8 Protection of critical infrastructure
| (a)
(28183)
16932/06
COM(06)786
(b)
(28184)
16933/06
+ ADDs 1-2
COM (06)787
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Commission Communication on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection
Draft Council Directive on the identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructure and the assessment of the need to improve their protection
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| Legal base | (a)—
(b) Article 308 EC; consultation; unanimity
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| Document originated | (a) and (b) 12 December 2006
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| Deposited in Parliament | (a) and (b) 4 January 2007
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| Department | Home Office |
| Basis of consideration | EM of 19 February 2007
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| Previous Committee Report | None; but see (26072) 13979/04 HC 38-v (2004-05), para 5 (26 January 2005), HC 34-xiv (2005-06) para 8 (10 February 2005) and (27052) 14910/05 HC 34-xviii (2005-06), para 12 (8 February 2006), HC 34-xxviii (2005-06) para 16 (10 May 2006)
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| To be discussed in Council | No date set
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| Committee's assessment | Legally and politically important
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| Committee's decision | Not cleared; further information requested
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Background
8.1 The Commission communication and draft Directive follows the
publication by the Commission of a Green Paper which the previous
Committee considered on 10 February 2005 and which we considered
on 6 February 2006 and again on 10 May 2006. The Green Paper followed
the request from the European Council to the Commission and the
High Representative in June 2004 to prepare an overall strategy
for the protection of critical infrastructure from terrorist attack.
8.2 "Critical infrastructure" for these
purposes consists of those facilities and networks, services and
property the destruction of which would have a serious impact
on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of citizens
or the effective functioning of government in the Member States.
Such infrastructure includes systems for electricity and gas production
and distribution, telephone exchanges and other communications
systems, sewage plants, food distribution and key government services.
8.3 The Green Paper suggested the creation of a common
framework, (the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure
Protection — EPCIP), supplemented by a critical infrastructure
warning network — CWIN, with common principles and standards
for the protection of critical infrastructure, and with common
definitions of concepts such as critical infrastructure protection,
European critical infrastructure and Operator Security Plans.
The Green Paper also suggested the adoption of a common list of
critical infrastructure sectors, which would include energy, information
and communications technologies, water and food supply, health,
financial services, "public and legal order and safety",
civil administration, transport, chemical and nuclear industries
and "space and research". Under the heading "civil
administration", the list included government functions,
emergency services, civil administration services and postal and
courier services, but also included the armed forces. On this
latter point, we sought and obtained from the Minister an assurance
in her letter of 30 January 2006 that in no circumstances would
the disposition and organisation of this country's armed forces
form part of any "common framework" at Community level,
as referred to in the Green Paper.
8.4 The Green Paper argued that it was in the interests
of the Member States and the European Union as a whole that each
Member State should protect its national critical infrastructure
under a common framework but in our view, some of the issues raised
in the Green Paper touched on the fundamental duty of a national
government to ensure the security of its citizens.
8.5 The Government's reply emphasised that the management
of national critical infrastructure must be left, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, to the Member State concerned.
The Government also stated that the proposed activities of the
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)
needed to be clearly established. In its view, the aim of the
EPCIP should be to share good practice and expertise and to share
research into issues and solutions related to critical infrastructure
protection, but should not include national critical infrastructure
issues such as the justification by Member States of what it regards
as critical, the national armed forces and associated infrastructures,
vulnerability analyses or monitoring of protective security measures.
The EPCIP should also exclude assessing the threat from terrorism.
The protection of critical infrastructure being "first and
foremost a national responsibility", the Commission's efforts
would be most effective when working with Member States on the
protection of critical infrastructure having an EU cross-border
effect (i.e. when having an impact on at least three Member States),
but any sharing of information on critical infrastructure would
have to take place on a strict need-to-know basis. The Government
also stated that it was not persuaded of the need for any additional
warning network, and did not support a CWIN format which would
involve the dissemination of information on specific threats,
alerts or vulnerabilities.
8.6 We wholly supported the Government's reply to
the Green Paper, and considered it was right to express caution
about a number of the options suggested. We also noted that the
legal base for action at EU level in this area would require the
closest examination.
The Commission communication
8.7 The Commission communication (document (a)) sets
out the principles, processes and instruments which the Commission
proposes for the implementation of the EPCIP. The Commission also
intends to produce further communications relating to specific
sectors of critical infrastructure, such as energy and transport.
8.8 In the Commission's view, the objective of the
EPCIP is to be achieved by the creation of an EU framework concerning
the protection of critical infrastructures. The threats to be
addressed include that from terrorism as a priority, but the EPCIP
will be based on an "all-hazard" approach. The Commission
considers that if the level of protective measures in a particular
sector is found to be adequate "stakeholders should concentrate
their efforts on threats to which they are vulnerable".
8.9 The Commission describes subsidiarity as a "key
principle" to guide the implementation of the EPCIP, and
that it will focus its efforts on infrastructure which is critical
from a European, rather than a national or regional perspective.
However, European critical infrastructure is evidently to be given
an extended meaning. It is described in the communication as constituting
"those designated critical infrastructures which are of the
highest importance for the Community and which if disrupted or
destroyed would affect two or more Member States, or a single
Member State if the critical infrastructure is located in another
Member State". The communication adds that the procedure
for identifying and designating European critical infrastructure,
together with a common approach to assessing the need to improve
protection for such infrastructure will be determined by a Directive
(see document (b) below).
8.10 The other "key principles" include
"complementarity" (i.e. that the Commission will avoid
duplicating existing efforts at EU, national or regional level
"where these have proven to be effective in protecting critical
infrastructure"), "confidentiality" (i.e. that
at EU and national level information will be classified appropriately
with access granted on a "need to know", with information
being shared "in an environment of trust and security"),
"stakeholder cooperation"(i.e. that owners and operators
of critical infrastructure should be involved as well as public
authorities in the development of the EPCIP) and "proportionality"
(that measures should be proposed only in case of need and proportionate
to the risk involved). Finally, the EPCIP is to be developed using
a sector-by-sector approach.
8.11 The Commission proposes a framework for the
EPCIP consisting of a Directive to provide for a common approach
to identifying and designating European critical infrastructures
and assessing the need for improved protection, an EPCIP Action
Plan, a Critical Infrastructure Warning Network (CWIN), together
with support for Member States in relation to national critical
infrastructure. The Commission also proposes that it should chair
an EU level body to coordinate work on the EPCIP.
8.12 The draft Directive (document (b)) is considered
below, and the Critical Infrastructure Warning Network (CWIN)
is to be the subject of a separate proposal. The EPCIP Action
Plan envisages a range of activities in which the Commission would
take a leading role. For example, it would be for the Commission
to identify sectors where action should be taken as a priority,
and the Commission with the Member States to elaborate criteria
for identifying European critical infrastructure and to create
an inventory of national bilateral and EU critical infrastructure
protection programmes.
8.13 The Action Plan also provides for the Commission
to assist the Member States in the development of national critical
infrastructure programmes. The communication notes that the responsibility
for protecting national critical infrastructure falls on the Member
States, but with "due regard for existing Community competence".[27]
However, the communication also encourages each Member State to
establish a national programme for the protection of critical
infrastructure and sets out a list of issues which such programmes
should address as a "minimum". Such issues include identifying
critical infrastructure according to "predefined national
criteria" which, again "as a minimum", would take
into account the geographical area affected by disruption or destruction
of the infrastructure, the severity of the effects assessed on
the basis of the effect on the public, the economy, the environment,
as well as political and "psychological" effects and
consequences for public health. The communication argues that
the introduction of similar approaches to the protection of national
infrastructure will "contribute to ensuring that CI stakeholders
throughout Europe benefit from not being subjected to varying
frameworks resulting in additional costs and that the internal
market is not distorted".
The draft Directive
8.14 Document (b) is a proposal for a Directive,
to be adopted under Article 308 EC, for the identification by
the Member States of relevant infrastructures and for their designation
by the Commission as "European critical infrastructure".
In its explanation of the proposal, the Commission argues that
"only a common framework can provide the necessary basis
for a coherent and uniform implementation of measures to enhance
the protection of ECI" and that "non-binding voluntary
measures, while flexible, would not provide the necessary stable
foundation as they would not provide enough clarity on who does
what, nor would they clarify the rights and obligations for ECI
stakeholders involved".
8.15 The legal base chosen for the proposal by the
Commission is Article 308 EC, but the reasons for this choice
are not explained. In particular, it is not explained how the
proposal, which relates essentially to national security, is nevertheless
necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common
market, one of the objectives of the Community.
8.16 The Commission argues that the proposal complies
with the principle of subsidiarity by stating that, although it
is the responsibility of each Member State to protect the critical
infrastructure under its jurisdiction, "it is crucial for
the security of the European Union[28]
to make sure that infrastructure having an impact on two or more
Member States or a single Member State if the critical infrastructure
is located in another Member State are sufficiently protected
and that one or more Member States are not made vulnerable by
weaknesses or lower security standards in other Member States".
It is also argued that "similar rules concerning security
would also help to make sure that the rules of competition within
the internal market are not distorted". The Commission states
that as the Member States have "varying approaches to critical
infrastructure protection and different legal systems" a
Directive is "best suited" for creating a common procedure
for identifying and designating European critical infrastructure.
8.17 The detailed provisions of the draft Directive
may be summarised as follows. Articles 1 and 2 are concerned with
the purpose of the proposal and with definitions. Article 2 defines
critical infrastructure as "those assets or part thereof
which are essential for the maintenance of critical societal functions".
"European critical infrastructure" is defined as critical
infrastructure "the disruption or destruction of which would
significantly affect two or more Member States, or a single Member
State if the critical infrastructure is located in another Member
State".
8.18 Articles 3 and 4 provide for the identification
and designation of European critical infrastructure. Member States
are required by Article 3(3) to identify such infrastructure in
accordance with criteria ("cross-cutting" and "sectoral"
criteria) to be adopted by the Commission following a comitology[29]
procedure under Article 11(3). Member States are required to notify
the Commission of the critical infrastructure they have identified,
following which the Commission is to draw up a list of infrastructures
to be designated by the Commission under the Article 11(3) procedure
as "European Critical Infrastructures" (Article 4).
8.19 Article 5 requires each Member State to cause
the owners or operators of European Critical Infrastructure situated
on its territory to establish and update an "Operator Security
Plan". Such a Plan must include a risk assessment and "relevant
security solutions" in accordance with the provisions of
Annex II to the draft Directive. Annex II requires important assets
to be identified, the preparation of a risk analysis and the "identification,
selection and prioritisation" of counter-measures and procedures,
distinguishing between "permanent security measures"
(i.e. those which cannot be introduced by the owner/operator at
short notice) and "graduated security measures" (i.e.
those which are activated according to varying risk and threat
levels).
8.20 Article 6 requires each Member State to cause
the owner/operator of any European critical infrastructure on
its territory to designate a "Security Liaison Officer"
as the point of contact between the Member State and the owner/operator.
Member States are also required to communicate relevant information
concerning identified risks and threats to the Security Liaison
Officer.
8.21 Article 7(1) requires each Member State to carry
out a risk and threat assessment in relation to European critical
infrastructure situated within its territory. Article 7(2) requires
Member States to report to the Commission on the types of vulnerabilities,
threats and risks encountered in each of the sectors referred
to in Annex I to the Directive (i.e. energy, nuclear industry,
information and communications technologies, water, food, health,
financial, transport, chemical industry, space and research facilities).
Provision is made for the format for such reports, and for the
development of "common methodologies" for risk and threat
assessments to be determined by the Commission using the comitology
procedure under Article 11(3).
8.22 Article 8 requires the Commission[30]
to support the owners/operators of European critical infrastructure
by providing access to best practice and "methodologies"
related to critical infrastructure protection. Article 9 requires
each Member State to appoint a "critical infrastructure protection
Contact Point" and provides for such a Contact Point to coordinate
critical infrastructure protection issues[31]
with the relevant Member State and with other Member States and
the Commission.
8.23 Article 10 makes provision for the protection
of information. Article 10(1) imposes a duty of the Commission
to take "appropriate measures" under Commission Decision
2001/844/EC, ECSC, Euratom[32]
to protect information subject to a requirement of confidentiality
to which it has access or which has been communicated by Member
States. Member States are required to take equivalent measures
in accordance with the relevant national law. Article 10(1) also
provides that "due account shall be given to the gravity
of the potential prejudice to the essential interests of the Community
or of one or more of its Member States", but the effect of
this provision is far from clear.
8.24 Article 10(2) requires that any person handling
confidential information pursuant to the Directive "shall
have an appropriate level of security vetting by the Member State
concerned". Article 10(3) requires Member States to ensure
that "Critical Infrastructure Protection Information"
(i.e. specific facts about an item of critical infrastructure,
whether national or European) which is submitted to the Member
States or the Commission is not used for any purpose other than
the protection of critical infrastructures.
8.25 Article 11 provides for a 'comitology' committee
to assist the Commission. In relation to decisions by the Commission
under Article 5 on whether the requirements of the Directive on
Operator Security Plans are satisfied in particular sectors, the
role of the committee is advisory only.[33]
For all other decisions, including criteria for identifying European
critical infrastructure, amending the list of priority sectors,
imposing requirements for Operator Security Plans in particular
sectors, and devising templates and methodologies for reports
by Member States, the Commission is to be assisted by a regulatory
committee .[34]
The Government's view
8.26 In his Explanatory Memoranda of 19 February
2007 the Minister of State at the Home Office (Tony McNulty) deals
separately with the communication (document (a)) and with the
draft Directive (document (b)).
8.27 The Minister begins his assessment of the policy
implications of the communication by considering the question
of subsidiarity. The Minister finds it clear from the communication
that the Commission's efforts will focus on infrastructure that
is critical from a European, rather than a national or regional,
perspective. The Minister notes that the communication indicates
that, "where requested to do so and taking due account of
existing Community competences and resources", the Commission
may support Member States' efforts to protect critical infrastructures
within their territory by providing relevant information. The
Minister explains that the UK supports this approach but that
the Government is clear on two points, first, that responsibility
for national critical infrastructure is a national responsibility
and, secondly, that protection of European Critical Infrastructure
is the responsibility of the Member State within which the infrastructure
is located.
8.28 On the more general policy implications of the
communication, the Minister comments that critical infrastructure
protection is an issue of high priority in the UK and that the
Government considers it important that it "engages fully
in the development of EPCIP and clarify the added value that the
Commission can bring to the area of European critical infrastructure
protection". The Minister considers it "very encouraging"
that the Commission "has listened to the views of the Member
States and is now proposing a series of voluntary measures to
improve CNI capabilities across the EU". The Minister concludes
that "consequently there are few concerns for the UK in this
Communication".
8.29 The Minister notes that the communication recognises
that the threat from terrorism is a priority, but that the EPCIP
will be based on an "all hazards" approach. The Minister
explains that UK support for the change in scope from terrorism
to the "all hazards" approach is based on the consideration
that "plans for infrastructure resilience tend not to be
terrorist specific". The Minister adds that the extension
to the "all hazards" approach "could dilute the
effectiveness of the security measures against terrorist attackes
which EPCIP was originally expected to develop" and that
therefore the Government is keen to ensure that the threat from
terrorism "is maintained as the key focus for EPCIP".
8.30 The Minister also explains the Government's
concerns over the definition of "European Critical Infrastructure"
used in the communication and the draft Directive, and emphasises
the Government's view that designation as European Critical Infrastructure
should be limited to those items of infrastructure the disruption
or destruction of which would affect at least three Member States
significantly.
8.31 The Minister explains that the Government challenges
the Commission's claim that the introduction of similar approaches
to critical national infrastructure (CNI) protection across the
Member States would "benefit critical infrastructure stakeholders
throughout Europe by reducing the additional costs that result
from varying frameworks and ensuring that the internal market
is not distorted". The Minister points out in this context
that the threat to critical national infrastructure is not equal
in all Member States and that it is therefore not appropriate
to apply the same standard of protection measures in all Member
States.
8.32 In relation to the proposal for a Critical Infrastructure
Warning Information Network (CIWIN), the Minister explains that
the Government remains to be convinced that new systems need to
be developed in order to exchange best practices, experience and
knowledge between Member States. The Minister states that the
Government does not agree with the Commission's intention to implement
a new warning system to share specific threat and vulnerability
information, and welcomes the fact that the communication presents
this as being only a possibility. Nevertheless, the Minister notes
that a prototype for CIWIN is being developed and is expected
to be produced by the end of 2007, and that this gives the Government
some cause for concern.
8.33 In relation to the draft Directive (document
(b)), the Minister explains that the Government supports, in principle,
the Commission's decision to implement the EPCIP through a combination
of binding and non-biding measures. The Minister comments that
the use of a Directive to implement the basic elements for the
cross-border components of the EPCIP would "allow the Commission
to make these requirements obligatory for Member States whilst
still allowing the Member States to adapt the obligations to their
particular legal systems and existing CIP procedures".
8.34 The Minister nevertheless points out that the
Government does have concerns in relation to the Directive. The
key concerns are the definition of "European Critical Infrastructure"
(ECI) as being infrastructures which are critical to two or more
Member States whereas the Government believes that the EPCIP should
focus on infrastructures which are critical to at least three
Member States, the omission of any provision allowing a Member
State to challenge the designation of infrastructure located within
its territory as ECI, and the imposition of legal obligations
on infrastructure operators to produce Operator Security Plans
and to provide Security Liaison Officers.
8.35 The Minister makes a number of detailed comments
in relation to the draft Directive. First, the Minister develops
the concern expressed over the definition of ECI as it appears
in Article 2 of the proposal, emphasising that the Government
remains firmly of the view that the EPCIP should focus on the
areas best suited to EU cooperation, namely where there are many
Member States involved. In the Minister's view, designation as
ECI should be limited to those items of infrastructure, the disruption
or destruction of which would affect at least three Member States
significantly, and where only two Member States are affected bilateral
rather than European level arrangements are appropriate. The Minister
comments further that bilateral arrangements are the preferred
solution for items of infrastructure which are shared by two Member
States. The Minister adds that the Government believes that this
approach works well without Commission intervention and that the
introduction of the Commission into these bilateral arrangements
"risks politicising the ECI designation process".
8.36 The Minister notes that Article 3(2) provides
for the Commission to identify particular sectors as priorities
for action, but that the Government prefers such priorities to
be fixed through comitology, using the regulatory procedure[35]
. In relation to Article 3(3) (which requires Member States to
notify the Commission of critical infrastructures within its territory
and in other Member States) the Minister explains that the Government
is concerned that in some cases, for security reasons, the UK
"may prefer not to identify a particular infrastructure in
another Member State as being of critical importance to the UK",
and that even if the Government were prepared to nominate an infrastructure
in another Member State for designation as ECI, it would need
to consider carefully the risks of sharing sensitive information
relating to such infrastructure.
8.37 The Minister explains in relation to Article
5 that the Government does not support the imposition of a legal
obligation on operators of infrastructure to produce an Operator
Security Plan (OSP). The Government wishes the wording of the
proposal to be modified so that it leaves to Member States the
question of how reporting on vulnerabilities, threats and risks
is achieved. Also in relation to Article 5 the Minister notes
that the proposal requires OSPs to identify the "assets",
which term the Minister considers unclear. More substantively,
the Minister points out that "the location of assets that
are deemed to be critical to a Member State is highly sensitive
information which would be shared only on a need to know basis".
The Minister also notes that the Commission may decide to exempt
a particular sector from the requirement for OSPs, using only
the advisory procedure. The Government considers that the regulatory
procedure should apply.
8.38 In relation to Article 6, the Minister explains
that the Government does not support the imposition of a legal
obligation on operators of critical national infrastructure to
appoint a Security Liaison Officer (SLO) as a result of the item
of infrastructure being designated as ECI.
8.39 The Minister explains that the Government has
a number of concerns with reporting requirements imposed on Member
States by Article 7. First, the Government points to the risk
of overlap and confusion between the assessments of risk made
for the purposes of the ECI and those made for national purposes.
Secondly, the Government has "significant concerns about
the disclosure of detailed vulnerability, threat and risk information"
and has made it clear to the Commission that "it will not
disclose sensitive information regarding specific threats or vulnerabilities"
and that it will provide only a generic overview of information
comparable to that which is in the public domain. Finally, the
Minister notes that Article 7(3) (which provides that the Commission
"shall assess on a sectoral basis whether specific protection
measures are required for European Critical Infrastructures")
appears to enable the Commission to prescribe what kind of measures
the Member States should adopt in order to protect ECI in their
territory. The Government would be content for the Commission
to be able to recommend such measures, but believes that the decision
whether to adopt such measures should remain for the Member State
concerned.
8.40 The Minister notes, in relation to Article 9,
that each Member State is to be obliged to appoint a critical
infrastructure point (CIP) to coordinate critical infrastructure
issues with other Member States and with the Commission, and comments
that this should be amended to make clear that the CIP coordinates
European critical infrastructure issues. The Minister adds
that the way in which each Member State decides to organise the
coordination of its national critical infrastructure is a matter
for that Member State alone.
Conclusion
8.41 We thank the Minister for his thorough and
helpful Explanatory Memorandum. We agree with the general observations
the Minister has made on subsidiarity and the scope of the policy
for critical infrastructure protection at EU level. In particular,
we see no reason for Commission involvement in bilateral cooperation
between two Member States in relation to critical infrastructure
which is of concern to those Member States. We therefore agree
that the Minister is right to insist that "European Critical
Infrastructure" should be defined in the narrow sense he
has suggested, namely that its disruption or destruction should
affect at least three Member States.
8.42 We note that the communication envisages
an extensive role for the Commission, but does not even mention
the role of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (Mr
Gijs de Vries). As, in the Government's view, the key focus of
the policy should remain on the threat from terrorism, we ask
the Minister to explain if the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator has
been consulted and what role is envisaged he should play in the
development of the EPCIP policy.
8.43 We have considerable misgivings over the
adoption of an EC Directive in this area, believing it to be of
doubtful legality and questionable in principle. We note that
the proposal is made under Article 308 EC, but it does not appear
to us that a measure which is concerned essentially with the national
security of Member States is a matter falling within the EC Treaty
at all, and still less under Article 308 EC. We agree with the
Minister's comment that the threat to national critical infrastructure
is not equal in all Member States and we doubt the need to address
any supposed distortion of the internal market, as argued by the
Commission. In our view, this is a makeweight argument seeking
to justify the improper use of Article 308 EC to extend the Community's
competence into matters of national security. We therefore ask
the Minister to reconsider if this proposal is properly made under
Article 308 EC.
8.44 Apart from the question of the legal base,
the adoption of a Directive in this sensitive area seems to us
to be inappropriate. We note, and agree with, the comments the
Minister has made about Article 3, 5, 6 and 7. We remind the Minister
that such issues can become the subject of legal proceedings before
the ECJ, either by way of preliminary reference, or -more likely-
by infraction proceedings by the Commission which may lead to
unexpected results. We question whether policy in this area of
such sensitivity to the Member States is really appropriate for
a binding legal instrument and for judicial determination at EC
level. We should be grateful for the Minister's comments.
8.45 We also ask the Minister if any assessment
has been made of the effect on external competence of the European
Community if the Directive were to be adopted. We note that the
UK has made bilateral agreements in this field, one of these being
an agreement made with the United States on cooperation in science
and technology for critical infrastructure protection. We ask
the Minister to explain what effect adoption of the proposed Directive
might have on the ability of the United Kingdom to conclude agreements
in this field with countries outside the European Community.
8.46 We shall hold the documents under scrutiny
pending the Minister's reply.
27 The communication does not explain what these competences
are. Back
28
The 'security of the European Union' is not referred to in Article
2 or 3 of the EC Treaty as an objective or activity of the European
Community. Back
29
A method for the adoption of delegated legislation by the Commission,
and provided for by Council Decision 1999/468/EC. The relevant
procedure is the 'regulatory' procedure under which the Commission
is assisted by a committee of Member States' representatives.
Back
30
As the Directive is addressed to the Member States, not the Commission,
it is hard to see how this effectively imposes any obligation. Back
31
Such issues do not appear to be confined to those concerned with
'European Critical Infrastructure'. Back
32
OJ No L 317 of 3.12.01, p.1. The rules on security form part of
the Commission's internal rules of procedure. Back
33
The Commission is required (by Article 3 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC)
to 'take the utmost account' of the committee's opinion, but is
not bound by the opinion. Back
34
Under this procedure, the Commission may adopt the measure only
if the committee gives a favourable opinion. Otherwise the matter
is referred to the Council. If the Council has neither adopted
nor opposed the measure within the required time, the Commission
may adopt the measure. Back
35
This procedure would involve the Member State giving their opinion,
which the Commission either would have to follow, or submit a
proposal to the Council for adoption by QMV. Back
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