Quadripartite Select Committee Written Evidence


Letter to the Chair from the Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

  Thank you for your letter of 25 August to Margaret Beckett about British made equipment found in Southern Lebanon. I am replying as the Minister responsible for export controls in the FCO.

  The Government approached the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) about reports that they had found British-made thermal imaging equipment in southern Lebanon. They have now provided us with full details of the two pieces of British-made equipment found. The Government of Israel made no complaint about this equipment, and has been grateful for the UK's determination to get to the bottom of this issue.

  The first item was a remote video camera manufactured in the UK, which did not require an export licence and is widely available through normal commercial outlets.

  The other item was a static thermal imaging system (described by the Dual Use List (not the Military List) and as such required an export licence) that was exported under an export licence to Lebanon for use at a private residence in 1999.  An export licence would still be required if the same equipment were to be exported now. The exporter has confirmed that the equipment was exported and would have been part of a fixed installation, and that the equipment is not suitable for hand held operation.

  The equipment found by the IDF was not exported to Iran, as the media have speculated, nor did it include night vision goggles.

  We continue our policy of rigorously assessing each export licence application on a case-by-case basis against consolidated EU and national export licensing criteria. If we assess that the issue of a licence would be inconsistent with these criteria, we will not issue a licence. The licence for the static thermal imaging system was issued on the basis of all the facts available at the time, and at that time (1999), there was no reason to suspect that the equipment would be used for anything other than its described purpose. Whilst proper procedures were followed in relation to this export licence, the threat of diversion is obviously a matter of considerable concern, and one which I will continue to take most seriously. The circumstances surrounding this matter will be factored into our consideration of export license applications in the future.

  The UK is, of course, fully committed to the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, including through our export licensing policy. UNSCR 1701 specifies that arms or related material may only be sold or supplied to Lebanon with the Lebanese Government's authorisation.

  You also raise the point about end-use monitoring. The preferred position of the Government remains to issue export licences without end-use conditions, undertaking instead strict risk assessment at the pre-licensing stage and refusing a licence when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion or misuse. In addition, UK Overseas Posts have standing instructions to report any misuse of UK-origin defence equipment. If the conditions of a licence were breached, this would be taken fully into account when the Government assesses any subsequent licence applications. The Government may also, if appropriate, revoke other related licences, and consider whether to prosecute if any criminal offence has been committed.

  The recommendations in the Committee's Annual Report 2004-05 were appreciated. The Government is working on a response to the report and looks forward to publishing it as soon as possible after recess.

September 2006





 
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