Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 86 - 99)

TUESDAY 27 FEBRUARY 2007

PROFESSOR JOHN MURLIS AND MR MIKE MASON

  Q86  Chairman: Good morning, welcome to the Committee, thank you for coming in. A general question to start with: can you just say what role you think carbon offsetting can play in the UK's overall climate change strategy?

  Professor Murlis: I think that there are several kinds of roles that offsetting can play. The first thing to say is that offsetting is an instrument that can, under the correct circumstances, produce real and permanent carbon reductions, and from that point of view is something to be encouraged. I also believe that it plays an important role in terms of bringing innovation into the arena of carbon reduction. We know there are technologies out there that can play a part—the Carbon Trust and Energy Saving Trust have pointed to them—and they do not appear to market, for a number of reasons, amongst which is that they come at a small premium compared with other technologies that deliver the same basic goods. We believe that offsetting enables there to be a flow of resources that brings those technologies rather earlier into carbon reduction than would otherwise take place. We also believe that by thinking about their carbon impacts and by trying to manage them, companies raise not only their own awareness and the awareness of their various employees but also have the opportunity to use it as a way of communicating with their clients and of course with their supply chains, so we feel there is quite a powerful way in which offsetting can signal, if you like, the cost of the carbon imprint and provide incentives for managing it down. For those reasons we believe that offsets are a thoroughly useful part of an overall strategy. In UK terms, obviously the UK, which is quite a market leader in terms of technologies, should be able to benefit very well from this kind of input.

  Mr Mason: I would like to answer that by using a real example and I am going to draw the example from a book that George Monbiot wrote. Those of you who know George will know that he is a very forceful guy who is a journalist and he is a sometime fairly passionate critic of offsets. In his book he observed rather despondently that it would cost him something like £20,000 to turn his house from an ordinary Victorian terraced house into something that was environmentally friendly. My retort to that was, "Okay, George in the life of an energy-efficient light bulb, let us call it seven years, you are going to save three tonnes a year by doing that, so your 20,000 quid in those first seven years will do three times that, let us call it 20 tonnes, of emissions reduction. If you gave me that 20,000 quid and I put it into energy-efficient light bulbs in townships in South Africa, where there is a social benefit and an economic benefit as well as a carbon saving benefit, each of those lamps will save about a tonne of CO2. £2 per lamp, £2 for monitoring, measuring, checking, all of the things that people would like us to ramp this with to guarantee certainty, and you are still saying £4 per tonne of reduction. I am going to do 5,000 tonnes of emissions reduction in those seven years and he is going to do 20. If we have got a crisis, if we are in a hurry, we have a real duty to do "cheapest, bestest, firstest", and so from my point of view, trying to wear a rational economic hat for a moment, I think that we are overly concerned about the priority of doing things at home, not that we should not be but that at the expense of doing the better things first. The other side of that is let us just take his home as being typical: there are 22 million households in this country, take £20,000 as a reasonable estimate of the cost of doing it; that is £400 billion we are going to have to spend. If 50% of that cost is manpower at £20,000, there are 10 million people we need to train. Physically we have not got the human resources or the financial resources to deal with the problem at the speed that we need to, and so for me I would be slightly more aggressive than John I think about the role of offsets and I would say if you are serious about dealing with global warming, you seriously have to have a position on offsets.

  Chairman: Okay, that is helpful. We have heard evidence from other people, including WWF and I think more along the same lines from RSPB and the Energy Saving Trust and they say that they would like offsetting to be at the bottom of the hierarchy of responses to climate change, but what you have just said is clearly taking a completely different view; you are looking at it on a global basis and looking at what you can do most quickly and most cheaply and so offsets ranks higher, and that is a helpful contrast to some of the things we have heard recently. Des?

  Q87  Dr Turner: You are obviously not going to like the tenor of my question because I think that those who would say that the great imperative is immediately to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in absolute terms would also say that there is a danger, certainly with offsetting, that it is treated as a sort of comfort zone for people who can buy their offsets and then carry on polluting as they did before, and that in effect you have business as usual and the actual carbon saving from offsetting comes along somewhat later because it is an emitted tonne of carbon today but it may be many, many, many years before that tonne is saved by offsetting.

  Mr Mason: I think there are two important things I want to separate here. Let us leave the quality of the offset—and I am not talking about planting trees because I think planting trees is mostly a waste of time and energy—if we are talking about things that sit in the technology space, so for example we are doing tens of thousands of energy-efficient stoves or light bulbs for people around the world, you are talking about the emissions reduction happening within one to six or seven years. In the context of global warming there is nothing magic about 365 days particularly and we are talking about something that is well within the time horizons needed to make the emissions reduction, so I do not think the multiple year argument is a material one. The other one is important though. The line that most people will take is that people will buy offsets and it is like selling indulgences because you can go out and carry on sinning because you bought a good crop of indulgences this week. To an extent I am not trying to make moral and behavioural judgments. I think society has to make its own choices. We absolutely need to change society but I am not sure that we can wait to change society; we are in too much of a hurry, and Parliament has never shown a great deal of interest in applying some teeth to make those changes happen. So I am saying the reason that I got into this was that in the absence of any either social bite or parliamentary teeth we had to do something. I do not deny that we would really like to do things and I think we should do them in parallel; they are not one or the other, they are one and the other. If we want to grow an oak tree we have got to start today. We have got to do both of these things right now but the evidence is that it does not stop people doing the right thing. We surveyed in the middle of last year 3,500 of our customers and we received a 33% response rate, so over 1,000 people came back, so it is a statistically significant sum. Let me give you some of the numbers that came back from that. "Our website helps improve `carbon literacy'". 78% said that this was the first time they had measured their carbon emissions. 79% agreed that website calculators had increased their understanding of their own impact on climate change. 90% have done one or more of the following: home energy efficiency improvements, driven less or flown less. 22% have written to their MP about climate change. 70% have encouraged friends and family to take action. 59% have driven less. I have got a whole list that I am happy to put in. The data is there and we will happily make the survey data available. What I am saying is I think there is a immediate assumption that people are going to do the bad thing. The reality is that the climate does not care what is in their minds so long as the emissions reduction is made, and the evidence that we have does not actually point in the direction of your supposition.

  Professor Murlis: The experience of the CarbonNeutral Company, as I understand it, is very similar. That is to say that companies that are looking for a carbon neutral accreditation find that they are faced with a protocol which demands that they do three things. One is to measure their carbon footprint; the second is to wrestle it down as far as they can; and the third thing is to deal with what is left. It is our experience that the first two steps are very salutary for those companies and quite apart from saying the third step is an indulgence, they see it as something that happens once they have been able to understand what their impacts are and deal with them insofar as they can. I think it is also worth remembering that there are some bits of impact that companies probably cannot deal with, they can only go so far. For example, if you are running a taxi company, quite clearly you have to have fuel and although in the longer run you could have renewable fuels, in the interim period until those are available to any substantial amount (and we know the RTFO is still a glimmer in the Government's eye) we know very well that there will be a need for fuel and consequently they will inevitably have a carbon footprint. Thinking about that bit is really important. I would also argue that in an economic sense, and I think Mike alluded to this earlier, one should really try to deal with the low-hanging fruit first—and this is something that Sir Nicholas Stern points out in his report—in taking an economics approach to this problem you really want to get the most cost-effective carbon reductions you can as early as you can, and the need then is to ensure that there is the investment to bring those in. I would argue that firstly, quite apart from allowing people to feel they can just continue polluting and continue sinning, that is not the evidence we have. Secondly, I would argue that it is worth trying to ensure that solutions appear in all of their cost-effectiveness and if it turns out that offsetting instruments are highly cost-effective you will need to grab them quickly.

  Q88  Dr Turner: Even if you are right about people reducing their sinning, there is still an onus on carbon offsetters to demonstrate that they are actually making an impact in terms of carbon saving that could not otherwise be made. In other words, if you are spending X pounds on low-energy light bulbs in the developing world it is quite possible that they would do that anyway because there is an obvious saving for them in so doing anyway, so (a) you have got to demonstrate the additionality and (b) an awful lot of offsets that are on the market are things like forestry et cetera, et cetera, where the carbon savings are at best debatable and certainly long delayed. So how can you suggest that you establish the bona fides of carbon offsetting?

  Mr Mason: I would like to persuade the Committee to separate again these two strands which have become conflated. The first is the principle: are we going to encourage, support, regulate and manage an offset market as an important instrument of policy? The second thing is can we make offsets that deliver because if we cannot make offsets that deliver then clearly there is no point in having them involved. The reality is that offsets may be a good thing and I would not want the idea to be corrupted by people doing them badly, so we do need to separate those two. The other thing that I would say is that of course we are dealing in a world in which we are trying to change the future and of course because we do not know what the future is by definition, anything that we aspire to have done has to be a matter of surmise and judgment. So, for example, we put 10,000 energy-efficient lamps into a township in South Africa recently. Subsequently Eskom the national electricity company, decided that they would put a large number of lamps—one million or 10 million, I cannot remember what the number was—out there and people came to us and said, "Why was what you did additional because Eskom did this on top of you?" The retort was two-fold, I guess. The first is Eskom put in 10 million and we put in another 10,000 so there were more, but the second is sometimes you will be overtaken in life by things which are better than what you are doing. If you did not do anything for fear that someone might do something better and make it redundant I think you would be paralysed by indecision and inactivity. We are much better off doing things with a considered but small risk of getting it wrong and maybe doing twice as much, than doing nothing in case we make a mistake or misjudge it. I think there is a terrible danger that because we are unable to achieve certainty in our projections of what would have happened had we not been involved that we do not do anything at all.

  Q89  Dr Turner: So it is fair to say that the actual impact of offsetting is very difficult to determine?

  Mr Mason: I would not say that. I would say that it is very difficult to be 100% certain that what you did would not have happened anyway, but you can be reasonably certain within the bounds of normal commercial risk. We cannot be certain that global warming is going to happen but we are not all sitting here saying we will wait until we know before we do anything.

  Professor Murlis: I think there is a little more to this actually. We do have some evidence of additionality and we have it in the United Kingdom, and that is the very slow uptake of these low-energy light bulbs again. We have had them around for a very long time. If you look at the scope there is for energy efficiency in Britain, according to the Carbon Trust it would deliver on current technology about half of the Government's 2050 60% reduction target, that is what the Carbon Trust is saying, and yet it does not appear in the market, so that anything that makes it appear in the market would be a helpful addition to what has historically been the case.

  Q90  Chairman: Accepting that obviously one does not know what is going to happen next, additionality does seem to go to the very heart of the case for offsetting. Would you agree that at least to qualify for additionality it has got to be beyond what you can reasonably assume is going to happen in the foreseeable future?

  Professor Murlis: Of course, and in fact every company that has a reputation and has a product that it wishes to defend has very complicated procedures for ensuring that, first of all, it understands to the best possible certainty what the likely "business as usual" future would be and then also calculates on top of that the addition that would be produced by the resources that fund the offsetting instrument. I know that in many cases the kinds of bodies that do this work are exactly the same kinds of bodies that are recognised in various international fora like the IPPC, and under the Clean Development Mechanism there are bodies that do this kind of thing, verifiers and so forth, and they are normally the people that are brought in to advise on this. Certainly it has been my feeling, looking at these instruments, that tremendous care goes into ensuring that the assumptions as to the future are treated as conservatively as possible, that is to say that they are as optimistic as possible, and that therefore anything additional is truly additional. Obviously we are working in the futurology area and certainly, as I have said, behaviour historically has been very slow to adopt these technologies, but where there have been resources, for example we have got photovoltaic projects going where clearly nobody is going to put money into those unless there is some extra source of funding for them.

  Q91  Chairman: Staying on futurology for the time being, how fast do you think this voluntary offset market is going to grow in the next few years?

  Mr Mason: Let me give you some of our statistics. We have expanded 700% in the last 12 months. Web sales, which are a small but growing proportion of what we sell, have increased 20-fold in the last 24 months.

  Q92  Chairman: That is 1,900%.

  Mr Mason: Thank you, Chairman. It is a lot; huge. Two years ago if we went to a company and made a pitch and sold 50,000 tonnes of emissions reduction we would be cock-a-hoop and we would be out partying for the next three months. These days people ring us up and say, "I made an error in my assessment." A bank recently rang us up, "We made an error in our carbon assessment for the year and we have not been as good at reducing (John's point again) as we thought. Please can we have another 50,000 tonnes?" 18 months ago this would have been utterly unheard of so it is going through a transformation which is vast. If you project it for more than a few years you have solved the world's problems, so clearly it not going to do that, but just at the moment it is going through a huge sea change.

  Q93  Chairman: Given that the post 2012 environment is uncertain, would that act as any brake on the voluntary market or does it act as any kind of brake on the CDM market?

  Professor Murlis: I would not have thought so.

  Mr Mason: The voluntary market relies on people who have made a decision that this for them is something that is critically important, they do not write you cheques for £1 million just on a whim, and having made that decision and written it into the company's or individual's culture and their thinking it is a much more certain outlet for projects, I suspect, than the vagaries of the international regulatory market. We have seen in the European Union trading scheme, for example, prices wildly oscillate between €30 and €1 a tonne whereas in 10 years that Climate Care has been selling carbon offsets we started at a price of £5.45 10 years ago and our weighted average cost now is about £6.30 or £6.40, and the price has not moved very much, so we provide a stability, interestingly enough, which the other market because it is a political instrument has not done.

  Professor Murlis: Clearly the price of allowances matters greatly and the allowances provided under the first stage of the EU ETS were such that really they did not support very much of a market. There are technologies out there for the companies who come within EU ETS which would be waiting in the wings and waiting to be implemented. There are very high-efficiency ways of generating electricity for example and there is also carbon capture and storage, and I am sure the Committee has heard about that several times. Both appear at a premium but not at an outrageous premium. A good price on the EU ETS would certainly encourage companies to bring those technologies into use, there is no doubt about that, but historically it has been very difficult to get the correct level of allowances. Similarly, on the second period of the EU ETS there is a certain amount of discounting going on in investment houses to say, "Can we rely on it that these things will really appear and they will be tough enough to support a higher price?" However, when there is a vigorous voluntary market it is pretty clear there are a lot of people looking for cost-effective ways of using carbon and the technology developers may feel more confident. I think that Mike's experience is that that supports stability of price and I think that would be ours too. Looking forward, we can see the prices rising as investors are more confident and invest first of all in the development of the technologies and then in bringing them to market.

  Q94  Mark Lazarowicz: My apologies for missing the start of your evidence, I was at another meeting, and so if the question has been asked already no doubt the Chairman will tell me, but on this question of the price, the general view of course on the price for carbon, and suggested by Nicholas Stern for example, is that it is well in excess of the figures you are talking about when it comes to people purchasing voluntary offsets. What is your assessment of the likely consumer reaction if the price were to start getting anywhere near the figure that is suggested is the real price for carbon? Your rapidly growing demand may suddenly become rapidly decreased demand unless there is a compulsory mechanism.

  Mr Mason: Again we have to look at two different things. We have to separate price and cost and the cost of carbon in the short to medium term can be set by a number of things. Let us presume that the policy instruments make all carbon fungible around the world so an emissions savings here is equivalent to one there. At around €30 a tonne of carbon dioxide the big German coal producers switched to gas. There are huge savings to be made, so in the short to medium term I think we see a ceiling there. In the very short term there are huge zero cost savings to be made in the developing world where the problems are infrastructure, technology availability and knowledge. When Sir Nicholas talks about the cost of carbon, he is talking about the marginal cost of carbon at the edges as you get close to achieving the policy objectives. If I come back to the point that you made earlier about is it not better if we did things at home and insulated our houses and cut our emissions; the reality is that we will see the marginal cost of carbon driven up to the point at which people should be then persuaded that it would be better to do these things at home than to do those things overseas. I am very happy if the market gave way. I run a renewable energy business so I do not mind which way it goes, in truth. The offset market will be a useful policy instrument if once people start to get involved in this, there are strong encouragements, arm twisting, policy measures which keep them in so that as the price rises, which it inevitably will, they do not say, "Thank you very much but not now Josephine." I think you are right, the price will rise, and if we do not capture their willingness now while it is low and wrap that up in a series of measures, systems, protocols and encouragements, then we have missed a major opportunity to get the general public on board while they can afford to be on board.

  Q95  Mr Caton: The Environment Agency told us in its memorandum to this inquiry what it does as an alternative to offsetting through organisations like yours. What it does is to calculate what it would need to spend to offset its emissions and then uses that amount to set up a number of funds to reduce its direct emissions instead. Is that not a better way forward?

  Mr Mason: No, it is worse.

  Q96  Mr Caton: Could you expand on that?

  Mr Mason: It is worse because we are in a hurry. As a society we are constrained in resources. If we are in a hurry we should do the cheapest things first and by cheapest I mean we do not have to worry about financial discounting, in the timescales that we have to deliver—ten or 20 years—we have to reduce as much carbon as we humanly can do. There are two reasons why you might not want to do it internally in the way that they do. The first is that it is just more expensive. The second is that many of these expensive technologies will have fallen in price by the time the cost of offsets has risen so you have got the technology price curve doing that and the carbon offset price curve doing that. When they cross is the time to start doing it. The rational answer is to follow the economics. Do the most you can with the resources you have available and do not be too hung up about where you do them; the climate really does not care.

  Professor Murlis: I think my view would be rather similar to that. I am not sure exactly what the Environment Agency is saying on what they do and how they actually do this job, but I come back to the idea that for the Environment Agency, first of all, understanding carbon impacts and then managing then down as far as possible is a very reasonable thing to do, but I suspect they will rapidly run into diminishing returns on investment, and as they run into those diminishing returns on investment if they wish to make further reductions in their carbon footprint, then offsetting I think is a very reasonable way of doing that and, as I have said, is of enormous benefit in bringing innovation into this, so I would have thought from an Environment Agency point of view there would be a limit as to how far they can reasonably go before they run into either enormous costs or great operational difficulty. They have got a serious job to do and they therefore may be thinking of perhaps some kind of mixture of managing down as far as they can and then looking for other ways in which they can take an offset.

  Q97  Dr Turner: You have both made play of the effect of your activities being just not to directly drive down but to change the awareness and behaviour of your customers. Indeed Professor, in your memorandum you place great emphasis on that.

  Professor Murlis: Yes.

  Q98  Dr Turner: Is there not a danger that companies that have an interest in compensating for emissions through buying offsets will not necessarily try too hard to reduce their emissions? Mr Mason, there was a hint of that in one of your earlier answers in which you talked of your great joy at a company ringing up and saying, "We have not done very well, we have got to buy another 50,000 of these because we have not done it for ourselves." You have yourself given evidence of that danger.

  Professor Murlis: I do not think it is a danger, I think that is a very good thing. You could put that the other way which is that it is good the company is so aware and so concerned for its reputation that it wants to come back for another slice.

  Mr Mason: Let me take that to its most extreme example that I can think. Members of the Committee might be aware that we offset 45,000 miles of emissions for every 2007 model of Land Rover, Range Rover, Defender, all of those. This was an interesting ethical decision for us. Here we have a car which by most accounts is a heavily polluting car; should we be associating ourselves with this? The logic is interesting. They have a number of choices. I know the management of Land Rover now from the top right downwards and I am beginning to know them quite well. They absolutely understand that they have got a very beautiful but fundamentally rubbish product. It is not a product designed for a highly carbon-constrained world, so sitting there, they have a number of choices. They can say, "Fantastic guys, we have made a big decision to deal with global warming and we are going to close the factory door and stop." Never mind the employment consequences, the reality is that as long as society carries on buying these and as long as Parliament does not stop people buying them, other people—Porsche will walk straight into the niche and say, "Fantastic, thank you very much," so that will not achieve anything. The next thing they can do is they can say, "We will wait until society changes." That course of action will not achieve anything either. You might say as a third course of action, "Let us invest £1 billion and develop new platforms and new technologies to reduce the emissions hugely." Great, and Ford are doing that, a lot of it in the UK (Ford is their parent) but that is going to have 10 or 15 years' gestation period before it finally comes to fruition. The fourth thing you do is say, "Okay, I really need to do something. I am utterly convinced that this is a problem. How can I get the emissions down?" They rang Climate Care and we ended up with a lot of conversations and what we now have is a vehicle whose net emissions—and I am talking about three to seven years from the date of the emission, actually that is not true, one to four years from the date of the final emissions—being 100% offset—not 50%, not 20%, not 10%: 100%. Let us accept some uncertainty. We might do a bit more and perhaps we might be a bit optimistic and we do 110% and 30% gets thrown away; it is still an 80% emissions reduction. In other words, we have achieved a huge amount whilst the technology is catching up because all of the alternatives in the absence of a legislative framework would not have achieved anything at all. It is not as simple as, "Oh well, they don't care so they aren't doing it." It is like the old saying "if I was going to go to Brighton I would not start from here"—unfortunately you are here and we have to move from here to there as fast as we can.

  Professor Murlis: We at the CarbonNeutral Company provided some evidence to you of case studies of some companies that had actually gone through the process of accreditation through the Carbon Neutral Protocol, and that is a protocol, as I explained, where at these three stages companies are obliged to measure and to reduce insofar as they can and then as a third stage to deal with the residue through offset. Within that protocol there is quite a lot of detail and, again, we have offered you the copy of the document in its current form. It is always evolving and I chair a group of independent people whose job it is to essentially exercise governance over that protocol as to how it develops in the future to meet future challenges. It has been the experience of the list of companies that we provided you with that by going through this process they had actually informed themselves a lot and rather changed the way they saw the world. An interesting example is RadioTaxis who came to this thinking, "We ought to do something, we are not quite sure what it is, perhaps we will have a look at it," but came away from it much more enthusiastic and feeling rather positive about it and thinking, "What do we do about new fuels, how are we going to deal with the RTFO, and how are we going to make use of all these things that are coming down the line at us?" So essentially we have a management there now that has perked up and begun to listen to these messages about carbon. Similarly with Sky, Sky started off thinking it would be a very good thing to do and it would be nice to do it for the company but then began to think about why not do it to our supply chain, why not ask them to come in, and then we have got the customer base, why not ask them to do something and we can campaign and do all of these things. We have engaged what is a very large media player and I think that is very positive myself. We see this sort of change going on all the time. People come along tentatively not quite sure how to think about this but go away, first of all, thinking that they have got quite a lot to do but, secondly, interested in it and thinking about it so it is not at the bottom of their mind any more, it is near the top.

  Q99  Chairman: Coming back to the Land Rover example; how much does it cost them to do that?

  Mr Mason: About 100 to 150 quid per car.


 
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