SND3
73
Memorandum from Paul Rogers
Introduction
1. On the issue of
Trident replacement, the Defence Committee "...looks forward to a robust and
thorough Parliamentary and public debate over the coming months." Its new enquiry "...will consider the
arguments put forward by the Government for the retention and renewal of the
UK's current Trident system and will analyse the White Paper's assessment of
the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st Century."
2. This paper
seeks to examine a key aspect of the Trident replacement decision that is
scarcely figuring in the debate - the use or threatened use of UK nuclear
weapons in circumstances that fall short of a major nuclear exchange. In this respect, the maintenance of a
"substrategic" or tactical variant of the new system, and the
inclusion of a first use option are particularly relevant.
.
Context
3. The proposal to replace Britain's existing
Trident nuclear force with a new system means that Britain is likely to remain
a nuclear power until around 2050. As
the Government acknowledges, the global security context over that period is
likely to be complex, with a variety of potential security challenges. Even so, the thrust of the Government's case
for replacing Trident is that Britain needs a nuclear force that is a deterrent
to fundamental threats - an insurance against such threats.
4. Indeed, the two words "deterrent"
and "insurance" are oft repeated in the White Paper and in speeches
and statements, so much so that the very strong impression is given that this
is the sole function of UK nuclear forces.
Very little is said about the role of UK nuclear forces in conflicts
that fall short of a major nuclear war.
5. Although Britain continues to deploy
tactical nuclear weapons, currently in the form of what is termed a
"substrategic" variant of the Trident system, there is only one brief
mention of the planned inclusion of such a variant in the Trident replacement
in the recent White Paper, The Future of the
United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent (Command 6994).
As with our
current deterrent, the ability to vary the numbers of missiles and warheads
which might be employed, coupled with the continued availability of a lower
yield from our warhead, can make our nuclear forces a more credible deterrent
against smaller nuclear threats. (page 23 - emphasis added)
6.
The White Paper also says little about Britain's willingness to use
nuclear weapons first, even though nuclear first use has formed a part of the
UK nuclear posture, either within NATO or in terms of independent use, for some
five decades. The only substantive
mention is as follows:
We deliberately
maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would
contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent.
We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by
defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of
our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we
will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear warheads. (emphasis added)
7.
Neither the continued deployment of a tactical (substrategic) nuclear
system nor the maintenance of a first use option is included in the Executive
Summary of the White Paper.
8.
Given that the government seeks a public discussion on the replacement
of Trident prior to a vote in parliament, it is perhaps unfortunate that this
core aspect of the UK nuclear posture gets so little attention. The Defence Select Committee has expressed
concern over the dearth of information in this regard in the past, and may find
it of interest to encourage more openness from the Ministry of Defence at the
present time. This paper seeks to aid
that discussion by:
· Reviewing
some aspects of the origins and development of UK nuclear forces relevant to
this subject,
· summarising
aspects of NATO's nuclear posture, and
· pointing
to the deployment of UK nuclear weapons in the past in circumstances other than
a direct threat to the UK homeland.
Origins
9. Britain commenced its nuclear weapons
programme shortly after the end of the Second World War and tested a fission
(atom) bomb in October 1952 and a crude fusion (hydrogen) bomb in May
1957. By the end of the 1950s Britain
had developed a strategic nuclear force based on the V-bomber medium-range jet
bombers, the Valiant, Victor and Vulcan.
10.
From the mid-1960s, Britain began to develop a force of ballistic missile
submarines capable of deploying the US Polaris submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM). The first such
submarine, Resolution, commenced
patrol in June 1968, and control of the UK strategic nuclear force passed to
the Royal Navy in July the following year.
11.
Britain also developed a range of tactical nuclear weapons, principally bombs,
that were deployed on a number of land-based and carrier-based strike aircraft
from the late-1950s onwards. These
included the Scimitar, Buccaneer, Jaguar, Tornado and Sea Harrier, and the Lynx
and Sea King helicopters. In addition,
US-made nuclear depth bombs were carried by Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and
US-made Lance missiles and nuclear warheads, and nuclear artillery shells, were
deployed with the British Army.
12.
At its peak, in the early 1980s, Britain deployed some 400 of its own nuclear
weapons together with several scores of US nuclear weapons. With the ending of the Cold War, the
majority of the types of nuclear weapons declined fairly rapidly, but two major
types of British nuclear weapon remained in service until the late 1990s, the
Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile and the WE-177 tactical nuclear bomb.
13.
In the 1990s, these were replaced by Trident, another submarine-launched
missile, which is deployed with two warhead variants, a powerful strategic
version many times more destructive than the Hiroshima bomb, and a
"sub-strategic" or tactical version that has, at most, around half
the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb and possibly much less. Since the 1950s onwards, Britain has
operated a twin-track policy of committing forces to NATO and having them available
for independent deployment and possible use.
NATO Nuclear Planning
14. Although the early nuclear weapons of the 1940s and
early 1950s were essentially strategic - intended for use against the core
assets of an opposing state, the development of nuclear weapons intended for
tactical use within particular war zones was an early feature of the East-West
nuclear confrontation. As well as
free-fall bombs, short-range battlefield missiles were developed along with
nuclear-tipped anti-aircraft missiles and several types of nuclear artillery
and mortars. The presumption was that
if such weapons were used, they would not necessarily involve an escalation to
an all-out nuclear war. In other
words, nuclear war-fighting could be controlled.
15.
For NATO in the 1950s, prior to the Soviet Union's having developed a large
arsenal of nuclear weapons, the posture was codified in a military document
MC14/2, colloquially termed the 'trip-wire' posture. Any Soviet attack against NATO would be met with a massive
nuclear retaliation, including the use of US strategic nuclear forces, and this
assumed that the US could destroy the Soviet Union's nuclear forces and its
wider military potential without suffering unacceptable damage itself.
16.
By the early 1960s, the Soviet Union was developing many classes of tactical
and strategic nuclear weapons, making it less vulnerable to a US nuclear
attack. In such circumstances, MC14/2
became far less acceptable to western military planners who consequently sought
to develop a more flexible nuclear posture for NATO. This became known as "flexible response" and involved
the ability to respond to Soviet military actions with a wide range of military
forces, but also with the provision that nuclear weapons could be used first in
such a way as to force the Soviet Union to halt any aggression and
withdraw.
17.
The new flexible response doctrine was progressively accepted by NATO member
states in 1967 and 1968 and was codified in MC14/3 entitled Overall Strategic Concept for the Defence of
the NATO Area. It was a posture
with one particular advantage for the United States in that it might avoid
nuclear weapons being used against its own territory. A US Army colonel expressed this rather candidly at the time,
writing that the strategy
"recognizes the need for a capability to cope
with situations short of general nuclear war and undertakes to maintain a
forward posture designed to keep such situations as far away from the United
States as possible." (Walter Beinke, "Flexible Response in Perspective", Military Review, November 1968, p48.)
18.
By the early 1970s, flexible response was well established under the Nuclear
Operations Plan which embraced two levels of the use of tactical nuclear
weapons against Soviet forces, selective options and general response. Selective options involved a variety of
plans, many of them assuming first use of nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact
conventional forces. At the smallest
level, these could include up to five small air-burst nuclear detonations
intended as warning shots to demonstrate NATO's intent.
19.
At a rather higher level of use were the so-called pre-packaged options
involving up to 100 nuclear weapons, the US Army Field Manual at the time
defining a package thus:
"a group of nuclear weapons of specific yields
for use in a specific area and within a limited time to support a specific
tactical goal... Each package must contain nuclear weapons sufficient to alter
the tactical situation decisively and to accomplish the mission." (Operations: FM 100-5, US Department of
the Army, 1982)
20.
Thus, by the end of the 1970s, NATO had developed a flexible response strategy
that involved detailed planning for the selective and even the early first use
of nuclear weapons in the belief that a limited nuclear war could be won. One indication of this coming eventually
from a remarkably candid interview given by the NATO supreme commander, General
Bernard Rogers, who said that his orders were:
"Before you lose the cohesiveness of the
alliance - that is, before you are subject to (conventional Soviet military)
penetration on a fairly broad scale - you will
request, not you may, but you will
request the use of nuclear weapons... (emphasis in the original)." (International Defense Review, February
1986.
21.
The long-standing NATO policy of the first use of nuclear weapons was not
promoted widely in public, where all the emphasis was placed on nuclear weapons
as an ultimate deterrent. Even so, the
policy was made clear on relatively rare occasions, as in this example of
evidence from the Ministry of Defence to a Parliamentary Select Committee in
1988:
"The fundamental objective of maintaining the
capability for selective sub-strategic use of theatre weapons is political - to
demonstrate in advance that NATO has the capability and will to use nuclear
weapons in a deliberate, politically-controlled way with the objective of
restoring deterrence by inducing the aggressor to terminate his aggression and
withdraw."
Current Relevance of NATO Nuclear Planning
22.
With the ending of the Cold War, there was some easing of NATO nuclear policy,
with withdrawal of a substantial proportion of NATO nuclear weapons from
Western Europe as the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Europe, and the
possibility of first use was considered increasingly unlikely, but not
abandoned as a facet of NATO policy.
Although the Soviet Union is no more, NATO nuclear planning still
involves a policy of first use, British nuclear weapons remain committed to
NATO and the United States still maintains tactical nuclear bombs at one of its
remaining bases in the UK, Lakenheath in Suffolk.
23. Until around three years ago, the relevance of NATO's Cold War nuclear
posture appeared limited, given the low risk of a confrontation with
Russia. That may well remain low risk,
but NATO has undergone a recent transformation in that it is now engaged in
major military operations in South West Asia, with some 32,000 troops involved,
many of them involved in high intensity conflict.
24. That particular conflict in Afghanistan does not
itself relate directly to NATO's nuclear posture, but it does mean that NATO is
now an alliance that has embraced the concept of operating out of area on a
very substantial scale. As such, the
relevance of its nuclear posture, including its maintenance of a nuclear first
use option, is most certainly pertinent to this enquiry, given that the UK is
one of only two countries that provides NATO's nuclear forces. As the White Paper makes clear: "Nuclear deterrence plays an important part
in NATO's overall defensive strategy, and the UK's nuclear forces make a
substantial contribution. (page 18)
British Independent
Targeting
25.
Since the 1950s, Britain has deployed nuclear weapons on many occasions outside
the immediate NATO area of Western and Southern Europe and the North
Atlantic. This included the basing of
RAF nuclear-capable strike aircraft in Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s, regular
detachments of V-bombers to RAF Tengah in Singapore in the mid-1960s, and the
deployment of Scimitar and Buccaneer nuclear-capable strike aircraft on the
Royal Navy's aircraft carriers from 1962 to 1978. Nuclear weapons were also carried on four Task Force ships during
the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982.
26.
This long history of "out-of-area" deployments of nuclear weapons by
Britain is matched by a number of indications of a willingness to use them in
limited conflicts. In one of the few
published studies of British tactical nuclear targeting, Milan Rai wrote in his
1994 paper Tactical Trident (Drava Papers):
"Sir John Slessor, Marshall of the RAF in the
1950s, and one of the most influential military theorists of the period,
believed that 'In most of the possible theatres of limited war... it must be
accepted that it is at least improbable that we would be able to meet a major
communist offensive in one of these areas without resorting to tactical nuclear
weapons,'"
27.
Although this came from a senior military figure rather than a politician,
there were several statements from more official government sources. Back in 1955, the Defence Minister at the
time (and later Prime Minister), Harold Macmillan stated in the House of
Commons
"...the power of interdiction upon invading
columns by nuclear weapons gives a new aspect altogether to strategy, both in
the Middle East and the Far East. It
affords a breathing space, an interval, a short but perhaps vital opportunity
for the assembly, during the battle for air supremacy, of larger conventional
forces than can normally be stationed in those areas."
28.
Such an idea of a small nuclear war was further expressed during the 1957
Defence Debate by the Defence Minister, Duncan Sandys:
"one must distinguish between major global war,
involving a head-on clash between the great Powers, and minor conflicts which
can be localised and which do not bring the great Powers into direct
collision. Limited and localised acts
of aggression, for example, by a satellite Communist State could, no doubt, be
resisted with conventional arms, or, at worst, with tactical nuclear weapons,
the use of which could be confined to the battle area."
29.
This historical context raises the question as to whether the smaller
sub-strategic Trident warheads, or indeed the more powerful strategic versions,
might be used independently of NATO.
Britain reserves this right, and one of the more detailed assessments of
the range of options for sub-strategic Trident warheads was made in the
authoritative military journal International
Defence Review in 1994:
At what might be called the "upper end" of the usage
spectrum, they could be used in a conflict involving large-scale forces
(including British ground and air forces), such as the 1990-91 Gulf War, to
reply to an enemy nuclear strike.
Secondly, they could be used in a similar setting, but to reply to enemy
use of weapons of mass destruction, such as bacteriological or chemical
weapons, for which the British possess no like-for-like retaliatory
capability. Thirdly, they could be
used in a demonstrative role: i.e. aimed at a non-critical uninhabited area,
with the message that if the country concerned continued on its present course
of action, nuclear weapons would be aimed at a high-priority target. Finally, there is the punitive role, where
a country has committed an act, despite specific warnings that to do so would
incur a nuclear strike. (David Miller, "Britain Ponders Single Warhead
Option", International Defence Review, September 1994)
30.
It is worth noting that three of the four circumstances envisaged involve the
first use of nuclear weapons by Britain.
31.
Such issues rarely surface in the public arena, but there has been concern
expressed in parliament that the government has not been sufficiently clear
about the circumstances under which British nuclear weapons would be used in
post-Cold War circumstances. For
example, the Defence Select Committee noted, in 1998:
We regret that there has been no restatement of
nuclear policy since the speech of the then Secretary of State in 1993; the SDR
[Strategic Defence Review] does not provide a new statement of the government's
nuclear deterrent posture in the present strategic situation within which the
sub-strategic role of Trident could be clarified. We recommend the clarification of both the UK's strategic and
sub-strategic policy.
32.
This was, in part, in response to comments made to the Committee by the then
Secretary of State for Defence, Mr (now Lord) Robertson. He had told the committee that the
sub-strategic option was "an option available that is other than guaranteed to
lead to a full scale nuclear exchange".
He envisaged that a nuclear-armed country might wish to "...use a
sub-strategic weapon making it clear that it is sub-strategic in order to show
that ... if the attack continues [the country] would then go to the full strategic
strike," and that this would give a chance to "stop the escalation on the lower
point of the ladder".
33.
This statement indicated that "a country", such as Britain, could consider
using nuclear weapons without initiating an all-out nuclear war, and that the
government therefore appeared to accept the view that a limited nuclear war
could be fought and won. It was
evidently not the clear statement that the Committee sought, and it did not
indicate the circumstances in which such weapons might be used. In particular, it did not appear to relate
to whether Britain or British forces had already been attacked with nuclear
weapons, or whether nuclear weapons would be used first in response to other
circumstances.
34.
At the same time, there had been no evidence to suggest that Britain had moved
away from the nuclear posture of the Cold War era that included the possibility
of using nuclear weapons first. Indeed,
just as the Cold War was winding down, the first Iraq War in early 1991 was one
occasion when British nuclear use might have been considered. As the UK forces embarked for the Gulf in
September 1990, The Observer reported that Britain was prepared to
retaliate to an Iraqi chemical attack with nuclear weapons:
"A senior officer attached to Britain's 7th
Armoured Brigade, which began to leave for the Gulf yesterday, claims that if
UK forces are attacked with chemical gas by Iraqi troops, they will
retaliate with battlefield nuclear weapons.
The Ministry of Defence refused to confirm this last night, but it is
the first unofficial indication that British troops might be authorised to use
nuclear weapons to defend themselves if attacked." (Observer, 30
September 1990).
35.
More than a decade later and prior to the start of the second Iraq War in 2003,
the then Secretary of State for Defence, Mr Hoon, was questioned by members of
the Select Committee and appeared to indicate that Britain maintained this
policy. In relation to a state such as
Iraq he said that "They can be absolutely confident that in the right
conditions we would be willing to use our nuclear weapons."
36.
This exchange did not make clear whether this would be in response to a nuclear
attack initiated by a state such as Iraq, but Mr Hoon was questioned on this
point on 24 March on the Jonathan Dimbleby Programme on ITV. He was asked whether nuclear use might be
in response to non-nuclear weapons such as chemical or biological weapons. He replied:
Let me make it clear the long-standing British
government policy that if our forces if our people were threatened by weapons
of mass destruction we would reserve the right to use appropriate proportionate
responses which might...might in extreme circumstances include the use of
nuclear weapons.
37.
Later in the exchange, Mr Hoon made it clear that he could envisage
circumstances in which British nuclear weapons were used in response to
chemical or biological weapons. He was
later asked by Mr Dimbleby:
But you would only use Britain's weapon of mass
destruction after an attack by Saddam Hussein using weapons of mass
destruction?
Mr
Hoon replied:
Clearly if there were strong evidence of an imminent
attack if we knew that an attack was about to occur and we could use our
weapons to protect against it.
38. Surprisingly, Mr Hoon later confirmed (July 2003) that
there had not actually been a change in policy since Mr John Major had ruled
out the use of British nuclear weapons against Iraq in 1991, some time after
the Observer news report cited above.
The problem is that there have therefore been thoroughly confusing
signals as to British nuclear weapons policies, and the current White Paper has
done nothing to clarify the situation.
Indeed in its brief statements about continuing to deploy a low yield
nuclear system and not ruling out nuclear first use, there are firm indications
that Britain will retain a far more flexible and usable nuclear system then the
deterrent insurance policy that receives so much attention.
Warheads
39.
UK nuclear warheads are produced at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at
Aldermaston and nearby Burghfield which is responsible for "...initial
concept and design, through component manufacture and assembly, to in-service
support and, finally, decommissioning and disposal." (AWE website) Although the White Paper states that the current warhead design
"is likely to last into the 2020s" (page 30) AWE is presently
undergoing a very substantial development programme, the reasons for which are
not clear.
40.
Current developments include the recently ordered Larch supercomputer with a
power some ten times that of the Blue Oak computer installed in 2002, and the
Orion Laser, due to be completed by the end of 2007 and 1,000 times more
powerful than the current Helen Laser.
In addition, a new Core Punch hydrodynamic testing facility is planned
that will be tens times as powerful as the existing facility, and planning
permission was sought last year for two new office blocks to accommodate 1,400
people.
41.
AWE currently has some 3,600 people on its staff, is investing £1,050 million
in new projects over the three years to 2008 and will have an annual budget of
just under £1,000 million a year early in the next decade, equivalent to about
ten universities. According to AWE
Today (December 2005). "At its
peak the construction work will make AWE one of the largest construction sites
in the UK - similar in scale to the Terminal 5 project at Heathrow."
42.
Although AWE is responsible for decommissioning and disposing of old warheads,
Britain's most recent systems, (the Polaris warheads and the WE177 tactical
gravity bombs) were withdrawn at least a decade ago. A decision on a new warhead for the Trident replacement is not
even going to be contemplated until the next parliament (White Paper page
31). It might therefore be helpful for
the Ministry of Defence to be more informative as to the reasons for the
current high level of investment in AWE, given that the cost of AWE over the
period to 2050 is likely to exceed £35 billion.
Conclusion
43.
Britain has deployed nuclear forces for fifty years. For most of that time, they have been primarily committed to
NATO, which has maintained a nuclear targeting posture that includes the first
use of nuclear weapons. Britain also
retains the capability to use nuclear weapons independently, it maintains a
tactical or substrategic variant of Trident, will have a similar capability in
its replacement, and will retain the option of nuclear first use. It is currently investing heavily in its
nuclear weapons research and production facility even though no new warhead
programme is contemplated at present.
44.
Unfortunately, the current debate on the replacement of Trident is being
expressed primarily in terms of an ultimate deterrent, an insurance policy,
whereas evidence suggests a substantially greater versatility. In seeking a "robust and thorough
public and Parliamentary debate" the Committee might aid the process by
examining the wider issues and gaining more of an insight into government
thinking on these issues than is currently available in the public domain.
15 January 2007
