8 EU support for conflict resolution
in Georgia
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| Council Joint Action extending Joint Action 2006/439/CFSP regarding a further contribution of the European Union to the conflict settlement process in Georgia/South Ossetia
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| Legal base | Article 14 EU; unanimity
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| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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| Basis of consideration | EM of 13 June 2007
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| Previous Committee Report | None
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| To be discussed in Council | 28 June Environment Council
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| Committee's assessment | Politically important
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| Committee's decision | Cleared
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Background
8.1 At the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, many autonomous
regions (e.g. South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh) tried to upgrade
their status to independent states. In 1989, when South Ossetia
(in Georgia) did so, Georgia reacted by revoking its status as
an autonomous region. Conflict ensued until a Russian-brokered
ceasefire in 1992. Over 60,000 people (out of a population of
103,000), mainly ethnic Ossetians but also several thousand Georgians,
were displaced. Most of the displaced ethnic Ossetians moved into
adjacent North Ossetia (a republic within Russia).
8.2 Conflict settlement machinery was established
with OSCE facilitation— known as the JCC — with representatives
from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, Russia and the OSCE
and, through its funding and provision of technical assistance,
the Commission as an observer. On 18 July 2005 the Council adopted
Joint Action 2005/561/CFSP regarding the EU's contribution to
the conflict settlement process. This was further to the first
Joint Action (2001/759/CFSP) of 29 October 2001 and the second
Joint Action of 12 June 2003. The EU contribution has been to
ensure the continued functioning of both the Georgian and South
Ossetian Secretariats (run under the aegis of the OSCE) and the
JCC.
8.3 Since the first 2001 Joint Action, the belief
that Chechen terrorists were taking haven in the remote border
regions of Georgia adjacent to the border with Russia and adjacent
to South Ossetia led to Russian pre-emptive bombing raids on Georgian
territory in 2002. Then, in summer 2004, Georgian President Saakashvili
tried to close down the black market in South Ossetia, which led
to the most serious outbreak of fighting since the 1992 ceasefire.
The hostilities put paid to any political breakthrough in the
conflict for a while, and the June 2003 Joint Action was left
to wither.
8.4 The 2005 Joint Action thus essentially picked
up where the second Joint Action left off. Aid was conditional
upon the holding of no less than two JCC and two Experts' group
meetings within twelve months, with both the Georgian and South
Ossetian sides making demonstrable efforts to achieve real political
progress towards a lasting and peaceful settlement of their differences.
The Commission, in cooperation with the EUSR and the OSCE Mission
to Georgia, would monitor and evaluate the EU contribution —
which would receive visible recognition — and control expenditure.
The Commission would in turn report on implementation to the Council.
The EUSR, in conjunction with the Commission, would assess the
need for further support and make recommendations as appropriate.
8.5 The 2005 Joint Action was extended for a further
year, from 30 June 2006, in response to a request from both Georgian
and South Ossetian JCC co-Chairs for further financial assistance
to the conflict settlement process. At that time, the Minister
for Europe said that the EU's assistance had usefully reinforced
efforts to help resolve the conflict, along with the appointment
of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus,
and that the JCC had had a positive role in supporting peaceful
resolution of the conflict. The EUSR would contribute to this
conflict prevention and resolution process and work to intensify
the EU dialogue with the relevant parties. The Joint Action would
finance meetings of the JCC and other mechanisms within the JCC
framework, provide for the organisation of JCC conferences and
provide running costs for the two Secretariats for one year. Although
the Minister said nothing about whether or not the conditions
referred to above had been fulfilled, we felt that continuing
tensions in Russo-Georgian relations suggested that the continuation
of EU support in this context and for this purpose made sense,
was risk-free, and was modest — €150,000 (£103,463)
funded from the EU's CFSP budget, to be spent over a period of
12 months, with a UK contribution of approximately €25,500
(£17,510). As hitherto, time would tell if it was successful.
The draft Joint Action
8.6 The current Joint Action expires on 30 June 2007.
In his Explanatory Memorandum of 13 June 2007, the Minister for
Europe at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Geoffrey Hoon)
says that the proposed Joint Action takes into account that the
funds provided for under the current Joint Action have not been
fully spent and grants an extension, from 30 June to 31 December
— more appropriate, he says, than the customary twelve months'
extension.
8.7 The EU funds have not been fully spent over the
last year, he says, as scheduled Joint Control Commission meetings
"have been continuously postponed by one party or the other
as the tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia have increased
significantly over the last year". But he sees no alternative
to the Joint Control Commission, which he says is the only framework
acceptable to all parties. He continues as follows:
"The EU's efforts thus far in promoting dialogue
through support for the Joint Control Commission have played a
positive role in keeping the parties engaged and discouraging
them from resorting to alternative methods to achieve their objectives.
Since the inception of this support the EU has appointed, and
in 2006 reinvigorated the mandate for, an EU Special Representative
for the Caucasus. It is all the more important that the EU maintains
these efforts at a time of heightened tensions between the parties.
The tensions are likely to persist while uncertainty remains over
a political resolution to Kosovo's status."
8.8 In this regard, he says that South Ossetia, "encouraged
by Russia", sees a solution of near-independence for Kosovo
as one that should be equally applicable in its own situation.
"During this time, the Joint Control Commission becomes an
important tool for conflict prevention as much as for conflict
resolution".
8.9 He says that neither of the conditions —
regular JCC meetings and both sides making demonstrable efforts
to achieve real political progress towards a lasting and peaceful
settlement of their differences — has been met. But he is
"not inclined to dismiss the request for an extension to
the Joint Action by Roy Reeve, the UK Head of the OSCE Mission
to Georgia, a request supported by the Commission and the EU Special
Representative. To do so would risk sending the signal that our
support for settlement through peaceful negotiations (only) is
waning".
8.10 Looking ahead, he says that the Commission,
in close cooperation with the EU Special Representative for the
South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, and in liaison with the OSCE Mission
to Georgia, will monitor and evaluate the EU contribution's implementation
and impact; and will report in writing on the Joint Action's implementation
to the Council, under the responsibility of the Presidency and
assisted by the Secretary General/High Representative, Javier
Solana. "The reports will in particular be based on the regular
reports provided by the OSCE Mission".
The Government's view
8.11 The Minister continues by noting that the EU's
wider objective is to promote a political settlement of the Georgian/South
Ossetian conflict, with the full involvement of Russia, thereby
improving regional stability. He again says that the EU contribution
has been effective in ensuring the functioning of the permanent
secretaries for the Georgian and South Ossetian sides, under the
aegis of the OSCE, and in facilitating meetings of the JCC and
of the Expert's Group, which are the main instruments of the conflict
settlement process. "The Government believes it is important
that we should be proactive in seeking to deter a military offensive
and promote meaningful dialogue to ensure the long-term sustainability
of a negotiated settlement".
Conclusions
8.12 On previous occasions we have not considered
that, important as the overall situation is, this modest EU contribution
to the overall effort warranted a substantive Report to the House.
On this occasion, however, we judge that the present unhappy state
of EU-Russian relations, which we considered in our previous Report,[21]
and the linkage with the Kosovo Status Process negotiations —
in both of which major EU interests are engaged — warrant
a substantive Report. We should be grateful, therefore, if and
when it is proposed to extend or amend the Joint Action at the
end of this latest extension, the Minister fully explains the
then situation and covers these wider factors in the overall equation
in his next Explanatory Memorandum.
8.13 In the meantime, we clear the document.
21 (26607) 8799/05: see HC 41-xxv (2006-07), para 9
(13 June 2007). Back
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