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Memorandum from the Royal Aeronautical Society

 

 

1. The Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS) is the Learned Society for the Aerospace and Aviation community. Based in London, it has a world-wide membership of over 19,000, with over 13,000 in the UK. Its Fellows and Members represent all levels of the aeronautical community both active and retired. Through its various Boards and Committees, it can draw upon considerable experience and expertise in aviation matters. In addition, the Society has over 120 organisations who are members of its Corporate Partners scheme.

 

2. Military airlift narrowly defined refers to those specialised fixed-wing or rotary-craft capabilities designed to provide strategic or tactical support to the armed services in the field. The equipment is usually specially designed or adapted for deployment, with features such as rough-field landing, rear and/or forward opening doors and other systems required of meeting potentially hostile elements, particularly if operating close to the "frontline" (these days flying into a recognised airport may require defensive aides). Other support tasks such as in-flight refuelling also require converted commercial aircraft (although these may also double-up as troop and material transports). Other aspects of logistical support can be discharged by chartering of conventional freighter or passenger aircraft.

 

3. Such rugged and versatile equipment, as well as the operational skills of the military that use them also makes this equipment and its personnel highly desirable, rapid reaction forces to respond to natural disasters and other emergencies.

 

4. It is often the case that the full requirement for airlift is only fully apparent when it is needed. This reflects the gulf between routine operations in support of frontline forces, even if located if widely separated locations, and the demands of expeditionary warfare. Any deficiencies in either tactical or strategic airlift immediately become apparent or emerge as the tempo of operations increase and existing capabilities are stretched to the limit. Additional pressure may arise from the need to respond to natural disasters.

 

5. The gap between "peacetime" and higher tempo operations has often caught governments unprepared. This is true not only of the UK but also elsewhere; even the US which appears fully capable of sustaining global forces has in the past found itself short of critical airlift components. The explanation is a mixture of prudence - the temptation is to avoid procuring costly equipment to meet a worst-case logistic scenario; and institutional - the natural tendency of the armed services to afford priority to combat equipment. In the UK this may have been compounded by the fact that until recently most heavy-lift aircraft (including some helicopters) had to be bought from abroad, with little domestic industrial or technological interest. (The C-130J was a partial exception, having a significant UK content).

 

6. The supply of specialised airlift equipment is limited to a small number of extant programmes, mainly in the US. These are the Boeing C-17, Lockheed Martin C-130 (J & K), the Boeing Chinook helicopter, the CASA CN 235 and the Alenia C-27 J) The European A400M is currently still in development. Production of the C-17, rightly regarded as the most versatile strategic and tactical airlifter currently available, is at risk of termination due to lack of orders.

 

7. The A400M is Europe's most important military airlifter programme since the Franco-German Transall of the late1950s. The UK has not produced a specialised military freighter since the Belfast dating from a slightly earlier period. Now developed by Airbus, the A400M has a UK-designed composite wing, UK manufactured wingbox (Airbus UK Filton) and wing spars (GKN) an engine with Rolls-Royce participation and other UK supplied equipment. It is specifically designed as a tactical freighter with a capability roughly between the C-130 and C-17

 

8. Procuring the A400M has not been one of Europe's successes. It must hold some kind of all-comers record for protracted development. In one form or another, roughly the same coalition of European governments, including Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain, have been considering a European military airlifter (initially called FLA) since the European Staff Target of 1993. Its antecedents are even earlier in a failed bid to launch a programme that then included the Americans. The specification has continually evolved and changed, but has been largely fixed since 2003 when the development and production MOU was signed. An important breakthrough came when responsibility for developing the aircraft was assumed by the Airbus consortium. Airbus was to bring commercial discipline to the programme but delays have continued and its in service date is now 2011. There is some concern that further delays might be caused by Airbus's current problems with its commercial programmes. These problems may of course, added to the view that the A400M is a "political" project where industrial issues take precedent over operational requirements.

 

9. From a British perspective, the continued delays in the progress of the A400M added to the pressure to acquire 4 C-17s under lease from Boeing to fill a major gap in strategic airlift. Subsequently, the RAF ordered one more making a total of five and is now in the process of buying-out the lease. The A400M will, when deployed, add significantly to UK capability but it does leave the RAF with an inventory of three types of aircraft where two (C130J and C17) might have been a more satisfactory outcome (although the C130 fleet should be retired or sold off as the A400M enters service). Equally, a single airlifter can only be in one place at one time so total freight capacity of a fleet is not the only consideration for devising force structure. This is a particular consideration in expeditionary operations over dispersed theatres where a hub and spoke arrangement is required. It offers the potential to transport relatively heavy equipment longer distances than the C-130 and direct to the "frontline".

 

10. This capability of course in practical terms must be seen in the context of other planned UK procurement, primarily the FRES system. The A400M will able to carry the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) as currently defined (a 37 tonnes payload) But it should be noted that vehicular weight, airborne or ground based, tends to creep upwards during design, as well as once in service - 20% growth is not unusual. Clearly it would be sensible to ensure that the FRES specification is consistent with A400M performance. The in-service date for FRES remains set at 2012, but a more realistic estimate would be 2017, which should ensure that the A400M is available to guarantee tactical air mobility. While the A400M performance is likely to improve through later development, this should facilitate further growth in FRES overall weight as it evolves in service, but improvement in A400M baseline performance should not be anticipated in defining the FRES platform.

 

11. Although an obvious reference point, it is not always the case that the development of aircraft and an important item of cargo are successfully coordinated. In this respect the history of the US Army Stryker programme may offer a cautionary tale. This family of Armoured Personal Vehicles was conceived as part of the Army's rapid global response capability. The vehicle was to be carried with crew to the tactical theatre by C-130 transports. In the event, increased design weight plus the addition of extra external armour meant that the Stryker could not be carried with its crew, thus doubling the aircraft requirement; nor could it be carried safely over the designated combat radius nor operate from "hot and high" locations. While it is too late to effect major changes to the A400M design, it should be an essential task to ensure the FRES system does not exceed this aircraft's performance and dimensions.

 

12. In conclusion, the Society would encourage the Committee to consider the following points:

 

· If the UK is to maintain an effective expeditionary warfare posture as well as make a contribution to humanitarian relief, airlift should be given an equal priority to any other front line capability.

· The MoD must ensure that the procurement of heavy lift aircraft and the development of key items of cargo equipment must be synchronised.

· The A400M remains an important element in the UK aerospace industry, especially in terms of the development of a composite wing technological capability in the UK.

 

27 March 2007