UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 727-i

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

defence committee

 

 

uk operations in iraq

 

 

Tuesday 26 June 2007

DR ALI ANSARI, DR TOBY DODGE, DR ERIC HERRING, DR GLEN RANGWALA and PROFESSOR SAMI ZUBAIDA

MR NADHIM ZAHAWI

Evidence heard in Public Questions 1 - 79

 

 

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee

on Tuesday 26 June 2007

Members present

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David S Borrow

Mr David Crausby

Linda Gilroy

Mr David Hamilton

Mr Adam Holloway

Mr Bernard Jenkin

Mr Brian Jenkins

Robert Key

Willie Rennie

John Smith

________________

Witnesses: Dr Ali Ansari, University of St Andrews; Dr Toby Dodge, Queen Mary College, University of London; Dr Eric Herring, University of Bristol; Dr Glen Rangwala, University of Cambridge; and Professor Sami Zubaida, Birkbeck College, University of London; gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: Good morning. Welcome. This is our first evidence session in a new inquiry into UK operations in Iraq. What we are going to be considering is the political and security situation in Iraq, what are the prospects for national reconciliation and what the progress is on security sector reform and reconstruction and what the future is of the UK Forces in Iraq. We have got a couple of hours this morning. We had to start a bit late - I am sorry about that - because of the queues outside; but welcome to our witnesses. We have got a lot of ground to cover. I wonder if you would begin, please, by introducing yourselves and saying what your background is, very briefly?

Dr Rangwala: I am Dr Glen Rangwala, a Lecturer in politics at Cambridge University and a Fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge. I teach Middle-Eastern politics and have been doing research in Iraq over the past four years. I am co-author of a book, Iraq in Fragments, with Eric Herring, my neighbour.

Dr Herring: I am Dr Eric Herring. I am Senior Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Bristol, co-author of the book Iraq in Fragments, with Glen here, obviously, and, some years previous to that, I have been conducting research into UN sanctions policy on Iraq and so it has been a continuing interest, US, UN, UK policy towards Iraq.

Dr Dodge: I am Dr Toby Dodge. I am a Reader in International Politics at Queen Mary College, University of London, and a Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. I have worked on Iraq all my academic life, as a political scientist. I was in Baghdad recently, for the month of April, both in the Green Zone and then travelling through Baghdad and down to Mahmudiyah, Latifiyah, Yusufiyah and then finally to Basra.

Professor Zubaida: I am Sami Zubaida. I am Emeritus Professor of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College. I work on religion, culture and politics in the Middle East. I was born in Iraq so I have a special interest in Iraq, a comparative perspective, so to speak.

Dr Ansari: I am Dr Ali Ansari. I am a Reader in Modern History at the University of St Andrews and my specialism is actually Iran, so I am here looking at Iran; it is near abroad, I guess.

Q2 Chairman: Thank you very much. Gentlemen, can we start by asking, what are the underlying causes of the violence in Iraq; which are the principal insurgent groups, if insurgent groups are part of the causes of that violence, and what are they trying to achieve? Dr Dodge, you were there last month?

Dr Dodge: I was there during April, trying to assess the success of the surge. I think the cause is the collapse of the Iraqi state; the state was put under 13 years of the worst sanctions ever imposed, I think, in international history. It did what it was meant to do, but at the wrong time, so as too few American troops reached Baghdad they could not control the looting, the civil servants that were running the state had gone through three roles in 20 years and the state was taken to pieces. I was in Baghdad in May 2003 seeing the almost complete destruction of the state. If you add on to that the now infamous decisions to disband the Iraqi Army and to de-Ba'athise, what de-Ba'athification did was take away what was left of the state, the senior levels of the Civil Service, its institutional memory. Into that vacuum firstly stepped criminals and then insurgents fighting to drive out American occupiers, and then, finally, militias, legitimising themselves by sectarian ideology, and that big stew of violence is the Iraqi civil war as it stands. The one thing I would add to that is the complexity of this situation; the final legacy that Saddam Hussein left to the country was, by using vast amounts of violence and money, he combed through society, breaking any organisational capacity he did not control, so the organisations I have just described to you, the militias, the criminals, the insurgents, are deeply fractured and very fluid. The danger would be to simplify the groups on an ethnic or organisational basis, and I do not think any one group has the coherence to be called institutionalised.

Dr Herring: I would agree with all of that and would add a number of things to it. The first is that in different parts of Iraq you have different conflicts and they are certainly not all inter-sectarian. In the west of Iraq there is now a developing conflict between Sunni Arab elements which are connected with the Coalition versus those opposed to it versus those supporting al-Qaeda in Iraq. In the north of Iraq you have the potential struggle over Kirkuk, which obviously is Kurdish Turkeman and Arab. In the south of Iraq, although it is relatively quiet, much of the territory, nevertheless it is an intra-Shi'a political and effectively mafia struggle; so a number of complex struggles there. However, the US Department of Defense's own figures show that, and further consistently so, about 70 per cent of the violence, the attacks are directed at Coalition Forces. There is a lot of uncertainty over that figure, the Iraq Study Group says that there is much, much more violence than that, many more attacks, and so the figures are uncertain. In the Coalition's own assessment, it is very much the primary attacks are directed against the Coalition, and what it raises, of course, is the major policy issue, which I am sure we will come to.

Q3 Chairman: We will. Any other comments on which are the principal groups?

Dr Rangwala: I would add that I think a picture of complete disorder within Iraq today would be inaccurate. A number of the insurgent groups have increasingly formed command structures within them that have shown themselves willing to engage in compromises with groups that are not their ideological bedfellows, and so we have seen over the past year, in particular, a number of different groups that were essentially autonomous insurgent groups engaged in deal-making structures with other insurgent groups. We have seen the formation of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, in Anbar, in Mosul, and in that respect, at least, there is some sense of there being structures within the insurgency which show themselves willing to engage in negotiations.

Q4 Mr Jenkin: This may seem a strange question, but obviously the targets are very varied, sometimes they are other insurgent groups, sometimes they are Government or Police or Iraqi Army targets, sometimes obviously they are the British and American and Coalition Forces. Against whom is the insurgency campaign directed, what is the agenda behind the various insurgencies; because it is not a so-called Shi'a/Sunni civil war, which is often what it is mischaracterised as, is it?

Professor Zubaida: I think you are quite right, it is not just simply sectarian, or ethnic, I think it is also a battle over resources. In fact, if you look at, for instance, the battles in Basra and in the south of Iraq, it is over control of oil resources, of smuggling gangs; most of the people there, well, all the sides there are Shi'ite but they are divided along different loyalties to different parties, to different tribes, straightforward gangs and mafias, and so on, so I think part of the objectives of the insurgency are actually control of material resources: profit.

Q5 Chairman: Dr Dodge, you looked as though you wanted to answer that question?

Dr Dodge: I just think 'insurgency' is probably the wrong word now, that we have a series of different groups fighting different wars. Glen is right, that there has been some solidification of the insurgency, but that solidification is our next state of Iraq, for example, resulting again in a second splitting, so we have, I think, a series of different groups, some coming together, some splitting. If you were to look at the extrajudicial killings in Baghdad - 1,400 in January, 800 in February, 550 in March, 550 in April, 700 in May - that would give you another example of a civil war that is being driven by ethnic cleansing, so what we have is a multi-level conflict. As Eric has said, there are different geographical struggles going on, but I think if you were looking for the overarching explanation for that it is this security vacuum which these different groups have stepped into, with different objectives.

Q6 Chairman: We have got a lot of questions to cover, so although there is much that could be said on this can I ask what is the position now and has it got better or worse in recent months?

Dr Rangwala: The number of multiple-fatality bombings, the number of extrajudicial killings, has gone down in recent months since the injection of new US troops into Baghdad. Therefore, the question arises, to what extent is that a permanent reduction in the violence in Baghdad, in particular, and in the rest of Iraq more generally; is this a situation in which those groups which did engage in those multiple-fatality bombings and extrajudicial killings have been disbanded. I think the answer there has to be pessimistic, that, in some sense, these groups have either left Baghdad and are operating outside the capital city, or have just stored their weapons away temporarily, waiting for the US Forces which are there, going to be there really for only another few months, at current levels, to depart from the country. In that sense, I believe there is a temporary lull in the violence, but not a reduction.

Dr Herring: The US Department of Defense's own figures say that the overall number of deaths globally in Iraq has continued to increase very slightly in this period, and so there is a displacement of violence to other parts of Iraq and a destabilisation of places which were relatively quiet; it is definitely a decline. There are other measures of decline, which would be including increasing support across Iraqi communities, in Shi'a and in some Kurdish elements as well, for attacks on Coalition Forces. Iraqis are now, broadly, evenly divided on this. More Iraqis than ever want Coalition Forces to leave, and support for the idea of an Iraqi national state, while still in a majority, is declining really noticeably, from about 80 per cent into the 50s. There is a fundamental decline; the strategy cannot work, in terms of these kinds of trends. The standing up of Iraqi Forces is not linked to a decline in the killings; they are both on the same upward trajectory.

Q7 Robert Key: Gentlemen, do you think Coalition Forces are still an essential stabilising element, or do they just fuel the violence?

Dr Dodge: I think they are a stabilising force. I think where we have seen them withdraw, especially in the provinces in the south, the violence has increased and there has been a sharp drop-off. Both Eric and Glen are right to suggest they are the target for violence, but there is an awful lot of violence going on outside their remit. On one level they are not reducing the violence across Iraq but I think they are putting a break, albeit a rather malfunctioning one, on the swift movement to civil war.

Professor Zubaida: I agree with that up to a point, but the point is, by staying there, is the stabilisation of the situation permanent or is it the fact that whenever they leave there is going to be a civil war. If they leave now or if they leave in two years' time it could be the same outcome, unless in the meantime, while we are staying, they have effective measures for controlling, reconciling the different sides in the conflict. I am not sure that they are capable of doing that, so it seems to me that they are there stabilising the situation, to some extent, now; whenever they leave the terrors will be unleashed, in any case.

Q8 Robert Key: Do you see that chaos as inevitable, whatever happens?

Professor Zubaida: No; not inevitable. If, in the meantime, there are actually measures to stabilise the situation, successful measures, although I cannot see what they are, then obviously that will be useful. I am sure that Toby will have some answers to this, but, as far as I can see, as soon as the Americans leave there will be a fight between the different sides to consolidate their territory and to consolidate the resources they control.

Dr Rangwala: I would take Professor Zubaida's point a little bit further. It is my sense that deal-making, national reconciliation between different Iraqi groups is actually hindered by the uncertainty about the future of the US presence in Iraq at present. If some sides believe that the US will continue to stay in the country and support, say, for example, those parties currently in government, they see no good reason to make a deal with, say, the insurgent groups which are aiming for that ousting; they see no reason to engage in compromises because they have got the US to fight on their behalf during those struggles. If there becomes increased certainty about what will happen to the US presence in Iraq, whether they will retain a long-term, small presence, whether they will retain an ability to intervene in the country to support the Government, that would enable different Iraqi groups to engage in compromises in a way which they do not at the moment. Therefore, at least, the uncertainty about the future of the US presence is a major factor which is preventing national reconciliation in that way.

Q9 Robert Key: Dr Rangwala, you gave evidence to the Iraq Commission and you said, with Dr Herring, the immediate withdrawal of British Forces from Iraq would be the right decision, as they are doing little of value, attracting increased hostility and suffering losses in support of an approach that has failed?

Dr Rangwala: Yes, because I believe that it is impossible for the US or the UK to have a credible commitment to stay in Iraq indefinitely. I think that would not be seen as a credible promise by the British or American Governments, in that sense. Therefore, if one wants to stabilise Iraq, the best way of showing the Iraqis that the future, essentially, is in their hands and that they have to make a deal between themselves is to withdraw Forces. That is why I have been a proponent, since over the past year, of the need to scale down and eventually eliminate the US military presence.

Q10 Robert Key: This is seen primarily as an Army operation, a land operation. Can I ask you what you think would be the consequences of the United States, Australian and the British Royal Navy withdrawing their Navies from this area, and it might be interesting to have an Iranian perspective on that?

Dr Ansari: An Iranian perspective: I think that Iran's position vis-à-vis the Coalition as a whole can be viewed as dichotomous, there are two different strategies going on in Tehran, at the moment. One if reflected by, really, I suppose, what you would normally call the Civil Service, the Foreign Ministry and the old hands in Government, and the others being perpetrated, or promoted, by the current Government and Mr Aminajad and his allies in the Revolutionary Guard core. I think the latter would very much like to see a withdrawal of Coalition Forces from a whole range of their activities, both in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, which of course they will emphasise to you is the Persian Gulf and therefore is something that they have a certain right to monitor. I have to say, I think that views in Tehran are divided, I would not say that it is quite so clear, and there are those that actually see the Coalition presence as doing some good, at the very least in directing certainly insurgency activities away from them. I think there is an acknowledgment in Iran that if the Coalition withdrew then a lot of these groups probably would turn their attention on to the Iranians that are around, so there is a lightning-rod activity, facility, going on there as well, at the very least.

Dr Herring: I would like to say, briefly, that the fundamental role of the Coalition Forces is a destabilising one, because it is permitting the intransigence of forces in Baghdad that are not interested in delivering the things that are necessary for national reconciliation, so it is fundamentally destabilising. Then there are particular operations, like the current one in Diyala Province, which are deeply destabilising because they are highly polarising military exercises, which come across to Sunni Arabs in Iraq as essentially anti-Sunni. Then there are other roles, for which actually there is quite widespread support, the idea of peace-keeping and policing, and so on, which Iraqis can support, and that leads to issues of Naval patrolling, and anti-smuggling activities are in a different category. You are dealing with a fundamental, strategic role, then specific military operations which the US is conducting, which are deeply unhelpful and just a repeat of what we have been doing over and over. Then there are these other, more peace-keeping, policing-orientated activities, which would receive widespread support.

Q11 Robert Key: Is the Iraqi Navy capable of protecting Iraq's bialex(?) ports?

Dr Herring: No.

Professor Zubaida: No.

Dr Dodge: The port in Basra is thoroughly penetrated by militias who cream off, in effect, a tax for everything. The Iraqi Navy has little or no role in stopping that. Just to disagree with my two august colleagues, I think what we are involved in doing is second-guessing the rationality of Iraqi actors, and the vast majority of those Iraqi actors, Eric and Glen claim will come to compromise when the Coalition Forces leave, are at the moment the key national figures involved in perpetrating killings and murders. If you want to look at their motivation and their actions, let us look at what they are doing now. The militias, a vast array of them, and forces within the Iraqi Government are perpetrating violence against other Iraqis. My assessment is the same with Eric and Glen, it is speculation from present events that they will increase their deployment of violence, and not decrease it, when troops go home.

Dr Herring: There is actually not a difference between our positions. If you refuse to support these intransigent troops, they might still prefer chaos to compromise; that is certainly the case. The question is are we stabilising by supporting intransigent groups, and the answer has to be, no. How that will then play out, I agree, they might simply say no, and that is why it is important to know a best case, or the idea that if you try to manipulate them in giving military support and dangle carrots and sticks that they will go for that, it might be just simply another agenda that is very localised.

Q12 Mr Borrow: Just in the same area, what I am not clear about is whether the presence of Coalition troops is actually, in a way, allowing violence to take place, because their mere presence perhaps saves the perpetrators from the consequence of that violence. In other words, if the troops were not there, there would be a reaction and there would be more violence towards the perpetrators of violence; but the mere fact that the troops are there is actually encouraging people to take part in violence without suffering the real consequences which would exist were the troops not there. Is there an element of that?

Dr Herring: That is actually what is happening, right now, in Baqubah. As far as I can see, the current offensive, the so-called Iraqi Army offensive, supported by the Americans, could not have happened without the American Army, and it is the kind of operation which simply should not happen, because that population has no intention of submitting to what they will see as Shi'a rule, they are just not going to do it. They might have to back off a little when the Americans are there in large numbers, but the American military have said, in the last few days, that the Iraqi Army, so-called, Forces cannot hold Baqubah, and so when the Americans leave the insurgents will come back and they will be fighting to regain their territory and the Shi'a forces will simply have to meet that. I would say that is a major destabilising element.

Q13 Mr Jenkin: How much is this cycle of violence psychologically inevitable, after the terrible years of Saddam's oppression and the systematic decapitation of all the natural leadership of society and the settling of old scores, like a sick wound opening up, and it has just got to let all this out, and it is part of the process that Iraq has got to go through? How much of it is just inevitable; however Saddam departed, whatever happened after Saddam, there is going to be some dreadful reckoning?

Professor Zubaida: I think Saddam laid the basis for it but I do not think it was inevitable. In fact, I think what Saddam had done, as you point out and as has been pointed out before, was destroy any basis of social autonomy, social organisation, political organisation in the country, with the result that the only leadership and coherence that were left were those of religion and tribe, and even then these were fractured, reformed. There was no necessity, no inevitability that these divisions would actually lead to violence. I think one of the most important factors which led to the violence was the policy of the Americans when they got there, which was to abolish, as has been said already, the Government and the Army. What do you expect, if you abolish the Government and the Army and you do not put anything in its place? That really is the crucial factor. Saddam may have laid the grounds for it but what actually activated these primordial solidarities into violence, and formed them as well in groups, was the fact that there was no Government and no Police.

Q14 Linda Gilroy: Does the Maliki Government have the capacity and the will to tackle the violence, and, if not, are there ways in which it can be addressed, and what are they?

Dr Dodge: That is the question which I suspect we are all struggling to answer. Let me give you two sides to the answer. One is, through incentivising the Maliki Government, possibly through saying, as there is a head of steam in Washington, "If you do not do X, Y and Z we are going home, or we'll not fund you; we'll withdraw resources," the argument is you could minimise their room for sectarian behaviour, you could reduce their undoubted evidence of the deployment of government services in a sectarian manner; you could do that. That is one side of the argument. The second side of the argument is that we know that ingrained in the Maliki Government, especially in key ministers of state are sectarian actors who are pursuing a sectarian agenda and/or that the Maliki Government is largely irrelevant to what tentative institutions of state, especially the Police and the militias, are actually wreaking havoc in society. I would argue more towards the first, and the second, incentivising the Maliki Government, on one basis only, that we have got a series of governmental changes, from the CPA to the Alawi Government, to the Jaffri Government, and with each change in government we have seen a massive drop-off of governmental capacity, of incoherence, and whatever, to try to social-engineer another change in a Government which claims at least a democratic mandate will be extremely disrupting. I think we have to work with what we have got and move heaven and earth through, I suspect, an international compact to work with the Maliki Government and try to reform it, or encourage it to reform.

Professor Zubaida: I would largely agree with what Dr Dodge has said. I think that is the case.

Dr Herring: I would add a number of things to that. You are faced with the basic choice of trying to strengthen what is there, and I would actually oppose that. I would say that it is not a coherent actor, it is an alliance, fundamentally, of Kurdish political forces which are doing mostly their own thing, and, broadly speaking, Shi'a fundamentalist forces who control various aspects of the central Iraqi Government in another alliance with the United States, and we see it that way. We will have to look at how you break up that alliance and how you try to find different politics to come out of that, and I do not think that you mapped out here, road and mile, the stages that we do that, it will be something we have to respond to in Iraqi political process. What we need to focus on are the key things of how will the coherent actor emerge and why will it seem more to be gained from negotiating than fighting. No-one is really asking those questions clearly enough, and the surge is simply not going to do that, it is not a coherent actor and it gets more from fighting than from compromising, so there is no point in continuing in that road. There is actually some hope in all of this, which is that you can compare the preferences of most Iraqis, and it has been polled very consistently, we could go into some detail but I will stick to a few specifics. In comparison with what is happening at the national level, it is very different. Overwhelmingly, Iraqis reject sectarianism, overwhelmingly, we think it is being forced upon them, overwhelmingly, actually, they favour some kind of Iraqi national government and some kind of Iraqi national presence, and that is true amongst Kurds as well as Shi'ites. It is not the case that they are all broken down in that way. The question is how do we connect that remaining Iraqi national feeling to some kind of political process, rather than balance the Maliki Government, which has no prospect of delivering it.

Q15 Linda Gilroy: To what extent is that tied up with the success, or lack of success, of the Government in tackling the sectarian divide, and what evidence is there that they have even tried to do that?

Dr Rangwala: The Government itself, as Dr Herring was saying, is largely dependent upon one of the Shi'a political parties, the Supreme Council, now for its parliamentary representation; they are the major block. That is left within the mainstream of the United Iraqi Alliance. They have an extensive militia, the Martyrs Brigades, which are involved in sectarian conflict throughout southern Iraq and in parts of Baghdad; so in that respect they are an actor within a sectarian conflict rather than a mediating force between different sectarian groups. At present, the Maliki Government is facing quite a severe challenge in retaining a parliamentary majority, in any case, and one of the parties within the Shi'a alliance has broken away from it. If the Sadr Movement breaks away from that political alliance, they will be a minority in the Parliament, in any case, and there is a very real prospect, over coming months, of Iraq having a minority Government; so, in that respect at least, it will retain a consistent problem of legitimising itself to its own heartlands.

Professor Zubaida: I agree with that. Really, the Maliki Government is a party in the sectarian conflict in Iraq. In many respects, as a Government it is highly ineffective because it has very little capacity, and it is only the fact that insofar as it depends on its own militias or the various bits of the Government depend on their own militias, which of course just adds to the sectarian conflict. I think it is quite right to say that many Iraqis, when asked, would come out against sectarianism, in favour of national unity and a national government, but the national unity and the national government, as they see it, is under their control. Very few people, except some of the Kurds, would want to divide up Iraq; most of the parties who are Arabs want to keep Iraq as a unit but with themselves in control. This applies, of course, especially in relation to the oil resources, which are so vital for any future Iraqi economy; and these are issues upon which it is very difficult to see how people, under present or foreseeable circumstances, could come to agree.

Q16 Linda Gilroy: Do any of you see any prospect of any of the political actors emerging to rise above those sectarian divides?

Dr Herring: Not until the current ones are undermined. It is worth pointing out that the Maliki Government is under a lot of pressure from within its own Islamic Alliance for not doing enough to protect the Shi'a Muslims, so he is actually putting more effort into that one side of things. I do not see that there is any reason to believe that the current actors have any interest in doing that, especially as they are in government, they are being supported, militarily and economically, and running entire government ministries, and able also, with rampant corruption, to pocket vast personal fortunes in this process. They have just no incentive; and what are they going to do, reach out and undermine their own militia base: I just do not see that, I do not see how it can happen.

Dr Dodge: I agree with all that; it is just that when you look at the comparative studies of civil war, civil society, which is what Eric is looking towards, it is going to find it very difficult to organise. It is the people with the guns who rule the streets, so if you are struggling to get your kids in and out of school, struggling to stop your family being murdered or kidnapped, you are not going to join a political party and put yourself on the front line where the men with guns can shoot you. The Government is undoubtedly corrupt and undoubtedly incoherent; factions within the Government undoubtedly are a central player within the civil war. It is just when you look into society, and Eric is exactly right on all the opinion poll data, where is the organisational capacity going to come from to mobilise and overturn what was, and what the politicians in Government claim is, a democratic electoral mandate given from two elections on a referendum in 2005. Those are the two problems. They claim to have a mandate and society is going to find it very difficult to organise against them.

Professor Zubaida: I think the main element of this society, the kind of educated, urban middle classes, they have been targeted particularly and under great attack, and I think one of the really dire consequences of this conflict is the disempowering, and indeed the displacement, of the middle classes. In fact, many of the people who are now refugees, in Jordan and in Syria, are from this group, not to mention the many professionals and business people who have gone to the Gulf or to Europe or America, in the millions. I think, in many respects, this vital element, which could constitute civil society in Iraq, which is genuinely anti-sectarian, which has been the mainstay of Iraq in the 20th century, has been displaced and disempowered, and that is a very grave question.

Q17 Chairman: Dr Herring, in his evidence to the Iraq Commission, Dr Dodge said that he was vehemently against what is quickly becoming the conventional wisdom, which is to pull troops out, run away and hope for the best. If the current Government, the Maliki Government, has been elected via democratic mandate, why do you think that these people, which Professor Zubaida is talking about, might be tempted back to Iraq to form some sort of civil society, if the first thing that you would advise is undermining that democratically-elected Government?

Dr Herring: There are a couple of elements there. The first is, it was certainly elected through a form of democratic process but it was hardly a particularly free process, and it is certainly not representative of what Iraqis have been saying they want. If you were faced with a situation of rampant militia control, complete breakdown of the state, if you were being picked on and potentially murdered, in this country because you were Scottish or Welsh, you would end up engaging in self-protection and backing forces which would protect you. That is not the same as saying that this is representative of what the people want in Iraq and I am not suggesting that simply by pulling out forces therefore that will emerge. I cannot see how actively supporting, and I will give you a specific illustration, military offences by what is effectively perceived by Sunni Arabs as a Shi'a occupation force in Diyala Province, that advances, in any way, anyone's rights, regardless of which way they did or did not vote. That is just not the way to go. It is not simply, as I say, a question of leaving or staying, it is a question of what function you play and what role you play and Iraqis are more interested in that more supportive role. It is not a question of simply leaving and washing your hands, I have never said that.

Dr Rangwala: Just to respond to the very specific point, what will bring the educated professional classes back from Jordan and Syria, what will bring them back is not necessarily a democratic government being in place but a peaceful country, and what will bring a peaceful country is what we have been discussing. My sense is that a number of these groups, which are engaged in quite explicit violence on a very high scale within Iraq, already through back channels have negotiated with each other, they have shown already their willingness to engage in deal-making, and therefore we need to set the conditions in which they can actually implement the very deals which they have drawn up in private already.

Q18 Mr Jenkin: On the back of that question, is not the rather idealised democratic constitution, attempting to base itself on the reconciliation of all the various factions, really misconceived, for the present circumstance? Should we not encourage them to adopt an emergency constitution which is going to allow perhaps a single individual to impose much more control than is possible with a minority government, which is one prospect?

Dr Herring: What you need is coherent actors and there are going to be a number of them in Iraq; there just is not going to be one. That would be magicking someone out of the air to do it. There is no-one who could play that role, there is no-one who would be accepted, they would simply be fought. We have someone in that role; it is called the Coalition, and you are not going to find an Iraqi to do that role. What you need is not just, of course, fluffy civil society, actually you need a military balance in Iraq, an emergent set of forces which made it clear, in western Iraq, "You cannot conquer western Iraq, so stop trying." As long as the Coalition is going to keep on trying to conquer western Iraq they are going to fail to do so; and are they going to back the Government in Baghdad indefinitely, trying to conquer western Iraq? As soon as the Coalition does not back that attempt at conquest, that attempt at conquest will have to stop; and if that becomes part of the emergent forces, in terms of strength, and I think you do have to look at strength as well as civil society, so it is a balance of those coherent political actors and the military situation on the ground.

Q19 Mr Jenkins: Running an army is expensive and running a militia is expensive, and whilst you have a territory of very poor people there is only so much you can squeeze out of poor people. Who exactly is funding these militias?

Dr Herring: They are smuggling oil.

Dr Rangwala: The oil-smuggling, essentially. All the political parties in the south engage in extensive siphoning off of the oil or smuggling of the oil across borders, and in that respect, at least, they get a very large proportion of their income and very extensive amounts of funds from dealing with Iraq's most valuable natural resource: oil.

Dr Herring: Also the United States, all the money it has poured into Iraq, vast volumes of that have just been disappearing, left, right and centre. To give you a specific illustration of how ludicrous the current situation is, an Iraqi soldier gets about $317 a month, the Police get about $50 or $60; they are being issued with $1,000 pistols which they can sell on the black market, and only a tiny proportion of those, or even I think the US do not even bother to take a note of the serial numbers to keep track of those, and this is according to the US's own official figures. If you want to fund your insurgency join the Iraqi Army or join the Police; they are what Glen and I call embedded insurgents. You get a wage for doing it, you get nice, expensive weapons which you can sell on, or just use during the evenings, and then you go back to work in the morning, if you bother to show up. The US official figures say "These are the Iraqi security forces," little asterisk, and down at the bottom it says, "Just by the way, we don't know how many of these people actually show up."

Q20 Mr Hamilton: I am thinking, Chairman, of an 18-month period when the American elections are going to be coming up, so my question to both Glen and Eric is that you do not say you disagree with Toby, in actual fact, what you are really saying is just let the cards fall, withdraw and that will take care of itself, because that is what will happen, in two years' time, three years' time, four years' time. I just want to be clear that is what you are really saying, is it not?

Dr Rangwala: Not really. I think one does not give incentives to Iraqi political parties to make a deal between themselves, but one thing that the British and Americans can do is try to negotiate with the surrounding actors, with the regional states, Iran, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, to ensure they do not use Iraqi political groups as their own proxies in a turf war in Iraq. I think the main role of the Coalition has to be in ensuring that the regional states do not engage in a way that they could do, with devastating consequences for Iraq if they do.

Dr Herring: Again, I do not say just walk away and wash your hands, but, for example, are you going to try to conquer insurgents by force; the answer simply has to be no, because they have massive support. Are you going to try to conquer the Sadrists by force, as is happening currently, right now; you cannot, so do not try. You must negotiate with them. Engaging all the surrounding actors is a good idea, in the sense that what you must do is you have to do it seriously, not like the United States does currently, where it just wants to get what it can but fundamentally it does not accept your legitimacy. Really, it is going to be an Iraqi national process, because Iraqi nationalism will not be too keen on the idea of the surrounding states, somehow or other, just deciding the future. We will not just walk away, but you have to calculate what will produce coherent actors and what will produce a military balance conducive to negotiations. You cannot win by force and the Coalition should stop trying to do so; it cannot do it.

Q21 John Smith: Do you envisage any strategic threats from the premature withdrawal of the Coalition; strategic threats to the west and to this country in particular?

Dr Dodge: Yes, I do. We have a failed state at the moment which no-one controls; a multi-layered civil war. I think Eric talked about a military balance; what would a military balance look like, as we go forward? I do not think it will look like a neatly-divided Iraq into three areas. Because all of these militias were set up after regime change, bar the two Kurdish militias, they are prepared to come back into a country, and no one group will win and you will have intra-communal and inter-communal war, so you will have a failed state with comparative stability in fractured areas. That looks to me broadly comparable to Afghanistan before the rise of the Taliban. The international community turns its back on a country, the country then descends into civil war with proxies increasingly fighting their own state policies on Iraqi soil. A failed state, already with a rising Islamic radicalism and a transnational Jihadist trend in it, looks to me to pose a distinct threat because it sits on the edge of Europe.

Dr Herring: That is what we have now, but we have layered on top of that Coalition Forces trying to win offensives against two major actors, and that is the absurdity of it. This is the direction we have already; we are already there, it exists. The comparative stability in Basra is precisely because the militias have managed to dominate.

Dr Dodge: There is no stability in Basra.

Dr Herring: Actually, stability in terms of a fragile balance between militias. I do not mean in any positive sense. I think we can agree on that.

Chairman: We are now aware of the general views that you have expressed about Iraq as a whole. Moving on, and dealing first with the surge, David Borrow.

Q22 Mr Borrow: On that point, how successful has the US surge been; is it delivering the results that were expected and what do you expect General Petraeus to report in September?

Dr Dodge: I was travelling through Baghdad in April, which was about the third month of the surge, and travelling on the western bank of the Tigris, Yanouk(?), Mansour(?), what are generally considered Sunni neighbourhoods. You could say, to some extent, in those neighbourhoods, what the surge has done is stopped the militia of the Mahdi Army, Muqtada al-Sadr's militia, coming in and purging those communities of Sunnis, which it did at least for 12 months. To a certain extent, we have seen somewhat of a drop-off in extrajudicial killings, but, as Eric was saying, that is an incredibly localised and probably temporary issue and that has led directly to the fighters, the militias and insurgents, moving out of the capital to Diyala, where violence has increased massively. On that level, I do not think the surge has yet been successful. Secondly, in my wildest imagination I cannot see General Petraeus turning up at Congress in September and saying "It's all over; let's go home." What he will say is "Here is the data; I think we need more time." That is crystal-ball-gazing, or anyway controversial; he will try to push for more time.

Dr Herring: Briefly, it is a blip not a surge, in the sense that there is a small increase in Forces to below the maximum previously there, so actually you could call this the refusal to go back to previous levels, the maintained cut, would be just as accurate a description. Presumably we will be going to get on to political benchmarks because the surge was meant to create the space for the achievement of the political benchmarks on provincial elections, the reversal of some de-Ba'athification, compromising the Constitution, oil revenue-sharing and the future of the oil industry. All of that, more or less, is struggling very much, and effectively I think has stalled, even the things that they claimed to have some agreement on, so the idea of surge to create some political space has failed.

Q23 Mr Borrow: There has been some talk about the approach of the UK as opposed to the US; at the same time as the US is putting extra troops into the surge the UK is drawing down troops from the south. Do they represent different strategies or are they part of a single strategy, and what has been the reaction in the south to the draw-down of the UK Forces?

Dr Rangwala: There has been a consistently different strategy taken by the British in the southern governance, in the south-east of Iraq, from the US approach in central Iraq, essentially. The British approach has been a much more hands-off approach; in that sense, they have not tried to intervene in many of the disputes that have taken place between the different groups within Basra, they have not tried to intervene in some areas in which they know that they will provoke a violent response. This is quite different from the US approach, which is essentially tackling those areas, sending their troops into those areas in order to impose a new form of rule in those towns or cities concerned. The British approach at the moment of scaling down its presence to 5,500 troops in Basra essentially is a continuation of that hands-off approach. We are likely to see the removal of British Forces from their central base in Basra completely over the coming months, and I think, in that sense, at least, it is part of that different approach that the British have taken.

Q24 Mr Jenkin: Is not really the future of Iraq dependent upon the politics of Washington, rather than the merits of any particular strategy or policy any General or department in Washington might adopt?

Professor Zubaida: I think there are many issues in Iraq which are dependent upon policy in Washington, but given that Washington has proved to be so impotent in actually managing Iraq then there must be very limited issues which are determined by Washington. I think one of the big questions that will be determined by Washington is the future of the Kurdish region. In fact, the Kurdish region is relatively well-off, relatively stable, and so on, but that depends very much on continued American support and keeping Turkish Forces at bay. That is one of the issues which depend very much on Washington and what happens in the future. Given that Washington has not really been terribly successful in controlling Iraq, I do not know, apart from the decision to stay or withdraw, and in what form to stay, there are so many elements in Iraq, as has been made very clear, which are not under control.

Dr Ansari: I just want to add, I think that the situation in Iraq, in the border region, could probably be, in some ways, certainly affected perhaps in a positive way if US policy towards the region was a little bit more coherent. I am focusing particularly on Iran there.

Q25 Mr Jenkin: Lots of people talk about engaging Iran. How should we do that and what are we trying to achieve?

Dr Ansari: My own view is that you are not going to get broader results in the war on terror, be it Afghanistan or Iraq, unless you begin to have some sort of coherent policy and strategy towards Iran. Engagement can mean a broad range of issues. At the moment, as far as I can see, the United States and Iran are settling into a rather uneasy war of attrition and some of the excesses of this war of attrition are being seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the one hand, the Americans are pushing for a fairly tight and, I would say, in some ways, quite successful economic embargo, in a sense, a sort of siege of the Iranian economy, which is beginning to bite, and the Iranians are beginning to retaliate by supporting a whole range of different proxy groups, to try to put pressure on the Coalition. I have to say that we generalise at our peril, in a sense, because clearly in the United States as well there are some strong divisions within the Administration as to how to proceed. On my recent trip to the United States, I was quite struck to see the differences in opinion between the State Department and, say, for instance, the Vice President's Office. The Vice President's Office seemed to be carrying on a policy, quite distinct and of its own, as far as, say, Baluchistan was concerned. There are things going on which I do not think are terribly helpful, but you can see how the Iranians might retaliate in kind by supporting units like the Taliban or supporting even Sunni insurgents in Iraq, however limited I consider those to be, but nonetheless obviously it exists.

Q26 Mr Jenkin: The West is torn between a policy which might be characterised as carpets and pistachios and being nice to the trading ruling class in Iran, or carrier groups and backing the PMI. Should we be doing either of those two things, or both of them; are they mutually exclusive?

Dr Ansari: In my view, I think the latter point is probably not helpful. I do not think it is helpful at all to be backing groups such as the PMI, principally because until they can convince me that they are a democratic opposition I do not see what the point of them is. On the other hand, yes, there are elements, and one of the things we find in Iran is that it is a very plural political system, that there are options for engagement with different groups. The problem with western policy, I think, towards Iran is it has been too monolithic, so we fail to see the distinctions between different groups, we tend, as you say, to have carpets and pistachios, in a general sense, in a sense mollifying even the more hard-line elements. The great joke in Iran today is that when we had a President who talked about dialogue with civilisations we responded with the axis of evil and when we have a President who talks about the Holocaust we offer him talks. This is the thing, that there is sort of a contradiction in western policy, and particularly coming out of Washington, and it is not missed in Iran, the Iranians see it. Even Iranians who have no affection whatsoever for Mr Ahmadinejad are struck by the fact that he seems to get away with murder, and they wonder what his magic is, his great trick is, really. What they do not understand is, and this is, as I am sure you appreciate, as far as Britain is concerned, they certainly cannot conceive that anything that Britain does is anything but calculated at the most profound level. The notion that Britain might in some ways make a mistake, or not actually deal with something in a coherent manner, is inconceivable to most Iranians because that is simply not the way Britain works.

Q27 Mr Jenkin: What sort of Iraq does Iran legitimately want and how do we appeal to Iran's legitimate interests?

Dr Ansari: I was struck by one of the comments that Sami made earlier. We have this situation of various different groups which all want a united Iraq but no-one can be in control of it. I think the Iranians can be counted as one of those groups which want a united Iraq but want to be in control of it. Ultimately, they see themselves as being there when the Coalition has gone. They have a certain complacency about it, of course, they consider themselves to have been around for thousands of years and will continue to be so and they see Iraq as their justifiable near abroad, as I used the term earlier. I think, by and large, the comments that were made to me certainly, and this is, I have to say, a while back, certainly 18 months to two years ago, but when I was talking to some senior officials their argument was very strongly in favour of a united Iraq but a united Iraq which was militarily weak. Their red line was "We will not allow, at any stage, a military threat to emerge from this country again. That is our red line. What emerges out of Iraq, out of that, ideally, we would like a politically unified Iraq, one that can be a good market for Iranian carpets and pistachios." This is the sort of thing that they are looking at. If the country was to fragment, they think they can manage it, with the Turks, and that is their view.

Q28 Mr Jenkin: Moving on, we know that lots of stuff comes over the border, which is killing our soldiers, bluntly; is this with the support, the permission, the active involvement of the Iranian Government?

Dr Ansari: I think that there is a dual layer in Government in Iran, since 2004 this has been particularly evident; one is basically what you would call the orthodox republican elements of government machinery, and the other is the IRGC, and the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, tends to operate on its own agenda. I think, where you find some of the more unhelpful elements of Iranian intervention in Iraq, it comes from the IRGC. Their response, incidentally, will be "This is our response" to what they perceive to be US/British intervention in Khuzistan or in Baluchistan. There is a cycle of violence emerging, which I suspect is part of the whole fragmentation of political life in Iraq, which is spilling over the border; but that is the way they see it. There are other ideological agendas going on, of course, where they say "We want to make life as uncomfortable as possible," for two different reasons. One is "If the Coalition is kept busy they won't pay attention to us;" and, two, "Perhaps we can encourage them to leave earlier," because some of them believe that Iran will be in a very strong position to be the dominant player. I think there are others, of course, in the Foreign Ministry and other cases, many of whom are not in Government actually at the moment, who would argue that both views are fanciful, that actually there should be some sort of constructive engagement with the Coalition, tacitly, behind the scenes, you would never say it publicly, of course, to ensure that some form of stable Iraq is left, because the last thing they want is, as Toby drew the analogy, another Afghanistan on their western border.

Q29 Mr Jenkin: If we got the support of the Iranian Government, could they actually stop the flow of weaponry across the border?

Dr Ansari: Inasmuch as there is IRGC intervention then, yes, that could be stopped. I do not think there is a problem there. Inasmuch as there are entrepreneurial elements at work, that is more difficult, yes.

Q30 Mr Jenkin: The Committee was recently briefed on the Fulton Report into the capture of the UK Naval personnel. One of the questions we were asking was what was the motive behind this attack? What do you think was in the minds of IRGC; was it their idea, was it somebody else's idea, was it a local thing? What was behind it?

Dr Ansari: I think the IRGC had made it quite clear that they wanted to retaliate for the seizure of the Irbil Five; the intelligence was there.

Q31 Mr Jenkin: The intelligence was there: that is a very serious accusation to make?

Dr Ansari: It was on their website; they were making announcements about it, they were saying "We will go after blonde, blue-eyed..." What they did not say, necessarily, was "We will go after a British Naval vessel." The assumption was they would target the Americans. My view of that is, judging from the experience of 2004, if they were going to go after people probably they would not go after Americans. There was always vulnerability there, but the fact is that, on the occasion of the Persian New Year, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, effectively gave the go-ahead. He said, in his speech, very clearly, that "If the Coalition persists in illegal activities, we will retaliate with illegal activities of our own."

Q32 Mr Jenkin: Does that include the capture of the Irbil Five?

Dr Ansari: The Irbil Five was a factor; it was them plus there was a defection, supposedly, of an Iranian Minister of Defence, there were also the diplomats which were being abducted. We have to bear in mind that from the moment that George W Bush announced, I think it was, in January, or December, I cannot remember, that Iranian personnel would be legitimate targets of Coalition Forces, and you have this sudden surge - splurge - whatever, seeking to abduct as many Iranians as you can in Iraq, to curtail their activities, the likelihood of a retaliation was always there, and they made it very clear. The Irbil Five, despite the fact, of course, that the Iranians, during the whole episode of the sailors, officially would say "There is no link," very frequently, when you got to point two, the link became very apparent, the link was there. They wanted, first of all, access to the individuals, there was no access; as usual, the individuals were abducted, there was no Red Cross access, there was no diplomatic access, they did not know where they were. I think now we have Red Cross access. As I understand it, from Tehran, there was an assumption, they were led to believe, now whether this is true or not I have no idea of saying, that they would be released on the occasion of the Persian New Year, and when they were not released on the occasion of the Persian New Year I think the go-ahead was given that they should act.

Mr Jenkin: You would think it entirely reasonable for HMS Cornwall's Intelligence Officer to have been furnished with or to have access to that kind of intelligence?

Chairman: That is not a question for Dr Ansari.

Q33 Mr Jenkins: What exactly is the relationship between Iran and Russia at the present time; how close are they?

Dr Ansari: I think one of the unfortunate consequences of the developments in Iranian politics that you are seeing now is part of a tighter relationship with Russia. As you see Mr Putin going down the route of growing meritocracy, I think you can see his influences reigning large in Iran at the moment. There is a very strong business link, basically, between the two; black market links, I suppose, is the polite way of putting it. It is very strong business links, and so on. I think also, from the Russian perspective, they see the issue of Iran as a useful stick with which to beat the United States. It is leverage for the Russians, as far as I can see. It is the old game.

Mr Jenkins: Yes, it is the great game returns.

Chairman: Dr Ansari has been talking about Iran at some length and very helpfully. Is there anything any of you would like to add to that, or would you like to bask in his wisdom: right, then let us move on.

Mr Jenkins: Thank you very much. That is very helpful.

Q34 Willie Rennie: To what extent is there a risk that the sectarian violence in Iraq could spill over to a regional war, with the Sunnis and Shi'as?

Dr Dodge: I think, if this is King Abdullah of Jordan's rather ill-measured and extreme statements about the crescent of crisis, and maybe King Adbullah can say that because he has no indigenous Shi'a population of his own, a spill-over into a regional war is highly unlikely; extremely unlikely. I think what is much more likely is that conflict will be contained in Iraq and regional tensions will be fought out in Iraq by proxy. I think there is a great deal of very realistic worry in Saudi Arabia and in Jordan that they are living on the edge of a failed state and that what they want to do is seal their borders and push the conflict away from them. Their big fear is, as US troops draw down and as the situation gets worse, there will be less and less to stop the regional players playing in and we will get, basically, a cold war, a proxy war, between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Iraq. That, I would argue, would have nothing to do with sectarian identity; that would be dressed up as sectarian identity. It would be reasons of state, the two ruling élites fighting each other across the dead bodies of the Iraqis.

Professor Zubaida: There is also very strong Sunni Salafi sentiment in Saudi Arabia and that Saudi influence around the world against the Shi'a, and this translates often into internal conflicts within these countries, so, in fact, with the Iraq situation, the Shi'a of Saudi Arabia have come under greater pressure and the tensions between Shi'a and Sunni in Bahrain have been sharpened, as a result of Iraq. In fact, there is a certain degree of triumphalism of oppressed Shi'a minorities in Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf States, through the Iraqi Shi'a resurgence; this, of course, is also true in Pakistan. In fact, while I agree with Toby that it will not lead to a regional war, possibly greater intervention by proxy within Iraq, at the same time I think we have to look at the internal situation in many of these countries, which have a significant Shi'ite community.

Dr Herring: You do get pockets of local fighting and balancing and settling-up, and there has been no reference to Basra; what you have there is the dominance of militia forces which have driven people out. They killed off the former Ba'athists, they killed off the local intelligentsia, the dominative local tribes, and they established something that they managed to settle themselves, very violently and with lower levels of continuing violence. Surrounding states will not look to just throw themselves, willy-nilly, into doing their own fighting and trying to work out all of this locally; they do have these incentives to continue and extend the involvement, and picking horses rather than going in themselves.

Dr Dodge: Let me give you an example. Basra is quite fascinating; the extent to which the powers in Basra have been picked, or created, by Iranian funding is a matter for discussion.

Professor Zubaida: I think, in speaking of Basra, there are also other parts; we have forgotten about the Christians. In fact, one of the sectors of victims of this situation has been the smaller Christian communities in Iraq. Whereas all the official political leaders and religious leaders make noises about tolerance and unity, and what have you, the actual facts on the ground, of the militias and the various groups which try to force their authority over neighbourhoods and communities, have been that the Christians have been targeted. In many ways, they have been, in some areas, and I think in Basra, particularly, under great pressure and some have been ethnically cleansed, so to speak.

Q35 Willie Rennie: We have touched on this issue briefly already, about dialogue with Iran, not so much about Syria, but do you think there is really constructive dialogue or do you think it is tokenistic, between the US, UK and all the various states?

Dr Herring: From what I have seen, it appears fundamentally to be token; primarily because the United States is extremely hostile to those states. There might be tactical accommodations they can both make and so they can actually get real deals on some specifics, but it does not change the fact that when you spend time in the United States, for example, or in the case of Iran maybe, the American media is awash with just an amazing amount of hostile material, being over there. You have all the stuff on television about how the Iranians are going round the New York Subway system, taking down all the targets that they can use for their possible chemical weapons and nerve gas in the US Subway. That kind of frenzied mentality in the United States is not conducive to serious engagement. There has to be a choice; are you even going to recognise the Iranian state, are you going to establish full diplomatic relations, are you going to deal with it as a legitimate state, or not, and if they cannot fundamentally bring themselves to do that then it is hardly surprising if those states are not going to co-operate fully in your regional designs.

Q36 Willie Rennie: Do you think that applies to Syria as well?

Dr Herring: Less so, but it is still fundamentally yes.

Professor Zubaida: I think, when we talk about engaging with, the question really is what are you going to give them; presumably engaging with means negotiating: what are you going to negotiate, what are you going to offer? Syria has a whole list of objectives, in relation to Israel, the region, Lebanon, what have you; what lines are you going to follow with this, for instance? The other question to ask is, supposing you did get Syria on your side, what can Syria do, what can they achieve; apart from closing their borders and stopping the Iraqi exiles being active there, or whatever, really there is very little they can do in terms of controlling the situation in Iraq.

Dr Rangwala: I think there are very specific things which can be achieved through negotiation with Iran, in the short term. Border liaison and co-operation over the border and Naval liaison are two of those things which can be achieved through negotiation, and are achievable. Both have been attempted in the past by the British, actually, the British Ambassador in Iraq entered into negotiations with both Syria and Iran, with regard to stabilising the border region and co-operating over that, as well as, I believe, over Naval liaison, in 2004. Both were called off by the opposing side, as it were, Syria and Iran, as US rhetoric against both those countries escalated. In that context, at least, a more subdued US critical tone towards those two countries will enable those short-term objectives to be secured, with respect to Iraq.

Dr Ansari: There are two things I want to talk about. One is, the difficulty we find with Iran, of course, is you have a Government which does not want to talk; that makes it more difficult, obviously, and I do not want to romanticise the prospects of having a good dialogue with Iran at present. At the same time, I would want to say that I think the problem with western, American policy in particular to Iran is that I simply do not think Iran really, for the last 30 years, has been taken seriously enough at high levels of political decision-making. The sad thing is that Iran is seen very much as an aspect of another problem, so we either talk to Iran as part of the Iraqi problem, the Afghan problem, any other problem, and we fail to look at Iran just on its own merits and its own particularities. Until we do that we are not going to get results; it is just simply not going to happen.

Q37 Willie Rennie: What about the Arab-Israeli conflict, peace process, what kind of an effect is that having on Iraq and the region as a whole?

Dr Herring: There is a very widespread commentary that you find just about everywhere that really you cannot make progress on Iraq until you take seriously the Arab-Israeli problems. I would dispute that, pretty fundamentally. What is happening in Iraq is actually very Iraqi and I think it would really help if we took the substance from Ali's point, that we take Iraq and what is happening there more seriously. Rather than having the recent lurch towards referring obsessively to al-Qaeda in Iraq, every time something happens it is al-Qaeda, it is not even al-Qaeda in the Mesopotamia region, it is the Iraqi version of it, it is actually simply al-Qaeda, it is incredibly unhelpful and also the references to Iran, and therefore they are implying that everything in Iraq is to do with everything else except Iraq. This, again, is part of the problem, I would suggest, and if what happens in Iraq can be de-linked from the Arab-Israeli conflict, that is not what they are fighting about.

Dr Rangwala: Fundamentally, I agree with that. I think, especially in southern Iraq, the battles are essentially local battles being fought by different parties, all of them drawing, to some extent, upon Iranian support to some degree, but they are local battles and have their own dynamics, quite independently of external actors. Whether that be actors involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict or engaged in struggles between the US and Iran at present, they are local battles which can be resolved on their terms.

Q38 Chairman: Drawing on Iranian support to some degree; is there evidence of Iranian manufacture of IEDs and of Iranian training of insurgents in Iraq?

Professor Zubaida: I think one point is worth making, which is not a direct answer to your question, which is that for the most part the Americans and the Iranians are supporting the same side in Iraq; that, in fact, the main Iranian client in Iraq is SCIRI, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and they are precisely the main ingredient in the Maliki Government, which is supported by the United States. The idea that somehow Iran is arming the other side against the United States may be correct to a very small extent, but the main thrust of Iranian influence and Iranian support in Iraq is the same side as that of the United States. I think that is worth keeping in mind.

Q39 Chairman: What a curious business.

Dr Rangwala: I would disagree with that slightly. My sense is that the Iranians are backing every side, they are backing every horse in the race, as it were, within Iraq at present, they are backing groups which are opposed to the Supreme Council as well as backing the Supreme Council itself, so that no group takes - - -

Professor Zubaida: Are they backing Sunni insurgents though?

Dr Rangwala: I think they are, as well. They have shown in the past their willingness to support groups which are fundamentally ideologically opposed to Iran, in the hope that will bring them into a position of a modus vivendi with Iran over other issues.

Q40 Chairman: Specifically, are they exporting IEDs, or exporting the expertise?

Dr Herring: The information which has been made available in the public domain by the United States on this is inconclusive at best.

Q41 Chairman: You cannot make it conclusive in front of us?

Dr Herring: There has been nothing that I have seen, in terms of all the claims about serial numbers and manufacture, and so on, nothing enough for me to say, yes, I have seen that. Also, the fundamental thing is, if you are worried about weapons coming over the border, they are coming in via the United States. There is no shortage of weapons in Iraq, they do not particularly need them from Iran, and that is a critical factor; so they are important critically but trivial militarily.

Q42 Chairman: Are relations improving between local government in Basra Province and the United Kingdom Armed Forces?

Dr Dodge: Do you mean specifically Governor al-Waili?

Q43 Chairman: Let us start with him, yes.

Dr Dodge: Certainly he is a frequent visitor to the Airport and he has long and detailed discussions with British diplomatic and military representation there. I would go as far as to say that I would not think the British support him, and I would hope they would not, because one would have deep misgivings about his style and approach to government. They have gone up and down, certainly during Operation Sinbad, and then the targeting, the brief, more forward-leaning forage of the British military into Basra, relations went down, depending if the British tripped across militias around Fadullah, the party which supports the Government. At the moment, the Governor's own political position is very weak, so I suspect he is looking to the British for some kind of sustenance, and not receiving it, as far as I know.

Q44 Chairman: We have heard already all you have said about the general position of the Coalition Forces, but how are UK Forces in the south-east regarded and, subject to what you have said, are they a contribution to stability or are they destabilising?

Dr Rangwala: I spent some time with Basrawi academics in Jordan last week, and their fundamental position seemed to be that British Forces were actually irrelevant to much of what goes on within Basra, they rarely saw them, they rarely engaged with any British institutions, and in that respect they have marginalised themselves from the politics and society of Basra. They have not taken on the sort of role which is either stabilising or destabilising, in that sense, within the city.

Q45 Willie Rennie: Is that a good thing or a bad thing, do you think?

Dr Rangwala: It is an irrelevant thing; not a good thing or a bad thing, I suppose.

Q46 Mr Holloway: What do people think the British are for then, in southern Iraq?

Dr Dodge: I think two things. I would not disagree with Glen that they are just about to give up their base in town, they are hunkered down at the Airport, they are getting mortared at the Airport, more I suspect to put pressure on London than anything else; that is all true. However, I suspect, in the highly unstable and extremely violent arena that Basra in politics is, a complete withdrawal of the British may trigger, may destabilise and increase the violence there. I do not know if that is true or not but that would be something to put on the table; their presence limited but there is some ill-fitting brake on the violence.

Q47 Mr Holloway: Can I ask the Professor, so they are not there for anything, they are there just in case?

Professor Zubaida: I take the view, as I said earlier about the Coalition Forces in general, that Toby may be right that, in fact, they are a brake on much wider violence, but the question is how long can they stay and be a brake and, if they do not leave now, at any time in the future when they leave will the situation be any better, is the question. Of course, it depends what can be done in the meantime, and I am not sure what can be done in the meantime.

Q48 Mr Holloway: I do not know if this is a fair characterisation of what you seem to be saying, Professor, but are you suggesting really that it is time now for us to get out and let Iraq get on with its civil war? If that is the case, do other people agree?

Professor Zubaida: I would really hesitate to suggest anything, certainly anything - it is such a desperate situation - which might increase the violence would be irresponsible to advocate. At the same time, this is a genuine question that I am posing, if they were to stay there and leave in two years' time, what is going to happen in these two years which is going to lead to a different outcome? This is really a question that I cannot answer.

Dr Rangwala: My sense in Basra is that the Fadullah Party runs the oil protection force, the Supreme Council run the Intelligence Services, the Sadr Party run much of the Police Force in Basra, and in that sense, at least, the British presence does not have a significant impact upon those different relations between those different parties, each running different sectors of the Basra Armed Forces.

Q49 Mr Holloway: Should we leave and let them get on with the civil war?

Dr Rangwala: I do not think there is a civil war and I do not think there is in Basra specifically, and I do not think that there is an impact upon the low-level violence which continues to occur between different armed groups within Basra itself.

Dr Dodge: I think it is simply, periodically, outright conflict breaks out and violence flows. I think to qualify that as low level is simply not the case. People are dying in Basra. Basra is a lawless place where the politics of the gun dominate; that is not low-level violence, that is anarchy, and it could get worse or it could stay at a steady state.

Q50 Mr Hamilton: Surely, Chairman, the point that Dr Rangwala is making is that the Brits are not involved in all that; they have stepped back out of that, and therefore why should they be there? It seems to me there is a difference of opinion in relation to how best we deal with a diverse Iraq. What is happening in the north is not the same as what is happening in the south and the reactions are different. The real question, because there is a difference and I do not want to go away from here with a difference of opinion, not being fair myself, effectively, you are saying, as I understand it, the Brits could walk out tomorrow and it would not make much difference at all in the south, and the real question is why are we there then?

Dr Herring: There are a couple of things in that. It varies from place to place and if you take Maysan Province, in which the British Forces have been fighting recently, and so have the American Forces, the irony is that the British military's own opinion-polling shows that the vast majority of the population support attacks on British Forces, that is the British military's own internal polling; whereas only a minority in Basra support attacks on British Forces. Again, you have to look at what they are doing. What people locally would like is British Forces to help, occasionally they do take on militiamen, they do actually free people who have been tortured, and so on, and that has got to be a good thing, but it is not going to fundamentally reshape the politics of that area and sometimes it is just going to escalate, especially whenever you are involved with the American anti-Sadr agenda, which is just not going to work there. You cannot defeat any of these people this way, even if you do help things occasionally, and, Toby is right, you will simply get major outbreaks of fighting as they try to rebalance against themselves; but that is happening anyway again.

Q51 Mr Hamilton: I am waiting to hear what Dr Dodge will say, because your view seems to be they are better there in case a major problem comes and they are already there. That is not the same thing as your two colleagues; your two colleagues basically are telling us "Let's go home because we're doing nothing there anyway"?

Dr Dodge: No. There is a difference of interpretation about what the future holds. I do not think we are disagreeing particularly on the hell that Iraq is in, and I have not got a solution. I think the solution that they will be forced to come to an accommodation when the Coalition Forces pull out is fundamentally mistaken, but that is a little bit of a disagreement between us. What I would say is, we are in the midst of a civil war, when the US and the UK pull out, and ironically I think they will pull out, I just do not think they should, the chances of a re-intervention are next to nothing. It is a very low justification for Coalition troops continuing to be there; once they have gone there is no solution. While they are there, there may be the possibility of a solution; and, just to add, if there is a multilateral solution with the UN it certainly will not come about once the US has gone home.

Dr Herring: This is a political point, because really I think we are getting to the nub of the whole thing, in relation to the UK presence there. The first thing is, British Forces are dying, about one a week, on average, and really we have to have a better reason for that than, vaguely, "We might sometimes help," and I would argue that sometimes we do. Glen and I have never said we are sure that these people will be forced to an accommodation upon its departure, especially not in the south; they have already, mostly, got their own accommodations and then they decide not to have them and they fight. Sometimes Britain, and you are right, happens to just stumble across one particular militia group and the Governor happens to be happy. That is just no way to continue to have British Forces killed. Whether or not you have a re-intervention, that is not a reason to stay in a bad situation, just because you will not go back there. This is not something that we are capable of solving. British Forces cannot resolve it, which is why lives are being lost, pretty needlessly, even if occasionally they help on something; and things may get worse in the short term, but that is not a reason. They are going to go anyway so there are just going to be more people dying; more British Forces die, then they go. That is an even worse outcome.

Q52 Chairman: You are not saying that things would get better if we left; you are saying that things have no chance of getting better while we are there, is that right?

Dr Herring: It may be that, incidentally, things happen to turn out to get better, but we will not be causing that, we will not fundamentally be causing that; that is just beyond British control. We are not involved to a degree that would possibly deliver that kind of control.

Q53 Mr Holloway: What is the use of staying then, if there is no plan and we do not really understand why we are there any more?

Dr Dodge: There is a plan. It is being executed by General David Petraeus.

Q54 Mr Holloway: Yes, but the British?

Dr Dodge: I assume, I would not want to speak for our new Prime Minister but there are two things, that there is a great deal of resentment in Washington and in the American Embassy in Baghdad at the draw-down discussion, and I think that was handled very badly, so if there was any justification for joining this Coalition to invade Iraq it was Anglo-American relations, the decision to pull out from Anglo-American relations, undoubtedly. Secondly, the reason we are staying, just to repeat it, I think that the British are acting as some form of brake on increased violence in the south.

Q55 Mr Holloway: Do the others agree with that?

Dr Herring: Fundamentally, no; only at the margin, only at the margin. One of the reasons for thinking that is, in terms of the pattern of the violence, there were a number of waves of violence that struck through, the anti-Ba'athists, the anti-Christian, the religious moralist violence, all of which has mostly swept through the Province. Then there is the intra-faction fighting, the mafia fighting, and this keeps sweeping through, and we happen to get caught up in it. If you remember the fiasco in 2004 when the first real military challenge, of course, to the British Forces resulted in the Government headquarters being overrun, the Americans having to come to the rescue; in terms of any real fighting, they were simply incapable. I think my assessment would be it is at the margin and sometimes it is making it worse; so, therefore, do not be there.

Q56 Chairman: What about the important role of training the Armed Forces there?

Dr Rangwala: Could I make just a prior point, because I had a point which followed on from that. There already has been the release of security responsibilities from Muthanna, Mayson and Dhi Qar Provinces by the British, Provinces which the British had a security role in, quite extensively, before 2006. There has been no explosion of violence in those territories.

Dr Dodge: There was in Amara. There was an out-and-out fight between Badr and Sadr in Amara after the British left.

Dr Rangwala: No; that was less than actually were killed in 2004 while the British were still there, in scale. There has been a continuing threat of disputes but there has been no marked increase in the violence in any of those governorates since the British left.

Q57 Mr Hamilton: Dr Dodge, you seemed to indicate that we will damage Anglo-American relationships if we pull out; but that completely ignores the fact that Democrats, who have taken a different position from the Government, argued very strongly on a timetable to leave. How do you come to the conclusion that it will damage Anglo-American relationships if the Democrats win the next election?

Dr Dodge: On two bases. One, the British presence sits across American main supply lines from Kuwait straight up; if the British draw down the Americans will have to send troops down to take their places, which, until a Democrat President, if and until a Democratic President takes office, will damage north-south relations. Secondly, and this is my own interpretation, once the next US President takes office, elected on an undoubtedly Iraqi-sceptic platform, they will look at how they will have to pull out. If you look closely at the fine print and the planning for drawing down, are we talking about a complete cut and run, are we talking about scaling back to the Green Zone or a removal to the fringes; and all of that process will depend on supply lines coming up from Kuwait. It is not black and white, cut and run, with the Democrats. My own interpretation is that it will take most of that first term for a US President to try to work out what they do between a corporate swing and a collapsed state and a civil war in Iraq and an increasingly and totally unpopular occupation in America. I think, as that process unfolds, if we are busy packing up and going home, we are going to engender a deal of resentment at the highest levels of the American Government, even as they are themselves struggling to scale down.

Q58 Chairman: Training: is not the role of the British Army in the Basra area absolutely essential to the training of the Armed Forces there?

Dr Herring: I think the fundamental answer to that has to be no, because training is not the issue, loyalty is the issue. All the forces, all divided by the sectarian political parties, the notion that you can professionalise them and they will stop doing this, because suddenly they realise that professional soldiers do not do these naughty things, is not a description of what is happening at pretty much any level in Iraq. The issue is not training. The ones that were given the most training and were deployed elsewhere in Iraq again are fundamentally useless forces, even the ones that are meant to be the best, that have been deployed in the recent surge offensive, and the Americans are saying, "Well, it turns out they've got no bullets, they're short of uniforms, they're short of radios, they're short of trucks, and actually they tend to be kept that way because we are worried about what they will do." The fundamental issue is loyalty, they are riddled with, as we call them, embedded insurgents; we are not going to train that out of them. It is about politics, it is not about training.

Dr Dodge: You would have to make a distinction between the Army and the Police Force, and I think, if you had a representative of the British military here, they would say that they have had quite a deal of success in training the Army, and probably they would not say it but I would be happy to say it, and the training of the Police has been an abject failure. The Police are responsible for a great deal of kidnapping in Baghdad and have been thoroughly penetrated by the militias in the south. I think it is the Tenth Battalion in the south. The British Army said that they sent forces up to Bagdad and have been seen to be comparatively effective. I think, although undoubtedly there are problems in the Army, they are much, much less, and if you look at opinion poll data that we have both been siting, the Army consistently gets a much higher recognition of trust than the Police Force, which, again, not detracting from the problems inside the Army, indicates the Army has more professionalism, they were sent against the Mahdi Army in Diwaniyah, to some degree of success as well. I think, although the Army has problems, it is more coherent, a more nationalist force than the Police themselves.

Professor Zubaida: I have no special knowledge on military matters but it seems to me that, while Toby is correct on the difference between the Army and the Police, whenever your Army has been entrusted with tasks without American support it has done pretty badly, including in Diyala right now. I wonder to what extent this is a question of lack of training, a lack of resources or insufficient numbers, or perhaps weak motivation.

Q59 Linda Gilroy: Or even expectations being too high, that you can actually train people pretty much from scratch within a year; is that really realistic? Are you saying the military have had some success, that you can expect within a year for us just to draw back completely?

Dr Rangwala: Iraq has had a trained Army, of course, for all of its modern history, so there are many trained Iraqis. The question I do not think does come down to training, in that respect, as my colleagues have said.

Q60 Linda Gilroy: Not recently trained to operate under a democracy, of sorts?

Professor Zubaida: Democracy is laughable.

Dr Rangwala: If one wants to talk opinion polls, and a number of my colleagues have sited opinion polls, I think the most revealing answer in a recent opinion poll from March this year to "Who do you think runs Iraq?" was that over half the population said they believed the US Governments still run Iraq. I think, there, at least, the question of who one is obeying when one takes one's orders becomes the relevant indicator, not the question of "Can I do this if I want to do this?" which is the training question.

Q61 Linda Gilroy: Was that throughout the whole of Iraq, and we are discussing southern Iraq at the moment and the role of the British in training there. As I have understood it, when we were there last year, there was a programme that would take a period of time; there was always the thought that we would be withdrawing. Clearly, we are not going to say precisely when we are going to withdraw because that would be a hostage to fortune, but we are talking as if that had never been, as if there had never been any differences in the southern area at all, and is not, in fact, the essential difficulty linked to what the US position is? The point drawn out in relation to David Hamilton's question, that in fact you are talking about the lines of exit for the US troops, important lines of exit, being through the south?

Dr Rangwala: I think I would disagree slightly with Dr Dodge on that point; the US can protect the roads and the exit route, as it were, without having to take control of Basra city, in keeping the transit route through from Kuwait. My sense is, at least, that the sense that the Iraqis do not own their country, which I think is prevalent, both amongst the Sunnis as well as amongst the Shi'a population of Iraq, not so much amongst the Kurds but amongst the Arab population of Iraq, is a very damaging one. It is why there is, I think, such rampant corruption, why there is tapping of oil pipelines by political parties which otherwise are in charge of the country. They have those resources at their disposal in any case, but they are still profiteering from the use of these resources on the side because they feel that this is, as it were, "a process that we need to exploit rather than a process that we need to manage," so I think that is a very damaging perception.

Q62 Mr Jenkin: Can I just ask a rather provocative question; there was a poll done in March which suggested that still the majority of Iraqis would not bring back Saddam Hussein. Is it the opinion of Iraqis that it was still the right thing, to get rid of Saddam Hussein, in your view?

Dr Herring: Polling on that has gradually declined to a position where overall nationally you have a relatively even split either way, all things considered. Was it the right thing? You can find one recent poll, in March, when there was actually a very narrow favour saying, all things considered, the invasion was wrong. My recollection was that was the first time ever, but there has been a decline. Obviously, when you break that down in sectarian terms you tend to get a much happier view in the north, which of course mostly was not the north-east, which mostly was not occupied, and of course, pretty relentlessly, critical views in Sunni Arab areas. Of course, no-one has asked two million Iraqis, who are now scattered into surrounding countries, how positive they are about the invasion, we suspect they might be pretty not positive, or dead people, if they could vote on this, what they would say. I think it is looking pretty bad, even on that measure now it is not looking good at all, and in terms of what Iraqis are being asked about what they would prefer, a strong-man democracy, and so on, the first preference is democracy, as in choosing to change your leader, the second preference is then some form of Islamic state, and the third preference is a strong man for life, and that does trail still, the distant third.

Q63 Chairman: Two million dead; where do you get that figure from?

Dr Herring: No; sorry, two million refugees, so not dead.

Professor Zubaida: From another long-term perspective, and I have seen many years of Iraqi history, every regime change, in its wake, makes people nostalgic for the previous one. I think, given the dire situation in Iraq at the moment, all the previous regimes appear preferable to the present situation.

Mr Hamilton: That is also true of governments.

Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you very much indeed for giving up your morning to us in so informative and helpful a way. We are deeply grateful. It was most interesting and helpful. I am now going to declare a short break while we wait for our next witness, but thank you very much indeed.

Witness: Mr Nadhim Zahawi, Joint CEO, YouGov, gave evidence.

Q64 Chairman: I am grateful to you for rushing. Please could you introduce yourself and say what the polling that you have given us is based on?

Mr Zahawi: My name is Nadhim Zahawi. I am a Chief Executive of YouGov plc. I also happen to be the son of immigrants to this country; my father is Kurdish, from northern Iraq, and my mother is from Basra. I travel to Iraq quite often. I was there till Friday, for three days, in Urbil. We conduct research across the whole country for the media and for corporates and Government.

Q65 Chairman: Have things in Iraq got better or worse over the last few months, would you say?

Mr Zahawi: In certain governorates and regions the data coming back is things are getting much better, so the picture is obviously uneven.

Q66 Chairman: Which areas are getting better?

Mr Zahawi: Obviously, the north, for example, in the Kurdish region, things are demonstrably better, people have more regular electricity supply, clean water, there is a rebuilding programme taking place, both in the cities and the villages, and so life is much, much better. In most of the southern governorates, people would say life is much, much better for them, too. It is really Baghdad and the Sunni triangle where life is perceived by people as getting much worse since 2003.

Q67 Chairman: That is since 2003, but in recent months, in the last six months, are things getting better or worse?

Mr Zahawi: I would say, incrementally better, but it is within the margin of error.

Q68 Mr Jenkin: Are Coalition Forces still a stabilising element in Iraq, in your view?

Mr Zahawi: Yes, they are, on many levels. One of the great problems is that, obviously, there is no effective Government in Iraq, there are centres of power. The Iraqi Army, in essence, if it were not for the Coalition's influence, would probably break up into those factions; i.e., the Iraqi Army has not coalesced around a Government, a flag, the country, bits of the Iraqi Army have different loyalties.

Q69 Mr Jenkin: We have been hearing how the Iraqi Army is comprised of a rather fluid element, that people collect their weapons and then disappear. Is the Iraqi Army taken of becoming a prevalent force?

Mr Zahawi: My instinct would be, I do not think so. I think that the problem we face is that these power centres call the shots, so you get the Sunni conscripts who will collect their weapons and then go off to Mosul and pass on the weapons to the militias there. The same happens with the Shi'a conscripts, who just go down to whomever they belong to, religiously or politically, it is usually the same thing, in the south of Iraq, and the weapons are just passed on. The problem that you have is that the Government is just not effective, in the sense of bringing everything together. Even the ministries, the way the ministries operate, what you get is, "Oh, well, this ministry belongs to this particular party and therefore we can't do anything with them, because we happen to be from a different party." You really have not got a real Government, you have got these power centres, who have carved up bits of Government for themselves. It is almost a false creation which, without the Coalition being around, would break up into its constituent parts.

Q70 Linda Gilroy: Can the Government develop a capacity and the will to tackle the sort of violence that we have been hearing about this morning? If so, over what timescale?

Mr Zahawi: From what I have witnessed, it can, if you reorganise the Government into what I think is the only solution that is left now, after what has happened over the past three years, and that is into a sort of federation, where you have very clear leaderships in those three different parts of Iraq; there is no other way. If you look at what is happening in the Kurdish region, and already they have had a couple of bombings recently, the leadership there has coalesced around a parliament and a system which now is in control, it has respect for the people, it runs things; of course, there are hurdles still to overcome, but essentially it is in control of that society, the rule of law is respected, in the region. I do not think it is any longer possible to have that as a collective; you almost need to recognise that and break it down into a federation. The bigger issue is obviously Baghdad, and Baghdad will need to have its own administration; you could have the federation where the president is a rotative president, every year, from the three bits of the country. There is no way a government for the whole is going to carry the country with it. You will have the south saying, "Well, if we're going to have a Sunni in control we're just not going to join in;" the Sunnis saying, "Well, a Shi'a is in control; of course, he's not going to do us any favours," and whatever. You need to, I think, really look at the structure of government in Iraq and simply just accept the fact that actually it is made up of three different countries.

Q71 Linda Gilroy: I take it that you feel that the Iraqi Government has been totally unsuccessful at bridging the sectarian divide?

Mr Zahawi: Absolutely. On the face of it, they will all sit round a single table and appear to be a government, but the reality on the ground, you do not have to go very far into any ministry to realise that basically it is power bases, it is completely factional.

Q72 Chairman: What is your perception of the way the US surge has gone down, with the presence of more American troops?

Mr Zahawi: The data coming back from Baghdad is, and we run a tracking study in Baghdad which looks at how people perceive security in the capital, it is getting better, but people think it has just simply been displaced, rather than it has actually gone away completely. Part of the problem is you have got this feeling that "Actually they are not going to have the stomach to be here for very long and therefore why should I put my head over the parapet and start co-operating, because if they're not going to be around these militias are going to come back, and therefore basically I'd better align myself with whoever has got the biggest gun to protect me."

Q73 Chairman: What about British troops; what would be the reaction to the withdrawal of British troops?

Mr Zahawi: I think that, obviously, what you have in the south, where the British presence is, is a situation where at least one of the factions there would like rid of us as soon as possible, because they need to exert more control over the region, heavily backed by Iran in that area. I think that the people would feel much less secure if we left, so the silent majority would feel it a betrayal, because there would be huge amounts of blood shed and factional infighting to take control of the area, between SCIRI and the Mahdi Army or the Da'wa.

Q74 Mr Hamilton: We have just heard from previous witnesses, a number of them, that the British have a hands-off attitude in the south and therefore they were encouraging the view that if the Brits move out very little will change in the south?

Mr Zahawi: There is a difference between hands-off but being there with a big stick, if necessary, and not being there at all and the factions which were co-operating with the Coalition then becoming exposed to just slaughter, essentially.

Q75 Mr Hamilton: Could I ask, Chairman, with your permission, an answer to a previous question indicated that we should look at a federation rather than the separation of countries: what do you prefer?

Mr Zahawi: I think a federation would be the most preferred route for, I would say, all the groups, including the Kurds. In terms of the Kurds, I think a separation, if you talked to the leaderships there, would be very unhealthy for them, especially the recent troubles with Turkey. Certainly a federation, co-operation over things like having a rolling presidency, co-operation over Baghdad, creating a form of government for Baghdad in which all three can participate, would probably be the most preferable route.

Q76 Mr Holloway: If you saw a federation emerge, would you see large movements of population, as we saw in the Balkans in the early nineties, where minority groups would go to their areas?

Mr Zahawi: Sadly, a lot of it has happened already. Baghdad obviously is an extreme version of that; i.e., that the Sunni population of Baghdad is down to about 11 per cent. People have either moved out to Sunni areas or have left for Syria or Jordan, or the Kurdish region.

Q77 Mr Holloway: So the answer is yes?

Mr Zahawi: Yes; absolutely.

Q78 Mr Holloway: How much more do you see though in the rest of the country, what sorts of numbers would be moving around?

Mr Zahawi: The bit that it will depend on obviously is where you draw the boundaries, so, again, the Kirkuk issue, for example; if that ends up being rolled into the Kurdish federal area then you might see bigger proportions of movement. Really it depends; it is very hard to put your finger on it. Obviously, as you have seen and you have witnessed, there has been an exodus anyway of the Sunni population away from areas which are becoming dominated by the Shi'as in Baghdad.

Q79 Chairman: Mr Zahawi, thank you very much indeed for coming to help us. You have a busy life in YouGov, I know, but it is good to hear that you are doing stuff in Iraq as well as in this country.

Mr Zahawi: Thank you very much and I apologise for keeping you, for the delay. I got my timing wrong.

Chairman: Thank you very much.