Memorandum submitted by Nicholas MacWhirter
(BW 54)
1. Background
I am Managing Director of Intermodal Solutions
Ltd. (ISL). I am a small ship designer and consultant, and in
this role I have designed tugs and barges for Cory Environmental
to operate on the Thames, and small sea-going ships carrying waste
for Dean and Dyball and Veolia Environmental (ex. Onyx UK).
2. Relevant experience
2.1 ISL has worked extensively on the Continent
developing intermodal transport routes with Rhine based barge
operating companies and their customers. In particular, ISL has
worked in Holland and Germany developing technological solutions
to facilitate the opening of more direct river-sea routes for
the transport of new cars and car parts from vehicle manufacturers
at Cologne on the Rhine and Russelsheim on the Mainz to ports
lower on the Rhine and the UK.
2.2 ISL was sub-contracted by Mott, McDonald
to assist in the production of the Waste by Water report for British
Waterways in 2000. ISL's role was to design and cost an appropriate
barge for the transport of waste containers on the river Lea in
London, to provide guidance on the transhipment interface between
the barge and the canalside infrastructure, and to assist in writing
the report.
2.3 In 2002, ISL was commissioned by Hampshire
County Council to conduct a study into intermodal transport on
the Hampshire coastline, including the Solent, and in 2003 was
contracted by Veolia Environmental to conduct a study into the
intermodal transport of household waste across Southampton Water
to the new Energy from Waste facility at Marchwood on the West
side. Both studies included the production of an extensive report.
2.4 The company was sub-contracted by Peter
Brett Associates in 2005 to assist in the production of the West
London Canal Network Water Freight study for British Waterways
and Transport for London. ISL's input was specifying the type
of canal equipment that would be used for each business case,
estimating the cost and duty cycle and the associated running
costs for the barge movement and writing sections of the report.
2.5 ISL initiated and ran the Hackney waste
by water pilot scheme to examine the viability of a new system
for water transport of containerised household waste on the river
Lea. The pilot was operational during the summer months of 2003
and 2004. The report is to be found at www.hackneywastebywater.com
2.6 I am coordinator of the British Waterways
Action Forum whose website is to be found at www.britishwaterways-squanderingourinheritance.com
3. Background
3.1 Global warming is upon us, and if mankind
is to survive, the steps we must take to counter this will influence
every part of life, including the way we transport freight.
3.2 In future, financial advantage will
increasingly be given to modes of transport, such as water, which
can reduce the world's carbon footprint. Inevitably, road transport
will attract increased taxation, relative to rail and water, in
the form of congestion charges and/or rising fuel duty.
3.3 Of the four principal transport modes,
water is by far the least damaging to the environment. A 12 barge
train operating on the Grand Union Paddington Arm in the 1950s,
for example, could carry over 700 tonnes freight whilst producing
less than 3% of the carbon emissions of the 30+ road vehicles
it replaced. Even a single 70 tonne capacity barge produces less
than 25% of the equivalent road vehicle emissions when carrying
heavy loads such as aggregates and less than 15% when carrying
low density loads such as waste.
3.4 The waterway network is not operating
to anything like its maximum capacity for freight. In the early
1950s, for example, the London waterways alone were carrying over
three million tonnes a year, excluding freight tonnage on the
Thames.
3.5 The problems associated with the implementation
of intermodal freight transport are not unique to Britain's waterway
system. In comparison with several Continental countries, Germany,
Holland and Switzerland in particular, Britain is not good at
transferring freight loads to rail or water to take advantage
of reduced cost and environmental impact.
3.6 In the next few years, freight transport
logistics must change to meet the challenge of the future, and
the environmental benefits of water transport are such that the
waterways will have to play a much more significant role.
3.7 Most of the following notes, except
where stated, relate to freight transport on the London canal
network. This is where ISL has gained most of its experience,
where freight transport is least developed and where the potential
is perhaps the greatest.
3.8 The waterway network administered by
British Waterways in London includes the Grand Union, its Slough
and Paddington Arms, the Regents canal, Limehouse Cut, the Hertford
Union canal and the river Lea. All have differing characteristics
which bear on their viability for freight transport. In general,
the London canals are limited in size in relation to some of the
Yorkshire canals, the Aire and Calder for example.
4. By comparison, what is happening on other
waterways, for example the Thames, to meet the challenge of the
future?
4.1 The latest Port of London Authority
figures for freight on the Thames are for 2005. They show that
there was a 47% increase in intra-port freight (that is, between
the ports) within the Greater London area from 1.25-1.84 million
tonnes in the one year—of this, 1.17 million tonnes were
aggregates for construction.[17]
Much of this traffic was to Thames terminals as far upstream as
Wandsworth, Battersea and Fulham.
4.2 The increased use of the Thames is directly
attributable to economic and environmental pressures, and to the
planning processes detailed in the London Plan, including the
safeguarding of key wharves for water freight transport.
4.3 In 2005, the operational safeguarded
Thames-side wharves saved over 950,000 trips by heavy goods vehicles.[18]
No less than 35 such safeguarded wharves are operational.
4.4 Within the last few months, one of the
15 non-operational but viable wharves, Alexander Wharf, was brought
back into working use after lying idle for over a decade. The
wharf is now being used to tranship over 1,000 tonnes of scrap
stainless steel a month. Plans to bring several of the other non-operational
wharves back into use are well advanced.
4.5 For many years, Cory Environmental have
been shipping up to 700,000 tonnes of containerised household
waste per year (approximately 15% of London's total) from four
riverside transfer stations as far up the Thames as Wandsworth
to riverside landfill at Mucking in Essex. This operation takes
over 100,000 heavy goods vehicle movements a year off the roads.
Recently, Cory received planning approval for a Thames-side Energy
from Waste (EfW) plant at Belvedere in East London. Planning permission
was granted principally because water transport will be used to
move the majority of the waste to the site.
4.6 These are impressive statistics, illustrating
a water transport renaissance on the Thames led by a number of
public bodies working in close cooperation with the private sector.
5. What disadvantages do the London canals
have for freight transport?
5.1 The principal disadvantage of the waterways
listed in para 3.8 is that they are all much smaller than the
Thames and the maximum barge size is commensurately limited in
length, beam and depth. All other things being equal, this inevitably
has an impact on unit transport costs. In particular, water depth
in places may not be sufficient to carry heavily laden freight
barges—this can influence the loads that can be carried
without high dredging costs being incurred.
5.2 With the exception of the 20 mile lock-free
section of the Grand Union and its Paddington Arm, the waterways
notes in para. 3.8 have locks varying in number and size. These
limit the size of vessel that can use the waterway and slow the
progress of barges, reducing the number of round trips that can
be made per day or per week. Again, this has an impact on unit
transport costs.
6. What advantages do the London canals have
for freight transport?
6.1 Most waterways on the canal network
are non-tidal. If the tidal wharves, for example on the Thames,
do not have sufficient water depth at low tide they must either
be dredged to ensure 24 hour access for barges or ships, or access
will be limited to a number of hours either side of high water.
If there is insufficient water depth for movement of the loaded
ships, either the wharf owners must pass on high dredging costs
to ensure an adequate water depth, or the business will have to
be run to suit the tide, and ship owners must time arrivals and
departures and the related transport logistics accordingly.
6.2 By contrast, water depth in the canal
network remains much more constant. Barges can arrive and depart
when it is convenient and logistics planning is therefore straightforward,
easier in fact than for any other mode of transport as there will
usually be less congestion on a waterway and timetables do not
have to accommodate higher priority, faster traffic—a problem
that has always beset the rail freight industry.
6.3 This ease of logistics planning on the
waterways can yield significant benefits. Instead of the large
quays required to stockpile freight at conventional wharfs, non-tidal
waterways can make use of very small facilities to tranship very
large quantities of freight. For example, in Hackney, the ISL
pilot scheme loaded the barge with containers through a four metre
wide access gate in Hackney's perimeter fence (see photographs
in Appendix 1). By moving the barge fore and aft semi-automatically
at its moorings, all Hackney's 125,000 tonnes of waste per year
could be loaded aboard the barge through the same access gate.
6.4 The relatively small and consistent
distance between the water and the quayside on a canal, compared
to a tidal waterway, makes it possible to develop transhipment
technologies that remove the requirement for cranes and the staff
to operate them; loads can be moved directly from road vehicle
to barge. The Hackney pilot scheme, for example, proved that cranes
were not necessary for transhipping Rollonoff or skip-lift type
containers onto canal barges. With the right technologies in place,
common or garden hook or skip lift trucks can do the job quicker
and at much lower cost than a crane (see photographs in appendix
1). But with the wrong technology, the quayside becomes a costly
bottleneck.
6.5 With the exception of glass, waste and
recyclate are low density cargoes; size for size, the barges that
carry them float much higher in the water than those that carry
higher density cargoes such as aggregates. Costly dredging may
be required to accommodate barges carrying the latter. It follows
that canal infrastructure costs will be least if the lower density
cargoes are targeted to get freight transport going at minimum
cost. Higher density cargoes can follow, but only after a thorough
analysis of ALL the costs and benefits to the customer and British
Waterways.
6.6 Waste transfer stations are used to
improve the efficiency of refuse collection vehicles (RCVs) throughout
the country. Instead of journeying to distant landfill sites or
EfW facilities, the RCVs discharge at a local transfer station
if one is available, and can then be back on their collection
beats in minutes. But transfer stations use valuable land and
are something of a noisy, smelly environmental blight, generally
hated by local residents. In addition, the benefit of increased
RCV efficiency must be balanced against the cost of transfer.
These are high; the real cost of transferring waste from RCV to
barge at the four Thames-side transfer stations, for example,
is between £6 and £10 per tonne. The cost of transferring
10 tonnes of waste to another transport mode is therefore at least
£60 for a 10 tonne RCV load, this for a commodity that at
present has little or no intrinsic value.
6.7 In addition to RCVs, Rollonoff and skip
type containers are now a UK standard for companies collecting
waste and recyclables. There are tens of thousands of these containers
in daily use in London alone. The efficiency of the hook and skip
lift vehicles that move them is in large part dependant on the
number of round trips that each vehicle can make per day—a
company that is able to pick up 10 containers per vehicle will
be making greater profit than its competitor who might only manage
six. On London's congested streets, the shorter the distance to
the location where such vehicles can drop off the loaded container
and pick up an empty container for the next customer, the more
units per day they will carry, and the less fuel per unit they
will burn in doing so.
6.8 As the Hackney pilot showed, barges
can add value to road vehicle operations in the vicinity by acting
as mobile transfer stations onto which both RCVs and hook and
skip lift vehicles can demount their waste containers, with four
significant advantages over conventional land-based transfer stations:
1. Reduced cost of transfer—the waste
or recyclate stays in the container during transhipment to and
from the barge, reducing the transfer costs, typically between
£6 and £10 per tonne in London.
2. Reduced infrastructure requirement—the
container can be placed aboard the barge by the road vehicle—no
crane and no additional personnel are required (see photographs
in appendix 1).
3. Reduced infrastructure requirement and
improved environment—the barge is the transport medium,
there is no transfer station.
4. Reduced cost of transport—with the
container on the barge, the transport costs are now significantly
less than by road.
6.9 The fly in this otherwise appealing
ointment is that a large number of containers have to be in circulation
for the system to work. This is not seen as a major obstacle provided
that the container assets are driven hard to minimise their number
and cost. It is, after all, exactly the principal that has been
used to sustain the worldwide traffic in 20' TEU and 40' FEU containers,
a traffic that has grown so much since the 1960s that it could
now be said to be one of the driving forces behind the growth
of the Far East tiger economies.
7. Setting the scene behind the potential
for waste transport on London's canals, for example
7.1 The following statement is to be found on
the capitalwastefacts.co.uk website:
"London produces approximately 17 million
tonnes of waste each year. This is made up of household, business
and industrial waste, including construction and demolition waste
and some hazardous waste. Municipal solid waste, which accounts
for a quarter of all waste in London, is collected by Local Authorities,
including household waste, civic amenity waste, litter and some
business waste. It is dealt with in a number of ways; recycled
or composted, incinerated or sent to landfill. We recycle 9% of
this waste, incinerate 20% and landfill the remaining 71%."
7.2 The vast majority of this 17 million
tonnes waste will be on London's roads at some stage during its
collection or transport. Small wonder that it is estimated that
one in 10 trucks on Europe's roads are carrying waste.[19]
7.3 The transport of such large quantities
of waste is recognised as one of the key problems faced by the
GLA in implementing the Mayor's 2003 Municipal Waste Management
Strategy. In Chapter 2 of this report, Table 2 is entitled "Key
issues for waste in London: constraints and problems" and
includes the following bulleted key point:
"Waste transport already has, and will increasingly
have, an adverse environmental impact. We therefore have to deal
with our waste closer to its point of production and use the most
environmentally friendly methods and modes of transport."
7.4 There are numerous other references
in the document to the need to increase the transport of waste
by water. For example:
"Proposal 94: The Mayor will require waste
authorities to include contract conditions and specifications
in waste or associated contracts, which:
— Maintain and increase the use of
rail and water transport."
"4S.4 When new waste contracts are being
developed, the Mayor expects that all contracts with any waste
transport implications consider minimising the effects, including
consideration of possible alternative modes. For contracts with
significant transportation elements, a full assessment of the
effects of the transportation of waste should be carried out,
including an assessment of the onward movement of materials after
processing. This should also include meaningful and full consideration
of the use of water and rail, as alternatives to road transport."
"4S.9 The canal and river network can play
a small, but significant, role in the future collection of waste
and recyclables. The waterway network crosses Greater London from
west to east passing through suburban and densely developed areas.
Every one of the 13 inner London boroughs has access to the waterway
network."
"4S.14 The GLA Act 1999 requires this Strategy
to have regard to the desirability of promoting the use of the
River Thames safely for the transportation of freight. In order
to realise the potential for the waterway network, to carry a
greater proportion of London's waste, it will be necessary to
increase the number of facilities located on the waterway network
and encourage waste authorities within their waste contracts and
strategies to seriously consider the use of water as a transport
medium. However, any increased use of the waterways for waste
transport should be accompanied by an environmental risk assessment
to ensure there is no potential detrimental effect for example
on water quality and habitats."
"4S.16 The primary barrier to maintaining
and increasing the proportion of waste carried by water and rail
is the lack of waste facilities within London served by the water
and rail networks. This Strategy and future planning for land
use in relation to waste management will aim to locate as many
waste and recycling facilities as possible on the water and rail
networks in London."
"4S.17 Even when waste management facilities
are located adjacent to the water and rail networks they are not
necessarily used. The incinerator at Edmonton and the glass recycling
plant at Greenwich are both located on the waterway network but
are not serviced by it. Barriers are largely infrastructure related
and can be resolved by using grants to improve or install facilities
on the water or rail networks. Although for rail, track path capacity
can be an issue."
"4S.19 The London Plan will consider the
land use requirements for waste management facilities in London.
The transportation of waste to and from these sites will be a
key consideration. Therefore, the future role for the canal, river
and rail networks needs to be assessed and future viable developments
identified."
"4S.20 Changes in waste transport will occur
when waste is diverted away from landfills to deal with the increasing
levels of source-separated recycling. This will in turn require
new patterns of movement, serving new destinations. We should
ensure that the opportunities created by these changes, to improve
the sustainability of waste transport are not missed."
"Policy 39: The Mayor will, in line with
the Best Practicable Environmental Option, aim to minimise the
environmental impact of the collection and transportation of waste
and recyclables, both before and after processing."
"Policy 40: The Mayor will work with all
agencies, including TfL and the LDA, to develop the capacity of
sustainable modes for the transport of waste and recyclables in
London, and will promote new schemes where they are feasible within
this overall framework."
"Proposal 87: The Mayor will ensure, in
his review of contracts, municipal waste management strategies
and planning applications for waste facilities, that waste authorities
have considered transport implications and, where appropriate,
undertaken a full transport assessment of the impacts of the transportation
of their waste. Waste authorities should demonstrate that meaningful
and full consideration has been given to the use of water and
rail transport."
"Proposal 88: The Mayor will encourage the
use of sustainable modes of transport (particularly, rail, river
and canal). Where materials cannot be managed locally, wharves
and rail waste transfer stations that are, or can be made viable,
for the movement of recyclables and residual waste should be protected
through the London Plan."
7.5 The quotations from London's Waste Management
Strategy in paragraph 7.4 above make it clear that GLA policy
makers consider water transport must play a key role in developing
strategy. And things have moved on since 2003. In December, 2006,
the GLA published the London Waste Apportionment Study which was
undertaken by the consultants Jacobs Babtie. The first paragraph
of the executive summary states:
"Draft further alterations to the London
Plan require that London becomes 85% self sufficient in waste
management by 2020. Achievement of this target will require new
waste management infrastructure to complement that which already
exists. Analysis carried out by the Greater London Authority indicates
that, in strategic, London-wide terms, there will be sufficient
capacity in the form of land suitable for waste management development
to be able to meet these targets. However, this analysis also
reveals that there is unlikely to be sufficient capacity/sites
in all London Boroughs, to enable all Boroughs to be self-sufficient
in their own right. As a consequence, in order to enable London
to meet its strategic self sufficiency target, there is a need
to apportion waste that cannot be managed within boroughs with
insufficient capacity, to other London boroughs."
7.6 An increase to 85% self-sufficiency
coupled to a waste apportionment policy can only mean an increased
waste transport requirement within London.
7.7 The Waste Apportionment Study developed
a fairly sophisticated methodology to share out London's total
requirement for waste management facilities between the Boroughs.
The methodology was based on nine key criteria by which the study
considered a fair apportionment could be made. Of these, Criterion
No. 2 was "Proximity to waste arisings", No. 3 was "Proximity
to sustainable transport modes" and No. 5 was "Ability
to use sustainable transport modes (rail and water)". Weightings
were given to all the criteria according to their perceived strength.
7.8 In discussing Criterion No. 2, paragraph
4.36 of Part A of the report stated:
"It was considered that the proximity to
waste arisings could be evaluated using rail and water transport
modes as well as road travel. However, it was agreed at the stakeholder
workshop that transfer of waste by rail within London was unlikely,
but that navigable waterways were a realistic mode to incorporate
within this criterion."
It is significant that the London Borough Authority
planning and waste officers who formed the stakeholder workshop
considered, with one exception, that a high weighting should be
given to this criterion.
7.9 The general mechanism by which Criteria
Nos. 3 and 5 were applied to the analysis was described in the
executive summary as follows:
"Sustainable transport is a major national,
regional and local planning policy driver. Density of rail network
and navigable waterways (ie centimetres of rail track/canal per
square kilometre) was used as an indicator for sustainable transport.
In addition, these criteria took account of the ability to use
sustainable transport modes by incorporating a representative
value for the number of protected wharfs in each borough. Data
was not available for the number of rail nodes."
7.10 Paragraphs 7.3 to 7.9 above are included
to illustrate that there is the political will to encourage sustainable
waste transport on the waterway network in London.
7.11 Meanwhile, on London's waste transport
coalface, the market has been changing rapidly and this will continue,
driven by factors including:
1. The gradual reduction, under EC directive,
of landfilled waste; by 2010, for example, the landfill of biodegradable
municipal waste must be reduced to 75% of 1995 levels. Waste disposal
strategy is increasingly being led by diversion to recycling coupled
with new waste disposal technologies such as low emission Energy
from Waste, Mechanical Biological Treatment, Gasification, Pyrolysis,
etc. These new technologies are high cost and, to an extent, work
against the principal of recycling (waste disposal contracts have
minimum quantity thresholds to encourage private sector investment—too
much recycling, and these might be crossed at the public expense).
Such disposal facilities are therefore fewer in number, located
further apart than previous landfill sites, and worked intensively.
The inevitable result is increased transport activity as waste
is moved over greater distances to fewer reprocessing facilities.
2. European Working Time Directives are reducing
the hours that drivers can work. This increases the number of
vehicles and drivers required, and increases driver employment
costs at a rate higher than inflation.[20]
3. Driver shortages in the waste management
sector, which is perceived to be an unattractive working environment.[21]
4. Disproportionately rising (in relation
to barge transport) vehicle insurance, road congestion and fuel
charges.
All these factors work in favour of moving waste
transport from roads to water.
7.12 In earlier oral evidence to the Committee,
Mr. Schlegel commented with regard to waste transport by barge
"if double handling comes into it at any stage it becomes
a problem and the economics kill it". I agree completely
with his statement but would add the caveat that if the double
handling problem is solved, the cost/benefit balance changes completely.
7.13 The Hackney pilot scheme demonstrated
that waste could be transhipped to barge at much lower cost than
hitherto because there was no requirement for double handling.
The report indicated that full implementation could reduce Hackney's
road waste transport mileage by 52% and capital and annual operating
costs could fall by 23% and 33% respectively (see report Executive
Summary at www.hackneywastebywater.com).
7.14 Two different types of Multi-Modal
Refuse Collection Vehicle (MMRCV) were used in the Hackney pilot
scheme (see photographs and report in Appendix 1). MMRCVs differ
from conventional RCVs in that the waste is compacted into a container,
rather than a fixed body on the vehicle. The full container can
then be demounted onto the ground, or as the pilot proved, directly
onto a specially designed barge—no transfer station and
no double-handling is required. The vehicles thus make waste and
recyclate collection more efficient, regardless of the transport
mode used to move the containers to the discharge point—barge
transport is just one option.
7.15 This concept is well-proven in many
Continental cities; Barcelona, for example, uses the technology
exclusively. The Hackney pilot scheme prompted Transport for London
to invest in the development of MMRCVs (in the wrong direction
with regard to the container handling, in my view) to make them
more appropriate for London operations. TfL's intention is that
all London Boroughs who would benefit from intermodal waste transport
would use these vehicles.
7.16 In other words, in addition to the
waste transport operation on the Thames, large scale sustainable
waste transport on the London canal network is within our grasp.
The political will is gathering, market forces are pushing in
the same direction, and MMRCVs working with barges can provide
the means.
7.17 The 15 London Boroughs which have access
to the BW waterway network (shaded in colour on the map below)
represent a significant part of the Greater London area.
7.18 London Waste's EfW facility at Edmonton
on the river Lea and the SELCHP EfW at New Cross are identified
on the map, along with the recently approved Cory Environmental
unit at Belvedere on the Thames. The Mechanical Biological Treatment
(MBT) plant at Powerday's Old Oak site alongside the Paddington
Branch which is proposed by several business cases in the WLCN
study is also shown, along with an MBT plant proposed by this
document on the Main Line of the Grand Union at Hayes.
7.19 Rollonoff and skip-lift type waste
containers from boroughs South of the Thames, particularly those
to the West of the tidal locks, such as Richmond and Kingston,
could also be moved onto the canal system, for example, at Brentford.
These boroughs have not been included in this assessment.
7.20 The large Thames-side recycling centres
at Charlton, Dagenham and Rainham are also shown on the map in
para. 7.17 above. Water transport to these facilities has also
not been included as part of this assessment but they represent
a significant additional opportunity for generating freight traffic
on London's canal system. They were located alongside the Thames
to make barge transport of recyclate to the sites an option. This
has not proved possible to date, mainly because the high costs
of transhipment to and from the barges on the tidal Thames make
it uneconomical. The Hackney pilot showed that these transhipment
costs can be minimised on the canal system. In my view, recyclate
could be transported to these three facilities by barge, particularly
from wharves such as Brentford in West London, at considerably
lower cost than by road and, perhaps more significantly, at lower
cost than by barge from the waste transfer stations on the Thames.
8. The potential for waste transport on the
London canal network, for example
8.1 The tonnages of municipal solid waste
produced by the boroughs shown on the map in para. 8.1 above are
tabulated below (source: capitalwastefacts.co.uk), along with
the canal to which they have access, an estimate of the waste
percentage that might be transported by water from each borough,
and the resultant tonnage to canal transport.
|
| Borough | Canal
| Waste Disposal Facility
| Municipal
Solid Waste
tonnage
| Estimated
Percent to
canals from
MMRCVs
| Estimated
Total
Tonnage to
Canal
|
|
| Brent | Paddington Branch
| Powerday or Hayes? | 284,131
| 100% | 284,131
|
| Camden | Regents
| Powerday or Hayes? | 235,214
| 100% | 235,214
|
| Ealing | Paddington Branch
| Powerday or Hayes? | 304,895
| 65% | 198,181
|
| Enfield | River Lea
| Edmonton | 314,725
| 15% | 47,209
|
| Hackney | River Lea & Regents
| Edmonton | 124,674
| 100% | 124,674
|
Hammersmith
& Fulham | Paddington Branch
| Powerday or Hayes? | 149,076
| 0%* | 0
|
| Haringey | River Lea
| Edmonton | 236,800
| 10% | 2,368
|
| Hillingdon | Grand Union Main Line
| Powerday or Hayes? | 167,724
| 10% | 16,772
|
| Hounslow | Grand Union Main Line
| Powerday or Hayes? | 235,933
| 40% | 94,373
|
| Islington | Regents
| Powerday or Hayes? | 204,867
| 100% | 204,867
|
Kensington
& Chelsea | Paddington Branch
| Belvedere | 90,821
| 0%* | 0
|
| Newham | River Lea
| Edmonton | 123,822
| 100% | 123,822
|
| Tower Hamlets | R. Lea, Limehouse Cut & Hertford Union
| Edmonton or Belvedere |
103,397 | 0%*
| 0 |
| Waltham Forest | River Lea
| Edmonton | 126,084
| 25% | 31,521
|
| Westminster | Regents
| Powerday or Hayes? | 293,248
| 0%* | 0
|
| | Totals:
| 2,995,411 | 46%
| 1,363,132 |
|
* Currently all or part of this waste goes by barge to
landfill at Mucking in Essex.
8.2 Note that the figures in the right hand column headed
Estimated Total Tonnage to Canal do not include the tonnage that
currently goes down the Thames to landfill at Mucking, most of
which will presumably in future go to the recently approved Belvedere
EfW. At present, the majority of the municipal waste from the
Western Riverside Borough group (Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith
and Fulham, Wandsworth and Lambeth) and from Tower Hamlets goes
by barge to Mucking, along with a proportion of Westminster's
waste.
8.3 The figures are estimates only, but they give an
indication that the total waste that could be transported on London's
waterway network, excluding the Thames, is about 1.36 million
tonnes, 94% in excess of the 700,000 tonnes currently moved on
the Thames. Approximately 1.03 million tonnes (76% of the total)
of this would be on the Grand Union main line and its Paddington
Branch, with the remaining 329,600 tonnes (24% of the total) on
the Lea.
8.4 On the river Lea, the total 329,600 tonnes of waste
per year would be carried by about 23 loaded barge journeys per
day, excluding weekends. These barges would probably be self-powered
rather than towed or pushed as there are at least two locks to
be negotiated and this is easier in a self-powered unit. This
represents approximately six barge movements per hour during an
eight hour working day, a relatively small number for a waterway
which, by itself, carried over two million tonnes per year in
the early 1950s.
8.5 On the Grand Union and its Paddington Branch, 1.36
million tonnes per year would be carried by about 116 individual
loaded barge journeys per day, again excluding weekends. These
barges would probably be towed by a tug in trains of up to six
(in the 1950s, these trains were up to twelve) as there are no
locks to negotiate on the 19 mile lock-free section between Camden
and Cowley (16 miles lock-free to Hayes, the site of the MBT proposed
in this document). Thus there might be up to 30 such loaded barge
trains per day, assuming an average of four barges per train.
This represents approximately eight barge train movements per
hour during an eight hour working day. This is undoubtedly an
intensive use of the canal, but carefully managed, its impact
on pleasure boaters need not be great. And the barge trains would
be carrying the equivalent load of about 260 20 tonne bulk waste
road transporters per day using less than 10% of the fuel. It
is also worth noting that if the transport service were operated
seven days a week, the number of loaded barge trains would reduce
to about 22 per day.
9. How have British Waterways responded to this challenge?
9.1 It is unfortunate that British Waterways have not
given freight the priority that it deserves, particularly given
the contribution that the network could make to the environment.
It is quite another matter that BW should be prepared to obstruct
private sector initiatives that have sought with government funding
to get freight transport off the roads and moving on key waterways.
Appendix 1 describes the Hackney pilot scheme where BW worked
from the beginning to stop the waste transport project and Appendix
2 details a similar attitude on the river Weaver.
9.2 The committee's attention is drawn to the final two
paragraphs of page 4 and the first five paragraphs of page 5 of
a document submitted to DEFRA by Neil Edwards, Chief Executive
of the Inland Waterways Association in July 2004 (see Appendix
3). The complete text can be found on the internet at www.waterways.org.uk/Library/ConsultationResponses/main_content/defra_bw.pdf.
I am in complete agreement with all the comments made in these
paragraphs, the only proviso being that judging from the fifth
paragraph on page 5 of their document, IWA were clearly unaware
that BW had been taking steps to frustrate this initiative.
9.3 In paragraph 4 on page 5 of the IWA document included
as Appendix 3, Mr. Edwards makes reference to BW staff being unaware
of the London Plan and, as he puts it, "therefore, its commitment
to water freight". Unfortunately, this has not changed. In
a recent submission to a public inquiry in Brentford (BW wish
to develop houses, partly on the site of a disused but very obviously
viable wharf), BW's representatives submitted, as part of their
evidence, a BW document which concludes that "a case could
not be made for protected canalside locations simply because they
could be used to transfer freight between road and barge"
(see Appendix 4, page 15). This was BW making policy on the hoof,
unaware or dismissive of the provisions of the London Plan, despite
the fact that it is mentioned on Page 12 of their document.
Policy 3C.24 of the London Plan states:
"The Mayor will promote the sustainable development of
the full range of road, rail and water-borne freight facilities
in London and seek to improve integration between the modes and
between major rail interchanges and the centres they serve."
And Policy 4C.15 states:
"The Mayor will, and boroughs should, protect Safeguarded
Wharves for cargo-handling uses, such as inter-port or transhipment
movements and freight-related purposes. The Mayor will, and Boroughs
should, encourage appropriate temporary uses of vacant Safeguarded
Wharves. Temporary uses should only be allowed where they do not
preclude the wharf being used for cargo-handling uses. Development
next to or opposite Safeguarded Wharves should be designed to
minimise the potential for conflicts of use and disturbance. The
redevelopment of Safeguarded Wharves should only be accepted if
the wharf is no longer viable or capable of being made viable
for cargo-handling".
9.4 A number of other points in the BW document forming
Appendix 4 of this evidence should be brought to the Committee's
attention as this document is headed "British Waterways Strategy
on Freight on the London Canal Network"; clearly, the contents
are now BW policy.
9.5 On page 14 of the BW document, under the heading
"Waste by Water Initiative" the statement is made "BW
has carried out trials in Hackney on modified refuse carts...".
This is completely untrue as Appendix 1 makes clear. This follows
the BW Chief Executive making the claim to a 2004 Parliamentary
Waterways Group meeting that BW had opened four wharves on the
London canal network. That, too, was untrue. Two of the wharves
were developed for the Hackney pilot scheme and had nothing to
do with BW. British Waterways have a habit of claiming credit
for freight initiatives that have nothing to do with them, indeed,
which they have worked behind the scenes to disrupt.
9.6 Under the heading "Containers" on page
13 of the BW document, the comment is made "In order to effectively
carry freight inland waterways often need substantial additional
investment, and we need the same upfront investment whether we
carry one or one hundred freight carriers. This additional investment
is high-risk for us, as we could make a substantial loss if we
do not encourage enough carriage. We wholly support the additional
public benefits this investment will bring, however we have to
consider these, along with the financial risks involved when deciding
whether to facilitate freight." In my view, this goes to
the heart of BW's dilemma over freight transport. BW's management
fear that the public investment will be high and the return on
this investment negligible, at least as far as BW are concerned.
They recognise that they must be seen to be encouraging freight
transport, but too often as a freight project develops and the
necessary infrastructure costs become clearer, BW have backed
away from their initial commitment. This is completely counter-productive,
wasting public and private sector time and money and worse, giving
the completely false impression that in reality there is no potential.
9.7 On page 15 of the BW document under the heading "Future
potential freight development in London" nine rather vague
conclusions are drawn, purporting to be supported by the findings
of the West London canal network (WLCN) study, completed in 2005.
As stated in para. 2.4, I worked on this study. Paragraphs 9.8
to 9.12 below refer to these conclusions.
9.8 Bulleted item No. 2 states that "Movement by
barge can be a more cost-effective solution than road for certain
commodities over short distances where both ends of the journey
are close to the canal". Apart from not quantifying what
a "short distance" is (one mile? two miles? four miles?),
the statement implies that longer distance (five miles? 10 miles?
20 miles?) journeys by barge are not cost-effective. This is not
true, and is not supported by the main body of the WLCN report
(see, in particular, the third paragraph in Section 7.1.2 of the
report).
9.9 Bulleted item No. 3 states that "Transport economics
are not the main constraint on freight movement but rather the
location of `origins' and `destinations'". Again, the body
of the report does not support this. Transport economics are always
the main constraint on freight movement. The "origins"
and "destinations" were just those chosen for the report!
There are plenty of others.
9.10 Bulleted item No. 5 states that "Journeys where
more than two locks are negotiated are less economic than road".
This statement is nonsense and not supported by the body of the
report. What happens between the second and the third lock that
does not happen between the first and second lock? It is true
to say, and the report supports this, that the more locks the
barge operator has to negotiate, the higher his costs will be,
but to suggest that two or more locks will render the waterways
"less economic than road" is nonsense and indicates
a fundamental lack of understanding.
9.11 Bulleted item No. 6 makes the assertion discussed
in para. 9.6 above.
9.12 Bulletted item No. 7 states that "Identified
suitable locations for MMRCV containerised transfer stations should
then be protected against alternative development uses".
This is partly true, but misses the point. The Hackney pilot showed
that there are canal-side sites which need protection where MMRCVs
are used intensively such as Hackney's Millfields Road base, but
the real benefits are to be had from numerous occasionally used
loading sites, each of which have other uses. This is normal practice
on the Continent where these vehicles swap containers on sites
such as sports centre car parks, industrial estates or road lay-bys,
thereby reducing costs and the effect of many MMRCVs coming together
at the same loading point, creating their own road congestion.
For example, multiple multi-use barge loading sites could be located
within the Park Royal industrial estate to reduce traffic pinch-points.
The same sites could be used by hook and skip lift vehicles.
9.13 The conclusion that must be drawn from the comments
above is that this British Waterways document, in seeking to promote
freight on the London canal network, is very weak on strategy,
a weakness underpinned by a fundamental lack of interest in the
market for freight transport by water or its potential. It is
a document produced by an organisation with its priorities elsewhere.
9.14 Throughout the 2003 and 2004 operation of the Hackney
pilot scheme, not one British Waterways director or employee turned
up to watch the pilot in action or contacted ISL to ask questions
about the potential or the methodology. Far from "facilitating
water transport", one of their key responsibilities, BW were
instrumental in starving ISL of much needed and already approved
funds for the project. When it went ahead anyway, BW stopped the
pilot from moving to the next stage (a small scale implementation
in Hackney) by excluding ISL from the decision making process
(see Appendix 1). BW's true commitment can also be measured by
the fact that it ignored ISL's contract with the Department for
Transport to run a further four pilot schemes in London and elsewhere.
9.15 This British Waterways reluctance to engage properly
with the potential for freight transport is systemic. At the same
time, BW also stopped a DfT funded initiative to transport salt
on the river Weaver.
10. What steps should BW take to improve their performance
on freight transport?
10.1 British Waterways must establish much more transparent
relationships on freight, not just within the organisation and
with the government (in particular DfT) but also with the potential
freight operator from the outset. It is in everyone's interests
to know what the true position is with regard to freight traffic
on a chosen waterway, and not to be carried away by the hype in
some glossy BW freight brochure that pretends to be policy.
10.2 British Waterways must go after the freight traffic
that involves least infrastructure development and cost. For example,
where water depth is a problem, the emphasis should be on low
density cargoes such as waste and recyclate; the barges will float
higher in the water and transhipment will usually be easier and
less costly. Higher density cargoes can come later, if and when
the market starts to prove itself and the cost/benefit balance
can be established for all stakeholders.
10.3 British Waterways must work much more co-operatively
with the small and medium sized (SME) companies who wish to develop
a business in freight transport on the waterway system. At present
BW like to work with large companies, without realising that waterway
transport is most unlikely ever to be "core business"
for those companies. An SME, on the other hand, developing its
core business around water freight projects will be absolutely
committed to getting it right at minimum cost.
10.4 British Waterways must develop a proper strategy
for freight transport, reflecting the very real financial benefits
that water transport can confer on road and rail based operations—in
other words, it must turn round and be "customer facing".
The BW chairman made it clear in his recent evidence to the committee
that such a strategy does not exist when he said "The fact
at the moment is we spend a million, we get half a million, there
are very few movements, the amount of tonnage is going down—why
is that? Because the market does not want to use it. We could
have more wharves but what would be the point of them at the moment?".
This is not the statement of a chairman anxious to bring sustainable
freight transport to the British Waterways network, or even familiar
with policies such as the successful Safeguarded Wharves scheme
which have helped to contribute to a large increase in Thames
freight traffic.
10.5 The potential for freight on the waterway network
is there and facilitating waterway transport is a key British
Waterways responsibility. This should be reflected by a true commitment,
from director level downwards, to implement Government policy.
"We don't do freight" is not an acceptable comment from
a BW director to staff and indicates an attitude that must change
and must be seen to have changed.
10.6 British Waterways should appoint a director whose
sole responsibility is the development of freight transport on
the waterways. This director should have a small team, made up
in part of experienced road freight managers, whose brief is to
work with the private sector to develop working low-cost freight
transport systems (such as those in Hackney and on the River Weaver)
rather than yesterday's headline grabbing, investment hungry and
ill-thought projects.
10.7 The potential for waste transport outlined in Section
9 above for London exists in several of Britain's major cities,
including Birmingham, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Sheffield, Nottingham,
Stoke on Trent and Gloucester. Waste transport is just one example
where a different approach to the problem could yield spectacular
results. British Waterways must grasp this nettle.
10.8 This is an opportunity which in many places is unique
to British Waterways. The rail industry will confirm, as the stakeholder
quote in para. 7.8 of this document implies, that rail is a working
option for waste transport out of London, but it is not an option
for such transport within London. The same applies to other cities
listed in 10.7 above. Sustainable waste transport on the waterways
has never had such a good market opportunity.
Nicholas MacWhirter
March 2007
17
Source: Port of London Authority. Back
18
Source: London Plan Implementation Report-Safeguarded
Wharves on the River Thames. Back
19
EC press release: Mrs Margot Wallström European Commissioner
for the Environment, "Future Directions for European Waste
Policy" European Waste Forum, June 2001. Back
20
The Impact of Increasing Road Transport Costs on Waste Recovery
and Recycling-RRF Report 2004. Back
21
Not printed. Back
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