Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 240 - 259)

WEDNESDAY 16 MAY 2007

MR MICHAEL ROBERTS, MS GILLIAN SIMMONDS, MR GARETH STACE AND MR ROGER SALOMONE

  Q240  Lynne Jones: What about the CBI's view on this?

  Mr Roberts: On your point about purchasing international credits?

  Q241  Lynne Jones: And the floor on the price of carbon.

  Mr Roberts: On the point of buying overseas emission reductions, our view is fairly straightforward, which is that the approach in the UK should be consistent with the approach that is taken internationally. First of all, there is the principle of supplementarity which applies here. In other words, the delivery against our own targets should not be exclusively through purchasing overseas credits. It has to be in addition to domestic action. There is a convention which has grown over time about what supplementarity means. It means effectively domestic action up to at least 50% of the total effort. I do not think our view is that we should be looking to achieve our targets by unfettered purchasing of overseas credits. What we should do is adopt an approach which is internationally recognised.

  Q242  Mr Rogerson: On this concept of flexibility, could we say that there is an argument that the whole point of this is to take it beyond the political debate and set in stone what we want to do, so that you are taking it away from political pressure and the only political pressure is on the government to deliver as opposed to all the other pressures on the government to back away from the targets that have been set? Would you not agree that allowing that flexibility means that there are not necessarily the organisations you represent but others as well in society who will be pressing to move away from those targets? In allowing us to do that, we are undermining the whole thing.

  Mr Salomone: I see where you are coming from. We would not see having flexibility in there as an entirely bad thing. Having rigid targets is not a substitute for a sound judgment by an expert body that the Carbon Committee provides in government. There is a role there. We are not going to be able to set accurate targets for every single eventuality necessarily. That is our main point. There needs to be a balance between certainty and flexibility but that lies somewhere in the middle.

  Q243  David Lepper: The role of the Committee on Climate Change is obviously going to be an important one. The government sees the role of that Committee as independently assessing how the UK can optimally achieve its emissions reductions goals. In EEF you talk about the Committee having mainly advisory rather than a policy making or proposing role and you see that advisory nature as central to its independence of government. Could you explain that, please?

  Mr Salomone: What might be a problem for the Committee on Climate Change would be proposing what the budgets are, setting the budgets and then reviewing whether progress against those budgets was achieved. There could be a conflict of interest there. It is far better to have someone standing back objectively and making a recommendation that these are the levels of carbon constraints that look feasible or these are the levels we need to achieve our emission reductions targets. For government to set the targets and for the Climate Change Committee to review them. That might give it a degree of independence there.

  Q244  David Lepper: It seems to me to weaken the role of that Committee.

  Mr Salomone: In setting the targets?

  Q245  David Lepper: You see it as a body that should be reviewing what has been achieved?

  Mr Salomone: Advising on what should be done.

  Q246  David Lepper: Advising and then reviewing rather than setting the targets?

  Mr Salomone: That would be the responsibility of the Secretary of State.

  Q247  David Lepper: The kinds of analogies that we heard earlier this afternoon and indeed from some of our witnesses on Monday with the Monetary Policy Committee are not the kinds of analogies that you feel would be appropriate to the role of this ----?

  Mr Salomone: We would probably favour the model that is being put forward now.

  Q248  David Lepper: Have you looked at what the Bill says about the range of expertise which should be represented on the Committee? I address this to all four. Does that seem adequate? I wonder if you have any views—as well as the individual members—on how those members should be resourced to carry out their work.

  Mr Stace: The members of the Committee must be experts, not stakeholders. The list we see within the Bill sets out the expertise that is needed. In terms of resource, this Committee needs to be adequately resourced and, more importantly, to enable them to be an independent body its secretariat needs to be independent. There was some talk earlier that perhaps the secretariat should come from the Office of Climate Change. We would be thinking that they may recruit certain people who may be currently part of the Office of Climate Change but once they step out of that and step into the role of the secretariat for the Committee on Climate Change they would be independent of government and government departments.

  Ms Simmonds: We would reflect those views. We would like to see a secretariat that is independent of government. Mindful of what was discussed earlier, that is of also not wanting it to be a conflicting relationship between government and the Climate Change Committee. There is a need for that to be avoided. I do not think we necessarily want to see a Climate Change Committee that is criticising government through high profile public statements, but rather through a relationship that is about monitoring progress and providing recommendations in response to its progress.

  Q249  David Lepper: So far as the resourcing goes, a clear distinction between government departments and those who are working on behalf of the Climate Change Committee?

  Ms Simmonds: I think so. Without that you have potential to co-opt the Committee or to weaken the Committee.

  Mr Roberts: Just as the draft Bill suggests the expertise that needs to be reflected in the Committee, one will want to see some sort of reflection of that type of expertise in the secretariat. That might suggest that the pool of the secretariat is not just from the classic Civil Service but from outside of it.

  Q250  David Lepper: Industry perhaps?

  Mr Roberts: The scientific community perhaps, for example.

  Q251  Lynne Jones: I presume from the earlier comments that you are all comfortable with the idea of the enabling legislation to introduce new trading schemes? Do you want to make any comment on that?

  Mr Roberts: In our evidence we did indicate that, whilst we are comfortable with the basic principle, we are concerned that that might lead government to pursue particular emphasis on a particular part of the economy. We want to watch out for that. In other words, by focusing particularly on the use of powers to introduce trading schemes, the natural inclination might be to focus unduly on additional effort that can be achieved through the business community rather than through other parts of the community.

  Q252  Lynne Jones: One trading scheme could be personal carbon allowances. What is your view on that?

  Mr Roberts: It is not one where we have developed an extensive view but personally I think it is an interesting idea. There are some significant issues to overcome, both practical issues and also some social equity issues. There will be parts of the community that are perhaps more at ease with the idea of trading on the back of a personal carbon quota and some parts of the community that might find that a bit more challenging.

  Q253  Lynne Jones: You heard the discussion earlier about other policy instruments that could be introduced through enabling powers. Do you have any suggestions or concerns about this?

  Mr Salomone: Our understanding of the rationale of the enabling powers is that there already are the means to introduce fiscal measures and regulation without recourse to primary legislation and that is the concept of bringing this into here so that there is the same opportunity for emissions trading schemes. We would echo a lot of the views of the CBI. It is quite a wide ranging power, hopefully one that will be exercised with caution and, in that respect, we are glad to see that the trading schemes that can be introduced through this route would have to involve free allocation because we think that there are potentially more serious financial consequences for emissions trading schemes with, say, auctioning and we think it would be appropriate for those to come forward via separate legislation.

  Q254  Lynne Jones: Professor Grubb was suggesting that the Climate Change Committee should have some oversight of these areas of policy. What do you think? Should that be enshrined within the legislation or should that just be a general competency?

  Mr Salomone: I think it is in the Bill that the Secretary of State would have to consult the Committee on Climate Change before using enabling powers. That would seem appropriate.

  Q255  Lynne Jones: I do not mean enabling. I mean other measures, building regulations, social measures.

  Mr Salomone: It would definitely be appropriate to look at what the appropriate burden across society is and what types of policy instruments are most appropriate in different sectors. Absolutely.

  Mr Roberts: Yes, we would agree.

  Q256  Mr Drew: Can I be sure what your response would be to a community that might want to go further than the government is currently suggesting? This notion of a carbon free community is very attractive but that obviously has an impact on your members. There is a real danger, if you saw communities being picked off because they have a lot of ambition but individual companies would say, "If you do those sorts of things, we are out of here". How do you try and remedy that danger, or do you not see it as a danger? Do you see that we must go forward? Mr Stace, I saw your eyebrows raised. That is what we have learned from Germany, that there were states that have gone further and faster and have now gained by it but there was pain in the short run and there must have been some interesting discussions with industrialists.

  Mr Stace: It is a very difficult question.

  Q257  Mr Drew: It is a hypothetical one but it is one that could well arise.

  Mr Stace: Just as an individual you might find it a doable thing to become carbon neutral but in terms of heavy industry, if you are producing steel, you are producing carbon at the same time currently. With carbon capture and storage and other measures, the steel industry currently is undertaking a European funded project to develop ultra-low carbon steel and also is looking to carbon capture and storage. Yes, in the future, we might see a significant reduction in the amount of carbon produced per tonne of steel. However, in terms of locally here within the UK moving towards that, in terms of sectors that have very limited abatement technologies currently and more importantly are very exposed to international competition, such as steel, you have a very difficult problem there. Once you start to internalise the cost of carbon within your production and therefore increase your cost, can you pass that cost on to your customer? We believe there are certain sectors of the economy that can pass their costs on. One of the easiest ones is the electricity supply industry. At the other end of the scale is the steel sector that cannot pass its costs on and we see the issue of carbon leakage as being very significant for our sector and potentially very damaging for our sector. I do not know if that fully answers your question but for certain parts of the economy and society it will be much more easy.

  Q258 Lynne Jones: This is for EEF. You have argued that carbon allowances should be distributed without charge, for free. Why should this be the case given that there is a lot of evidence that, when permits were allocated free of charge through the EU Trading Scheme, there has been excess profit in power generation sectors?

  Mr Stace: What Roger was saying is, if it is secondary legislation with enabling powers, then free allowances. We are not saying that our trading schemes always have to allocate allowances free of charge; it is just with enabling powers.

  Q259  Lynne Jones: That is the only way in which any new schemes would be set up so why should the allowances be distributed free?

  Mr Salomone: I may have misunderstood but I thought what the Bill was doing was introducing a quicker route through secondary legislation whereby you could introduce certain types of emission trading schemes. One of the criteria for that would be that allocations have to get allocated free, but there would still be the route through primary legislation to introduce a different type of trading scheme. I do not think that would be precluded by this piece of legislation, unless I am wrong.


 
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