21 The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
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5823/06
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| Common Position in regard to the 2006 sixth review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
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| Legal base | Article 15 TEU; QMV
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's Letter of 16 January 2007
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| Previous Committee Report | HC 34-xix (2005-06), para 13 (15 February 2006)
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| Discussed in Council | 27 February 2006 General Affairs and External Relations Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared, but further information requested
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Background
21.1 The Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), which
was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force on 26
March 1975, bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition
and retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins,
in types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes. It also bans weapons, equipment
or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict. There are now 155 States
Party to the Convention. The Russian Federation, the United States
of America and the United Kingdom are the Co-Depositary Governments
of the Convention.
21.2 As the BTWC website notes,[81]
"[it] is only four pages long and has no provisions for verification
or for monitoring compliance. When it was negotiated in the early
1970s, there was a perception that biological weapons had little
military utility although previous biological weapons had demonstrated,
by all means short of actual use, their potential effectiveness.
Since the BTWC entered into force, there has been evidence of
biological weapons programs even in some countries that are parties
to the Convention. In addition, terrorists have been found to
be close to completing a biological weapons capability. The rapid
progress in biotechnology and genetic engineering has also raised
the spectre of designer biological warfare agents. These developments
have heightened international concern about the danger of biological
warfare and reduced confidence in the Convention's effectiveness".
21.3 In the years since the BTWC was negotiated,
the international community has increasingly recognized the importance
of verification and of the monitoring of compliance to the arms
control process and to the building of confidence. Multilateral
agreements negotiated since the BTWC, in particular the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention, contain detailed provisions for declarations,
routine inspections and challenge inspections.
21.4 The Second and Third Review Conferences in 1986
and 1991 agreed some measures intended to strengthen compliance
and to improve transparency, including confidence-building measures
(CBMs) consisting of annual exchanges of data and information,
as well as declarations of past and present activities of relevance
to the Convention. The measures include:
- Measure A, Part 1 — Exchange
of data on research centres and laboratories that meet very high
national or international safety standards;
- Measure A, Part 2 — Exchange of information
on national biological defence research and development (R&D)
programs, including declarations of facilities where biological
defence R&D programs are conducted. This measure also includes
information relating to contractors and on available publications;
- Measure B — Exchange of information on
outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused
by toxins that seem to deviate from the normal pattern;
- Measure C — Encouragement of publication
of results of biological research directly related to the Convention
and promotion of use of knowledge;
- Measure D — Active promotion of contacts
between scientists, other experts and facilities engaged in biological
research directly related to the Convention, including exchanges
and visits for joint research on a mutually agreed basis;
- Measure E — Declaration of legislation,
regulations and other measures including exports and/or imports
of pathogenic micro-organisms in accordance with the Convention;
- Measure F — Declaration of past activities
in offensive and/or defensive biological R&D programmes since
1 January 1946; and
- Measure G — Declarations on vaccine production
facilities, licensed by the State Party for the protection of
humans.
21.5 States Parties have also agreed annually to
complete and submit a simple proforma indicating for each CBM
whether they have "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing
new to declare". Since 1987, over half of the States Parties
have made one or more CBM declarations.
21.6 On 15 May 1999 the Council adopted Common Position
199/346/CFSP in support of the BTWC. On 17 November 2003 the Council
also adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP on the universalisation
and reinforcement of multilateral agreements, including the BTWC,
in the field of non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and means of delivery.
21.7 On 18 January 2006, we cleared a Council Joint
Action in support of the BTWC, in the framework of the EU Strategy
against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with the
objectives of promoting universality of the BTWC and supporting
the implementation of the BTWC by States Party.[82]
The Joint Action referred to the importance of the CBMs outlined
above, and particularly improving the number and nature of those
submitted to the UN Secretary General by Member States. It also
looked ahead to the sixth BTWC Review Conference as "a good
opportunity to agree specific, practical and realistic measures
to strengthen both the Convention and compliance with it".
The Common Position
21.8 Then in February we considered a further Common
Position, the purpose of which was to strengthen further the Convention
by promoting a successful outcome of the BTWC Review Conference,
particularly in the area of identifying effective mechanisms to
strengthen and verify compliance. The EU would:
- contribute to a full review
of the operation of the Convention, including the implementation
of undertakings of States Parties;
- support a further intersessional work programme
during the period between the Sixth and Seventh Review Conferences
and identify specific areas and modalities for further progress
under this work programme;
- support a Seventh Review Conference of the Convention,
to be held no later than 2011; and
- help build a consensus for a successful outcome
to the Sixth Review Conference, on the basis of the framework
established by previous such Conferences.
21.9 The EU would accordingly promote:
- universal adherence of all
States to the Convention, including calling on all States not
party to the Convention to adhere to the Convention without further
delay and to commit legally to the disarmament and non-proliferation
of biological and toxin weapons;
- full compliance with the obligations under the
Convention and effective implementation by all States Parties
by working towards identifying effective mechanisms to strengthen
and verify compliance, strengthening, where necessary, national
implementation measures, including penal legislation, and control
over pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins in the framework of
the Convention;
- efforts to enhance transparency through the increased
exchange of information among States Parties, including annual
information exchange among the States Parties and identifying
measures to assess and enhance the country coverage and the usefulness
of the CBM mechanism, and exploring the relevance of any possible
enhancement of its scope;
- compliance with obligations under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), in particular to eliminate
the risk of biological or toxin weapons being acquired or used
for terrorist purposes, including possible terrorist access to
materials, equipment, and knowledge that could be used in the
development and production of biological and toxin weapons;
- the G8 Global Partnership programmes targeted
at support for disarmament, control and security of sensitive
materials, facilities, and expertise; and
- consideration of, and decisions on further action
on, the work undertaken to date under the intersessional programme
during 2003-2005 and the efforts to discuss, and promote common
understanding and effective action on, the adoption of necessary
national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in the
Convention.
21.10 EU supporting action would comprise:
- agreement by Member States
of specific, practical and feasible proposals for the effective
enhancement of the implementation of the Convention for submission
on behalf of the European Union for consideration by States Parties
to the Convention at the Sixth Review Conference;
- where appropriate, demarches by the Presidency,
pursuant to Article 18 of the Treaty on European Union, to promote
universal adherence to the Convention and national implementation
by States Parties; to urge States Parties to support and participate
in an effective and complete review of the Convention and thereby
reiterate their commitment to this fundamental international norm
against biological weapons; and to promote EU proposals aimed
at further strengthening the Convention; and
- EU statements delivered by the Presidency in
the run up to and during the Review Conference.
21.11 In his accompanying 8 February 2006 Explanatory
Memorandum, the then Minister for Europe said that the Common
Position was being adopted in an effort to encourage a forward-looking
meeting with a substantive outcome. Partners believe that the
adoption of a Common Position would "send a clear message
to other States Party about the need to engage fully in advance
of the Review Conference and help focus efforts to achieve a consensus".
He recalled that since the BTWC was opened for signature (1972)
and entered into force (1975) the UK had been a major supporter
of all measures that would strengthen the BTWC, particularly measures
that would result in an effective verification mechanism. Between
2003 and 2005 BTWC States Party had held three annual meetings
on specific topics directly relevant to the BTWC, which "were
successful in providing a forum for substantive exchange of news
and in each year a consensus report was agreed. A further work
programme, after the Review Conference, would give States Party
an opportunity to strengthen the Convention: "The Common
Position will help the EU pursue this aim".
21.12 We noted that this is a long, incremental struggle,
which was all the more important in a post-Cold War world in which
not just states but non-state actors pose grave threats to international
security, and particularly with respect to biological and toxic
weapons, and that, in connection with the earlier Joint Action,
there were plainly ways in which the EU can help, both via the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Community technical assistance;
and hoped that the Review Conference would provide the necessary
impulse. In clearing the document, we asked that the Minister
write to us after the Review Conference (which in due course took
place in Geneva from 20 November to 8 December 2006) with his
assessment of the outcome, including details of any EU proposals
agreed at the Review Conference that were likely to lead to further
Joint Actions.
The Minister's letter
21.13 The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (Dr Kim Howells) has now done so in his letter of 16 January
2007. He says that the EU "came to the Review Conference
in a strong position. It was well-prepared, which allowed for
smoother EU coordination and ensured EU visibility". He judges
that the main objectives — "to strengthen further the
BTWC and so promote a successful outcome of the Review Conference"
— were achieved. He continues as follows:
"Several specific proposals were pursued consistently
by EU partners and were subsequently agreed. These included the
creation of an implementation support unit; the promotion of universal
accession by all States to the BTWC; electronic submission and
circulation of the confidence building measures (CBM) returns
though, unfortunately, the forms themselves were not renewed or
revised. Finally, the Conference agreed a further intersessional
programme of work to discuss various topics relevant to the BTWC.
A number of topics proposed by the EU for the follow-up have been
encompassed in the work programme.
"The EU contributed to the full Article-by-Article
review of the Convention, providing specific language on each
Article. The Conference's Final Declaration also reflects most
of the EU's proposals, including support for a Seventh Review
Conference to be held not later than 2011."
Conclusion
21.14 Although the Minister does not, as we asked,
mention any consequential EU proposals that are likely to lead
to further Joint Actions, we will see any there may be in due
course.
21.15 Given the history of the process, it is
no surprise that the outcome is again undramatic; and in any case,
the full results will only emerge over the next five years, leading
to the Seventh conference in 2011. In the meantime, the closely-coordinated
EU approach embodied in the Common Position would appear to have
paid dividends.
81 http://www.opbw.org/ Back
82
HC 34-xv (2005-06), para 16 (18 January 2006). Back
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