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UK Def 04
Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
(1) Exercises: the number of formation-level training exercises, including, by way of example, the Medicine Man exercises in Canada, and the number of exercises cancelled with reasons for the cancellation
A formation is a military grouping of one or more units, usually commanded by a one star officer (Commodore, Brigadier or Air Commodore) or higher. The definition of a formation applies most readily to the Army, but it is possible to determine an equivalent level of exercise for each of the front line commands.[1] The answer is provided on that basis, and draws on the available data, which starts from 2002/3.
In 2002/03, 58 formation level exercises were conducted, and eight were cancelled. Seven of the cancellations were due to operational commitments, and the other was attributed to a savings measure.
In 2003/04, 44 formation level exercises were conducted, and 11 were cancelled. Six of the cancellations were due to operational commitments; three were due to savings measures; one was due to revised priorities, and the other was due to diplomatic reasons.
In 2004/05, 61 formation level exercises were conducted, and five were cancelled. Four of the cancellations resulted from savings measures, and the other was due to revised priorities.
In 2005/06, 56 formation level exercises were conducted, and 10 were cancelled. Seven of the cancellations resulted from savings measures, and three were due to revised priorities.
In 2006/07, 52 formation level exercises were conducted, and 14 were cancelled. Seven of the cancellations were due to operational commitments, two resulted from savings measures, two were due to revised priorities, one was cancelled by NATO, one was due to the operational tempo of an Ally, and one was cancelled by the host nation. (2) Flying hours: the Fixed Flying Rates for (a) fixed wing combat aircraft (b) battlefield helicopters, and (c) naval helicopters
The table below sets out the available data on actual flying hours each financial year (including on operations) for fixed wing combat aircraft, battlefield helicopters and naval helicopters.
(3) Personnel deployed: by Service, the percentage of regular Armed Forces personnel deployed away from home, on unaccompanied tours
Figures for the percentage of Regular Armed Forces undertaking Operations and other Military Tasks are published in the Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts and in quarterly Public Service Agreement performance reports. Figures from 2001-02 to the third quarter of 2006-07 are shown in the tables below. Summary information for 1998-99 and 1999-2000 was published in the respective Ministry of Defence Performance Reports (CM4520, CM5000), copies of which can be found in the House of Commons library. This information was not compiled on a comparable basis to the figures set out below.
The figures given below report the percentage of Regular Armed Forces undertaking Operations and other Military Tasks, which would include activities such as nuclear deterrence, military aid to the Civil Authorities and to the Civil Powers in Northern Ireland, integrity of UK waters and airspace, defence and security of the Overseas Territories and of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas and Defence Relations, Alliances and support to Wider British Interests. These figures are quarterly averages and are calculated by comparing the number of personnel undertaking Operations and other Military Tasks against the total strength of each Service. Figures are based on man-day equivalents.
Although precise figures are not available, the majority of the Service personnel undertaking operations and other military tasks will be unaccompanied, with only a small proportion serving accompanied. The figures for Army personnel in the tables below include significant numbers of personnel preparing for and recovering from operations. Those recovering from operations are likely to be at home with their families, either on post tour leave or carrying out recuperation of equipment and low level individual training.
2001-02[10]
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
(4) Harmony: for each Service, the extent to which harmony guidelines have been breached
Harmony performance has been included in the Department's Annual Reports since 2003/04.
Fewer than 1% of RN personnel have breached the Individual Separated Service harmony guidelines[11] in each year since 2002/03 (when formal reporting against the guidelines began for the RN).
The proportions of personnel in the Army and RAF who have breached the harmony guidelines[12] as at 31 March in each year[13] since formal reporting began are as follows:
(5) Manning balance: performance against the manning balance target, for each Service (in the form of the table given in the Autumn Performance Report 2006, if possible) with the projected trend for the next three years
Information on the Services' trained strength against trained requirement and performance against the manning balance target since 1998/99 has been provided in each of the Department's annual performance reports for that period. The graph below sets out performance against the manning balance target as at 1 April in each year, with data for the current financial year reflecting the position at the end of the third quarter of financial year 2006/07. The RAF position reflects a shortfall in personnel against the current requirement as numbers reduce in advance of the next formal reduction in the requirement in April 2007. Performance against the manning balance target will fluctuate throughout the year.
As set out in the Autumn Performance Report 2006/07 and as the Chief of Defence Staff indicated at the evidence session on 6th March, whilst operational commitments and the changes in Service personnel numbers announced in the July 2004 White Paper mean that there is currently some slippage in meeting manning balance targets, we expect to meet the target by April 2008.
(6) Reservists: for each Service, the number and percentage of reservists deployed on operations, and the percentage of personnel deployed who are reservists
Information on the strength of the Reserves and on the number of Reserves mobilised in support of operations has been provided in each of the Department's annual performance reports since 2002/03 and data back to 1997 is included in the UK Defence Statistics publication. The table below sets out by Service the number and proportion of Reserves mobilised in support of operations since 1997:
The table below sets out a breakdown by Service of Regular and Volunteer Reserves mobilised on current operations (as at 31 December 2006):
The table below sets out by Service the percentage of all Armed Forces personnel currently deployed in the main Joint Operational Areas who are Regular or Volunteer Reservists:
(7) Equipment usage: for each of the following equipments, (a) what were the planning assumptions for usage, (b) what has been the actual usage, (c) what was the planned service life when the equipment was introduced into service, and whether, and how, this has changed, and (d) the average age at present: Warrior, Chinook, Tristar, C17 heavy lift aircraft, and Type 23 frigate
Warrior:
(a) Operational usage is forecast separately from training usage, and is currently running at an average of 700 kilometres per vehicle each month. Operational usage is reviewed in detail on a quarterly basis to ensure that sufficient stock is available to meet operational requirements. The planned training usage for Warrior since 2000/01 was as follows:
(b) We are unable to provide comparable figures to those set out in the table above as, before the current financial year, the management information system was not configured to capture actual usage data by each financial year, and nor can training usage readily be disaggregated from operational usage. Improvements to the management information system mean that such data will be available from this financial year on.
(c, d) The first Warrior was fielded in December 1986, and the last delivered in March 1995. The initial assumption for the Warrior Out of Service Date was 2025, but the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme plans to deliver an upgraded capability from 2014 onwards. The planning assumption for the Warrior Out of Service Date has therefore been adjusted to 2035 to reflect the anticipated benefit of this mid-life investment, and to align with the Future Ground Manoeuvre Concept programme, which is assumed to replace Warrior from 2035. The average age of the fleet at present is around 16 years.
Chinook:
(a, b) Planned and actual flying hours for Chinook have been as follows:
(c) 34 aircraft came into service in 1979 with an Out of Service Date of 2000. Following a mid-life upgrade between 1993 and 1996 to improve the aircraft to the Mk2 standard, the Out of Service Date was extended to 2015. A new buy of an additional 3 aircraft of the Mk2 standard were delivered in 1996, which also have an Out of Service Date of 2015. A further 6 Mk2a aircraft were delivered in 1998/99 with an Out of Service Date of 2025. As announced on 30 March, the 8 Mk 3 aircraft originally procured for special operations and delivered in 2001 will now be converted to Mark 2 standard. The out of service date for these aircraft will be 2025 also.
(d) The age of the Chinook airframe itself is not an appropriate indicator of how long the Chinook can continue in service. The Chinook airframe is not 'lifed' and they have unlimited flying hours whilst being maintained in accordance with the mandated schedules. The mid-life upgrade and the anticipated Chinook Sustainment Programme effectively deliver new aircraft. The average age of the Chinook (including the Mk 3 aircraft to be converted) is currently 14 years.
Tristar and C17
(a, b) Planned and actual flying hours for TriStar and C-17 have been as follows:
(c). The original requirement for the TriStar Aircraft was that it would need to be in-service with the RAF for a minimum of 20 years, but it has not been possible to establish any further detail on the planned service life of the fleet when it entered service. The initial lease period for C-17 was for seven years, with options to extend. In July 2006 the Department decided to purchase the leased aircraft for their full 30 year service life (i.e. an additional 23 years beyond the initial seven year lease period), and also decided to purchase a 5th C-17, which is due to enter into service in 2008.
(d). The average age of the TriStar fleet is approximately 26 years. The average age of the four aircraft C-17 fleet is just over 5.5 years.
Type 23
a) The Type 23 Frigate was designed to replace the LEANDER Class and Type 21 Frigates. The original requirement (from 1983) was for a ship capable of operating in the North Atlantic, with a primary role of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), as well as some general purpose capability for operations inside and outside the NATO area. Among its capabilities, the Type 23 would deploy a towed array sonar system, and the Future Medium Helicopter (now Merlin). The design incorporated the lessons from the Falklands campaign; among the areas of particular concern were the ships' survivability and their ability to defend themselves in combat, as well as incorporating design features to make it a genuinely 'stealthy' vessel.
b) The class has been flexible enough to adapt to changing strategic circumstances, and has evolved into a capable general purpose frigate, while retaining its ASW specialisation. We are unable to provide statistical data on planned and actual usage.
c) The planned service life when Type 23s entered service was 18 years, which has since been extended to 28 years.
d) The average age of the Type 23s at present is 11 years.
(8) UORs: the number and value of UORs, and how much of that expenditure was taken out of the next year's budget
Our records show the following data for Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) related to campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq:
Afghanistan
Iraq
Detailed UOR information relating to other campaigns is not held centrally. As an indicative comparison, £136M of UORs were approved for the campaign in Kosovo in financial year 1999-2000.
The Treasury Reserve meets the net additional costs of current military operations, which includes the vast majority of expenditure on UORs. In a handful of cases, the Department - with Treasury agreement - has used the UOR process to deliver new capabilities from the Equipment Programme early, in order to meet immediate operational needs. The corresponding adjustments to the future Defence budget have amounted to £48 million over the three years of the Spending Review 2004 period.
(9) Readiness: the readiness of major force elements of each Service, explaining how readiness is defined
We have reported on the readiness of each Service and of Joint Forces in our Annual reports since 1998/99.
The relevant documents are:
a. Ministry of Defence Performance Report 1999/2000 Cm 5000, December 2000. Page 18, paragraphs 25 and 26. b. Ministry of Defence Performance Report 2000/2001 Cm 5290, November 2001. Page 18, paragraphs 22 to 27. c. Ministry of Defence Performance Report 2001/2002 Cm 5661, November 2002. Pages 13 and 14, paragraphs 37 to 44. d. Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2002/2003. HC 1125, 30th October 2003. Pages 18 and 19, paragraphs 39 to 47. e. Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2003/2004. HC 1080, 12th October 2004. Pages 22 and 23, paragraphs 32 to 36. f. Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2004/2005. HC 464, 28th October 2005. Pages 28 to 30, paragraphs 35 to 43. g. Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005/2006. HC 1394, 14th July 2006. Pages 38 to 42, paragraphs 38 to 43.
Copies of all of these documents are available in the Library of the House.
We have also provided the Committee with further evidence on Royal Navy and Royal Air Force readiness in response to their enquiries into the Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2005/2006. (HC 57, 13th December 2006.)
Readiness is the term used to describe the way we hold our military forces at varying levels of preparedness for contingent operations. We hold our forces at graduated readiness levels derived from Defence Planning Assumptions and force elements are funded to achieve these planned levels of readiness. Readiness is one phase of our operational planning cycle, distinct from the generation of forces from their funded level of readiness to being ready to deploy, deploying them, sustaining them on operations and then recovering them.
Our current methods for assessing readiness have been explained and reviewed in detail in the following publications:
a. MOD Annual Report and Accounts 2004-05, essay Measuring and Reporting Readiness b. NAO Report Assessing and Reporting Military Readiness, HC72 2005-06 dated 15 June 2005 c. MOD Annual Report and Accounts 2005-06, essay Delivering Readiness at the Front Line
(10) War Maintenance Reserve: the percentage of total stock of battlefield ammunition held as War Maintenance Reserve, indicating how long it would take to restock and where the supply line is
There is no longer a War Maintenance Reserve. The Department is able to sustain enduring operations and training requirements with no shortages by managing the stockpile. Current operations, pre-deployment training and programmed routine training are sustained by deliveries from Industry, in order of priority, along with a small buffer to cope with periods of higher demand. The Department currently buys approximately 80% by value of its general munitions requirement from BAES Land Systems under a Framework Partnering Agreement (FPA). This commenced in April 2000 and is currently due to end in March 2010. Project MASS, the follow-on arrangement to the FPA, is currently in its assessment phase. Approximately 92% of the remaining 20% is contracted through 12 suppliers the majority of whom the MoD has entered into 3/5 year Partnering Agreements, or contract agreements.
(11) Finance: the percentage of the annual budget which is devoted to servicing PFI contracts
The table below is based on the PFI payments set out in the notes to the Departmental Resource Accounts which have been published annually since 1999/2000 (the figure for 2006/07 is the most recent estimate).
(12) Defence Budget: the percentage of the Defence Budget devoted to annual operating costs and annual equipment expenditure.
The table below details the percentage of the Defence Budget devoted to operating costs and annual equipment expenditure for the years 1999-00 to 2005-06[17]. All figures exclude the net additional costs of military operations. Gross expenditure may in certain years exceed the budget because receipts are excluded from the figures; this, and the exclusion of capital expenditure on assets other than new equipment, mean that the proportions will not total 100%.
Supplementary Notes from Evidence Session, 6 March
(S1) Harmony Guidelines: how large the Army would need to have been, in each of the past 5 years, in order to have achieved harmony guidelines (Qq 35-37)
The Army manpower liability of 101,800 is the product of rigorous and detailed analysis of the force structure required to meet the most likely future commitments, guided by the Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs). The DPAs are a framework around which we develop flexible forces, and not a prescriptive set of rules about the level of commitments the Armed Forces can or should undertake. As such, it has always been acknowledged that elements of the Armed Forces may breach Harmony guidelines (which are themselves based on the DPAs) when operational demands require it. The high operational tempo means that this has been the case for areas of the Army since Individual Separated Service Harmony reporting was formally introduced in 2004/05.
The Army remains flexible and agile enough to deal with periods of high operational tempo and to meet the capabilities required on each operation. The Army maintains a range of capabilities in its force structure in order to be able to meet a range of contingencies, but then adapts to specific operational circumstances, including by re-roling units into a secondary role. This process is not new: the Army has for many years employed units in this way, using Royal Artillery units, for example, in a secondary infantry role in Northern Ireland, the Balkans and Iraq. The size of the Army (and the other Services) is of course kept under review. As the Chief of Defence Staff explained at the evidence session on 6th March, the Department's top priority for Army manpower is to achieve and sustain full manning against the existing target of 101,800. As part of this effort, the Department is also focussed on ensuring recruitment and retention in sufficient numbers in the pinch-point areas in greatest demand on operations, and on continuing to restructure the Army so that it will be better able to cope with the demands of the most likely operations of the future. (S2) Retention: what trends are shown from exit interviews about why there is a retention problem (Q48)
As the Chief of Defence Staff explained at the evidence session on 6th March, the relevant indicators do not suggest a substantial retention problem across the Armed Forces. Exit interviews are one useful way of understanding the reasons for voluntary outflow from the Services.
Exit interview surveys for Royal Navy ratings and Royal Marines other ranks leaving the Naval Service prematurely began in 2003. In the majority of cases personnel cite more than one factor as influencing their decision to leave, but the primary reasons are domestic stability; lack of job satisfaction and boredom, and pay and allowances (which is cited by RM Other Ranks in particular). We would expect the significant pay rise of 3.3% awarded to all Service personnel in 2007, and in particular the 9% increase for the most junior ranks and the introduction of a substantial Financial Retention Incentive for Royal Marines Other Ranks to reduce the number of Naval personnel citing the pay and allowances package as a reason for leaving the Service.
The main reasons given by Officers and Soldiers for leaving the Army voluntarily and prematurely relate to family and quality of life issues. However, married leavers are twice as likely to cite this as a reason for leaving, whereas job satisfaction is more relevant for single leavers. Other significant reasons include personnel management issues and external influences.
The key reasons for officers and airmen leaving the RAF have been largely consistent since the conception of the surveys in 1997/8, with 'family/domestic stability' being the dominant factor. Job satisfaction - both in the present and what can be expected in the future - and promotion prospects are other important factors behind the decision of officers and airmen to leave the service.
(S3) Under-manning: what savings have resulted from under-manning (say, in each of the past 5 years) (Qq 57-60)
The table below shows a broad order calculation of the net additional costs of the Services if they had been manned to their full requirement, against their actual strength. The calculation is based on average capitation rates and strengths for each Service, and covers the two years of the current Public Service Agreement and Spending Review period.
(S4) Risk: with reference to the reported performance against target in the Autumn Performance Report, where the risks, and how they are being addressed, are presented (Qq 62-65)
In the Autumn Performance Report 2006-07 we assessed that we were on course with some risk to achieve our PSA target for success on operations (Target 1), and that there was some risk to achieving our readiness target (Target 3). The risk to the former is that achieving our goals in Iraq and Afghanistan requires overcoming significant armed opposition from insurgents fighting hard to prevent it. We manage this risk by deploying the forces that our military commanders judge are needed to achieve our objectives. As the CDS set out in his evidence to the Committee, when this means that we have to operate beyond the bounds of our planning assumptions it is not possible for the Armed Forces simultaneously to reach the target level of readiness for contingent operations. In current circumstances the risks to achieving these two PSA targets are the opposite sides of the same coin. We are very clear that in balancing between them our overriding priority is operational success. These issues are reflected in our reporting on operations and readiness, although not precisely in these terms.
(S5) Force levels: to what extent the reduction in RAF manning levels can be attributed to leaning of logistics support, and to what extent there have been reductions in front line forces (Qq 61, 66)
Around 30% of the reduction in RAF manpower following the 'Future Capabilities' work is attributable to the logistics support area. Personnel directly involved in front line activity account for around some 10% of the reductions. The remainder of the drawdown has been made possible through organisational transformation and changes to the force structure, for example through estate rationalisation, headquarters collocation, and the introduction of the Joint Personnel Administration system.
(S6) Northern Ireland: confirmation of past and future force levels in Northern Ireland (Q 84)
In December 2005, there were approximately 10,000 military personnel in Northern Ireland (this figure would have been higher during the marching season). There are currently approximately 7,000 military personnel in Northern Ireland. This includes Royal Irish (Home Service) who have been non-operational since 1 September 2006. By 1 August 2007 and the end of Op BANNER, the military will have drawn down to a peacetime garrison of no more than 5,000.
With the end of Op BANNER, Field Army units based in Northern Ireland will reflect the Government's global defence commitments rather than being assigned for duties specific to Northern Ireland. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) requirement for Public Order support and the best way of meeting it will be kept under review by the Chief Constable of PSNI, the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Office and the Ministry of Defence.
(S7) Review process: clarification of the nature and timing of the MoD's reassessment of defence assumptions and force levels, how this fits with the Spending Review and how the Committee is to be involved in that process (Qq 86-89)
Planning assumptions are reviewed regularly to ensure that we develop the capabilities and force structure needed to undertake the range of tasks we might ask of our Armed Forces in the future. This is part of our routine internal planning cycle. Our assessment of the likely strategic context our Forces will be operating in, the tasks they will be required to undertake, and the capabilities they will need is also informing the Comprehensive Spending Review process. The current review of planning assumptions is underway and will be completed next spring. The intention is to set out the conclusions of the review in the next Defence White Paper. Our expectation is that the Committee will wish to debate this paper in the usual way.
(S8) UORs: clarification of the treatment of UORs, and the extent to which they have consequences for the Defence Budget (Q103)
The arrangements agreed with the Treasury for funding the net additional costs of military operations, including UORs, have not changed. A detailed response is provided at question (8) above.
(S9) Harmony: how being "away from home" is defined, and whether the Harmony guidelines measurements fully reflect time away from home (Q116)
'Away from home' is defined as absence from a Service person's home base, be that a ship in dock or a unit, for reasons which include involvement in operations, other military activity, routine tasks, and individual and collective training. Since the definition encompasses a wide range of reasons for absence, including non-operational tasks, we judge that the Harmony guidelines provide a full and fair reflection of time away from home.
(S10) TOPMAST: the state of the TOPMAST initiative and to what extent it serves to prevent the under-manning of ships (Q 143)
Over the period October 2002 to April 2004, TOPMAST introduced squad manning of warships, first for Able Seamen and then for Leading Hands. It has been applied largely to ships of destroyer and frigate size and above. In these types of ships, nearly 90% of Junior Rates are in squads. TOPMAST has introduced a more flexible way of manning the front line, and provides a means for ships to manage gapping (for example, to replace those on training courses or in shortage categories) and preserve harmony for the individual.
The focus of TOPMAST, though, is on Junior Rates in trades and specialisations with relatively large populations. The Squad approach is less well suited to small populations and has not been applied to Junior Rate trades with small numbers (for example, Leading Writers and Leading Regulators), nor to Senior Ratings and officers. These populations are rotated to shore billets to deliver their harmony between seagoing assignments.
(S11) In addition, the Committee would be grateful for a note showing the percentage of initial recruits who successfully go on to units, by Service (or broken down as available).
For the Naval Service, the proportion of initial recruits who successfully progress on to units is some 78% for the Royal Navy and 49% for the Royal Marines.
For the Army, the proportion of initial recruits who successfully go on to units or special to arm training is some 67%.
For the RAF, the proportion of officer recruits who progress on to units is some 94%; the figure is 93% for airmen recruits. 14 May 20007 [1] Navy - exercises involving a Component Commander or an enhanced Command and Control element, and major FLEET deployments. Royal Air Force - exercises involving a Component Commander or involving the same degree of Command and Control arrangements that would be required for operations. The key focus is on cross-component integration. Permanent Joint Headquarters - exercises involving operational headquarters and Permanent Joint headquarters exercises. These rarely involve the deployment of tactical elements, and primarily take the form of command post exercises. [2] Figures are planned flying hours not actuals. [3] Includes front line squadron, operational conversion unit, operational evaluation unit and operational flying hours. [4] In the latter financial years the reduction in Tornado F3 and Jaguar activity reflects the transition of fast jet crews to support the build up of the Typhoon force. Jaguar will reach its out of service date in 2007 and Tornado F3 will go out of service early in the next decade. [5] The reductions in Gazelle and Lynx flying hours reflect the combination of removing Lynx from the anti-tank role to be replaced by AH, and the change in the reconnaissance function that Gazelle provided. [6] The reduction in flying hrs in 2003/04 is attributable to preparations for Op TELIC and the consequent impact on availability of aircraft and operational flying rates. [7] The reduction in flying hours in 2000/01 reflects the introduction of the Puma simulator, and the reduction from 2004/05 reflects the improved security situation in Northern Ireland. [8] From FY 04/05 onwards, SK4 were receiving an avionics upgrade. [9] The drop in activity in FY 04/05 resulted from a suspension of flying between April and July of 2004, due to a crash investigation. [10] 2001/02 figures include personnel on Exercise SAIF SAREEA II. [11] For the RN/RM, individuals should spend no more than 660 days away from home over a rolling 3 year period. [12] For the Army, no more than 415 days separated service over rolling 30 month period; for the RAF, no more than 2.5% of personnel exceeding 140 days separated service over rolling 12 month period [13] 2006/07 figures reflect the position at the end of the third quarter of financial year 2006/07 [14] The RAF figures reflect the total number of personnel breaching individual separated service guidelines, rather than the number of RAF personnel above the 2.5% tolerance level. [15] Flying hours will have been affected by the need to take aircraft from the available fleet for modification with Urgent Operational Requirements; aircraft availability, and operational deployments. [16] In 'Near Cash' terms [17] 1998/99 is excluded, as the figures are based on cash accounting, and are not directly comparable to those after the introduction of Resource Accounting and Budgeting. 2006/07 is excluded, since the figures could only reflect an interim set of data on expenditure during the year, and would not be directly comparable to the final annual expenditure figures from 1999-2006. [18] The Defence Budget is defined here in Total DEL terms (ie. the sum of Resource and Capital DEL, minus depreciation and impairments costs, on an outturn basis) [19] Operating Costs are taken from the Annual Accounts and exclude depreciation, impairments and Annually Managed Expenditure. [20] Capitalised equipment expenditure is taken from the Annual Accounts. |