Examination of Witnesses (Questions 940-959)
MR TONY
COOPER, MR
SIMON VRY
AND MR
IAN HEWETT
27 NOVEMBER 2006
Q940 David Taylor: Three or four
consultants for about three months; that is about a consultant
year, is it not, for £300,000? It is more generous than the
previous contract to which Lynne Jones referred. Gartner must
be awash with money.
Mr Cooper: I think it is important
that we have clarity on the suitability of the IT before we put
further investment in the IT.
David Taylor: I do not deny the reasonable
use of the objectives of the process. I do query the applicability
and value of the source of the consultancy that you have contracted.
Chairman: I think the Committee will
find it very interesting that, now, with the benefit of hindsight,
so much care is being taken over the IT, when I think we can see
that there were some questionable decisions made at the beginning
of this process about the IT and the development of the software,
because that is from where a lot of the problems seem to have
come.
Q941 Lynne Jones: Do you think that
you have the necessary in-house expertise? You are appointing
consultants, but should you not have in-house expertise in these
areas?
Mr Cooper: I take the view that
having an in-house capability, to some extent, certainly is necessary.
One issue I would have though is how those individuals refresh
their knowledge and keep up to date with developments. I think
that bringing in a firm like Gartner to do a specific piece of
work actually does make sense to me, rather than trying to build
that capability in house.
Q942 Lynne Jones: When we saw Larry
Whitty, I have not recently looked up the account but in effect
he was saying that he was meeting with farmers and they were giving
him information about problems with the mapping system; we also
had a presentation of all the problems that were being experienced
by farmers in getting accurate mapping systems. Were you getting
any information from your customers, or from within the Agency
with members of your staff who were having to deal with your customers,
which caused any problems? This would be for Mr Hewett and Mr
Vry.
Mr Hewett: Yes, we do, through
various sources. Until Mr Cooper's arrival I had responsibility
for meeting on a regular basis with our main stakeholders; those
stakeholders brought some of those cases to our attention. We
undertook specific sessions with stakeholders to review specific
cases, to follow those through and see if there were any underlying
issues and where they were and what we would try to do about those.
We also obviously received inquiries direct, through our customer
contact centre and through written representations, and again
we undertook to review some of those and to follow those through
and see what changes were necessary. One of the key points in
relation to mapping is just the sheer volume that we were receiving
in relation to the 2005 Single Payment Scheme and the volumes
that we have seen since, a huge data capture and then cleansing
exercise. In 2005 there was a phenomenal amount of mapping inquiries
and registrations and modifications to those registrations, which
we have not yet seen, thus far, in 2006. I think it is fair to
say that some of the technical issues which beset us early on
in 2005 and eventually resulted in us outsourcing the digitisation
capability, which we discussed the last time we were in front
of this Committee, led to that problem in itself, and then certainly
the scale of it. As you may have heard, we have since brought
that digitisation capacity back within house and are now processing
predominantly out of one location.
Q943 Lynne Jones: All of this information
which was coming from your stakeholders did not lead you to have
any doubts that you would be able to achieve the payment window
that you expected?
Mr Hewett: It was certainly another
pressure, which we took into consideration but it did not alter
our overall view.
Q944 Lynne Jones: Did ministers have
access to this information, did they know what was going on; they
knew that the stakeholders were up in arms?
Mr Hewett: Indeed, ministers had
been meeting stakeholders on a regular basis.
Q945 Lynne Jones: They knew as well,
but again they still thought that somehow or other it was going
to be all right on the night?
Mr Hewett: Certainly they tried
to address issues during the course of those representations and
discussions.
Q946 Lynne Jones: Can you give me
a specific example of measures that you took to address those
issues; obviously, you outsourced the digitisation?
Mr Hewett: That was the first
part of it. That in itself allowed us to increase the rate of
digitisation but created its own problems in getting the data
back into the system, which then impacted on the speed at which
we can validate a claim. The first point was to get the land mapped
and registered, or to amend an existing registration, and then
we had to get that digitised area, or revised digitised area,
back into the main processing system so that we could get on and
validate. Once we got over the peak of that digitisation exercise,
and certainly we did a huge work amount of work during that outsourcing
period, we decided it was more efficient to have the process in
house. Certainly the intention is to centralise on one location
wherever possible to make sure that any errors are corrected at
source, or whether there are any technical issues which were created
through the outsourcing, and then getting the data uploaded, to
have that all within the system.
Q947 Lynne Jones: Did ministers have
access to any independent sources of advice, apart from the RPA
and Defra, in relation to the whole Single Payment Scheme?
Mr Hewett: Advice from their policy
colleagues, would have been one, and obviously from the stakeholders.
Q948 Chairman: Just on a point of
detail there, when you say "advice from their policy colleagues,"
who were those colleagues?
Mr Hewett: Sorry; policy colleagues
of mine to their ministers.
Q949 Chairman: Policy colleagues
of yours?
Mr Hewett: My policy colleagues
in the Department who would be advising ministers.
Q950 Chairman: Who would those be;
what functions did they perform? You said "policy colleagues."
Mr Hewett: The colleagues within
the Department who have responsibility for the Single Payment
Scheme.
Q951 Chairman: You mean, like Mr
Lebrecht?
Mr Hewett: Yes; people such as
that.
Q952 Chairman: He seems to be running
everything. When you look at the NAO Report, he seems to have
managed to be on the Executive Review Group and he seems to be
involved in CAPRI, I know he is a chum of yours, in giving advice.
How independent was this sort of route to ministers?
Mr Hewett: I am saying there was
a different source of advice, rather than just the RPA. Our RPA
policy colleagues would have provided advice on the Single Payment
Scheme to ministers, separate from that which went from RPA.
Q953 Lynne Jones: There was not anybody
independent of Defra?
Mr Hewett: There were independent
members on the CAPRI and on the Executive Review Group.
Q954 Lynne Jones: Did ministers have
access to their expertise?
Mr Hewett: I do not know, as I
was a member of only one of those groups.
Q955 Lynne Jones: Was there a culture
where bad news would be brought to the attention of ministers?
Mr Hewett: Yes.
Q956 Lynne Jones: When you were having
all these problems with the mapping, you discussed the implications
with ministers, so they knew, they had all these reports saying
that you had identified another 10,000 tasks that week and that
the number of tasks outstanding was growing?
Mr Hewett: I think those reports
were directed from Mr McNeill to ministers.
Q957 Lynne Jones: In June 2005 the
likelihood of success was rated by the Agency at 40%. What discussions
did you have at that time with Defra on contingency options or
measures to mitigate the risks of failure? Was this effectively
the last chance to follow a different course?
Mr Hewett: There were various
discussions at various stages. As Mr Vry explained earlier on,
there was a contingency solution which was intended to mirror
each stage of the process needed, first to data capture and then
to validate and then finally to pay claims under the Single Payment
Scheme. That contingency system sat alongside, until such time
as each of those various stages that we could get through the
main RITA solution was in and was operational. At that point,
and it came to a certain point, once we had moved into the RITA
validation system that contingency system no longer became viable,
because once there was only data captured and we had started to
validate on the RITA system, if at that point we would have decided
to move to the contingency solution we would then have had to
go back and separately data capture all of the SPS claims on the
non-RITA solution and then start the validation on that non-RITA
solution. It was at that stage that consideration turned to the
potential of using an interim or partial payment as a contingency
solution, and it was at that stage we discussed with our policy
colleagues, then in turn we discussed with their colleagues in
the European Commission, the potential for a partial payment solution.
That is my understanding.
Mr Vry: Basically, that is it.
We reviewed in that timeframe that you referred to the widest
range of options that we possibly could, but as we went closer
to the payment window, when information was being placed into
RITA at the front end, it became increasingly high risk to withdraw
it and place it into other systems, so an early decision was made
whether to continue with RITA or to proceed with a contingency
solution. The contingency solution was by no means a guaranteed,
successful alternative, because in itself it carried a lot of
risks and many workarounds and so it was deemed at the time that
actually the better option, in terms of the way forward, to proceed
with was with RITA. However, that did close off one contingency
option. When that occurred then we discussed with Defra alternative
contingency options around advance payments and, as is known,
Defra and policy colleagues had discussions with the European
Commission about what might be available to us by way of advance
payment and partial payment options.
Q958 Chairman: Can I just be clear
on the people who were advising within Defra on the flows of information
that you have just identified. Mr Hewett talked about his conversations
with policy colleagues. Was there anybody in Defra with IT or
systems experience that you knew of who was not in any way involved
in either the Executive Review Group or the CAPRI Board, who was
also privy to what was going on, who could give ministers some
degree of uninvolved, impartial but knowledgeable advice on the
messages coming out of the flows of information that you have
just described?
Mr Vry: There were obviously people
within Defra who had IT experience, because there are organisations
like the Defra Design Authority, but, the level of engagement,
I do not know whether it was adequate for them actually to provide
that advice or not.
Q959 Chairman: I think what you are
saying is, no; is that right, that there was not anybody? The
Secretary of State could not ring up X and say, "Have you
had a look at this flow of information? Come and tell me whether
we're going to make it or not"?
Mr Vry: Information was provided
through the reports to CAPRI, etc., which were seen by members
of the Defra Design Authority, so there were certain amounts of
information. Whether that was adequate for them to make those
types of value judgment decisions and advice I do not know.
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