Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80 - 99)

WEDNESDAY 13 JUNE 2007

IAN PEARSON MP, MR NIGEL ATKINSON AND MS CAROLINE CONNELL

  Q80  David Taylor: That phrase "gold plating" is a substitute for "thought", is it not? Do you not think so, because it is just bandied around as a means of shielding a defence from using the flexibility which was incorporated into the Directive deliberately so that countries like our own could indeed extend it rather further than they would otherwise have done.

  Ian Pearson: Gold plating is not a substitute for thought.

  Q81  David Taylor: The phrase "gold plating" is a substitute for thought. It is almost a knee jerk defence. I am looking at the extent of strict liability as opposed to fault based liability where a whole plethora of activities, the so called non-annex three activities, are going to be in the fault based liability camp, are they not, as opposed to a strict, automatic liability. That is correct, is it not?

  Ian Pearson: I think the term gold plating is useful as a discipline.

  Q82  David Taylor: No. Use an alternative phrase, not gold plating.

  Ian Pearson: What it is essentially about is the Government's better regulation principles. We think it is sensible to apply those principles to all EU legislation. We should not over-implement unless there is a compelling case to do so.

  Q83  David Taylor: You want to minimise the cost of implementation?

  Ian Pearson: That is what gold plating is about. Where there is a strong case for going further—

  Q84  David Taylor: A compelling case, I think you said.

  Ian Pearson:—than the Directive, that is something we might want to consider as part of implementing a directive; or we might want to do it through normal, UK legislation, but we will at least have the options to be able to do that.

  Q85  David Taylor: Would you agree with me that one method of implementing effectively would be to have a consistent, transparent regime across the piste in how the ELD is implemented? That would be true, would it not: not to pick and choose, not to make fish of one and fowl of another, not to identify the annex three activities as sheep and everything else as goats, particularly when it is the goats, according to Natural England, the non-annex three operations, that damage biodiversity more frequently than the annex three ones where there is a strict liability? Do you agree with that assessment on that front?

  Ian Pearson: Firstly, the Directive enables Member States to make choices in certain areas. I think it right that we exercise that right and choice. We have to choose one thing or the other. When it comes to the issue of fault based liability, I happen to believe that that is a sensible way forward. If I am a chemicals company based in Coventry that is fully applying the PPC regulations that have been imposed on it by the Environment Agency at some significant cost to it but it is acting—

  Q86  David Taylor: In the interests of the environment, the people who live in and around Coventry and the workers at that factory?

  Ian Pearson: Yes, indeed. It is acting in a responsible manner and it should be able to rely on that competent authority. If something goes wrong and it is a result of negligence or the fault of the company, then rightly that company should be liable for prosecution and we need to undertake remediation. If however that company has been fully following the guidance and working within the PPC regulations and something happens that was completely beyond its control, I do not think necessarily we should say that it is the company's failure. I think we should say it is the failure of the competent authority and the failure of the regulation. In those circumstances I think it right to say that the burden of responsibility should fall with the competent authority.

  Q87  David Taylor: You prefer consistency and transparency to be obtained by levelling down to a fault based liability for all activities. In other words, the annex three operations which are linked to strict liability. The inference I draw from what you say is that you rather regret that they are being categorised as strict liability operations, where no fault needs to be demonstrated.

  Ian Pearson: There is the ability in Article 8.4 to have what is called a permit defence or a state of the art defence. I think that is a very sensible way to go and that is one of the reasons why we have consulted on that.

  Q88  David Taylor: Are we not just caving in to pressure from the commercial sector? The British Insurance Brokers' Association, the CBI, the NFU? Are we not just pandering to them pursuing the standard of living and totally ignoring the quality of life which can be associated with some of their harmful operations? That is the reality, is it not?

  Ian Pearson: No, it is not the reality at all. I think you have it completely wrong. If a company is negligent, if it causes environmental damage, it should be pursued under legislation, whether it be the Environmental Liability Directive or whether it be through our own domestic legislation.

  Q89  David Taylor: If it is because of neglect, omission or commission but not strict liability?

  Ian Pearson: I use the example of a chemicals company in Coventry. If it has been completely fulfilling all the requirements that have been imposed on it by a competent authority, it should be able to rely on that. If it has been negligent in any way, it is perfectly legitimate that it would face prosecution.

  Q90  David Taylor: It will have a strict liability for some activities?

  Ian Pearson: If it has not been negligent in any way, I do not think it reasonable to blame the company for what is in effect potentially a deficiency in the PPC regulations. In other cases, you can envisage a farmer spreading fertilizer as an example, fertilizer which has been approved and licensed and certified as safe and has gone through all the normal statutory processes. If you envisage a situation in the future where the application of that fertilizer suddenly, unexpectedly caused environmental damage that was significant, I do not think it right to pursue the farmer.

  Q91  Mr Drew: That is exactly what the Directive says. It is the person who actually applies the action, if you like, rather than the supply chain who knowingly may have supplied that farmer with something which could cause environmental damage.

  Ian Pearson: The Directive in 8.4 talks about the ability to apply what we call a permit or state of the art defence. I think that is a sensible thing to do. We have to stress here that we are talking about very unlikely events. I am confident that our PPC regime is robust and that it is fit for purpose. I am confident that our product licensing regime that we have in the United Kingdom and throughout Europe is robust. What we are talking about is the very unlikely cases where something might happen.

  Q92  David Taylor: Natural England are a creature of your department to an extent but they do argue that non-annex three operations, the exempt operations if you like, are the ones which damage biodiversity more frequently. Should we not be focusing on that in a more effective way?

  Ian Pearson: That is true but they damage it through negligent activity. That is a very different point to the point about whether it would be right or not to have a permit or a state of the art defence.

  Q93  David Taylor: We are not selling the environmental pass under pressure from commercial interest groups then?

  Ian Pearson: No, we are not at all. In those cases where environmental damage is caused—again, in the overwhelming number of cases my understanding is this will be as a result of negligence or some other activity—there are legislative remedies there at the moment under UK law. Permit and state of the art defences are quite narrow and technical.

  Q94  Chairman: We accept the point. Mr Taylor quoted Natural England. In their evidence to us they say they want liability to be identical because non-annex three operations damage biodiversity more frequently. Creating a level playing field, by applying strict liability to all operations, would establish a more consistent and transparent regime. Why does Defra disagree with Natural England on that point?

  Ian Pearson: For the reasons that I have just outlined. I think it right that, where we have the discretion to exercise a permit or state of the art defence in those circumstances, it is right to do so. There is probably a separate point about how the two regimes fit together and how the Environmental Liability Directive regime would fit with UK domestic legislation. I have to be honest. This is not a perfect fit. Frequently our law in the United Kingdom can be a little bit jumbled and this is one instance where it is not as clear and transparent as it perhaps could be. Chairman, you will be aware of some of the company law project and the massive reforms we undertook there to try and put more company law in one place. Sometimes these things do not fit together as well as they should do.

  Q95  David Taylor: Your inclination would be to level down rather than level up?

  Ian Pearson: That is not my inclination at all. What I am explaining to the Committee is why we think, in the very few cases where it is likely to be exercised, a state of the art or a permit defence is appropriate and is in the best interests of everyone.

  Q96  Mr Drew: Let us use a specific area of concern which is obviously going to be GMOs. I know there is a view that GMOs are protected under a different piece of legislation but it does seem somewhat unclear as to whether GMOs will be a key part of a potential liability offence. Is that something that you welcome or is it something that you are going to serve a pass to and hope that our existing controls for GMOs are sufficient?

  Ian Pearson: We have one crop trial of a GM product taking place in the UK at the moment and we will probably have two trials next year. No GM crops are being grown commercially in the United Kingdom. It does not seem likely to me that they are going to be for a while. Having said that, it is right that we look very carefully at the issue of crop separation distances which is why we have been consulting on that. We want to move that debate forward. That is why as a Government we should judge each application for crop trials on its merits and make decisions about commercial growing based on the scientific evidence. The licensing of GMOs, whether it be for research or for general use, is governed by some very strict European legislation at the moment. Each application for consent to release is judged on its own merits based on potential risks to the environment. In the United Kingdom we would not allow a crop trial to take place and we certainly would not allow commercial growing unless we were confident, based on all the scientific evidence, that there was no threat to human or animal health or to the environment. That remains our position. If we are relating what I have just said to the discussion we have just been having about permit defences, if in the future—and this is speculation—we were in a situation where a farmer was being pursued because a crop did cause environmental damage and it was directly as a result of its genetic modification, we do think that permit defence would be allowed with respect to the farmer. The problem would be with the company providing the product and with the licensing regime. We should not be penalising the farmers for doing things that they have been given explicit approval to do.

  Q97  Mr Drew: I go back to my original perception of this. Unless I have it wrong, the ELD impacts on the immediate transgressor, even though they may be doing something in good faith. If they have a permit they are exonerated but up the line, the supply chain, there is no way that a company that supplied something that subsequently was proven to be environmentally damaging would ever be liable, come what may.

  Ian Pearson: In the circumstances you describe, if an individual or company is causing environmental damage, the immediate responsibility is on that individual or company to stop it.

  Q98  Mr Drew: That is something slightly different. They have caused the damage. Are they liable for the damage they have caused?

  Ian Pearson: They have caused the damage. They should stop it immediately and that is what we would all want to see, regardless of whatever legislation we are talking about.

  Q99  Mr Drew: Who makes good the compensation in terms of the damage?

  Ian Pearson: That is the issue. If for instance a farmer has been using fertilizer that is an approved, licensed product that everybody has been happy with for a number of years or if a farmer is growing a crop where he has been given explicit approval to be allowed to grow that crop, I do not think it should be the responsibility of the farmer to take the remediation activity that is required because it is not the farmer's fault. That principle of fault based liability is an important one. We would obviously need to look at avenues to pursue those whose fault we believe it is. Whether that would be through the Environmental Liability Directive or through other routes that might be available we would have to look at.


 
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