9 EU-Russia relations
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8799/05
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| EU-Russia: Road Maps for the Common Economic Space, the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Common Space of External Security and the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture
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| Legal base | — |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 5 June 2007
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| Previous Committee Report | HC 41-v (2006-07), para 12 (10 January 2007); also see HC 34-xxxiii (2005-06), para 15 (28 June 2006); HC 34-i (2005-06), para 6 (4 July 2005); and (25804): HC 42-xxvii (2003-04), para 17 (14 July 2004)
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| To be discussed in Council | —
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Debated in European Standing Committee on 20 October 2005
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Background
9.1 The Common Strategy instrument was created by the Amsterdam
Treaty, as the means of setting out the objectives, overall policy
guidelines, organisation and duration of the EU's external policies
towards geographic or thematic areas. The EU's Common Strategy
on Russia — its first — was adopted at the June 1999
Cologne European Council, for a period of four years. It had four
objectives:
- encouraging the democratic reform process in Russia;
- encouraging economic reform;
- promoting regional and global stability and security; and
- promoting cooperation with Russia on areas of common concern
such as international crime and environmental questions.
9.2 In July 2004, our predecessors considered a Council Report
on the main lines of a proposed successor. The Common Strategy
had had limited success, being described by the then Minister
for Europe as "long and diffuse", and not clearly signalling
what the EU's specific priorities were. It had never enjoyed any
"buy-in" from Russia. And it had been overtaken by developments
elsewhere in the EU-Russia relationship, culminating in the May
2003 St Petersburg EU-Russia summit, which envisaged the development
of relations instead taking place within an Action Plan embracing
four Common Spaces — a common economic space (building on
the notion of a Common European Economic Space); a common space
of freedom, security and justice; a space of cooperation in the
field of external security; and a space of research and education.
Work accordingly proceeded on this proposal, within the framework
of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement.
The Four Common Space Road Maps
9.3 The main lines of a Joint EU-Russia Action Plan on the four
"Common Spaces" were forwarded to Russia in April 2004,
for agreement at the May Moscow EU-Russia summit. But, in July,
Russia had yet to respond. Since it seemed that lack of political
will on the Russian side had limited progress on the Common Strategy,
and given the overlap between its four objectives and the four
Common Spaces, the previous Committee could see no obvious reason
why the latter was bound to be more effective. They were concerned
that the EU might be tempted to backslide in some of the more
contentious areas — especially in governance issues —
in order to make progress elsewhere. They accordingly asked for
information on those main lines forwarded to Russia.[19]
Several exchanges of correspondence culminated in an Explanatory
Memorandum of 7 June 2005 from the Minister's successor with the
full text of the four Road Maps agreed at the 10 May 2005 EU-Russia
Summit:
Common Economic Space
The objective is to create an open and integrated market, bringing
down barriers to trade and investment and promoting reform and
competitiveness, based on the principles of non-discrimination,
transparency and good governance.
Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice
The underlying principles are democracy, the rule of law, respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free and
independent media and the effective application of common values
by independent judicial systems. Implementation should lead to
agreements on readmission and visa facilitation, and facilitate
promote greater contact. Regular EU-Russia consultations on human
rights fall within this space, as does cooperation on combating
terrorism, organised crime and corruption.
Common Space of External Security
This underlines the shared responsibility of the EU and Russia
for an international order based on effective multilateralism,
including cooperation to strengthen the roles and effectiveness
of the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Both
parties will strengthen cooperation and dialogue on security and
crisis management, notably in relation to terrorism, the proliferation
of WMD and existing and potential regional and local conflicts
— with particular attention to "the common neighbourhood",
to promote resolution of frozen conflicts (e.g. in Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh), where the EU would
continue to provide humanitarian assistance and support economic
rehabilitation, confidence building and efforts to tackle poverty
and human rights abuses.
Common Space on Research, Education and Culture
This aims to promote economic growth and strengthen competitiveness,
reinforce links between research and innovation, encourage close
cooperation in the field of education and promote cultural and
linguistic diversity. A European institute in Moscow, co-funded
by the EU and Russia, would be set up in 2006.
9.4 The then Minister said that the challenge was to press ahead
with implementation and deliver practical, mutual benefits. As
"political documents [are] not legally binding agreements",
the Road Maps would not be put formally to the Council for approval,
but submitted for the Council to take note. The need to preserve
the confidentiality of the negotiations had left him unable to
share any of the contents of the Road Maps with the Committee
earlier.
9.5 Our predecessors felt that, though it might no longer be called
a Common Strategy, any "framework for the EU's relations
with Russia" was self-evidently of immense importance. The
Common Strategy was judged to have failed because it did not set
priorities and lacked political commitment. Progress had been
made, to the extent that a joint list of priorities has been agreed,
across a very wide agenda. Our predecessors felt, however, that
the relationship should arguably aspire to somewhat more than
"practical benefits", and that the challenge was likely
to be in making progress in those areas that tend to be grouped
under the notion of "shared values" and which revolved
around "good governance", but which nonetheless had
a real bearing on the attainment of long-term practical benefits.
Although our predecessors did not wish the Minister to hold up
agreement in the Council, they nonetheless recommended that the
Four Common Spaces "Road Maps" be debated in European
Standing Committee B, in time for the Government to be aware of
the views of the House ahead of the 4 October EU-Russia Summit.
The debate did not in fact take place until 20 October 2005, when
European Standing Committee B agreed that the Road Maps "provide
a valuable framework for the EU to achieve its objectives in its
relations with Russia in the medium term".[20]
9.6 The Minister also agreed to update the Committee after each
bi-annual Summit. The first such letter covered each Common Space
in terms reminiscent of the diplomatic communiqué, and
gave little insight into the nature of the discussions that had
taken place, particularly on the areas about which our predecessors
had expressed particular concern. But this was the first Summit
under the new arrangements, so they decided to await further developments.
9.7 A year ago, after the second EU-Russia Summit under the new
arrangements (and the 17th overall), the Minister for
Europe (Mr Geoffrey Hoon) reported "some substantive
progress", particularly approval of visa facilitation and
readmission agreements and on the basis for negotiations on a
successor to the current Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
(PCA; the legal framework document for EU-Russia relations, which
expires in 2007, but can be rolled forward until a successor is
negotiated). There were also "frank discussions on areas
important to the UK". The EU noted continuing concerns stemming
from the January Russia/Ukraine gas dispute interruptions; Russia
stressed reliability as a supplier, but did not agree to EU proposals
to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty. The latest round of the EU-Russia
Human Rights Consultations was welcomed. Discussion on Chechnya
was particularly noted. On the common neighbourhood, the EU expressed
the hope for progress on Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus;
the Russian side was less optimistic. There was final agreement
on the EU's aid package to the North Caucasus. The EU stressed
its concerns on Belarus and Moldova; the Russians defended their
policy of engagement with Belarus. The Russians raised the Kosovo
process as a possible precedent over questions of territorial
integrity, including for the South Caucasus states' frozen conflicts.
The EU underlined its view of Kosovo's unique situation. The incoming
Finnish Presidency had put the EU's relations with Russia as one
of their priorities, which the Minister welcomed. He would continue
to "sustain the focus on commitment to common values such
as democracy, human rights, and respect for OSCE and Council of
Europe principles".
9.8 Six months ago, the Minister for Europe said that although
the Finnish Presidency had "made steady progress in the EU-Russia
relationship", there was no agreement on a mandate for negotiations
on a new PCA because of Polish concerns to ensure the removal
of a Russian ban on certain meat and plant exports. In the meantime,
the "key outcome" of the Summit was the endorsement
of the result of negotiations on the phasing out of charges for
overflying Siberia, which would make European carriers significantly
more competitive on routes between Europe and Asia. There were
again "frank discussions" on other areas important to
the UK. On human rights, the EU repeated its concern over the
recent killing of journalist Anna Politkovskaya. On the common
neighbourhood, the EU raised its concern over the state of Georgian-Russian
relations and over the situation in Belarus. There were also discussions
on energy: the EU stressed its desire that Russia ratify the Energy
Charter Treaty; Russia said it was not ready to do so, but was
ready to come to a deal on a new agreement with the EU that would
respect the interests of both sides, including the principles
of the ECT. There were discussions on a number of other international
issues such as Kosovo, Iran, the Middle East and North Korea.
The Kosovo process was questioned by Russia as a possible precedent
over questions of territorial integrity, including for the South
Caucasus states' frozen conflicts, and the EU underlined its view
of Kosovo's unique situation. There was also discussion of the
countries of the "common neighbourhood", including Moldova
and Belarus. As with the Finnish Presidency, Germany had identified
relations with the EU's eastern neighbours as well as Russia and
Central Asia as a priority for its Presidency in the first half
of 2007. He would again "continue to support the EU's focus
on commitment to common values such as democracy, human rights,
and respect for OSCE and Council of Europe principles".
9.9 For our part, we noted that although it was gratifying to
see early signs of concrete progress in such a key relationship,
there remained important areas of considerable difficulty and
difference, perhaps the most disturbing of which, we thought,
was the new law on Non-Profit Organisations, which appeared not
to have been discussed but about which the EU felt sufficiently
concerned to issue a formal statement on 19 January. Six months
later, there was a further element of concrete progress but again
no sign of any meeting of minds on either the most pressing practical
issue — energy cooperation — or on many of the other
issues revolving around external security and "common values".
On the contrary, the situation and prospects appeared to have
worsened considerably, with developments in the energy sector
that had aroused widespread concern, a failure to find common
ground in challenges to international security such as Iran, Sudan
and North Korea and events relating to "common values"
that were even more egregious than the murder of Anna Politkovskaya.
The Minister's latest letter
9.10 The Minister reports on the 19th EU-Russia Summit, which
took place on 17-18 May in Samara, Russia. The EU side was led
by the German Presidency, represented by Chancellor Angela Merkel,
and European Commission President José Manuel Barroso.
The Russian side was led by President Vladimir Putin.
9.11 The Minister says that the Summit was "another useful
opportunity for frank discussion on a broad agenda of areas important
to the EU and the UK". He continues as follows:
"HMG continues to believe that it is important to engage
Russia in discussion on areas of both mutual interest and disagreement.
The EU was clear that the EU was united on key issues and that
Russia's difficulties with individual EU countries constituted
problems with the entire EU.
"The EU raised the human rights situation in Russia, stressing
the need to allow freedom of assembly and expressing concern over
the situation of non-governmental organisations in Russia. The
EU repeated its concern over Russia's reaction to the relocation
of the Bronze Soldier memorial in Estonia.
"There was also discussion of international issues. The EU
used the opportunity to urge Russia to support the EU's target
to stabilise temperature increases due to CO2 emission
to 2°C above 1990 levels. The EU re-iterated that Kosovo
represented a key issue in European security. Both sides underlined
the importance of the Quartet in the Middle East Peace Process,
and they exchanged views on a United Nations Security Council
Resolution on a tribunal to investigate the murder of Rafik Hariri.
The EU stressed the need to encourage Afghanistan and Pakistan
to work together to improve regional stability".
9.12 The Minister notes the continued failure to open negotiations
on a successor to the current EU-Russia PCA due to the continuing
Russian ban on imports of Polish food produce. However, "both
sides stressed the need to continue high-level and intense co-operation".
He concludes with the expectation that "relations with Russia
will continue to be an important topic for the EU, under both
the incoming Portuguese and future presidencies".
Conclusion
9.13 The post-Summit report is, in a sense, a substitute for
the transparency lost in the change from a Common Strategy to
the "Four Spaces" approach. Looking ahead, we should
be grateful if future reports were less of a recital of the topics
discussed and more of a rounded assessment, with an indication
not just of what was covered, but also of what was said and how
each party responded to the other. For example, it would have
been surprising if the EU had not re-iterated that Kosovo represented
a key issue in European security, or EU concern over freedom of
assembly and the situation of NGOs in Russia. But what were the
Russian responses? And what does the Government think of the outcome,
the challenges for ensuing Presidencies and how best to approach
them?
9.14 It would also be helpful to have these reports somewhat
earlier after the Summit in question.
9.15 On this occasion, the thinness of the Minister's report
perhaps illustrates not so much a reluctance to be more forthcoming
as the extent to which the development of relations with post-Communist
Russia continues to falter. Not only has there been no substantive
progress over the past six months; in many respects, relations
have deteriorated, and certainly in the areas encompassed by the
first three "common spaces". Developments in the energy
sector continue to arouse widespread concern. There remains little
sign of common ground in challenges to international security
such as Kosovo, Iran, Sudan and North Korea. Events relating to
the genuineness of "common values" continue to dog relations
with individual Member States, challenge EU solidarity and undermine
progress.
9.16 International relations have, classically, involved parties
seeking to identify each other's interests and working towards
mutual benefit where they coincide and resolution or containment
where they conflict. There can be no doubt that (as the Minister
says) "relations with Russia will continue to be an important
topic for the EU". A true partnership, however, can only
be between those who share a common approach to the fundamentals.
Some might see it as a dangerous and distracting chimera; others
as an unavoidable aspiration. Either way, the essentials of a
true partnership seem a distant prospect at present.
19 25804 -: see HC 42-xxvii (2003-04), para 17 (14
July 2004). Back
20
Stg Co Deb, European Standing
Committee, 20 October 2005, cols. 1-28 Back
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