8 Common Foreign and Security Policy:
Aceh Monitoring Mission
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12165/06
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(27767)
12166/06
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| Council Joint Action amending and extending Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM).
Council Decision concerning the extension of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) and its personnel.
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| Legal base | Articles 14 & 24 TEU; unanimity
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| Deposited in Parliament | 4 September 2006
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 8 January 2007
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| Previous Committee Report | HC 34-xxxvii (2005-06), para 53 (11 October 2006); also see HC 34-xxxiv (2005-06), para 11 (5 July 2006)
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| Discussed in Council | September General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared (reported to the House on 11 October 2006)
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Background
8.1 On 9 September 2005 the Council adopted a Joint Action establishing
the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) which became operational on
15 September 2005. At the request of the Government of Indonesia
(GoI), and with the support of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), the
mission was to monitor implementation of a peace accord between
the two parties. This accord had come about after 30 years of
conflict, and in the aftermath of the devastation caused by the
December 2005 east Asian Tsunami.
8.2 On 7 June 2006, the AMM was extended from 15
June to 15 September, to allow a continued monitoring presence
in Aceh until local elections, then expected to take place by
September. The total size of the AMM was reduced from around 200
to 88 EU and ASEAN country monitors, reflecting the fact that
some of the mission's tasks had already been completed. Then,
on 7 August, the Minister alerted the Committee to the Indonesian
request for a further extension. In his 4 September Explanatory
Memorandum he explained that:
— before
the local elections could be organised, the Indonesian parliament
(as mandated by the peace agreement) needed to pass legislation
covering certain terms of the peace agreement;
— due to the length of time which was taken
first over consultation on the draft, and then by debate in the
relevant parliamentary committee, the legislation was not passed
until 11 July;
— following this, there was further consultation,
including over the local regulations which will determine the
detail of how the legislation is implemented;
— this meant that it would not be possible
to hold the local elections in September; and
— the local elections had now been fixed
to take place on 11 December.
As a consequence, the Indonesian government requested
a further extension to the AMM, until 15 December, to continue
to support stability in the province and to facilitate contacts
between the government and GAM in the pre-election period, which
was supported by GAM. He further explained that the extended AMM
would operate in parallel with an EU election observer mission
(EOM), and focus on resolving any tensions which arise in the
run-up to the elections — something which the EU EOM would
not have a mandate to do. Additionally, he said that the mission
would be further slimmed down, leaving a small team in the headquarters
in Banda Aceh, and two district offices covered by mobile monitoring
teams; that ASEAN countries plan to continue seconding personnel;
and that the mission would then draw down until 28 February.
8.3 The only concern that we had had was that this
mission — the first of its kind, being in Asia and with
Asian partners — would find itself becoming open-ended,
and at a time when the CFSP budget was under strain. It being
now clearly time-limited, we agreed with the Government's position
and cleared the documents.
8.4 In so doing, we also asked the Minister to write,
once the mission was concluded, with his assessment of the outcome
of the political process and the mission's contribution thereto,
given the general interest in the House in Common Foreign and
Security Policy and the novel nature of the mission.
The Minister's letter
8.5 This information is contained in a letter of
8 January 2007 from the Minister for Europe (Mr Geoffrey Hoon)
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as follows:
PEACE PROCESS
"The Helsinki Peace Agreement, signed in August
2005, brought an end to over thirty years of armed conflict. Implementing
the agreement has required significant political commitment on
both sides to deliver on often challenging commitments.
"The credibility of the local elections (described
by the EU election observers as "competitive, transparent
and well-administered") is the most obvious sign of the progress
which has been made. This reflects the fact that throughout the
last 18 months, all the parties to the peace agreement have shown
considerable will to overcome practical and political difficulties
and move the peace process forward.
"The first step in implementing the peace process
was withdrawal of non-indigenous government forces, with parallel
decommissioning of Free Aceh Movement's (GAM) weapons. This was
completed by the agreed deadline of 31 December 2005. Another
key government achievement was the passage of the Law on the Government
of Aceh, taking forward the undertaking in the peace agreement
to give Aceh authority over most of its public affairs. The government
has fulfilled its undertaking to provide amnesty to GAM prisoners,
and provide reintegration funding to GAM former combatants. It
has undertaken to pass a law in 2007 to allow regional political
parties (currently only parties with a national support based
are allowed to contest elections). GAM has said it will complete
its transformation into a political party within 6 months of this
law being passed. Throughout the process, disputes which arose
were resolved through dialogue, facilitated by the AMM.
CONTRIBUTION OF AMM
"As anticipated, the AMM formally ended its
mandate on 15 December. The AMM played an important role supporting
the peace process. It facilitated regular meetings from regional
to sub-district level between the security forces and GAM representatives,
which contributed toward building trust between the two sides
and in some cases helped to resolve contentious issues. In the
handful of more serious incidents where the AMM had to conduct
an investigation, both sides were prepared to accept, in large
part, the AMM findings. Initial suspicions in the Indonesian parliament
and press about the role of the AMM were largely allayed and the
AMM was praised for its transparency by Indonesian stakeholders
and outside analysts.
"This was the first European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP) mission to monitor a peace agreement, the first
in Asia and the first with the participation of countries from
another organisation, the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). It is potentially a model for future ESDP engagement
in the region.
"During our Presidency of the EU, the UK played
an important role in securing an early and positive EU response
to the Government of Indonesia's invitation to establish the AMM
and taking forward discussions on the status of the Mission at
extremely short notice. UK support was also vital to the rapid
and credible deployment of the AMM so that it could have an interim
presence on the ground as soon as the peace agreement was signed.
This presence was an important factor in maintaining confidence
on the ground and ensuring that implementation of the peace agreement
started well. UK officials seconded from the FCO and British Embassy
Jakarta played a crucial role in supporting the Head of Mission's
office and the Mission press and communications team.
RISKS
"The new governor, Irwandi Yusuf, will need
to build good relations with the central government and win the
confidence of those who still do not fully trust the process.
He will also need to respond credibly to Aceh's other needs, including
long-term reintegration and reconstruction. Although he has little
practical political experience, he played an important role in
the peace negotiations, and since the peace agreement has been
GAM representative on the joint committee (government, GAM and
AMM) taking forward implementation of the peace process. This
has given him experience of negotiating with Jakarta. The AMM
found him pragmatic and constructive.
"It will be important for the parties to maintain
direct dialogue now that the AMM is no longer facilitating contact,
not least on the implementation of the Law on Aceh Administration
(outstanding areas of dispute include the division of powers between
central and local government and the share of oil and gas revenues
reverting to Aceh). Although the peace process has been very successful
so far, the legacy of mistrust between Acehnese and central government,
built up over decades of conflict, will take time to resolve.
"We, and other key international players including
the EU, will stay engaged on Aceh through our Embassy in Jakarta,
to monitor continued progress in implementation of the peace agreement,
and post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding".
Conclusion
8.6 As the Minister demonstrates, the AMM has
made a significant contribution to what has been a considerable
success thus far (and the UK to the AMM). It is all the more to
its credit that this has been done in very challenging circumstances
and via a novel format, with Member States operating well beyond
Europe and in conjunction with new partners who were themselves
unfamiliar with such operations. As the Minister points out, the
AMM could well therefore be the model for any such future requirement.
8.7 We are accordingly grateful to the Minister
for this thorough and comprehensive assessment, which we are reporting
in detail to the House.
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