APPENDIX 1
RENEWABLE ENERGY ASSOCIATION RENEWABLE HEAT
AND COOLING SUMMARY POLICY POSITION
CASE FOR
ACTION
Existing measures to promote renewable heat
and cooling fall far short of the incentives necessary to establish
a sustainable renewable heat industry that can deliver major benefits
for the environment, the UK economy and householders.
Benefits of Renewable Heat
Increased security of supply through
diversification away from fossil-fuel energy sources. Heat makes
up 30% of UK energy demand outside of the transport sector. [75]The
UK today depends on natural gas to meet 90% of its domestic heat
demand and 55% of industrial and commercial needs.
Carbon savings of between 2 and 5.6
MtC pa.[76],
[77]
One measure alonereplacing all suitable oil-fired boilers
with biomass alternativescould deliver savings of 2.5 MtC
pa.
Alleviation of increasing rates of
fuel poverty, particularly in off-gas grid locations. Once installed,
solar thermal units deliver heat at zero-cost to the consumer.
Heat pumps can cut electric heating costs by up to 75%. Woodfuel
heating options deliver overall cost savings of between 20% and
60% to households using heating oil, and up to 75% for those using
tanked gas. [78]
Growth and diversity in the rural
economy, through the development of an additional end-use that
will contribute to a sustainable market for energy crops and biomass
fuels in the UK.
An immediate contribution to UK energy
policy objectives:
Simple, proven and highly efficient
technologies are available today.
Commercial risks can be minimised
through incremental capital investment and under simple contractual
arrangements.
Potential
Renewables have the potential to make a major
contribution to UK heat supplies:
The Biomass Task Force[79]
estimated renewables could meet 3% of UK heat demand by 2010 and
7% by 2015; a market in heat supply of c£1.5 billion pa.
FES estimate a market potential of
92 TWh pa by 2020, or 12% of UK demand. [80]
Existing Incentives
Planning and grant-led approaches
deliver installed capacity, but used in isolation cannot guarantee
either physical heat supply or carbon savings.
Grants cannot deliver the long-term
confidence vital to attract investment.
Current policies for renewable heat
fail to match the scale of the opportunity:
policies are projected to deliver
a heat market share of less than 1%[81]
and a market of only £100 million paless than 7% of
potential growth; and
new measures announced in the
Climate Change Programme Review will save a maximum of 0.1MtC
pa2% of estimated potential. [82]
MEASURES
A co-ordinated package of measures should be
established to realise the potential contribution of renewable
heat supplies to the UK's energy policy objectives.
Institutional Reform
Adapt government, legislation and
regulatory agencies to recognise diverse sources of supply and
the need to develop a renewable heat market.
Monitor and measure the contribution
that renewables deliver to national heat supplies, irrespective
of the fiscal treatment of these supplies.
Capital Grants
Grants have an important function in pump-priming
demand for renewable heat technologies and fuels, and in facilitating
supply of biomass fuels:
To be effective, grants must be simple
to administer, with minimum transaction costs and bureaucracy.
The value and award of grants should
be structured to incentivise early movers and reward success.
Certificate-Based Renewable Heat Incentive
Sustained growth in the renewable heat supply
industry can only be achieved through a measure that creates enduring,
long-term demand:
The demand created by an incentive
scheme will generate revenues against which both capital installations
and businesses can be financed.
Through driving investment in the
industry, the incentive will optimise the impact of grant programmes,
stimulating competition and cost-reduction.
A certificate-based scheme:
Rewards schemes on the basis
of environmental benefits delivered.
Provides the flexibility to link
the incentive to new or existing schemes, including the Energy
Efficiency Commitment and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
An incentive should be structured
to provide a value equivalent to that afforded to biomass power
under the RO, addressing fuel market distortions, providing a
level playing field and maximising incentives for efficient CHP.
Planning and Public Procurement
Part L of the Building Regulations
should recognise the cost-effectiveness of renewable heat technologies
and "prescribe" renewable energy systems on a technology-blind
basis in all new-build buildings from 2010.
Positive planning policies should
be strengthened, to require developers to incorporate on-site
renewable energy in all new commercial developments over 1,000m2
and all residential developments over five units.
Planning guidance should be developed
to avoid a 10% minimum requirement becoming a de facto
cap.
Government must lead in demonstrating
the viability of renewable heat in the public estate through a
proactive public procurement policy.
OUTLINE PROPOSAL
FOR A
RENEWABLE HEAT
INCENTIVE
Introduction
The introduction of revenue-based, demand-side
incentive to underpin the long-term value of the renewable heat
and cooling market will be vital to securing investment in the
sector, achieving energy policy objectives and optimising the
impact of parallel measures, including capital grant schemes.
Guiding Principles
Equity
Any scheme should be accessible to
all renewable technologies on an equitable basis.
The level of incentive should be
the same for all heat technologies.
The level of incentive should allow
heat suppliers and customers to compete for feedstock on a level
playing field with other end uses.
Flexibility
Wherever practical the scheme should
directly reward the benefits delivered, creating a revenue stream
from units of heat supplied.
Below an appropriate de minimis
level, future benefits should be recognised as a present value.
The widest possible range of parties
should be capable of contributing to renewable heat supply and
realising the value of the incentive framework.
Capital Efficiency
The scheme should deliver stable
and secure revenue streams in order to leverage private capital
investment.
The introduction of the scheme should
be signalled as early as possible to deliver maximum impact from
existing grant programmes.
The scheme should be established
within the context of a long-term framework providing the incentive
for investment in the industry and supply infrastructure.
Consistency
The scheme should be consistent with
existing support mechanisms such as the RO, and should explicitly
provide for convergence with the carbon marketin respect
of both function and value.
OUTLINE STRUCTURE
Generic Requirements
Certificate-Based
The supply of renewable heat should
receive credits for the carbon saving, fuel security and economic
benefit that it delivers.
Credits should take the form of tradeable
certificates.
Sale of certificates would create
a revenue stream against which:
costs of fuel supply could be
supported; and
investment in renewable heat
plant and infrastructure could be financed.
Certificates would be awarded on
a flexible basis in order to maximise access and avoid disproportionate
costs of compliance (notably on smaller installations where metering
costs may be prohibitive):
primarily on the basis of metered
heat output;
in restricted circumstances on
the basis of a "derived" method meeting prescribed standards
of accuracy, eg quantity of fuel supplied, where that fuel meets
a consistent, verifiable standard and supply is supported by auditable
documentation; and
alternatively as an "up-front"
allocation equivalent to the lifetime output of the installation.
Since heat meters are widely used in industrial
and community heating applications, and accurate meters are increasingly
available at relatively low cost, the majority of capacity is
expected be metered.
Certificates could be awarded to
any entity meeting specified qualification criteria. This may
include owners or operators of plant. Criteria should reflect
plant standards of performance and capacity of operator to provide
accurate data.
OFGEM have already established a
simple and efficient process for certificate issue that could
be readily adapted.
Flexible Cost Burden
Purchasers of certificates could be one of a
number of parties, which might change or evolve with the scheme:
Obligated parties, established under
a Renewable Heat Obligation or similar.
Obligated parties, subject to the
Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) or any successor, such as an
Energy Reduction Commitment.
Other obligated parties.
Government, via a bilateral contract
with the producer, for conversion into carbon credits of some
type (AAU, unilateral ERU etc).
Transparent and "Future-Proof" Market Arrangements
Market transparency, third party access, and
liquidity would be facilitated by the establishment of a Government-sponsored
"clearing house" or "broker" for certificates.
This arrangement would:
Ensure that even the smallest parties
were able to transact efficiently and extract value from the scheme.
Preserve the capacity for evolution
of the scheme if the purchasing parties were to change.
Provide price stability and the capacity
to set a price floor.
Competitive and Equitable Revenues
The price of certificates would be driven by
an administrative process:
Under an Obligation arrangement,
demand for certificates would be driven by the alternative compliance
costs for obligated partiesa "Buy-Out Price".
To deliver a real incentive to supply this should be set at a
level that exceeds by a significant margin the expected costs
of supply of renewable heat.
Under any scheme the price level
would need to reflect the value of biomass created by the Renewables
Obligation in the power market and should be consistent with the
RO in terms of cost of carbon saved.
Over the long-term prices should
migrate towards a stable carbon price, in parallel with the similar
migration of incentives under related measures.
Differentials in the rate of Climate Change
Levy provide a potential precedence:
With lower emissions per unit of
output associated with generating heat, the Climate Change Levy
on heating fuels is roughly a third of that on electricity (0.15p/unit
compared with 0.43p/unit).
Correspondingly the Buy-Out Price
of a certificate should be £10-£15 per MWh (ie one third
to one half of the current level of a Renewables Obligation Certificate).
Administration
Any incentive scheme would require
an appropriate authority to register qualifying schemes and issue
certificates on the basis of metered heat output or other qualifying
criteria.
Existing experience, systems and
institutions could readily be adapted to deliver the administrative
infrastructure necessary to support a heat incentive:
collectively, OFGEM and the DEFRA-sponsored
CHPQA programme have established proven systems for data management
and scheme administration in respect of Renewable Obligation Certificates
(ROCs) and Climate Change Levy Exemption Certificates (LECs);
CHPQA has specifically addressed
the technical challenges in respect of heat; and
HMRC will gain relevant experience
of data management through the RTFO.
Considerations for an Obligation
Where to impose the cost burden for any certificate-based
heat incentive is a key consideration for Government. If Government
opted to place a cost burden upon consumers via an Obligation,
specific considerations would be raised over the mechanics of
collecting and disbursing funds.
Obligated Parties
An Obligation would be placed on
suppliers of fossil fuels for heat.
A party's Obligation would be determined
on the basis of the quantity of fuels sold for heating purposes
(as opposed to electricity or transport), and could be readily
determined:
Gas and coal together contribute
c85%[83]
of fuel supply for heating. Suppliers of natural gas and coal
are required to complete detailed records in order to comply with
the requirements of the Climate Change Levy. These records provide
for quantification and differentiation between supplies reaching
users in the power, transport and domestic sectors.
Liquid fuels contribute c15% of fuel
supply for heating. The majority of liquid fuels for the heating
market are duty-exempt (90% of domestic heating oil is kerosene).
Since these fuels are both marked under controlled conditions
at a limited number of bonded locations, and are sold through
Registered Dealers in Controlled Oils that declare quantities
and end receivers, it is possible to accurately record volumes
of these fuels. Gasoil supplies would need a separate administrative
system to differentiate end-use, but this should be readily achievable
(a similar system is already practiced in France).
Compliance
Obligated parties would face alternative
compliance options, analogous to the RO and RTFO:
Payment of a "Buy-Out"
penalty, set at a relatively high level that maximises the likelihood
that a party would seek to supply renewable heat.
Presentation of certificates, generated
either via the party's own actions or purchased from a 3rd Party.
Distribution of Funds
The decentralised nature of activity
in the renewable heat market suggests that 3rd Party supply of
certificates would be a prominent feature of any heat incentive,
and for an obligation would be a notable differentiation from
the RO and RTFO.
An administered "clearing house"
would minimise transaction costs, increase liquidity of certificates
and enhance system efficiency; it would likely prove a prerequisite
under an obligation approach in ensuring that obligated parties
meet the objectives of the measure at least cost.
Costs to the Economy
Cost of Carbon
At an incentive level of £10/MWh,
abatement costs range from £70 to £220/tC saved.
Table 2 illustrates the performance
of the schemein terms of cost per tonne of carbon savedfor
a range of levels of incentive from £7.50/MWh to £15/MWh
of heat supplied. Costs have been derived by determining the difference
in carbon emissions per MWh for a range of energy sources and
the renewable alternative, and equating this to the level of incentive
offered.
A heat incentive, imposed at the
levels proposed, performs favourably with other comparable measures
employed in the energy sector.
Table 3 compares a heat incentive
to a range of carbon abatement measures employed elsewhere in
the economy.
Table 2
COST OF CARBON ABATED USING RENEWABLE HEAT
AT VARIOUS INCENTIVE LEVELS
| Emission Factor |
Incentive (£/MWh of Heat Supplied) |
| | |
| (tC/MWh) | 7.5
| 10 | 12.5 |
15 |
Electricity | 0.115 | 69
| 92 | 116 | 139
|
ElectricityGrid Average | 0.115
| 69 | 92 | 115
| 139 |
ElectricityGrid Average/New Build* |
0.155 | 51 | 68 |
84 | 101 |
Gas | 0.054 | 159
| 212 | 265 | 318
|
Mains Gas | 0.053 | 163
| 217 | 271 | 325
|
Bottled Gas | 0.064 | 132
| 175 | 219 | 263
|
Fuel Oil | 0.076 | 109
| 145 | 181 | 217
|
Burning Oil | 0.072 | 115
| 153 | 191 | 229
|
Gas Oil | 0.073 | 113
| 151 | 189 | 226
|
Domestic Oil | 0.072 | 115
| 153 | 191 | 229
|
Non-Domestic Oil | 0.072 |
115 | 153 | 191 |
229 |
Heating Oil | 0.074 | 112
| 150 | 187 | 224
|
Heat from boilerswaste | 0.007
| 859 | 1,146 | 1,432
| 1,719 |
Source: ODPM, BRE |
| | |
* Average of marginal carbon intensity and plant built or avoided 2005-10
| | | |
| |
| | |
| | |
Table 3
COMPARISON OF CARBON ABATEMENT COSTS
Measure | Cost (£/tC)
| | | Source
|
| Low |
| High | |
Renewables Obligation | 183
| | 513 | NAO/Oxera
|
Renewables Obligation | |
175 | | DEFRA |
RTFO | slight -ve |
| 350 | DfT |
Social Cost of Carbon | 35 |
| 140 | DEFRA |
Heat Incentive @ £10/MWh | 70
| | 220 | |
Cost to the Economy and Consumers
|
| | |
|
Costs to the economy of a proposed heat incentive
are of the order of £0.5-£1.5 billion pa.
Actual cost to the economy will be determined
by the level of response to the incentives introduced. Table 4
illustrates the cost to the economy at various response, or success,
rates in successive years. Response rates reflect the potential
market penetration for renewables illustrated by the Biomass Task
Force and FES.
Costs of renewable heat supply options will become
increasingly competitive under conditions of rising fossil fuel
prices. Since an obligation does not impose a direct cost on the
consumer or taxpayer, this approach would offer the distinct advantage
that costs to the economy (and consequently consumers) of the
incentive could be reduced or even eliminated.
Costs per unit of energy supplied will depend
upon the level of incentive and the target imposed by Government.
Gas costs are presently approximately 2.0-2.5 p/kWh for industrial
consumers and 2.1-2.8 p/kWh for domestic consumers (including
taxes). [84]With a £10/MWh
incentive and a 7% target, a decision to impose the burden of
the incentive on consumers would introduce additional costs of
0.07 p/kWh for fuel supplied, equivalent to c3% of current gas
costs.
Table 4
SUMMARY OF COSTS TO THE ECONOMY
| Year |
| | | |
| | | |
| 2010 | 2015
| 2020 | 2010 |
2015 | 2020 | 2010
| 2015 | 2020 |
Level of Incentive (£/MWh) | 7.5
| | 10 |
| 12.5 |
Renewable Target (% Heat Demand) | 3%
| 7% | 12% | 3%
| 7%12%
3%
7%
12% |
Heat Demand (TWh) | 837 | 862
| 884 | 837 | 862
| 884 | 837 | 862
| 884 |
Maximum Cost (£M) | 188 |
452 | 795 | 251 |
603 | 1,061 | 314 |
754 | 1,326 |
Cost per Unit of Energy (p/kWh) | 0.02
| 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.03
| 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.04
| 0.09 | 0.15 |
Renewable Energy Association
September 2006
| | | |
| | | |
| |
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/acu/energy/fes-renewable-chp.pdf
http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/acu/energy/fes-renewable-chp.pdf
75
Renewable Heat and Heat from Combined Heat and Power Plants-Study
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76
Renewable Heat and Heat from Combined Heat and Power Plants-Study
and Analysis, FES, 2005 Back
77
Biomass sector review for the Carbon Trust, Carbon Trust, 2005. Back
78
Scoping Study: The Commercial Opportunities of Wood Fuel Heating
in Scotland, Econergy/Scottish Enterprise, December 2005. Back
79
Report to Government, Biomass Task Force, October 2005. Back
80
Report to Government, Biomass Task Force, October 2005. Back
81
UK Energy and CO2 Emissions Projections, Updated Projections to
2020, DTI, February 2006. Back
82
Climate Change-The UK Programme 2006, HM Government, 2006. Back
83
Since energy supply data as reported in DUKES and UEP is not disaggregated
by end-use, it is assumed throughout this paper that non-electricity
energy supplies will meet a heating demand. In some cases this
is likely to result in an over-estimate for heat demand and some
skewing of proportional allocations. Back
84
Quarterly Energy Prices, DTI, March 2006. Back
|