Memorandum from Saferworld
A. SUMMARY
This submission highlights some examples of
UK export licences of concern during 2005 and 2006. In addition
it examines the quality of the UK's reporting on strategic transfer
controls. As part of this examination, it considers the claim
that the UK has the best or one of the best reporting regimes
in the world, specifically by comparing the UK reports to best
practice in the EU. The results of this comparison reveal that
in a number of areas, other EU member states are providing information
that the UK is not.
B. EXPORT LICENSING
DECISIONS IN
2005 AND 2006
Licences for UK exports are assessed in line
with the Consolidated EU National Arms Export Licensing Criteria
(26 October 2000—HC 199-203W). The criteria state that the
Government will not issue an export licence which inter alia
"would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing
tensions or conflicts" or "if there is a clear risk
that the proposed equipment might be used for internal repression."
During 2005 and 2006 however, the UK Government authorised export
licences for military equipment to countries or regions which
raise concerns under these categories.
Listed below are some of the most worrying licences
granted during the period between July 2005 and June 2006, and
some background information to explain the basis of such concerns.
This list should be regarded as indicative, and is not intended
to suggest that these are the only licences that may have been
of concern. The evidence and quotes are drawn from the quarterly
reports on strategic exports and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office Human Rights Report Annual Report 2006.[18]
Recommendations
As a consequence of the licences about which
concerns are raised below, Saferworld recommends that:
— The Government should introduce
a "presumption of denial" for arms exports towards an
agreed list of countries which raise prima facie concerns
against the Consolidated Criteria;
— The UK should do more to control
the risk of "downstream" proliferation, by improving
post-export controls and controls on the transfer of production
capacity off-shore (eg via licensed production agreements).
THE 2006 UK HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT
AND LICENCES
OF CONCERN
During 2005 and 2006,[19]
exports of equipment were approved to 19 of the 20 countries identified
by the FCO in the Human Rights Report as "countries of concern"
regarding human rights abuses. Included among these were:
CHINA
The Human Rights Report states: "The
Chinese authorities continue to violate a range of basic human
rights. The use of the death penalty remains extensive and non-transparent;
torture is widespread".
Despite an EU arms embargo on China, standard
individual export licences (SIELs)[20]
were granted to the value of £68.5 million for inter
alia: technology for the production of combat aircraft, components
for tanks and military communications equipment. Open individual
export licences (OIELs)[21]
were granted for inter alia: components for radar equipment, and
components for military training aircraft.
COLOMBIA
The Human Rights Report states: "Serious
human rights abuse remain a tragically common occurrence in Colombia
. . . Illegal armed groups continue to carry out attacks on both
military forces and the civilian population, and the incidence
of murders, forced disappearances and kidnappings remains high."
SIELs to the value of £4.5 million
were granted for inter alia: armoured all wheel drive vehicles
and military communications equipment.
ISRAEL
The Human Rights Report states: "Progress
on improving the human rights situation in Israel and the Occupied
Territories has been limited . . . the UK remains concerned about
Israel's failure to respect the human rights of Palestinians in
the Occupied Territories."
Despite an escalation in violence in the Middle
East in the summer of 2006, the UK Government continued to authorise
licences to Israel. SIELs to the value of £15.5 million
were granted for inter alia: armoured all wheel drive vehicles,
components for military utility helicopters, components for military
training aircraft, components for submarines, components for unmanned
air vehicle control equipment, components for air-to-surface missiles,
components for airborne electronic warfare equipment and technology
for use of combat aircraft. OIELs were granted for inter alia:
components for combat helicopters and components for electronic
warfare equipment.
RUSSIA
The Human Rights Report states: "human
rights defenders continue to be gravely concerned by actions taken
by authorities . . . The North Caucasus . . . remains one of Europe's
most serious human rights issues."
SIELs to the value of £10 million
were granted for inter alia: military cargo vehicles, military
utility vehicles, sniper rifles, gun silencers, shot guns, components
for military aircraft navigation equipment and technology for
the use of military aircraft navigation.
SAUDI ARABIA
The Human Rights Report states: "there
is still cause for serious concern about human rights in Saudi
Arabia."
SIELs to the value of £26 million
were granted for inter alia: combat shotguns, sniper rifles, grenade
launchers, heavy machine guns, military helmets, night vision
goggles, body armour, tear gas/riot control agents, components
for sniper rifles, components for submachine guns, components
for heavy machine guns, components for anti-aircraft guns and
components for body armour. OIELs were granted for inter alia
pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine guns, armoured
plate, ballistic shields, body armour, components for pistols,
components for rifles, components for semi-automatic pistols,
components for submachine guns, and components for combat aircraft.
OTHER LICENCES
OF CONCERN
In addition to the transfers authorised to states
included as "countries of concern" in the 2006 Human
Rights Report, there were transfers to other destinations which
Saferworld considers to be of concern.[22]
These include:
NIGERIA
Human Rights Watch states: "Nigeria's
most serious human rights problems remain unresolved."
SIELs to the value of £32 million were
granted for inter alia: armoured all wheel drive vehicles, components
for armoured fighting vehicles, and components for combat helicopters.
OIELs were granted for inter alia: sniper rifles, components for
sniper rifles, shotguns, components for shotguns and small arms
ammunition.
PAKISTAN
Human Rights Watch states: "President
Pervez Musharraf's military-backed government did little in 2005
to address ongoing human rights concerns".
SIELs to the value of £17 million
were granted for inter alia: equipment for operation of military
aircraft in confined areas, components for combat helicopters,
components for combat aircraft, components, sniper rifles and
heavy machine guns small arms ammunition, sniper rifles, heavy
machine guns, military aircraft head-up displays, components for
air-to-air missiles, and components for combat aircraft. OIELs
were granted for inter alia: components for military aircraft
head-down displays, components for military aircraft head-up displays,
general military aircraft components, components for combat aircraft,
components for combat helicopters, naval radars, components for
military training aircraft.
TURKEY
Amnesty International states: "Human
rights deteriorated in the eastern and south-eastern provinces
in the context of a rise in armed clashes between the Turkish
security services and the armed opposition Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK)."
SIELs to the value of £61.5 million
were granted for inter alia: components for tanks, components
for heavy machine guns, components for surface-to-air missiles,
components for armoured personnel carriers, general military aircraft
components, and shotguns. OIELs were granted for inter alia: components
for combat aircraft, components for ground-based radars, armoured
plate, assault rifles, machine pistols, pistols, rifles, semi-automatic
pistols, submachine guns, and unmanned air vehicles.
DIVERSION AND
MISUSE OF
UK EXPORTS
In the case of several of the countries identified
above, the risk of diversion is also a concern. The UK Government
does little to check what happens to arms exports once they leave
the country. It is difficult to determine whether the arms find
their way to other users, such as criminal gangs, pariah states,
terrorists, paramilitaries or warlords or other rebel forces.
A number of states to which the UK authorises the transfer of
controlled goods have reputations as conduits of arms to other
irresponsible parties. For example, concerns have long been held
over the links between the Colombian Government and right-wing
paramilitary forces within the country. Israel has in the past
failed to honour explicit end-use undertakings and has, along
with China and Pakistan, been identified as a serial proliferator
of military equipment or technologies.
INCORPORATION
Also of concern has been the willingness of
the Government to issue export licences for equipment for "incorporation"
(ie components that will be incorporated into weapons systems
in the recipient country for onward export). Over £6 million
worth of incorporation licences were granted to the United
States, including components for combat aircraft and components
for military aircraft Heads-Up display units. The US has previously
incorporated UK-made Heads-Up Display units into F-16 fighter
jets, which have been subsequently exported to Israel. Under current
UK law, such equipment would be denied a direct transfer to Israel.
Incorporating countries also include China,
Israel, Russia and Turkey none of which would be regarded
as having export control standards equivalent to that of the UK.
To make matters worse, UK reporting on incorporation licences
is woefully inadequate; not all incorporation licences are reported
as such, and in no circumstances is information provided on the
anticipated final destination of goods transferred for incorporation
purposes (see section C).
C. THE FORMAT
AND CONTENT
OF THE
ANNUAL REPORT
The UK Government has been among the forefront
of developments in national reporting of strategic export controls.
The annual hard-copy report and the recent introduction of the
quarterly reporting system (available online in pdf documents)
are both welcome components of the UK strategic export control
regime. The quality of information, however, remains inadequate
for external observers to determine whether the Government is
meeting its commitments, and there are still a number of measures
the Government could take to improve transparency in the UK.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The UK system of reporting can be improved as
follows:
— With the publication of statistical
information in the quarterly reports, the Government should do
more to adapt the annual report so that it better serves to explicate
trends and policies, for example by providing:
— statements on the general arms
transfer control approach or policy toward recipient states, along
with any policy changes that have occurred over the year;
— summary information on the types
of transfer authorised during the reporting period and explanations
of how these reflect the Government's stated commitments;
— an analysis of any trends in UK
arms licences and exports globally and to each recipient state;
— More use should be made of the
possibilities created by online data-management systems. The Government
should maintain online a fully searchable, periodically-updated
database of all transfer licensing decisions.
— Information available on individual
licences granted or refused should contain more detailed descriptions
of the goods considered for transfer, and their quantities and
end-use and end-users.
— The system for reporting on licences
for incorporation is fundamentally failing and needs to be revisited.
— UK reporting practice should be
brought into line with best-practice from around the EU, for example
by providing:
— for each licence the specified
end-user by category, for example: armed forces, government, defence
related industry, industry, international organisation, trader,
or private;
— information on denial notifications
that includes: the country of final destination; a summary description
of the goods; the monetary value for the licence application;
and the reason behind the denial;
— information on the values of actual
exports to individual states;
— data on exports of dual-use goods,
including identifying the recipient country, the value of the
export and the type of goods;
— information on all legal proceedings
regarding breaches of export laws;
— details on the Government's outreach
activities including the targets and purposes of the outreach,
and which ministries were involved;
— information on the number of catch-all
procedures initiated for the reporting year;
— information on the quantities
of equipment licensed;
— information on transfers of manufacturing
rights and joint ventures.
Since the introduction of the quarterly reports,
the Government has looked at how annual reports can function as
complementary to rather than as a reformatting of the information
contained in the quarterly reports. The 2005 Annual Report was
described by the Government, with some justification, as "[representing]
a departure from previous publications."[23]
This is welcome, however so far not enough has been done to reform
the content of the annual report. So while the Annual Report for
2005 lists for the first time the number of seizures of controlled
goods by Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and successful
prosecutions under the Export Control Act during the year, there
are many things it could do but does not.
Saferworld continues to support the recommendations
contained in the UK Working Group on Arms January 2006 submission
to the Quadripartite Committee, which called for the annual report
to include:
— an explanation of the Government's
export licensing practice for sensitive destinations (including
reference to any changes during the year);
— information on the ECO compliance
process (number of visits; results of visits; remedial measures
in the event of poor compliance, etc);
— in addition to a list of successful
prosecutions, summary information on the number of ongoing investigations,
failed prosecutions, investigations that did not lead to prosecutions,
etc;
— details of all existing and new licensed
production agreements.[24]
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmquad/873/873we07.htm.
Saferworld is also concerned that some attempts
to summarise the information included in the quarterly reports
have resulted in a slight reduction in the user-friendliness of
the annual report. Table 3.1 of the 2005 Annual Report (Information
on OIELS and SIELS issued in 2005) lists the total number of standard
individual export licences (SIELs) and open individual export
licences (OIELs) issued for each recipient state. While at first
glance this is helpful, there is no global total for number of
SIELs and OIELs issued; for SIELs this can be (laboriously) calculated
independently, but it cannot be done for OIELs due to the nature
of this type of licence (multiple destinations can be covered
by a single OIEL). It may be the case that this lack is merely
an oversight. If so, this would give weight to the argument that
the Government should "road test" any changes to the
report with interested external observers.
While the shift to quarterly reporting has without
doubt been a significant step forward for transparency in the
UK, it has also had a (probably unanticipated) negative consequence.
As the new arrangement involves producing an increased number
of discrete reports—each covering a shorter time period—without
providing a simple way of collating data from more than one report,
it becomes more complicated to analyse UK strategic licensing
decisions over time. It is incumbent upon the Government to ensure
that as more data is made available, the tools are provided to
ensure that this results in more effective transparency. At the
moment this is not in all ways the case.
There are at least two ways the Government can
work to address this weakness. First, as proposed by the UKWG
in January 2006 and as a matter of priority, the Government should
develop a fully searchable, periodically-updated database of all
licensing decisions.[25]
This should ultimately include all such decisions made under the
reporting regime introduced by the current Government since the
late 1990s. Second, it should include in the annual report its
own summary analysis of the trends in licensing, going back over
several years.
OPEN LICENCES
Reporting on open licences continues to be problematic.
There is still nothing in the quarterly or annual reports on the
quantities or values of equipment transferred under such licences.
At the very least, the Government should revise the system of
open licensing to stipulate maximum quantities and values deliverable
under any one licence, and these should be reported upon.
For open general export licences (OGELS) the
lack of transparency is even more marked. At present the national
reports contain no data on the type of equipment, value or volume
of goods being transferred under any OGEL, nor whether such items
are destined for "incorporation" and re-export (for
more on this, see below).
INCORPORATION
UK reporting on incorporation licences is fundamentally
inadequate. Guidelines introduced in 2002 on awarding incorporation
licences effectively handed over responsibility for the analysis
of the risk that the eventual end-product might be misused or
diverted to the country in receipt of the items to be incorporated.[26]
It would seem appropriate in these circumstances for the Government
to be as transparent as possible about incorporation licences,
so as to maximise the opportunity for interested parties to evaluate
the impact of this policy shift. Unfortunately, the Government
has taken a different approach.
For SIELs, the Government does not report on
the final destination of goods which are known to be intended
for incorporation and onward export. For OIELs, the situation
is even worse, in that there is absolutely no information published
on whether equipment authorised for transfer under an OIEL is
for incorporation. Saferworld understands that the Government
is not always aware of the expected final destinations of incorporated
goods; at the very least the electorate should be informed when
this is the case.
REPORTING ON
THE UK GOVERNMENT
AS PRINCIPAL
One of the consequences of not requiring a transfer
licence when the Government is itself involved as a party to a
deal, eg for government-to-government sales or where the Government
gifts controlled goods, is that information on these transfers
is missing from the quarterly reports, which deal only with licensed
transactions. The information is available in the annual reports,
where such transfers are reported on specifically, however it
is not clear why reporting on these deals should take place on
a less timely basis than commercial sales (for more on Government-as-principal
arrangements, see the November 2006 UK Working Group on Arms submission
to the Quadripartite Committee on the Review of export control
legislation).
REPLICATING BEST-PRACTICE
IN THE
EU
The UK Government has for several years claimed,
with some justification, that its reports on strategic export
controls are among the best in the world. However in absolute
terms UK reporting is still inadequate, while in relative terms
the UK is in danger of being overtaken by other states. In the
last few years, improvements in reporting around the EU mean that
the UK is now being outshone by other member states in some areas.
The Government should be careful to ensure that it is aware of
and is at least matching emerging practice in other states.
EXAMPLES OF
BETTER PRACTICE
IN OTHER
EU MEMBER STATES
Actual exports
Many other EU states publish data on the values
of actual exports of military list items, eg Austria, Finland,
France and Sweden. Others, such as Denmark and
Estonia, provide data on exports of dual-use goods, including
identifying the recipient country, the value of the export and
the type of goods. Despite operative provision 8 of the 1998 EU
Code stating that: "Member States have identified the following
priority guidelines for the near future . . . harmonisation of
national reports in order to promote more homogeneous statistical
data . . . with a special focus on data relating to the value
of actual exports" and reiteration of this in the 8th EU
Consolidated Report (October 2006)[27]
the UK Annual Report does not provide this information.
Quantity of equipment
The annual and quarterly reports could be improved
by identifying the quantity of equipment licensed, as is done
in Finland and Portugal.
Information on end-use
In the Flanders region of Belgium, specific
end-users are identified by the following categories: armed forces,
government, defence related industry, industry, international
organisation, trader, or private.
Denial notifications
In both Germany and the Netherlands,
information on denials includes the country of final destination,
a summary description of the goods, the monetary value of the
proposed transfer, and the reason for the denial. Furthermore,
the Netherlands identifies the recipient and final end-user.
Manufacturing rights and joint ventures
The annual report from Sweden includes
information on transfers of manufacturing rights and joint ventures.
Specifically it identifies how many licences for manufacturing
rights were issued in the reporting year and the country of permitted
production.
Legal proceedings
Germany reports not only on actual prosecutions
in the year, but also on the number of investigations of breaches
of export legislation, including the number of suspects, the country
of destination, and the equipment involved.
Outreach
The German Government reports on all
its outreach work over the year, listing: the target countries;
the month in which the activity occurs; the type of event organised;
and the subject matter. The UK is among the most active of EU
member states in terms of outreach activities, both with near-neighbourhood
states and countries further afield such as China and South Africa,
but in its annual report only lists the outreach target countries.
Historical analysis
In France a comparison is made of the
number of exports, negotiations, and temporary exports for the
previous seven years, as well as a comparison of the numbers of
refusals over the past seven years. A specific comparison of the
criteria used for the refusal and the geographic distribution
between the current and previous year is also provided.
November 2006
18 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human Rights
Report Annual Report 2006 (2006 Human Rights Report), October
2006; Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, January-March
2006; Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, April-June 2006;
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, July-September 2005;
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, October-December 2005. Back
19
Note that for the states listed in the 2006 UK Human Rights Report
the information on the value and nature of licences granted is
for the period covered by the 2006 Human Rights Report, ie July
2005 to June 2006. Also note that the value figure refers only
to standard individual export licences (SIELs). For each of the
countries profiled herein the UK Government also authorised exports
under open licences (which typically place no upper limits on
quantities, values of number of deliveries and hence on values),
so the value figures here are not truly representative of UK Government
policy. Back
20
A SIEL allows for a single delivery to a named end-user, up to
a stated maximum quantity and value. Back
21
It is not possible to include a value figure for OIELs (see footnote
19 above). Back
22
Note that as these destinations are not linked to the 2006 UK
Human Rights Report, the figures and items referred to in this
section of the analysis are for calendar year 2005. As the UK
Government authorised exports to all three of these countries
under open licences, once again the value figures are not truly
representative of UK Government policy. Back
23
United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2005,
Cm 6882, July 2006, http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FCO-Annual%20Report%202005.LR.pdf. Back
24
Memorandum from the UKWG on Arms to the Quadripartite Committee,
January 2006, Back
25
Ibid. Back
26
Hansard, House of Commons, Parliamentary Questions, col
650W, 8 July 2002. Back
27
"Eighth annual report according to operative provision 8
of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports" (8th
EU Consolidated Report), Official Journal of the European Union,
C250/3, 16 October 2006, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_250/c_25020061016en00010346.pdf. Back
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