SND3 79
Memorandum from BASIC
1 Summary
1.1 There is widespread
suspicion that the Government's decision over Trident replacement has more to
do with domestic political positioning than it does with security concerns.
These suspicions are strongest when it comes to the timing of the decision. The
stakes are high. This decision is far too important in its own right, with
implications for Britain's role in the world and for global non-proliferation,
for the Government to be rushing a decision based upon assumptions from
outdated debates of the 1980s.
1.2 An early decision to
replace, weeks before the first NPT Preparatory Committee meets in April this
year, could derail efforts to build international momentum towards stronger
non-proliferation norms and multilateral nuclear disarmament, even before
delegates sit down to talk. It will not only strengthen the hand of those
within countries like Iran trying to justify dangerous and proliferatory policies
to their populations, stiffening their resolve to challenge the status quo, but
will also further weaken Britain's credibility within the majority world: the
183 Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) that are looking to the Nuclear Weapon
States to take previously agreed steps towards a nuclear-weapon free world.[1]
1.3 A commitment now to spend
a large proportion of the defence budget after 2014 on a system without clear
military application will undoubtedly harm the procurement prospects for our
active service personnel, and by extension the ability of the armed forces to
carry out the essential tasks future governments will require of them. It will
lock the MoD into this option, when alternative nuclear and non-nuclear options
may be more appropriate in the future as new technologies emerge, creating
vulnerabilities and new opportunities.
1.4 We were promised that the
White Paper would include extensive and detailed consideration of options and
the basis behind them. Given the dangers, the onus was on the Government to
justify an early decision. The White
Paper, in two short sentences in the first appended Fact Sheet, fails to do
this. It simply asserts the oft-repeated position that the maximum possible
life expectancy of the submarines is 30 years (with extension) and that it will
take 17 years to build a replacement (Trident took 12 years from agreement to
initial launch, the point at which the White Paper chooses to measure the life
expectancy). It ignores the points made by BASIC and other analysts that
question these bold statements. It is clearly taking a worst-case scenario on
life expectancy and main-streaming it, perhaps overly influenced by the
negative experience with Polaris, an entirely different design. Given the
redundancy built into the system (with four boats when only three are required
for CASD), this is unnecessary.
1.5 There are four clear reasons
for believing that the decision set out in the White Paper is premature and can
be delayed for a further 8-10 years.
1) Longer
life expectancy: the life expectancy of the current submarines is probably
much longer than stated, partly as a result of operational changes since the
end of the Cold War.
2) Dropping
Continuous-at-sea Deterrence (CASD): an option the Committee's first report
in June 2006 thought deserved consideration: a modest change in posture appropriate
to today's security environment could extend the life considerably, and was not
addressed in any satisfactory manner by the White Paper.
3) Reduced
lead-times: a less ambitious project, to simply modify Vanguard rather than
create a new class of submarine, would reduce lead-times considerably.
4) Point
of no return: modest investment in R&D now could put off an
irreversible decision for some years.
1.6 A
Parliamentary vote to put on hold a final decision would give the Government
more time to provide the necessary information for an informed debate. At the
very least the Committee should strongly recommend that Parliament make an
explicit and binding commitment to revisit any decision it takes now, prior to
Main Gate, with an open view as to whether it confirms, reforms or abandons the
project.
BASIC
The
British American Security Information Council (BASIC) is an independent
research organisation that analyses government policies and promotes public
awareness of defence, disarmament, military strategy and nuclear policies in
order to foster informed debate. BASIC has offices in London and in Washington
and its governing Council includes former US ambassadors, academics and
politicians. Further information is available on our website: http://www.basicint.org
Contact details:
The Grayston
Centre, 28 Charles Square, London N1
6HT
email: pingram@basicint.org tel: 020
7324 4680
1
Advantages to suspending the decision
2.1 The benefits to deferring the decision
for at least five years are overwhelming.
2.2 Maintaining
maximum flexibility of response to possible threats and to new technologies
makes military sense. Closing off options by making premature commitments to
particular solutions can result in expensive cash and opportunity costs,
particularly when lead-times are so long. UK military procurement is still
suffering from costly legacy decisions (such as the purchase of Euro-fighter) made
during the Cold War, which ended 17 years ago. A decision made closer to the
point of deployment would mean being closer to the possible threats for which
the system is designed and possess a superior understanding of appropriate
needs. It would also give the MoD a better idea of the latest technology
available, both for building appropriate systems, and in accounting for
counter-measures. New technologies are likely to provide numerous cost and
functionality benefits, such as miniaturisation of missiles, warheads and
platforms. Yet this decision is locking the UK into a system that deploys
massive D5 missiles, each capable of deploying 12 independently-targetted 100kt
warheads. Already these missiles are far larger than that required by UK posture,
which currently averages three warheads per missile, some of which only have a
single warhead. While currently it is difficult to imagine a platform more
stealthy than a submarine (a point made in the White Paper), this may not be
the case in a decade's time. Given the pace of technological change experienced
today we can expect with certainty that superior counter-measures and solutions
will be emerging on the market.
2.3 As the White
Paper acknowledges, a Trident follow-on system would have to be compatible both
with the (upgraded) Trident II D5 missiles and any (as yet undetermined) US
follow-on missile. Relying upon the exchange of letters with Washington on 7
December 2006 would be courageous, so far in advance of the Americans'
decisions on a follow-on missile. Future US Presidents will be making decisions
dominated by US technical and military requirements.
2.4 In April
this year the Foreign Office is to sit down with nuclear negotiators around the
world to find common ground in the search for elusive non-proliferation and
disarmament agreements. A decision by Parliament in March to replace Trident,
just a few weeks before, will severely weaken the UK delegation's hand in
demanding stronger non-proliferation commitments. It is the view of most
governments that the Nuclear Weapons States have collectively failed to live up
to their disarmament commitments under Article VI of the NPT - a fact
acknowledged by the recent Shultz-Perry-Kissinger-Nunn article in the Wall
Street Journal.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
envisioned the end of all nuclear weapons. It provides (a) that states that did
not possess nuclear weapons as of 1967 agree not to obtain them, and (b) that
states that do possess them agree to divest themselves of these weapons over
time. Every president of both parties since Richard Nixon has reaffirmed these
treaty obligations, but non-nuclear weapon states have grown increasingly
skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear powers.
2.5 Such
scepticism also applies specifically to the UK. While the UK Government has
reduced warhead numbers and readiness, the pressure it can place on Iran and
North Korea with the support of the rest of the international community is
weakened while it clings to the utility of its own nuclear deterrence. An early
decision to replace Trident shows a lack of confidence in the regime (while
expecting others to demonstrate it). Many within the Iranian parliament, for
example, have claimed that the NPT is no longer binding, because of the lack of
effective disarmament agreements. Whatever the legal truth, the consequence is
the same - a dangerously weakened non-proliferation norm.
2.6 A longer
window for the decision would allow the UK to initiate a new multilateral
nuclear disarmament initiative prior to any irrevocable investment in new
nuclear systems. One of the key reasons given by some to retain (and replace)
the UK nuclear deterrent is to enter international nuclear disarmament
negotiations from a position of strength. A new initiative could be the central
plank of Britain's effort to secure progress in the run-up to the 2010 NPT
Review Conference prior to any commitment to replace Trident.
2.7 Delay would
ease pressure on the public purse in general, and on the defence budget in
particular. Public spending plans in the run up to the 2007 Comprehensive
Spending Review are under severe pressure. This decision is likely to create
public and off-the-record resistance to achieving savings elsewhere in
government spending. The defence procurement budget in particular is already
unlikely to be sufficient to meet existing spending plans for 2011-2020. The
Prime Minister's renewal of the covenant between the armed forces, government
and the people outlined in his Portsmouth speech of 12th January,
would appear particularly hollow if a decision to replace Trident meant fewer
resources to an already over-stretched military. And if these resources do come
from another government budget, these are resources that could otherwise be
applied to properly equipping the forces.
2.8 Deferral
would give the Government time to provide adequate information to give the
public and parliament a chance to come to an informed view. Currently this is
impossible. The three month process, while an improvement on the past, is
grossly inadequate for a decision of this magnitude, and the information
provided is insufficient. Consequently, the debate is often dominated by prejudice
and presupposition.
3 Industrial Considerations
3.1 The Defence Committee's most recent
report on Trident outlined concerns that the skills base for building a new
generation of nuclear submarines in the UK is at a 'critical level', suggesting
that an indigenous production capability may be at risk. Certainly, industry
representatives are keen to see a new project follow on after Astute, warning
that lengthy gaps could lead to a loss of key expertise. A report from the Rand
Corporation, commissioned by the MoD specifically for the purpose of advising
on how best to retain the submarine industrial base, suggests delaying the
start of production of the next generation of submarines, to avoid a much
larger gap at the end of SSBN production and the start of the next generation
of submarine, the MUFC (Maritime Future Underwater Capability, the follow-on from
Astute).[2] However, exaggerated warnings of 'catastrophe' from
any delays should not frighten government into a hasty decision and over-ride
the strategic defence needs of the country, which as the Committee concluded,
must drive any future decisions, not industrial and employment factors.
3.2 In addition, a forthcoming report from
BASIC that looks at the choices between investment in Trident replacement and
renewable energy opportunities, suggests that far more
employment opportunities could be created through alternative investment than
those lost by the rationalisation or closure of the UK nuclear submarine
manufacturing capability.[3]
.
4 Life Expectancy
4.1 The 1998 SDR and 2003 White Papers
referred to a life expectancy of Vanguard of 30 years, as did ministerial
statements prior to 2006. In its evidence to the Defence Committee in January
2006, the MoD reduced this for the first time to a more conservative base life
expectancy of 25 years, with the possibility of extension, 'albeit with
gradually increasing cost and some increasing risk of reduced availability,
perhaps out to the mid-2020s'. The White Paper measures this 25 years from the point of launch
rather than commission. This brings forward the time for decision some 7 years
from that assumed by analysts previously, and by the MoD's DLO Nuclear Cluster responsible for
managing the strategic deterrent as late as August 2006 (they assumed an overall
life of HMS Vanguard to last to 2024).
Q: Why was the life expectancy of the Vanguard
submarine reduced by five years?
4.2 Operational changes introduced with the
1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) suggest a longer life-expectancy than 25-30
years. While the SDR retained a policy of Continuous-at-sea Deterrence (CASD),
it also announced reduced readiness: the UK "will have only one submarine
on patrol at a time". This significantly reduced the number of at-sea
hours for each submarine, in turn significantly reducing the stresses on both
hull and reactor and thus increasing the life expectancy.
4.3 Most UK analysts believe that three boats
are required to ensure that one is out at any one time (one on patrol, one in
dock in preparation and one in refit). Four boats give added security in case
of catastrophic damage or exceptionally poor performance and therefore, by
providing redundancy give added life expectancy to the system as a whole. It
also means that each boat is at out sea for only around a quarter of its
operational life (which includes time in refit).
4.4 By contrast, American Ohio-class
submarines are reported to be out to sea for roughly two-thirds of their
operational life, yet the DoD has extended their life-expectancy from 30 to 44
years. The White Paper says that the Ohio class life extension cannot be
replicated in the UK because such an option was not built into the original
design, manufacture, refit and maintenance of Vanguard.
Q. Why were the Vanguard-class submarines apparently built to lower
standards than the US Ohio-class submarines?
Q. Why is the same shipyard in line to receive the follow-on contract
when it apparently failed to produce a lifetime cost-effective solution last
time?
4.5 There are a number of projects already
underway that can be expected to further extend the lives of the submarines.
These include, for example, Rolls Royce working with the MoD's Nuclear
Propulsion IPT on an integrated support solution for the existing marine reactors.[4] These extension projects were not and could
not have been envisaged in the initial design of Vanguard, and it is difficult,
at this stage, to see how MoD can be so certain of their impact in extending
the life (by only five years in total).
Dropping CASD
4.6 The 2003 Defence White Paper stated that
the UK faces no major conventional threat today or in the near future. The
Defence Committee proposed the possibility of dropping CASD. Nine years ago the
SDR had rejected dropping CASD on the grounds that any emergency launch of
Vanguard could dangerously escalate tensions.
The White Paper also argues that CASD is necessary to reduce
vulnerability and assure the credibility of the deterrent. But such concerns are irrelevant to the main
reasons given for replacing Trident - in particular the insurance against
possible future risk. Dropping CASD would show British commitment to the
further dealerting necessary to promote global non-proliferation, while
maintaining a flexible deterrent if that is deemed appropriate. It would also
dramatically increase the life expectancy of the current system, both by
reducing stresses on the submarines today, and by providing for even greater
surplus capacity in the system.
Q: Is a continuous-at-sea-deterrent necessary at a
time when even the Prime Minister agrees there is no major nuclear threat to
our strategic interests?
Halving the lead-time
4.7 The option of building new Vanguard-class
submarines appears not to have been considered in the White Paper. Instead it
proposes a whole new class of submarines that "might take around 17 years" to
design, manufacture and commission, that will simply deploy modified Trident D5
missiles. This estimate "reflects the judgment of industry". It is a worst-case
estimate from BAE Systems, a company that knows it is in a monopoly position,
negotiating with a government apparently keen to make an early decision.
4.8 The lead-time for the Vanguard-class
submarines was 12 years from decision to launch (in 1992). This required major
new designs from scratch to create a submarine that bore little resemblance to
the previous Polaris-class boats. In contrast, in a slimmed-down and efficient
procurement exercise, it may take two years to design minor upgrades to the
Vanguard-class, and around five years to construct each submarine. The
appropriate lead-time could therefore be seven rather than 17 years.
Q: Why should a
minimum deterrent require a new class of submarine, and why should this take 17
years to design and build?
Q: How much faith should MPs put on the judgment
of BAE Systems, a company still under the shadow of the Serious Fraud Office investigation
abandoned in December 2006, and responsible for the MoD's six most delayed
major weapons projects (cumulative 25 years) and the five experiencing the
highest overspends (nearly £3bn).
Q: Could a
replacement submarine be purchased off-the-shelf from the Americans at a lower
cost and with a much reduced lead-time?
The point of no return
4.9 Since the bulk of spending is loaded into
the final stages of any replacement programme, namely in construction, modest
investment in the preferred option need not require an irreversible commitment.
The June 2006 Defence Select Committee report accepted this point, stating that
a binding decision on the final option and any serious investment would not be
needed until 2014. In fact, even if there was an urgency to commence work on
the project, a point we would fiercely contest, there is no need to make a
decision at this stage in the cycle to procure a new generation of SSBNs -
simply a decision to work up the options for future procurement decision. In
which case, at the very least, at this stage Parliament should with-hold any
decision to go ahead with the procurement of a new system, and instead agree to
the government working up the options, and require the issue come back to
Parliament prior to a Main Gate decision.
Q: Could a decision
be made to invest in R&D while holding off on a 'main gate' decision until
the next parliament?
5. Conclusions
The
White Paper fails to address the many issues raised by organisations querying
the need for haste in replacing the Vanguard class submarines, and fails to
provide the level of information promised for an informed debate. Instead, it
relies on stating the government's conclusions and asking us to accept them on
trust. BASIC believes the underlying assumptions are based upon unnecessary
worst-case perspectives, heavily influenced by commercial considerations, that
will have damaging consequences for Britain's role in the world, and for an
efficient procurement process. We would urge the Defence Committee to exercise
extreme caution before accepting the White Paper's conclusions.
15 January 2007
[1] Steps that
were agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
[2]
RAND Europe, The United Kingdom's Nuclear Submarine Industrial
Base, Volume 1: Sustaining Design and Production
Resources. Bottom p.47. Available online
at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG326.1.pdf
[3] Dr Steven Schofield, Oceans of Work: Arms Conversion Revisited, BASIC, 24 January 2007.
[4] The Nuclear Cluster, DLO, August 2006, available
online at:
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F25A7345-AA9D-46E8-B33A-76304FBF7B53/0/NuclearclusterPDF.pdf
