Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Wynns Group (BW 41)

1.  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

  1.1  Wynns Ltd are the UKs only independent transport consultancy specialising in the movement of abnormal indivisible loads. In 1998 and working on behalf of Powergen, Wynns engineered the delivery of 7 loads in excess of 150 tonnes to Cottam Power Station in Nottinghamshire. The loads were delivered directly to site via the River Trent.

  1.2  In November 2000 Wynns subsidiary company Robert Wynn & Sons Ltd was awarded an £8.5 million freight facilities grant. The grant represented 99% of the total cost of the design and build of a specialist ro/ro barge and the purchase and conversion of a former inland tanker barge. The vessels, later named the Terra Marique and the Inland Navigator, work as a system to maximise the potential of the inland waterway network for the carriage of the largest and heaviest abnormal indivisible loads. Specifically, Special Order & VR1 categories which are granted for road movement by the Secretary Of State for Transport.

  1.3  The Governments "water preferred policy" was announced on 11 June 2002 by the then Parliamentary Under Secretary for Transport David Jamieson MP and clearly states that:

    "the Departments VSE Division will henceforth adopt a policy whereby water transportation is the preferred mode for the movement of the largest and heaviest abnormal indivisible loads. Road movements will only be authorised where the Department has considered the possibility but believes water transportation is not feasible".

  1.4  Both our vessels can navigate on Britsh Waterways managed waters. The Terra Marique is some what limited by her size and is limited to the Upper Trent. However the Inland Navigator can access regional centres such as Nottingham, Leeds, Rotherham, York and Worcester all via the commercial waterways network.

  1.5  The commercial waterways network we refer to is that which is designated within the 1968 Transport Act, much of which is now managed by British Waterways.

2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREIGHT AND THE ROLE FUNDING CAN PLAY TO STIMULATE THIS

  2.1  The Committee has indicated that it would like to consider the development of British Waterways in the context of the policies set out by the Government in documents such as Waterways for Tomorrow.

  2.2  In the 2000 published "Waterways for Tomorrow" it stated that the Government wished to encourage the transfer of freight from roads to water-borne transport where this is practical, economic and environmentally desirable. It further stated:

    —  We will consult about extending the FFG scheme to encourage additional applications for inland waterways projects. Options will include grants for waterway projects covering non-capital as well as capital costs (as for rail) and the opportunity for grant to be paid directly to navigation authorities for the provision of freight infrastructure.

    —  We will sponsor an inland waterways freight study group including representatives of British Waterways, other members of AINA, commercial operators, waterway user groups, local authorities and the private sector.

    —  We will invite the freight study group to examine cost-effective and practical ways in which freight transport on the inland waterways can be increased, and whether there is a need for further studies examining issues such as whether the niche market for freight carrying on the historic narrow and broad canals can be expanded.

  2.3  While it would be unfair to suggest that the Government did not carry through its proposals as outlined above, we believe that it is clear that following the review of the freight grant system, the publishing of both the Freight Study Group report and the Governments response, we are no further forward in terms of the sustained development of inland waterway freight carriage on the British Waterways navigations.

  2.4  One of the main reasons why this is case is that freight is not seriously on the agenda of British Waterways. Furthermore, we have evidence to suggest that British Waterways do not pursue the carriage of freight due to (they claim) it being a loss making side of their businesses.

  2.5  The Government in its Response to Freight Study Group Report stated that they would strengthen British Waterways Framework Document to encourage it to exploit opportunities for freight traffic. We have no evidence to suggest this was carried out. If it were, we would ask why has it not had a significant effect on the amount of freight carried on there waterways.

  2.6  The Government response also welcomes the creation of a Head of Freight development post within British Waterways. This role lasted less than four years until the national freight team within British Waterways was cut from three members of staff to two with the role being downgraded to Freight Marketing Manager.

  2.7  It should be noted by the Committee that following the cut in funding to British Waterways, we understand that British Waterways have decided to make those responsible on a national basis for freight development be made redundant. This we believe further typifies British Waterways attitude to developing freight carriage on its waterways.

  2.8  While we did welcome the creation of regional "Freight Champions", as at the time they were to work along side the national freight team, it has come increasingly clear to us that the work undertaken by these post holders is reactive rather than the proactive. Freight Champions were existing senior staff based at British Waterways offices across the country. Our fear being that as already busy people they would not be able to devote the time and have the knowledge to act as catalysts for freight facilitation and development. We have expressed this to the Chief Executive of British Waterways.

  2.9  It should also be noted that British Waterways have appointed a number of independent board members with experience in property and leisure industries. Their is nobody in place who has come from the logistics industry. We would ask why is this the case if freight is a core activity. It is further evidence we believe of the semantics being played out between British Waterways and the Government.

  2.10  The funding of British waterways has been a high profile issue in the last months. While we are concerned about the short-term impacts of this, there is a need for a fundamental review of British waterways funding arrangements.

  2.11  It is our belief that the funding of British Waterways provides an opportunity for the Government to incentivise British Waterways. We see targets being set of other Executive Agencies and other arms of central government yet there is no scheme whereby the more freight carriage British Waterways facilitate the more funding they receive from there sponsoring department. You would hope that the savings gained in areas such as congestion and emissions should ensure that the Government get value for money via its investment.

3.  THE NEED FOR A JOINED UP APPROACH

  3.1  Due to the nature of their role and responsibilities British Waterways are required to interact with a number of different Government departments, regional and local government as well as other stakeholders such as Regional Development Agencies and the Highways Agency.

  3.2  Firstly we would question whether responsibility for the commercial waterway network should be within the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. It would seem more appropriate to us that responsibility for the commercial navigations rested with the Department for Transport, which was responsible for transport. Until the commercial waterways are considered as part of our national transport network then we believe they will not be able to move towards fulfilling there potential as means of carrying freight. We are increasingly seeing on the continent similar size waterways being used to carry substantial amounts of cargo. It is for Government to put in place the structure which will allow our commercial waterways to play there part within a fully integrated transport system.

  3.3  The planning process should play a significant role in facilitating the development of waterborne freight carriage. Documents such as "Planning for freight on inland waterways" highlight the fact that there is much guidance issued by the Government which if applied would assist in the development of waterborne freight carriage. One of the reasons why this guidance has not resulted in a significant increase in tonnage carried is that British Waterways are more often than not the only body consulted by local and regional bodies when they are drafting regional and local strategies. And as freight is not high up there agenda opportunities are being lost.

  3.4  An example of this is the redevelopment of Diglis Basin on the Severn. The planning authority spoke to no-one regarding the impact of the redevelopment of the last remaining freight wharf in Worcester. This was due to the fact that the applicant for the planning permission to redevelop the site was British Waterways itself.

  Indeed and as we have stated, in a recent letter to Robert Wynn & Sons, British Waterways Chief Executive, Robin Evans, attempted to justify the disbanding of his single person freight marketing team by advising that some £500,000 was collected in revenue through freight tolls and over £700,000 spent on facilitation. Quite how British Waterways account for this remains something of a mystery. It is our understanding that under the 1968 Transport Act, British Waterways are obliged to maintain the commercial navigations suitable for carrying freight yet they have not only consistently failed to do this through lack of maintenance, dredging and the continual selling of wharves, they now appear to then add the cost of maintenance, implicit in the act, to their argument to disband the freight team.

4.  SUMMARY

  4.1  In summary, we believe that British Waterways should be doing more to encourage modal shift from road to commercial waterway. As a Navigation Authority responsible for freight carrying waterways they should have senior staff responsible for freight rather than devolving it down to a local level.

  4.2  The government should reconsider where responsibility for the commercial waterways sits within its own departments and should also consider how the funding arrangements might be restructured to encourage British Waterways to champion freight development.

Wynns Group

January 2007





 
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