida), 2005 [2] Giustozzi (2000) p.186 [3] BAAG (2006) p.6 [4] Tufts (2005) p.18 [5] Interviews with NGO staff on condition of anonymity in Afghanistan, August 2006 [6] HRW (2006) p.3 [7] Interview with DFID Afghanistan official, 29 August 2006 [8] Interview on condition of anonymity, August 2006 [9] Interview on condition of anonymity, August 2006 [10] The British military doctrine (Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-90, April 2006 Edition) defines campaign authority as follows: 'Campaign Authority comprises 4 inter-dependent factors: 1. The perceived legitimacy of the international mandate that establishes the PSO. 2. The perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints, explicit or implicit in the mandate, placed on those executing the PSO. 3. The degree to which factions, the local population and other actors subjugate themselves to the authority of those executing the PSO; from active resistance, through unwilling compliance to freely given consent. 4. The degree to which the activities of those executing the PSO meet the terms of the mandate and the expectations of factions, local populations and others.
[11] 'From crisis response to state-building: services and stability in conflict-affected contexts', ODI Humanitarian Policy Group Discussion Paper (October 2006) [12] Mansfield, D., Pain, A., Opium Poppy Eradication: How to raise risk when there's nothing to lose? AREU Briefing Paper, August 2006, p.2 [13] Losing Ground Drug control and war in Afghanistan, Transnational Institute, TNI Briefing Series, December 2006 [14] CARE International, No Quick Fix: Curbing Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, December 2006, p.1 [15] Pain, A, Opium Trading Systems in Helmand and Ghor, AREU, Kabul, January 2006, p.21 [16] Losing Ground Drug control and war in Afghanistan, Transnational Institute, TNI Briefing Series, December 2006 2 April 2007
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