UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 462-i

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

defence committee

 

 

STRATEGIC LIFT

 

 

Tuesday 24 APRIL 2007

 

AIR VICE-MARSHAL KEVIN LEESON, BRIGADIER JEFF MASON

and AIR COMMODORE ANTHONY GUNBY

Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 109

 

 

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee

on Tuesday 24 April 2007

Members present

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David S Borrow

Mr David Crausby

Linda Gilroy

Mr Mike Hancock

Mr Adam Holloway

Mr Brian Jenkins

Mr Kevan Jones

Robert Key

John Smith

________________

Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence

Examination of Witnesses

 

Witnesses: Air Vice-Marshal Kevin Leeson, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Logistics Operations)(until 5 April 2007), Brigadier Jeff Mason, Director Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements, and Air Commodore Anthony (Tony) Gunby, Air Officer Air Transport and Air-to-Air Refuelling, Headquarters 2 Group, RAF, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: This is the first evidence session of our inquiry into strategic lift. We shall be looking at the progress made by the MoD since the Strategic Defence Review in improving strategic lift and whether the current arrangements are adequate. This morning we have before us MoD witnesses who are involved in identifying the logistical support needed for operations, tasking the various providers of strategic lift and directing the RAF's strategic lift assets. Gentlemen, welcome to the Committee. Perhaps you would introduce yourselves and explain very briefly in your introduction your role in the strategic lift sphere.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Chairman, thank you for the introduction. I am Air Vice-Marshal Kevin Leeson. Until two weeks ago I was Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff responsible for logistics operations. I have since changed appointment, but it is felt that as the man who has been doing that job for the past two years and seven months it is right that I come before the Committee in order to give the most relevant evidence. My responsibilities were the direction of defence-wide logistic policy and specifically the direction at the strategic level of logistics operation and support for current operations. I have with me today Brigadier Jeff Mason, Royal Marines, and Air Commodore Tony Gunby of Headquarters Air Command. I will ask them to outline their responsibilities.

Brigadier Mason: I am Brigadier Jeff Mason, Director Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements. Essentially, I set up and run the coupling bridges to the operational theatres and monitor the flow of PAX and materiel primarily into Afghanistan and Iraq. In my previous job I was a lead personnel and logistics planner at Permanent Joint Headquarters.

Air Commodore Gunby: I am Air Commodore Tony Gunby from Headquarters Air Command. I am Air Officer Air Transport and Air-to-Air Refuelling and therefore responsible for enacting the plans which Brigadier Mason and his colleagues construct, delivering the air bridges from military air transport and facilitating passengers and freight through Brize Norton and Lyneham.

Q2 Chairman: Perhaps we can start by defining "strategic lift". It has been suggested to us that in recent years there has been some blurring of the boundaries between strategic lift and tactical lift. What would be your definition of "strategic lift? Do you agree that there has been a blurring of the boundaries?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I would agree. Our various aeroplanes have the flexibilities and capabilities to operate in a strategic way as well as, in some cases, a tactical way. The nature of the operations means that we need to cover quite a wide spectrum, so in common parlance the working definition of "strategic lift" as in the memorandum tends to be the capabilities necessary to move from the UK main base to the deployed operational theatre, and "tactical use" becomes the aircraft that we would have deployed forward in that theatre operating under the local command rather than strategic direction back from the UK.

Q3 Chairman: At the beginning of the month the Defence Transport and Movements Agency ceased to be an agency. Obviously, there has also been the merger of the DLO and DPA. Will that change the way that strategic lift is managed and delivered within the MoD and the Services?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Perhaps I may start with the second question and then ask Brigadier Mason as the former chief executive of DTMA to deal with that. A fundamental principle that was followed in merging the DLO and DPA into the Defence Equipment and Support organisation was to move as quickly as we could to get the job done but fundamentally to ensure that nothing affected the support of current operations. That was the guiding principle of Ministers, CDS and now the CDM before us all. As a result, therefore, a minimum change policy was adopted to effect the merger. It was accepted that once the new organisation had stood up and moved forward it would adapt its shape, size and style as time went by. Effectively, the management of operations from within that organisation - the defence supply chain operations and movements centre - is utterly unchanged, so in that respect DES makes no difference.

Q4 Chairman: Because the merger was aimed at achieving completely different effects?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The issue was one of achieving better through-life management of the equipments that the organisation supports and fundamentally the direction of operational movements to and from the theatre is not per se involved in that deal, but perhaps Brigadier Mason can talk about the de-agencification.

Brigadier Mason: About 15 months ago I looked at the benefits that an agency brought to my organisation and, frankly, I could see very few if any. When it was set up nine years ago I think the principle was absolutely right: it allowed the flexibility to surge manpower and flow resources around. I had no flexibility; I was just another business unit in the then DLO. Of course there was parliamentary accountability which is a good thing. We have kept a number of those in the governance piece as I moved across to a directorate, but the key point is that how we support the operational theatres is not affected one iota.

Q5 Chairman: Therefore, the changes that we are discussing - the loss of agency status and the merger of DLO and DPA - are not expected of themselves to produce any benefits. Is it correct that what we are hearing is that if it is managed right it should not produce any disbenefits?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I would not say no benefits because better through-life management of all systems, equipments and capabilities will eventually have pay-backs, whether it be the freeing up of resources through more efficient delivery which can then be redirected in the greater term of the programme, but as a first order effect and in the immediate term none whatsoever.

Chairman: Let us move on to how one decides which type of strategic lift to use.

Q6 John Smith: What are the key factors you take into consideration when choosing between sea lift and air lift?

Brigadier Mason: As long as one has the time lines with the preparation and planning and applies an element of foresight to the plan one will look at what one can move by sea to the operational theatre, because that means moving much greater volumes and it is better value for money. But there will come a time when we are into routine sustainment where we have to send high priority stores by air and we will always move PAX by air. I suppose it comes to the decision points and time lines of planning and operation.

Q7 Chairman: When you say "PAX" do you mean people?

Brigadier Mason: Passengers. It is a fine dividing line, but we would prefer to move all freight in routine sustainment by sea and high priority stores by air.

Q8 John Smith: Are you satisfied that the decision-making process about what you need in theatre is quick enough to allow you to make a correct judgment on which type of lift to use?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Perhaps I may answer that first as the strategic director and then let the tactical manager whose job it is to fulfil my wildest dreams comment from his perspective. We have put in place quite a lot of metrics management over the past two years so we can get a quantifiable feel for how well it is going. There is an enormous amount of stuff moving down that line of communication and one must be quite careful in observing these statistics to keep up one's game. One can get lost in an awful lot of very odd one-off detail, but as a general principle our performance so far is good. We identified a number of lessons as a result of Operation Telic and management in both the command and control sense of the line of communication and our ability to deliver capacity down that line was one of the things that we had to improve. We put an awful lot of work into that over the past three or four years to achieve that. I am not content with where we need to be yet because we have a set of stringent priority codes with required delivery times against them. We are not meeting them to 100 per cent satisfaction yet, so a lot more needs to be done, but I am thoroughly content with the progress.

Brigadier Mason: I would try to influence Permanent Joint Headquarters for the military organisations to make decisions early in order that we can move equipment by sea. There have been occasions when that has been difficult to do, but in the main we have managed to achieve it. When one is looking at moving urgent operational requirements to theatre clearly there is an imperative to get those equipments integrated in theatre as quickly as one can. In that case it is more likely that we would fly them.

Q9 John Smith: If you are able to answer this question, is it right that we intend to fly Warriors to Afghanistan as opposed to sea-lift them?

Brigadier Mason: That was our original intent. My understanding is that if we move them up the line of communication there will be an intelligence issue and we do not wish to expose our Warriors to the line of communication, so at the moment we plan to fly them.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: You are correct to identify that in this open forum you are pushing us in a slightly difficult area. Clearly, there are a number of constraints on what one can move through third-party countries where one is not enabled by UN resolutions or whatever. Therefore, we keep under frequent review a number of operating principles to see what is most effective. Clearly, the simple conflict here is: aeroplanes are an extremely expensive way to move sizeable items like heavy armour, so we always love to do it a different way if we can, but moving warlike stores through third countries obviously gives rise to interesting intelligence as well as political issues and we try to avoid it where we can. In the case of other sensitive equipments such as cryptography the risks would be too great other than in an organic way to use military transport and convoy techniques.

Q10 Mr Holloway: About a month ago I and a colleague visited Kandahar in a C17 with the marvellous Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme. We were absolutely flabbergasted to see that half the aircraft was full of bunk beds. How can they be a high priority store? Is there a problem with supply chain management because that was quite bizarre?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The construction of air bridges generally in terms of how we schedule the various aeroplanes is all about ensuring that we can provide for an assessment of the freight and the people we have to move into theatre over a period at required delivery times. Effectively, that builds in a certain amount of volume over capacity on a daily basis which can then be backfilled by lower priority freight. I suspect that despite the excellent ability of the director of DSCOM to manage the business he is probably unable to comment on the movement of bunk beds that time ago. But we would backfill if we had to do so. I would conjecture that we had adequate supply of things that could be held at an air head and they were used to fill up available space on a daily basis. That was probably what happened. It is highly improbable that there would be an emergency deployment of such things because they are not in short supply.

Brigadier Mason: I would have been surprised as well if I was sitting on that aircraft. Normally, it is a theatre pool, ie they call for priority stores, but the only explanation I have - we do not have the exact reason at our fingertips - is that, as the AVM has said, there was space to be filled and rather than fly fresh air we moved stock.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: As an example, it is the sort of stores that coincidentally is relatively close to Brize Norton.

Q11 Mr Holloway: There were also flat packs of building timber. Is the air bridge not having increased pressure put upon it by an unwillingness to source items that perhaps are more readily available locally?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We aim to source locally where we can, but local sourcing in Afghanistan is incredibly difficult.

Mr Holloway: Pakistan is next door.

Q12 Mr Hancock: One would imagine that bunk beds would be essential if one had nothing else on which to sleep. I am sure that a number of our servicemen were grateful that they were on the aircraft. That aside, I want to ask about the difficulty of transporting equipment through third countries. Have you experienced significant difficulties with that? How much do you have to disclose about what is being transported, and how do you organise that transport through a third country?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Our record so far is simply exceptional. We have had tremendous support significantly from the Kuwaiti and Pakistani governments in terms of permitting us to operate through commercial ports, and by and large we use commercial transport arrangements. The statistics of the initial deployment into Afghanistan merit public acknowledgement of the hard work and effort that an awful lot of people put in. We moved something like 1,800 lorry loads of equipment on a commercial contract via either the Quetta or Khyber Passes without loss, so frankly it was a tremendous performance by the commercial sector and it was well managed by my colleagues in the defence logistics organisation as it then was.

Brigadier Mason: But that inload into Afghanistan was risky. We looked at other opportunities to get the equipment into theatre. We ruled out air because, frankly, 18,000 linear metres equates to about eight roll-on-roll-off ferries worth of loads. It was far too much. We ruled out coming in from the north because of the number of borders we had to cross to get the equipment through the Caucuses and down through Afghanistan. We were not allowed, and did not want to use, UK or Pakistani military convoys, so we went for a contractor. It was relatively costly but, as AVM has said, it was extremely successful.

Q13 Mr Hancock: Have drivers been killed when transporting our equipment around Afghanistan?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: There have been some equipment losses in Afghanistan.

Q14 Mr Hancock: And in Pakistan?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Not in Pakistan.

Q15 Mr Hancock: Have drivers been killed?

Brigadier Mason: As far as I am aware no drivers have been killed in Pakistan, but there are a number of drivers who have been killed within Afghanistan itself when moving either our stores or our food.

Q16 Mr Hancock: What do you have to disclose about what you are transporting to a third country in advance of leaving?

Brigadier Mason: As far as concerns Pakistan, we put a liaison officer into the embassy in Islamabad. We also have a task group liaison officer in the port of Karachi and we deal with the authorities and expose exactly what we are moving.

Air Commodore Gunby: I should perhaps add that sometimes we face a similar challenge when we have to inform the nation that we are overflying if we are carrying certain classes of dangerous cargo.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I am conscious that we have talked about process rather than provided an exact answer to the question. I think I need to take advice from Foreign Office colleagues on that, if you specifically want to press me on what we are required to do.

Q17 Chairman: That is fair enough. What we do not want to do is expose valuable information to people who would use it against us.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I am certainly content that we have a process that has not yet caused any hindrances.

Q18 Mr Jenkins: To paraphrase what has been said, you have that much spare air lift that you can fly in low priority goods rather than fresh air. For me, that does not sit true with the alternative suggestion that our airlift is under critical pressure and is hardly able to perform its function. Which is true?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We use quite a considerable amount of charter lift both in the passenger and freight sense to supplement what we own as military aircraft. There is a very large proportion of charter activity to support what we have. As a result, therefore, that offers Brigadier Mason the opportunity to set a daily normal response time capability that we must fulfil, and whether freight goes on the chartered aeroplanes or military aeroplanes can be prioritised on the basis of when the next most appropriate aeroplane is flying, the protection systems on the aircraft and prioritising it in that particular way. As a result, therefore, clearly we plan to make sure that with these rather long-term contracts with charter companies we have enough capacity to cope with the day-by-day and week-by-week variations that we need to achieve. One can imagine a ripple effect going on around a norm. All I am talking about is that we have space on that ripple around the norm occasionally to backfill with lower priority items which conceivably could have gone by sea. But I mentioned that I did not want to go too far into the example that was quoted without checking the specific facts.

Q19 Mr Jones: As to the use of the charter sector, clearly flying things into a theatre like Afghanistan is different from flying things to, say, BATUS in Canada, Kuwait or somewhere else like that. You just said that you had a contract with various suppliers. How does it work? Is there a ranking? For example, if you fly in something that is not sensitive to, say, Kuwait or Canada is that done on just a commercial basis like DHL or one of those big suppliers, or is it a contract that you can just pull down as and when you need it?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: It is for the brigadier's staff to manage it specifically, but perhaps I may give a few classic examples. Passengers into Afghanistan go on military aeroplanes. The Chief of the Defence Staff insists on that in principle. We can then put the defensive aid protection systems on board the aeroplane because the safe transport of Armed Forces personnel and the personnel of other government departments we are helping out is the absolute priority. Effectively, that becomes one of the defining marks of the brigadier's approach. Certain critical equipments, for example expensive short-supply items, would be a priority for air-freighting but it would not necessarily be charter, We would not necessarily be concerned about the losses of those equipments through a tragic incident as we would with people. We tend to transport weapons via owned air assets. Clearly, munitions transport is difficult because of explosive safety constraints in civilian ports and that sort of thing. There are a number of definite moments like that which effectively go from me to the brigadier as policy. Thereafter, it becomes a matter of best asset utilisation.

Brigadier Mason: For routine activity as you imply - let us say the support of BATUS - if we were not flying RAF military transport there we would swivel. We have DHL imbedded in my organisation. That is a long-term contract. They would move the item by whichever carrier they utilised. For support to the operational theatres and general bidding for aircraft we would use a panel of brokers and enabling contracts with them; otherwise, the commercial process would take too long. Therefore, we have enabling contracts imbedded with the brokers and when we want to utilise airframes we go through the brokers.

Q20 Mr Jones: How is that done? Is it a contract that is negotiated in advance and so is at a set price?

Brigadier Mason: It is not a set price but it is negotiated in advance. There are all sorts of issues that affect the costings. It depends on seasonal activity. For example, it is more difficult to get passenger aircraft in the main holidays in spring and summer; it may be there are some force protection issues that may increase the cost. Therefore, how much it costs depends on the time, but those contracts are extremely valuable and we could not operate without them.

Q21 Linda Gilroy: The MoD has acquired six roll-on-roll-off ferries through a PFI deal. How have those assets performed?

Brigadier Mason: Extremely effectively. As you rightly say, it was a PFI. They have come in from 2003. It provides assured delivery for the MoD in support of operational activity, but we have also managed to use them to support the South Atlantic islands and BATUS routine sailings. When we have planned out and there does not appear to be any activity we can go out to the market and either allow other nations to utilise them or go to the commercial market. Currently, we have four of the six ro-ros working for us full time; the other two are, if you like, on a longer string with the owners Foreland Shipping.

Q22 Linda Gilroy: Are there assets that are too large for the ro-ros to transport and what do you do in those circumstances?

Brigadier Mason: I do not believe we have ever come across an item which has been too large to be moved in a ro-ro.

Q23 Linda Gilroy: The Strategic Defence Review identified a requirement for four ro-ros and you have just said that four are deployed at the moment and six have been acquired. What was the rationale for requiring two more?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We originally had two ro-ro-style vessels already. I think that eventually we actually referred to four additional ones and when we went to the new contract effectively we terminated the previous arrangement, so that explains the numbers.

Q24 Linda Gilroy: From what you have said it is probable that my next question has been answered but I shall ask it anyway. Given the tempo of current operations, is there a case for acquiring more ro-ro ferries and, if so, how many?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I am very comfortable with our sea lift position. I think that the four plus the vessels that are part of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and amphibious force essentially give me what I need for the sea line of communication, even against the stressed planning assumptions and conditions to which CDS referred when he appeared before the Committee.

Q25 Linda Gilroy: Can you tell the Committee why the MoD needs to have its own strategic sea lift if chartered shipping is available?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I think it is a matter of surety. This is the very difficult balance that at the strategic level I and my colleagues in the equipment capability area have to make. There are times when the market is busy doing other commercial activity but we happen to need to be able to do something, so as long as we can provide flexible ways of surety with the appropriate security where necessary the commercial sector represents a hugely valuable way of doing the business, with all of the useful economies to which a commercial answer tends to drive one towards.

Brigadier Mason: If we did not have the ro-ros and were looking at deploying a multi-national force the other nations would also be looking for the same commercial shipping and that would turn into a bit of a bun fight. We might not get what we want and, therefore, potentially not put the force elements into theatre in the right order or, more importantly, the right time.

Q26 Linda Gilroy: Is the present balance what you judge to be right? Would it be right if the tempo increased?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: In terms of sea lift it feels right, and certainly with the additional two JRF ro-ros on the longer string that we can call in there would be other elements of the defence programme that would be the constraining factor before there was a problem with sea lift. But time is always the pressure. How quickly does one need to get there?

Q27 Linda Gilroy: Can you tell us a bit more about the two on the longer string that you have described? What sorts of things do they do when they are not required for operations?

Brigadier Mason: As to timeline, one we can access in 20 days; the other we can get in 30 days. We can support the medium-scale exercises that we do once every four years; we can call them back to support that, but there is a limit. We have to deploy over 15,000 linear metres of equipment to call them back. As to what they do on a routine basis, essentially Foreland hires them out. I believe that on a routine basis they are working in Finland moving timber from A to B.

Q28 Mr Hancock: What is the opportunity at the moment in the market for roll-on-roll-off ferries? The design has changed. Every design change makes it difficult to dock them. Coming from Portsmouth, we have our own ferry port. I know that every time a new ferry arrives we have to spend literally millions to reconfigure the dock so that the ship can be berthed. One of the issues is the size of the current fleet that is available. Would that be appropriate for you? Could you get them into Marchwood? You can with the current ro-ros, but what is in the market if you need to bring in ships? The market that you need is reducing all the time, is it not, because ships are getting bigger?

Brigadier Mason: Yes.

Q29 Mr Hancock: The configuration of the bow and stern makes it difficult to dock them.

Brigadier Mason: You make a very fair point. A lot of the ro-ros in the commercial market are used solely from point A to point B to match the infrastructure of those ports. We run a system where if we were looking for further roll-on-roll-off ferries we would have to go to the market and lay down the requirement to see what was available, but you are right to say that it is a reducing market.

Q30 Mr Hancock: Do you have a fallback position where you would be able to dock and load if you could not get the ships that you are bringing in in and out of Marchwood?

Brigadier Mason: I am sorry; you will have to rephrase that question.

Q31 Mr Hancock: If you are bringing in ships from trade and they do not fit what you have available to dock them at Marchwood do you have a standby relationship with one of the commercial ports which would allow you to bring in those ships and unload and load them?

Brigadier Mason: We could use commercial ports and that we have done in the past.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The style of cargo we move and the way we would prioritise it leads me to conclude there is a very low probability we will find ourselves in that situation. If it is routine, non-contentious freight then with UK port capability the world is literally our oyster. We tend to use the JRF ro-ros for bulky specialist stuff such as munitions and rolling vehicles. We have a number of other munitions dock facilities. Marchwood is ideally positioned as it is on the south coast and is central, but there are a couple of other assets further north that can be used for munitions if we need to.

Q32 Chairman: You have four landing ship dock (auxiliary) vessels. Do you use them differently from the ro-ros or not?

Brigadier Mason: There are four of them but a number are still to enter commissioned service. Our intent is that when they are not doing their core activity of supporting amphibious operations and training we will utilise those platforms in the sea transport role because they also are very effective ships. They are half the size of the roll-on-roll-off ferries, but if one is delivering only half the stores they would be very useful platforms to utilise. We have already been engaged with fleet command to make sure we can plan them. We have used them only once to date.

Q33 Mr Borrow: I should like to touch on the issue of chartering lift. To what extent is the MoD chartering shipping to supplement its own lift capacity to get into both of the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Brigadier Mason: Over the past couple of years we have chartered a number of ships but not, as far as I am aware, in direct support of Afghanistan or Iraq. But we do have what is known as the liner service where if we want to move low priority stocks essentially we have a contract for a container ship that will move containers full of our stock either to Kuwait or Karachi and then a civilian firm will move it up country. It does not make financial sense to charter a ship for that, so we have a weekly container movement. We are talking about 30 containers per week in each theatre.

Q34 Mr Borrow: At the moment there is no real problem about getting access to commercial shipping that you need for service operations. You are moving a few containers each week.

Brigadier Mason: Currently, that is the case because we have the assured use of the ro-ros.

Q35 Mr Borrow: In a hypothetical situation where you need much more commercial shipping do you have contingency plans should the commercial shipping that you have contracted for come under attack or threat so you do not lose that market, which is always a possibility?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: All things are possible, but I think that the determining case becomes: what is the operation? What is one planning to do and how quickly does one have to do it? Therefore, the circumstances that your question leads towards tend to be the challenging task of quickly moving one of our small-scale capabilities - perhaps a battle group or something of that order - to do a deliberate intervention or activity of that kind. Unfortunately, in terms of the planning assumptions system that would need to operate to shape one's defence programme that would tend to operate in a rather shorter timescale than sea-lift usually presents. Sea lift tends to lend itself to the routine sustainment case or where one's warning and preparation time is much longer, because sailing time becomes a discriminator in the effect one is trying to achieve.

Brigadier Mason: You referred to increased threat. We review the threat states every month and can put armed servicemen onto our current ro-ros, as we put the inload for the Iraq peace at the beginning onto commercial shipping.

Q36 Mr Borrow: It is hypothetical but it is looking at what has happened in the past. Things can suddenly jump up and bite you; you do not expect them to happen. It is 25 years since we had a major operation in the South Atlantic. Would we be capable of securing the commercial shipping that would be necessary if that happened again?

Brigadier Mason: We secured a significant amount of commercial shipping for the inload for what we call Telec 1, the first stage of the operation in Iraq. We secured some 60 ships as a result of foresight because we got in before other nations did. We secured what we required.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The brigadier probably cannot say it but I can because I supervise his organisation. The defence supply chain operations and movements centre is now very good at watching movements, fluctuations and trends in the marketplace from the point of view of warning us if there appear to be difficult periods. As we have just explained, on sea-lift by and large that is not an issue; as to chartered air lift it is much more so. Therefore, he is particularly good at warning me that there are periods when lift may become somewhat difficult. Therefore, major commercial sector product launches - Xbox, Playstation 3 and that sort of thing - make a significant change to air-lift availability in the commercial sector. It is those sorts of things that we have to watch very seriously.

Q37 Mr Hancock: Moving to strategic air-lift, how have the four C-17s performed? How would you evaluate their performance and the benefits they have brought to you?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: They have been absolutely first rate aircraft in terms of their capacity, speed, reach, reliability, availability, the arrangements with Boeing and the flexibility to keep them modified to the same standard as their American cousins so we have minimal overheads. They have been a resounding success.

Q38 Mr Hancock: Boeing has told us that it believes we are flying those aircraft way above the original specification and the usage is much higher than was first envisaged. What is the consequence of that?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The original contract under which we took them on was very flexible and it allowed us to increase the hours beyond the base line entry if we wanted to, because clearly it would be sensible to do that. We have certainly increased quite considerably the number of hours that we get off that fleet because of the tempo of current operations and the usefulness of the aircraft. We do not yet find ourselves in the position of approaching the fleet leader owner which is still the United States Air Force. Our aeroplanes are integrated into the overall fatigue and health-monitoring programme as the American owned aeroplanes, so effectively we have the advantage of being on the coat tails of that. There are elements of the way that we have been using them for operations where our aeroplanes are less stressed because when doing the strategic tasks they spend a lot of time airborne in a relatively static configuration rather than manoeuvring close to the ground in tactical flying, which we do not do with them. Essentially, we are very comfortable that we are not in any way putting ourselves into a difficult period because we are using them much more than originally planned.

Q39 Mr Hancock: You do not share the view that as a consequence of what we have been doing - flying them a lot more than was first envisaged - they will go out of service sooner than previously planned for?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Certainly, if you use any aeroplane more there comes a point when it will reach its ageing stage earlier, so we will have used more of the life of those aeroplanes, but they have so much life remaining that they are not on any planning horizon with which we need concern ourselves.

Q40 Mr Hancock: What was behind the decision to swap from leasing them to purchasing them? Did our usage of them have any relevance to that?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: No. It was always to be looked at as the most cost-effective way of operating these aeroplanes. I believe that at the time of the Strategic Defence Review which identified the need for additional outsize airlift, there were still uncertainties over the then future large aircraft contract which subsequently became the A400M procurement. We were not quite sure where that would actually end up. When SDR was authored we were nowhere near the tempo that we have been experiencing in the intervening period. As we do with all capabilities, we keep these things under constant review. I believe that in about 2002 we looked again at the likely volumes required in the outside airlift sector by which time the A400M programme had been determined insofar as how many aeroplanes we would be buying. It became clear that a review was then needed of our overall lift position with the C‑17s. The decision was that it was more cost-effective to own rather than continue to lease.

Q41 Mr Hancock: So, we were not under pressure from Boeing to buy these because otherwise the caveats in the lease would have made it more difficult for us to continue to operate them?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Not at all. Boeing have been splendid contractors in regard to listening to our real requirements and making sure they deliver as best they can towards them. It was very much an internal decision that we wanted to maintain ownership of these items.

Q42 Mr Hancock: Do we now own them?

Air Commodore Gunby: We will progressively take over the title deeds, if you will, of the aircraft so that next year at specified periods they will transfer piecemeal over to the MoD accounts.

Q43 Mr Hancock: Was that at the end of the original leasing period?

Air Commodore Gunby: That is correct.

Q44 Mr Hancock: You did not pay a penalty?

Air Commodore Gunby: No. The original lease was for a seven-year period, which at that time was termed the short-term strategic air lift requirements - the STSA - and, as the air vice-marshal has indicated, we have subsequently reviewed the situation and think we need these aircraft on our own books. We shall do that next year. At the same time, if that comes with the delivery of the fifth aircraft all five aircraft will ultimately be of the same specification and will meet a very rigorous design standard.

Q45 Mr Jenkins: I am glad that they perform well and we have the fifth one coming into place. There is something going round in my head. If it is such a great aircraft and we have an older decaying air lift capacity and know we want the A400 but it is being pushed back and back, and if we know we have the present operation with the C-17, do we have enough C-17s at the present tempo to fill the gap between now and when the A400 comes in, if ever? Do we need seriously to consider putting in for the purchase of another C-17, if not more?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: As far as I am concerned the A400 programme is static; it is not slipping. We have no indication that there is anything tangible out there that causes a problem.

Q46 Mr Jenkins: Who is building this?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: It is the Airbus military company which is part of the ADS organisation.

Q47 Chairman: We shall come to deal with that in a moment.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: To some extent I was going to use my get-out-of-jail-free card. In terms of dealing with that element of the programme my good friend General Figgures will deal with that when he comes before you in a few weeks' time.

Q48 Mr Jenkins: Do we need another C-17?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: If I may drift back to the present position, over the past 18 months there has been an increasing number of troops deployed and therefore the sustainment package and everything else that goes with it has progressively moved upwards. We keep that under constant watch to decide what it is we need to do. For example, the decision last year to go to five C-17s was very much based on what we were charting ourselves forward to do. We have a large reliance on the commercial sector to provide freight and people lift and I must say that I am becoming increasingly nervous as to whether, looking at the marketplace and the risk to aeroplanes, we got the balance quite right. There is now an extensive piece of work going on to repeat the review of the middle of last year of the volumes that we predict will be moved around over the next 12 months and assess that number again.

Q49 Mr Jenkins: Is that a yes or a no?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: At the moment we are delivering well beyond our planning assumptions and, as the CDS mentioned, that itself is not necessarily an issue. It means that one has configured a programme for a situation that is now being exceeded. That therefore causes a number of stresses and stretches in the programme. There is no doubt that the outside air lift sector and secure passenger lift sector of my owned base is the most stressed. As the logistics deliverer I would certainly wish to improve on that, but we have to find ways to deliver it in the relevant timescales against what the conditions will be at that time. That piece of work is going on.

Q50 Mr Jenkins: Obviously, you have more information and knowledge about the present situation than the Committee. In your opinion do we need another C-17 - yes or no?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I am sorry; it is not a simple yes or no answer. At the moment, by prioritisation and use of the chartered sector we can deliver sufficient support to where we are. Therefore, there is a need for analysis of the risks faced in future and the cost-effectiveness of the operation and whether or not one has the balance right. That piece of work is going on at the moment, so I would not like to prejudge its conclusion.

Q51 Chairman: But you say that you are becoming increasingly worried about those risks?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I am concerned that we carry a greater risk.

Q52 Mr Jenkins: Boeing told us that it intended to shut down production in 2009. It takes three years to build one of these aircraft, so we have already passed the deadline. Therefore, if we need to order another we will have to buy a used one. If we need these aircraft someone should face up to it and say that we cannot take the risk, the gap is there, the present aircraft are being worked to maximum capacity and to fill that gap another C-17 is needed. That is what I am asking.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Boeing's closure date for the line has gone back very slightly after a recent reorder by Congress, so there is no longer the need to have a decision tomorrow morning, as it were. We have time to make sure that we have the right answer here. Clearly, there is a complex dynamic between the A400 balance, the C-130J balance, the commercial balance and the C-17 which is why we must get that answer right. As I say, that work is in hand at the moment. We are not time-pressed by Boeing to make that decision this week.

Q53 Mr Jenkins: What weight can a C-17 carry?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: It depends on the range that one wishes to achieve. Clearly, the more one loads it the lower the range, but it is our longest haul and biggest freight aeroplane.

Q54 Mr Jones: I understand that work is going on at the moment to assess whether or not another C-17 is needed. Is there an option to do what we did earlier on in terms of leasing a C-17 rather than buying one off the production line? Would that option be open to us if we decided that we needed one?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Again, that is a matter for General Figgures in terms of the exact detail of where the work at the moment is going on. The original calculations to buy out the lease under the original terms of the lease made financial sense at that stage. Given the fact that we decided last year to buy the fifth one because we would want it for a long time I suspect that the same answer would apply when work is done on how best to achieve whatever de‑risking we deem necessary.

Q55 Mr Jones: When we were at NATO a few weeks ago there was talk about acquiring heavy lift simply for NATO's purposes. Is that being taken into consideration in the work on what we need?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: It has. We have worked very closely with our colleagues in Brussels on their proposal. First, they wish the UK to join in that proposal because clearly as a pretty large player in moving stuff around any offtake that we would have had would look quite attractive in that respect. We did some initial work on whether or not shared ownership or a shared lease with a bunch of other nations would work and it did not look right to us. We were sufficiently confident that in terms of our ability to assess volumes and cost the UK did not need another half or quarter of an aeroplane's lifting capacity; it would be a rather bigger package than that, and therefore there was minimum advantage to us in entering into that, albeit at the time we were alive to the fact that encouraging constructive good behaviour in new capability in Europe is always something to which we would wish to have an eye. We certainly offered to work with them very closely. In terms of what NATO colleagues are looking at and the cost-effective way in which they might operate their aeroplanes, for example by add-ons to our maintenance contract with Boeing, such that they could achieve a cost-effective answer which would also have advantages to us, we are still working that through with NATO at the moment, but we will not participate in that programme other than to assist.

Q56 Mr Jones: You have already referred to the A400M. Estimates are that the in-service date has slipped by 15 months. Can you give an update on where we are at with this programme?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I prefer to take a bye and say that that really needs to be answered by General Figgures as that is not strictly my area.

Q57 Mr Jones: Perhaps I may ask a related question which may be your area. As to the knock-on effect of any delay in terms of taking the C-130Ks out of service, in terms of capability what assessment has been made of the possible need to extend the life of those aircraft?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: In the previous planning round we took steps to do some life extensions on a certain number of airframes to deal with the current programme as is known. There is a little more space to do a bit more, but not very much. Therefore, C-130K availability will become a problem if the A400 programme slips any further.

Q58 Mr Jones: What timescales are you looking at? At what point does the decision become crucial?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We already face a modest but containable gap, so it is already with us.

Air Commodore Gunby: It is currently planned that the C-130K will go out of service after the introduction of the first A400Ms, and the C-130J will continue in service until 2030, so there is still a significant amount of air lift during that transitionary period, not all of which is currently employed on operations. There is a little bit of a header there to provide for some contingency.

Q59 Mr Jones: What happens if we have a situation whereby there is further delay of the A400M? For example, in its submission Marshalls Aerospace has told us, for understandable reasons, that it is seriously concerned about the retirement of the C-130Ks ahead of the entry of the A400M. Will we have to bring in something to fill that gap, or can you extend the life of the C-130Ks?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: More work can be done on the C-130K. The issue becomes whether or not it is a cost-effective thing to do. Given the style of aeroplane, you can extend it for ever if you are prepared to continue to replace the outer wings and the centre sections which is the area where we face difficulty with the C-130K. The work that we did last year has got us back into broad balance with any quantitative difficulties because of FSDA programmes and the freight capacity that is new and available as part of FSDA. It can carry a significant amount of freight below the floor as well as passengers above it. At present we have a programme that works. If any further slippages are announced we will have to go through those numbers again and decide what is the best answer.

Q60 Mr Jones: But are you looking at an alternative in case there is slippage, because you cannot continue the C-130Ks for ever, can you? Would you have to bring in another alternative?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We will have to look at everything subject to what those circumstances may be. One cannot go through endless analysis exercises against what may happen.

Q61 Mr Jones: The MoD is usually good at doing that.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I take that as a compliment.

Q62 Mr Jones: It is usually a method of delay.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We have done the numbers and we have a small dip in the number of airframes available prior to the current A400 programme. Should the A400 slip any further that will most probably get slightly worse.

Q63 Mr Jones: In terms of this financial year when will the first C-130Ks go out of service?

Air Commodore Gunby: The C-130Ks that we are retiring from service are the ones without theatre entry standard of equipment, so they are not of use to us in current operations. We are not losing any operational output in respect of current operations by retiring those aircraft.

Q64 Mr Jones: How many aircraft are you talking about?

Air Commodore Gunby: We have announced the retirement of four aircraft.

Q65 Chairman: You have announced the retirement of four aircraft.

Air Commodore Gunby: That was last year.

Q66 Chairman: When are those retirements to take place?

Air Commodore Gunby: Those aircraft will cease to operate when they reach the point at which they require very major servicing that would otherwise be required for continued service. I stress that those aircraft are without the theatre entry standard of equipment.

Q67 Mr Jones: What pressure has there been as a result of the loss of aircraft in Afghanistan and Iraq? You have lost one in Iraq.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We have lost a total of three.

Q68 Mr Jones: Does that include the special forces aircraft?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The total is three.

Q69 Mr Jones: What effect has that had in terms of operational ability?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We have had the capacity to be able to backfill the lost frames with UK fleet aeroplanes which are to theatre entry standard. We have had to uplift the fitting of certain systems to aeroplanes that were not to theatre entry standard to backfill that, but clearly there is an issue over the airframes themselves. Whilst one can do various neat tricks to extend capability and capacity, at the end of the day sometimes one needs the aeroplane where one needs it and therefore numbers rather than just activity or volume count. At the moment we are looking at what is the best replacement. As to the first C-130 for whose loss we were recompensed the money was used towards the fifth C-17 as that was the most effective way to deliver capacity.

Q70 Mr Jones: You are not necessarily replacing like for like?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: That is correct. We are very close to a conclusion as to the best way to use the compensation for the most recent two, but we do not have the absolute answer to that question.

Q71 Mr Jones: Obviously, I do not want to go into detail, but in terms of the special forces C-130s, are they separate from you? How are they managed?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: They are all part of the main fleet but clearly they are tasked separately.

Air Commodore Gunby: They are all available as part of the total fleet of C-130s, so they could be used for routine tasks and other more discrete tasks; they have utility across the range of potential tasks.

Q72 Mr Jones: You have lost three and you have been recompensed for those?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: For one so far, but we have not formally made a submission for the other two until such time as we know the best way to replace them. As we said, it is not necessarily two more C-130Js; it may well be one C-130J and some range and capacity extension equipment to make the best use of the ones we have got. We are still working through those numbers.

Q73 Mr Jones: Is that part of the larger review that you are conducting in terms of air lift capacity?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Yes.

Q74 Mr Jenkins: On 9 January in a Written Answer the Secretary of State said that of our 75 Hercules, Tristar and VC10 aircraft only 41 were available for service on that day; that is, 55 per cent of the total fleet was available. I presume that in the short period since then there has been very little difference in the figure, but when do we get to the point where due to the stress and strains of operational demands on these aircraft we no longer have enough aircraft to do the job? Let us say we drop below 45 per cent availability. What is the percentage?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The number of aircraft fit for purpose and available to be tasked by Brigadier Mason's and Air Commodore Gunby's organisations varies with each of the fleets because of the age of the aeroplanes and the various maintenance and fleet overheads that go with those.

Q75 Mr Jenkins: I accept all that.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Therefore, with something like the C-17 we would have very high availability; we would expect three or three and a half out of four on a daily basis to be available to the lift programme. The point where we would worry about availability, or not get ourselves into in the first place, will be different fleet by fleet. Clearly, we have been under great pressure to fit various systems to the C-130 fleet which has caused dips in availability and which are truly complex to manage at the moment. I do not wish to go any further with the equation for the fitting of urgent operational requirements that we have at the moment, so there is constant tension between my capability colleagues who wish to install new and useful facilities to aeroplanes and those of us who have to operate the air bridge in a sustainable and minimised risk fashion where clearly we would like to maximise the number of aeroplanes. Therefore, it is a constant process.

Q76 Mr Jenkins: To put the question another way, we have an ageing fleet that includes VC10s and Tristars. It used to be said, "Join the RAF like your father and fly the same 'plane", but now we work on the basis of, "Join the RAF like your grandfather and fly the same 'plane." The way we are going it will not just be the same type; it will be the very same aircraft. When does one get to the point where, irrespective of the commercial side of it, one says that one cannot meet all the requirements and there is such pressure that one is failing to do the job that one wants to do? We are trying to be helpful as far as putting the case as bluntly as we can to government that it should be mindful of this. This is not a secondary matter; it is a vital cog in the machine, but at times we forget that. We have 55 per cent availability. The question is: if we had 45 per cent availability would it function?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I will ask Air Commodore Gunby to answer it from the practitioner's standpoint. He is the man who has to deliver day to day and he can explain the challenges and pressures in the system. From my standpoint of where we shall be over a number of years I am very confident that the forward equipment programme looks very good in volume terms for what we need to have available. The future strategic tanker aircraft and the A400 programme will bring us to the end of the job to which Mr Jenkins referred. It will be a seriously modern and capable fleet. A lot of people are working in it extremely hard at the moment and are truly proud of the range of equipments they have, particularly with the arrival of the fifth C-17 which volumetrically gives us another great leap. Four aeroplanes in a fleet is a small number. If you add one more you are able to deliver good flow patterns and you have some good capacity increase as a result. The forward equipment programme is extremely attractive, but there is a great element of jam tomorrow in that. We have a very difficult period in front of us to continue to manage with our older ladies. At the strategic level I certainly do not underestimate the challenges faced by the guys out in the force. I do not want to be pulled on the particular percentage number. I become very concerned when we drop below 50 per cent availability because to operate at that level is a reasonable yardstick. We have had to do that because the fitting of defensive aid systems, explosive suppressant foam and so on has taken rather more out of the order of battle than I am reasonably comfortable to do because I am a cautious kind of chap, but at the end of the day I can see the great advantages of those systems going on because it makes my situation in six months' time much more attractive in terms of the number of aeroplanes with theatre entry standard equipment. It is a constant balance.

Air Commodore Gunby: I am afraid that I cannot offer a figure either in terms of the level below which we would fail to do something. The fleet management of our current air transport fleet is an extremely complex and dynamic situation, as I am sure you appreciate. Both scheduled maintenance and unforeseen arrivals - things that happen out of the blue - and a fairly extensive programme of capability grades either through the current programme or through urgent operational requirements need some very careful massaging across the totality of the fleet to ensure that we can maintain an appropriate operational outlook for the current demands which, as we all know, place us beyond the planning assumptions such as they are. Just to focus on a figure would be a little awkward. A forty-five per cent availability on one particular area would be pretty disastrous; 45 per cent availability somewhere else might be more manageable depending on the compensatory factors from other portions of the fleet. On literally a day-to-day basis we look at the fleet disposition and at what has happened to each platform within the force and veer and haul on programmes of maintenance and the capability insertion. A lot of the work that we are doing at the moment is to try to future proof some of these platforms to ensure we do not run into issues of obsolescence as certain equipments become unsupportable because they are no longer de rigueur in commercial aviation. For instance, we are installing a new flight deck system on the Tristar which will overcome some of those potential obsolescence issues on which you may attack us in future if we do not do that. It is a complex and very demanding process, but it is focused on delivering output for current operations.

Mr Jenkins: I understand the difficulties. When older aircraft are taken out of the system because they are constantly being maintained and modernised they are not much use to you anyway. Judging by the way you have couched your answers it is getting close, is it not?

Q77 Chairman: For the record, I should reflect for the record - otherwise, it will not be recorded - that you nodded your head in answer to Mr Jenkins' question.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Yes.

Q78 Mr Holloway: Referring to the C-130s, were you implying that the shortage of aircraft in the first place is drawing out the timelines for the fitting of UORs by Marshalls?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Do you mean: if I put in more aircraft could be done more efficaciously?

Q79 Mr Holloway: No. Does the fact you have so few aircraft in the first place draw out the timelines in which Marshalls are doing this important work?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Clearly, if you give them only one aeroplane at a time it will take longer than if one gives them two at a time, if they have the capacity to parallel track that work.

Q80 Mr Holloway: What I am getting at is that the important pieces of equipment are the crews and those who need to be transported. Is the fitting of that stuff being delayed because we do not have enough aircraft in the first place?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The maximum in body rate is affected by the number of aeroplanes that we can make available to the programme. That is the real balancing world in which we have to operate.

Q81 Mr Jones: Perhaps I may talk about what you refer to as two old ladies: the Tristar and VC10. Can you explain their role in the strategic lift and what the constraints are because of the age of these aircraft?

Air Commodore Gunby: Perhaps I may talk first about the VC10. We have three types of VC10. There are two types of tanker so they are air-to-air refuelling aircraft with a very small passenger-carrying capability. Usually just the support crew flies with the aircraft. Then we have 10 VC10s C1 mark Ks which are multiple role; they are both air-to-air refuelling aircraft and air transport in the sense of passengers and all freight. Those aircraft were procured for the Ministry of Defence in the 1960s so the C1Ks have been ours throughout. They will be maintained in service until the introduction of the FSTA. We are confident that we will be able to keep those aircraft in service until that point.

Q82 Mr Jones: I think that your website refers to the VC10s as now reaching the end of their service. I remember going on a refuelling exercise six years ago in a VC10 and being told that it was coming to the end of its life. I will come to the strategic tanker fleet in a minute. Realistically, great aircraft as they are - I think they are beloved by those who fly them - for how much longer will it be cost-effective to keep them flying?

Air Commodore Gunby: They are also greatly loved by me as a former squadron commander and navigator. They can continue flying until the FSTA comes into service and that is our plan. We are confident that we can do so.

Q83 Mr Jones: What is the financial cost of that? One can keep anything flying at a cost.

Air Commodore Gunby: Indeed. There would be some point beyond the introduction of FSTA when one would have to invest a disproportionate amount to maintain the fleet in service.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: It is already very high; it is more expensive to run a VC10 than to run a Tristar because it is an old lady.

Air Commodore Gunby: You asked about both the VC10 and Tristar.

Q84 Mr Jones: Let us deal with the VC10 to begin with. There must be a point on the graph when it becomes prohibitively costly?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: It is certainly not at the prohibitive point yet because we still have it in a relatively stretched defence programme and it is the best way to deliver. I would dearly love the FSTA service to start earlier, but there is a certain time to contract on that programme because of the scale and nature of that complex PFI, which General Figgures will deal with fully. We would be delighted to be in a position to have got rid of the VC10 far earlier than we have, but technically the programme can be continued even if FSTA slipped further. Such is the nature of what we have and its capabilities.

Q85 Mr Jones: As the person in charge from the RAF's point of view, you are saying that the sooner we get the strategic air tanker in service and working the better?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Absolutely.

Q86 Robert Key: When do you expect the first new tanker aircraft to be in operational service?

Air Commodore Gunby: The service is expected to enter in 2011.

Q87 Robert Key: Meanwhile, which other NATO countries can provide air refuelling aircraft that are compatible with our aircraft?

Air Commodore Gunby: Off the top of my head, the French, Italian and Dutch Air Forces have a tanker capability but it is not compatible with our fast jets, for instance. We can give you a note if that is helpful.

Robert Key: It would be helpful.

Q88 Chairman: Do any of them use VC10s?

Air Commodore Gunby: None of them uses VC10s.

Q89 Robert Key: When I was in Paris last month with the armaments directorate it expressed the hope that it might be able to be partners with Britain in the future strategic tanker aircraft. Are you aware of any such discussions?

Air Commodore Gunby: I believe that is really a question for General Figgures.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: In my previous job I had experience of international logistics engagement and I am not aware of significant overtures for participation in the FSTA programme as currently configured.

Q90 John Smith: As to the retention of the VC10, an absolutely superb job has been done at St Athan in maintaining and extending the life of that aircraft. Given the announcement on the DCR, do you anticipate any changes in where you will maintain and overhaul the VC10 in future, or is it going to stay at Twin Peaks in St Athan?

Air Commodore Gunby: I do not know the answer to that question. Perhaps we can provide a note.

Chairman: Perhaps you would do so.

Q91 Mr Holloway: When chatting to one of your engineers he referred to the VC10 fleet as rotting old aircraft, and in talking to others about the Tristars it was said that there were dozens of reds and greens, which are maintenance terms that I do not understand. Is there a safety issue in regard to the Tristar and VC10 fleets as the families of some of the aircrews seem to believe? As a passenger on the Tristar it was horrifying. There are doors without any lining. I know that that is superficial, but is there a deeper safety issue?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We take the safety of our air, land and sea systems extremely seriously and the process by which we ensure that those best able to discharge those safety responsibilities, the people in charge, do so is subject to some very firm and careful delegations. We never put people in a position where they can take undue risks with the lives of people who operate. That said, when systems age their reliability falls off and one constantly has to look at the reliability of those systems compared with any duplications or triplications that the aircraft carry to make continuing safety judgments. The cost of maintaining a safe system is effectively the metric against which all operators of aeroplanes are challenged. I am completely confident in the safety of our systems.

Q92 Mr Holloway: My understanding is that there have been rows at aircraft doors between flight engineers and crew or senior officers who are determined to get aircraft to leave and engineering staff have not been happy that the aircraft is in a fit condition to go.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Clearly, I cannot comment on hypothetical moments or anecdotes in that form. My expectation is that when there is a complex aeroplane with a variety of back‑up systems and a particular deficiency exists by and large the "go, no-go" list as authorised by headquarters will always be followed. There may well be the occasional moment when something is sitting on a margin that warrants discussion between the experts at the time.

Q93 Mr Holloway: But would it be right to say that with all these defects in these two classes of aircraft what is happening continually - again, I do not understand it but you are an engineer - is that a component has six layers of redundancy and we are eroding those layers so perhaps we are one or two away from a failure? I ask again whether you are satisfied that the VC10 and Tristar fleets are safe.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Yes, absolutely.

Q94 Mr Jones: Turning to the Tristar fleet, we understand from Marshalls that it has offered additional aircraft to supplement the fleet that you already have. First, would it benefit you; second, has it been considered?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: I am not aware of that offer. When looking at our activities over the past year and the fitting of defensive aid systems to the aeroplanes obviously we have made judgments on how many of them would be so equipped and the various challenges to and effects on the fleet. By and large, to date the analysis that we have carried out does not favour the purchase of more old aircraft like Tristar. The determining feature in that is by and large the availability of spares for Tristar that are in a usable condition. Clearly, Tristar was quite a large fleet in its heyday and there are a number of airframes mothballed in the desert in Davis-Monthan in the US. The issue becomes one of providing the standards of onboard equipment for which one has complete maintenance records that they have been maintained either to FAA or UK CAA standards. Therefore, the Tristar constraining factor is rather more to do with onboard equipment obsolescence than particularly the airframe or the availability of older airframes that we could acquire. Certainly, the analysis we have made in the recent months is that the purchase of more Tristars is not a viable option.

Q95 Robert Key: Air Vice-Marshal, right at the start of this session you referred to the importance of security of flight in and out of theatre. This Committee has been concerned for many years with progress on the fitting of defensive aid suites. We consider it inappropriate to discuss this in public session. Could you send us a note in confidence on the progress in fitting explosive suppressant foam to Ministry of Defence transport and tanker aircraft including the Tristars?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Yes. It is being fitted to the Hercules, not the Tristar.

Q96 Robert Key: But can you also deal with the security measures fitted to the Tristars?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Yes, we can do so.

Q97 Robert Key: I move on to aircrews. Do you have enough aircrews per aircraft or does the shortage which we have heard about limit the use of your airframes and also the use of strategic lift, transport and tanker aircraft?

Air Commodore Gunby: Aircrew availability like aircraft availability is a determining factor in what we consider at any time. The number of crews that we apportion to each aircraft in the inventory varies between aircraft types. It is specified in our management plan and planning assumptions how many crews we should have per aircraft type. The way in which we employ them is very different from the commercial sector. We are not in the business of revenue-earning where in the commercial sector the key determinant is to keep the aircraft on the ground for the minimum amount of time because it is not earning revenue. We are not in that game, or in the game of just flying aircraft in the hope that people book seats or deliver freight for that aircraft. Therefore, a balance must be struck between those contingencies where we need a surge requirement of air lift - in a moment I will come back to how we do that - and, if you like, the steady state when we are not going through those surge periods. If we were to crew our aircraft to deliver always that surge requirement in the most expeditious fashion what would we do with all those crews in peacetime? There might not be enough tasks out there in peacetime to keep all of them current or competent in the range of skills which they have. The method by which we employ our crews varies depending on perhaps whether the aircraft is employed in a tanker role or an air transport role. The most efficient use of our aircraft is to run what we call slip patterns. We would pre-position crews such that they will take over a particular aircraft at the point at which the first crew has expended its available crew duty time which is specified for each aircraft type. It is based on extensive aero‑medical advice and also best practice in commercial aviation. In that fashion we can keep the aircraft moving and maximise its utility, if you will. Obviously, that is quite crew-intensive because one has to place the crews in various positions. Our tanker employments tend to be based on one task on a given day or they are on deployed duties. Similarly, currently the C-130s in Iraq and Afghanistan are on deployed duties. We will send enough crews to deliver the task in those theatres but will not need as many crews per aircraft as we would to run an aircraft in a slip pattern if it was travelling a long distance. As a matter of course, for many years we have done veer and haul on the crew ratios - the number of crews per aircraft - across the fleets, and we continue to do that. Several years ago when we withdrew a number of VC10s from service we shifted some of the crews from that aircraft to the Tristar to enable us to generate more output from the Tristar. Similarly, on the back of the decision to retire four C-130Ks we have shifted some crews across to the C-130J both to enable us hopefully to buy back a little of the air lift capacity which we have now retired but also to ease some of the harmony issues in relation to the C-130J. As to the C-17, when it was originally brought into service under the lease programme we crewed it at three crews per aircraft. We have now raised that to four crews per aircraft. With the introduction of the fifth aircraft next year another four crews will come along. Whatever the number is - four to one for the C-17s is our highest ratio - that does not compare directly with commercial aviation at all. I do not have the figures to hand but commercial operators, depending on the scale of their operation, may have anything up to 10 or 12 crews per aircraft, but that is in the interests of earning revenue. We have to balance the surge and peacetime requirements in crew ratio terms and we do veer and haul as a matter of course. It takes time to requalify aircrews for different types. We keep that under review. Wherever it is appropriate we will run aircraft tasks fast and use slip crews. For our current operational air bridge sorties for both passengers and freight we make maximise use of the assets. We run them fast with the positioning of slip crews.

Q98 Robert Key: In the past couple of years has it become more difficult to meet surge demand, or, putting it another way, do you have to put in more slip crews than you used to?

Air Commodore Gunby: I do not think we need to put in any more slip crews than we used to. In my 10 or 15 years of recollection my sense is not that we do that on any greater basis than historically. We have the dynamic between the military air lift output in terms of delivery of lift and the commercial element of that.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We have probably been fairly successful in programming the number of crews on each type to reflect the way our internal market, if you like, has changed the use of certain types and the style of the operation. The air transport force manpower is certainly under strains similar to those applying to certain other existing niche capabilities around defence at large, so it is fair to reflect that they are working harder than an ideal plan would require in terms of both hours per day when they are at task or time away from home in the case of the deployed crews. But at the balancing end of the business we are probably content that at the moment that can be maintained and does not reflect an undue negative balance compared with other sections of defence which are similarly stretched.

Q99 Robert Key: We know that you lose aircrew to commercial airlines like Virgin. Is that problem becoming greater?

Air Commodore Gunby: There are indications that an increasing number of people are exercising their option to leave at the end of their engagements. Without the figures to hand, again the incidence of premature release from the service shows no marked increase, but people are probably a little more inclined, if you will, to leave at the end of their engagement. I think that when he gave evidence CDS referred to this as an indicator in terms of morale and the like.

Q100 Robert Key: What reasons do those aircrews give for leaving? Is it lack of money or being away from home?

Air Commodore Gunby: Perhaps we can give the Committee a note on that because I do not have the specific survey results.

Mr Jones: I would be interested to see the figures in that note. When I was in Afghanistan last week I spoke to a number of aircrew who said that the tempo of operation there - a month on and a month off, basically, and up to six months away from home - was having an effect on them. I know that the ups and downs of the commercial airline business have always affected the recruitment of pilots from the RAF. A few years ago a retention bonus was paid. Do we need to do that again? Clearly, although they enjoyed their experience in Afghanistan the pressure of operations on the aircrew had an effect on them.

Q101 Chairman: Could you include that in the note?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The principal personnel officers of all three Services keep a very close eye on the retention and loss rate figures. A range of financial retention incentives is available. They are not levers that we particularly like. You referred to the FRI which was last paid to aircrew. I had a substantial involvement in its creation in a previous job. That was a rather interesting process in that the tragic events of 9/11 occurred and there was a complete collapse in civil aviation. Before I knew where I was I had a serious extra number of aircrews who were not exercising the options that we would normally expect them to exercise. That is part of the problem of being a modest aviation player in a very large sector, so it is a difficult and demanding task. That is why the panel here is slightly cautious about giving you the answer because you have to rely on the best evidence which is what people write on the questionnaire that they complete when they leave the service. My recollection is that it is a standard mixture of things: life change, family circumstances and so on. Across defence generally we have not found the tempo of operations and the dangers and risks of operations to be a significant determinant across the piece. There are other things in play which tend to dominate the equation.

Q102 Mr Jones: I do not expect the answer today, but perhaps the note could contain the figures and also some of that information. That would be helpful possibly in trying to discount some of the anecdotal evidence that has been put to us.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: We will put it together.

Q103 Mr Holloway: Obviously, the air bridge is important for operations but also quite important for morale, that is, leave and so on. When I was in the Armed Forces I formed the conclusion that air transport was run for the convenience of the Royal Air Force, not the people travelling. I remember checking in 72 hours early for a flight to Canada and last summer the experience of a Member of the Committee was quite similar, but since then there have been some huge improvements. Can you take us through them?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Perhaps you would allow me to deal with the major equipment improvements and then I will hand it over to the operators to deal with some of the elements of the process below. The fundamental concern of the defence staff is to ensure the safe transportation of our people into the threat theatres. You are kind enough to acknowledge that we have had some dispatch reliability difficulties in the past 12 months where because we have had a relatively small number of aeroplanes equipped with the relevant defensive systems we have fallen foul of the reliability of those aeroplanes in dispatch terms, and therefore somewhat regrettably people have formed the view that with the defence-owned assets we do not deliver a particularly effective service. Since more aeroplanes have passed through the defensive aids equipping programme at Marshalls - I am talking predominantly of the Tristars - we are now in a much better position to provide the service. Indeed, I keep a very close eye on the statistics of disappointment to make sure that we are strategically doing everything we can. We are now getting the sorts of numbers where I am beginning to feel more comfortable. A good example of that is that in the past two months - Brigadier Mason runs the numbers for me - we have not disappointed. We have been delivering a good service because we can now provide a spare aeroplane that is properly equipped. In the event that the primary aeroplane has a start-up issue that cannot be fixed quickly we can revert to a back-up and deliver the sort of service of which the Royal Air Force can be proud. At the high technical end we have done a lot of work and spent a lot of money on delivering it. Post Mr Lancaster's experiences we have also invited the customer - Headquarters Land Command - to do a route review of all our tracks to see what sorts of things are irritants to the vision of a gold standard service. Land Command has provided a report which is being progressively worked through. A number of simple things can be done to make people feel as if they are valued customers and the problems that you previously highlighted are a thing of the past.

Air Commodore Gunby: The other very significant improvement that has been made since last summer is that we are now delivering personnel direct to Kandahar in Afghanistan whereas previously they had to go to Kabul and then move down country in a Hercules. That has significantly reduced the transit time for passengers reaching the point where they are requirement. The reviews to which the air vice-marshal referred are not entirely new. The identification and addressing of customer satisfaction, or customer irritants if you will, has been a continual process for many years, but events over the past 12 months have brought those into particularly sharp focus. A number of independent snapshot reviews have been conducted supplemented most recently by the Land Command-led review which was a small team of Army and Royal Navy personnel who for a couple of weeks were allowed free rein to look at the whole process of delivering the air bridge.

Q104 Mr Jones: Was that because they were the complainers?

Air Commodore Gunby: They are the predominant customers. To be fair, if the Air Force came along and said everything was rosy it would not smack as being entirely independent and necessarily fair. They had the opportunity to look behind the scenes at the whole process from concepts to planning to delivery and geographically they ranged very widely to both operational theatres and the Falklands. They looked at the South Atlantic, Akrotiri, Brize Norton and so on. They looked at what was going on at those locations and picked up what they saw as anomalies, inconsistencies in approach and made infrastructure recommendations, whether modest or major. One major improvement would be to introduce more reliable air transport aircraft. I wholeheartedly endorse that, and there are plans to do that in a certain timescale. But there is a whole raft of other rather more modest and in the view of some people perhaps trivial improvements in process and infrastructure that can be made and have been made which collectively improve the level of service provided. To give a few examples, at Brize Norton we have increased the number of people who are on movement shifts and handle passengers. We have introduced a contract element to bolster availability. It has also released some uniformed air movements personnel to do the operational job out of theatre. We have refurbished and expanded the café in the terminal. It is perhaps a relatively trivial thing, but it is a very welcome improvement. We have installed a customer helpline with a call waiting facility. These are relatively trivial things but collectively they mount up. In the recent past at Akrotiri air-conditioning has been installed throughout the lounges. There have been upgrades to the ablution facilities. A Tannoy has been installed there. A mobile phone service is available so that people can call home from Akrotiri. There is access to JPA facilities at the terminal in Akrotiri. We are focusing on these sorts of customer care initiatives, if you will. We have also focused very strongly on the training of our personnel who interface with customers. Perhaps for understandable reasons over the years the customer service mentality in a military organisation has not been strongly to the fore, but we have reintroduced and reinforced a requirement for customer handling training through our training processes. Therefore, there is a raft of relatively minor improvements which collectively contributes to the good of the service. Many have been enacted and many more are in progress. Looking beyond that, the CATARA programme at Brize Norton will deliver us the infrastructure to enable us to march forward with the new aircraft types.

Q105 Mr Holloway: For the record, most of the people to whom I have spoken believe that the Royal Air Force has done a magnificent job since last summer in improving it, but are there still shortcomings? Can you give some examples of what they are from your viewpoint?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: The infrastructure at Brize Norton is pretty creaky, which means that people probably have to work a lot harder and more diligently to achieve a modernised freight-handling system and a rather more swept-up and laid-out terminal. Ramps can sometimes be a challenge at peaks of movements given that we have already started the work to increase the apron area. Those are probably the testing areas, apart from the stresses and strains of operating relatively old aeroplanes which do not conform to good modern standards, because that is what people expect when they go on holiday.

Brigadier Mason: Whilst it is dangerous to use statistics because they have a nasty habit of creeping up behind you and kicking you in the head, I know that we have significantly improved our statistics for supporting Afghanistan. I asked for the most recent statistics covering the very difficult period of the relief put in place in Afghanistan when we were trying to move in 6,500 troops and move 6,500 out. The statistics for the Tristar over the period February to April show a 91 per cent success rates. That equates very well with the charter aircraft that are flying into Al-Adeed at 93 per cent. We must work to maintain that.

Chairman: This is a very important issue in maintaining the morale of the people who are doing such important work in Afghanistan.

Q106 Mr Jones: I want to ask about some of the work you are doing with the commercial operators you are using. I spent 18 hours flying to the Falklands on a Tristar. Just because it is a military aircraft there is more room; it is designed for military personnel. I also spent seven hours flying back from Qatar on a 767 Excel Airways which is not exactly designed to seat some large marines and others for a seven-hour flight. What work are you doing to charter aircraft which will provide accommodation so it is more comfortable for people to travel back from, say, Qatar for seven hours? It is perhaps all right to travel to Spain on a 767 charter flight, but if the passengers are marines with all their equipment it is a pretty tight fit. Some of the people I saw on that Excel Airways aircraft went through hell for seven hours. The service from the airline itself was not fantastic.

Brigadier Mason: Did you fill in a chit to say you were not satisfied with it? I am being slightly flippant, but it is an important point.

Q107 Mr Jones: There is a big difference. I have flown on a Tristar military aircraft which is designed to accommodate personnel, but these aircraft are not so designed; they are designed to take people on holiday.

Brigadier Mason: A good example is the support of the South Atlantic islands for which the Tristar was originally bought to support after the Falklands war. Because the Tristars are supporting Afghanistan we now charter 747s through Excel Airways. They are big enough and wide enough to take any number of troops. To answer your specific question, when we go out to contract we do not ask the airlines to adjust the way they do their seating because, frankly, none of them would want to have a contract with us if we so asked.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: There is the pragmatic consideration of conforming to IATA standards which clearly all of these aeroplanes do for the distance travelled, but I agree that we have rough-and-tough, big, solid chaps sitting in seats built for the average tourist. That is an issue. I do not pressure the DISSCOM to achieve 100 per cent load occupancies; I am perfectly content that they have a certain overcapacity in the PAX fits. Our statistics show that we are 80 per cent loaded also on charters. One must have some cognisance of the fact that a bit more space is needed for chaps who have done a serious job and are on their way home, but one cannot go much further and have, say, two seats per person. In most of these aeroplanes one is not allowed to lift the arm rest anyway. When we have the FSTA in service one of the rather useful spin-offs is that that aeroplane has a seating fit which will be very much more like modern standards of acceptability and will be more suitable for the larger framed individual we tend to employ. Again, it is another jam tomorrow answer, but the mitigating factor is that we just do not stretch the elastic too thinly in terms of the contracts we place. Occasionally, it is a completely full aeroplane and it is not the most pleasant experience, but we do our best to minimise the times when that occurs.

Q108 Mr Jenkins: I asked earlier about the carrying capacity of the aircraft. The figure I have is that the C-17A can carry 45 tonnes but for the A400M it is suggested that the carrying capacity is 32 tonnes. Does anyone ever consult you as to what the carrying capacity of the aircraft should be, and do you ever match it up with your obligation to carry? How would you feel if the new FRES vehicle could not be carried in the A400M because it was too heavy?

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: As I am sure the Committee is aware, there has been a lot of debate with Airbus and quite recently we have increased the floor loading specification for the UKA400s to cope with those elements of the FRES variants and capabilities that have now been identified. In the past two years' worth of activities that have been carried out the trend has been for armoured vehicles to become heavier to provide the required defence. Conscious of the security situation that we are now, it is a considerable worry that with each threat change there is an inexorable rise in the weight of armour or protection that our various vehicles are carrying. I think that is a very legitimate concern for the Committee and ourselves to pursue because it will constantly stress the ability to lift these vehicles around. The business that we are in is to try to find ways to achieve that. So far the A400 design is living up to the FRES demands. Should the threat situation suddenly change further then all of that will have to be looked at very carefully, but General Figgures is probably the best man to speak to that topic in the next couple of weeks.

Q109 Chairman: As we said, there is a trade-off between mobility and protection.

Air Vice-Marshal Leeson: Yes.

Chairman: Gentlemen, thank you for the interesting session this morning. We are grateful to you for your frank and open answers and for a most useful start to our inquiry into strategic lift.