House of Commons - Quadripartite Committee

Quadripartite Select Committee Written Evidence

Memorandum from Joanna Kidd and Dr Christopher Hobbs, Department of War Studies, King's College, London[49]

REPORT ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM'S EXPORT CONTROLS TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

This report will examine how adequate are the United Kingdom's (UK) export controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It will assess the adequacy of the UK's current controls in terms of both new challenges to non-proliferation which have recently emerged, such as the A.Q Khan network, and also in terms of clear definitions of and new developments in science and technology and information technology (IT).

The export controls which the report will examine are the 2002 Export Control Act (henceforth known as "the Act"); the Guidance on the Export Control Act for Academics and Researchers in the UK; the Supplementary Guidance Note (to the 2002 Act) on Additional Controls relating to the Prevention of Proliferation of WMD; the Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance (Control) Order 2003 (henceforth known as "the Order"); and the Uranium Enrichment Technology (Prohibitions on Disclosure) Regulations 2004 (henceforth known as "the Regulations"). Additionally, the Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) general guidelines on export controls will be analysed as will multilateral export control arrangements, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, of which the UK is a member.

The issues which the report will cover are: proliferation by state actors; issues associated with the A.Q. Khan proliferation network; multilateral export control agreements; any effects on academic research in the UK; potential restrictions on the transfer of software under the Act; the clarity of the law and future proofing.

PROLIFERATION BY STATES OF CONCERN

Summary:

The new UK export controls have significantly reduced the scope for proliferation by state actors through abuse by unscrupulous UK exporters. Ambiguous areas do remain, however, which could possibly be exploited by those who seek to avoid legal punishment if their activities are detected. An emphasis should be placed on efforts to prevent the inadvertent transfer of seemingly innocuous goods to entities which may then re-export UK goods (and possible intangible transfers such as designs and software) to states of proliferation concern. Although those exporters who are either willing or indifferent to eventual re-export can be punished, there is a limit to the ability of UK legislation to prevent this occurring inadvertently, and the ability of the UK to verify the final destination or end-use of nuclear-relevant goods and technology.

It would appear that UK export controls are generally adequate in regard to proliferation by state actors, except in the areas of front companies and re-exports, which are difficult to control. Proactive actions by the Export Control Organization (ECO) are clearly being taken to prevent inadvertent exports by UK companies to states of proliferation concern. An example of such action took place in March 2006, when the ECO published a special supplement to its Guidance on the Operation of the WMD End-Use Control. This listed various Iranian entities which were suspected of being involved in WMD programmes. The publication of such lists is to be commended, as it will help UK exporters to be more wary when dealing with these entities, and also to be cautious when dealing with other Iranian customers. It should be noted, however, that such lists are by no means exhaustive, and are likely to require frequent updating. Furthermore, state procurement networks frequently create front companies to obtain their required goods. This area is perhaps more in the realm of intelligence gathering, but the ECO should make UK exporters aware of this tactic and that the latter should note any requests from newly-established firms from countries of WMD concern.

A greater challenge when combating state proliferation is the fact that states often make extensive use of high volume transhipment hubs such as Dubai and Singapore, in order to mask their proliferation. Taking the case of the UAE, where most of the re-export trade is concentrated in the emirate of Dubai, it would appear that this trade is growing. According to the UAE Federal Government, "Overall re-exports in the 1990s have grown at a much faster rate than imports. Currently more than 25% of imports are for re-export, compared with less than 17% as recently as 1994".[50] For the past decade Iran has been the largest recipient of the re-export trade from the UAE.[51] UK Trade and Investment states that Iran's "key demand is for machinery products, which accounts for more than one third of its purchases from the UAE and is closely followed by textile products, vehicles and parts".[52] Although, as noted by the US International Trade Administration in a 2002 report that, "Iran has sharply restricted imports in an attempt to come to grips with a deteriorating economy and mounting debts"[53], figures of re-exports from Dubai produced by Dubai's Department of Ports and Customs demonstrate that, between 1998 and 2002, Iran remained the leading recipient of Dubai's re-exports.[54] In the same period, the value of Iran's re-exports rose from 2,791 million UAE Dirham to 7,399 million UAE Dirham. In this period, the value of Dubai's re-exports to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt and Jordan also rose.

It should be noted that very little if any of this re-export trade will be related to WMD proliferation. However, it does present a state wishing to proliferate with a possible means of avoiding UK export controls. Two actions may be able to lessen the threat posed to the UK's export control regime by such proliferation routes. Firstly, the UK should actively encourage states such as the UAE and Singapore to tighten their own export controls and also to subscribe to multilateral export control agreements. The United States government has sought to persuade the UAE to do so for some time. Kenneth I. Juster, the US Under Secretary of Commerce overseeing the US export control programme, visited the UAE in March 2004 for this very purpose.[55] Hitherto, this has met with some success as the UAE has joined the US Transhipment Country Export Control Initiative (TECI)[56], but there is still considerable room for improvement to be made in this area. Secondly, UK exporters should be made alert to this proliferation tactic, and then requests from firms in such hubs for dual-use technology would be more likely to prompt suspicion, and subsequent notifications to the ECO.

A.Q. KHAN NETWORK

Summary:

In general, the new UK export controls appear to be fairly adequate when it comes to closing loopholes which would allow an unscrupulous person or entity to export goods or technology in the knowledge or suspicion that they had a WMD end-use, although some may remain. However, given the lengths to which proliferation networks will go to disguise their true intentions, current legislation may be inadequate in the sense that it may be unable to prevent UK exporters unwittingly supplying proliferators with nuclear-relevant technology and/or goods. In addition, actions taken to try to remedy this may lead to a disproportionate burden falling on UK industry through overregulation.

The exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in 2003-04 prompted a thorough examination of export controls worldwide. A.Q. Khan was a Pakistani national and unlike, for example, the Iraqi nuclear programme, his network did not use the UK as a direct supplier. This suggests that the strengthening of UK export controls after the Gulf War has reduced the likelihood of British firms being targeted directly by a proliferant state's procurement apparatus, or a proliferation network. However, certain British nationals are alleged to have participated in the Khan network's activities. Moreover, it is unlikely that Khan's will be the last proliferation network to exploit gaps in export control regimes in order to obtain the necessary components for a covert nuclear programme. Although it is not apparent that any non-state proliferation network has emerged to take Khan's place, it is clear that various countries, notably Pakistan and Iran, still rely on clandestine imports for their nuclear programmes, and continue to target the UK and other EU states using their procurement networks.[57]

Although certain items can be confidently identified as primarily for use in a nuclear programme and placed on export "trigger lists", the Khan network was notable for its skill in procuring dual-use items under the pretext that their end-use was innocuous. It was also accomplished at re-exporting items, often via states perceived to be of minimal proliferation risk, to final destinations which would not originally have been granted an export license by the supplier state. In addition, the network's operations were aided by its capacity to produce sensitive components in what had been perceived to be less industrially-developed states such as Malaysia. The network was able to obtain the raw materials and equipment required by its workshops without arousing suspicion, as such states had little or no nuclear infrastructure and expertise, and hence were not considered to be proliferation risks. This "second-tier proliferation"[58] was partly possible thanks to the transfer of specifications and designs for nuclear components to "second-tier" states in electronic format. This information was then utilized by European "consultants" experienced in proliferation. Urs Tinner, a Swiss national, was employed as a full-time technical consultant to the SCOPE factory in Malaysia, configuring the machines that would produce dual-use items for Libya's nuclear programme. The Khan network also sold information necessary for the construction of an actual nuclear weapon, including component designs, information on fabrication of components, and instructions on the assembly of the weapon.[59] Alarmingly, there are indications that these plans and designs were "copies of copies of copies", suggesting that many copies exist and may still be available for sale, especially since there are concerns that all the nodes of the Khan network have not yet been rolled up. In addition, the network offered the Libyans ongoing technical assistance with any operational problems they may have encountered with the gas centrifuge facility that would have been provided to them. The ability of current UK export controls to deal with similar "intangible transfers" will be examined below.

Two UK citizens, Peter and Paul Griffin, are alleged to have been involved with the Khan network through their firm, Gulf Technical Industries of Dubai, although neither has been charged with any offence. As of 2004, UK export controls cover the activities of anyone in the UK or UK persons abroad. The extension of the maximum penalty for illicit exports to 10 years' imprisonment is an improvement; however, whether this is a sufficient disincentive to the potentially substantial profits to be made in illicit exports of nuclear-relevant technology is difficult to ascertain.

Many past proliferators have taken advantage of national control lists by ordering dual-use items whose specifications fall just below the parameters of controlled goods. This tactic has been countered by "catch-all controls", or what the UK terms an "end-use control": even if a good or technology is not on a controlled list, it will require an export licence if an exporter knows, has been informed by the UK government or (in most circumstances) has grounds for suspecting that they may be intended for any "relevant use". However, the grounds for judging "suspicious behaviour" by a potential customer are inevitably fairly subjective. Although Annex A in the DTI's general guidance on the Operation of WMD End-Use Control gives some useful indications of suspect behaviour, any adept proliferator will do his best not to display these signs of questionable conduct. As the Guidance itself admits, "this is not an area where we can give definite up-front guidance as the judgement is always made on a case-by-case basis."[60]

Under previous UK law, a license has been required if an "exporter knows, or is informed by UK Government, or has grounds for suspecting, that exports of technology or electronic transfers of technology from the UK to a destination outside of the EC would, or might be used in connection with WMD..."[61]. This rule has been broadened since 2003 also to include the transfer of WMD end-use technology by any means, including "face-to-face communication, personal demonstration, or by handing over material recorded on documents or disks". These new restrictions now also apply to anyone in the UK who proposes to transfer technology by any means to another entity within the UK, if the provider knows or has been informed by HMG that it may be intended for use outside the EC in connection with WMD. However, "none of the new controls are based on suspicion of a WMD end-use. The person or entity concerned must be aware or have been informed".[62]

According to the Supplementary Guidance Note on Additional Controls Relating to the Prevention of Proliferation of WMD, under the new controls a licence is needed if a person or entity in the UK "is aware or has been informed by the UK Government, that a proposed transfer of technology is or might be intended for ... any `relevant use' ... There is no requirement, however, to make active attempts to check that a proposed recipient of technology does not intend to use information in a WMD programme". Presumably, this caveat is intended to reassure potential exporters that they do not have to investigate all casual business acquaintances, as they will not be liable for prosecution on the basis of a face-to-face conversation with a foreign entity who, unbeknownst to them, was involved with WMD and sought to elicit technical details from them. This is probably reasonable; it would be impractical for a licence to be required for all such exchanges. However, it might be possible for an unscrupulous UK person to communicate technical details in a face-to-face conversation to a foreigner, and afterwards claim that he was unaware of his counterpart's nefarious intentions, and that there had been no obligation on him to make active attempts to investigate the foreigner's intentions. Presumably, he could also argue that he was not "reckless" regarding any such disclosed information, as is defined in the Regulations, ie that he had not recognised that the disclosure would create a risk of enabling "a specified activity", and that he was not indifferent to such a risk. Paragraph 2.2.(a) of the Regulations expands on the definition of "reckless", but still seems subjective enough to be open to abuse: "the disclosure creates an obvious risk ... but at the time he makes the disclosure he has failed to give any thought to the possibility that the disclosure would create such a risk."

There is only a limited amount of time that a busy UK exporter of dual-use goods can devote to evaluating a potential customer's intentions. Proliferators are aware of this, and often bury their desired items in a long list of innocuous products, or only make a request after a secure business relationship has been secured with the exporter. Possible technical solutions to the problem of end-use, such as (non-removable) transponders attached to dual-use goods which would reveal their final destination, could be explored in an attempt to make this task easier for the exporter.

In the 2003 Order, a distinction is made between transfers to the EC and outside the EC. Naturally, any transfer which the transferor knows or has been informed is intended for any relevant WMD use requires a licence. However, it may be useful to examine the calibre of export controls within the newer EC states, such as Romania and Bulgaria. Bulgaria in particular suffers from a high level of organized crime and, being located on the Black Sea and next to Turkey, is not far from numerous nuclear relevant smuggling routes.[63] Of course, any foreknowledge of re-export from an EC state to a non-EC state is also forbidden without a licence. However, it may be useful for UK exporters to be aware of potential weaknesses in the law enforcement and export controls of these new EC states, particularly if they receive a flurry of requests from these states for technology which is nuclear-relevant.

One difficulty possibly involved with intangible transfers is that, once they have been initially transferred, it is difficult to contain their further dissemination. For example, a UK exporter may be asked to electronically transfer information which could be useful to a WMD programme. However, although the original recipient of this information may appear to be perfectly innocuous, what mechanisms exist to prevent further transfers? Presumably, technical diagrams can be printed, photocopied and otherwise distributed indefinitely, once a licence has been granted to export them from the UK.

MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROL AGREEMENTS

Summary:

The UK remains one of the leading proponents of the non-proliferation regime and of its associated export control agreements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Zangger Committee, the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (UN 1540). It appears that whilst progress has been made in some of these areas, such as the Additional Protocol, others areas may be going backwards eg the reliability of certain NSG members is uncertain. Furthermore, the non-proliferation regime itself is under increasing pressure internationally and seems to be weakening (eg the cases of North Korea and Iran and regional responses to them). Further weakening of the regime would appear to be likely in the short term unless these cases can be resolved successfully.

Progress would seem to be slow in regards to expanding the membership and effectiveness of the various multilateral export control groups and arrangements. The Wassenaar Arrangement has a membership of 40 and does not include key states such as India and China.[64] Membership of the Zangger Committee is similar, it having 36 members, but its membership does not include Pakistan, Brazil, the UAE or India.[65] Participation in the Australia Group is of the same order, currently standing at 40; Russia, Israel, China, Brazil, the UAE, Pakistan and India are just a few of the states that are not participants.[66] Moreover, some of the newer member states of these groups such as South Africa, which is now a participant in the NSG[67], should not necessarily be given a higher "trustworthy" rating than other states. Whilst these factors do not have a direct effect on the adequacy of the UK's export controls, it should be noted that they do lessen the overall effectiveness of these controls for, as long as "gaps" in the international system remain, traffickers will be able to adapt to increased export controls by diverting their activities to these less-monitored states, as Khan did.

More importantly, the wider non-proliferation regime itself is under increasing pressure internationally and seems to be weakening. It is the case that Additional Protocols, granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements, are now in force for at least 71 states[68], and thereby have increased the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. However, the recent and unchecked acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan, India and North Korea have weakened the regime, as have the current nuclear activities by Iran. It may be difficult to contain this recent wave of nuclear proliferation, as it may lead to a nuclear "domino effect". The response of states neighbouring North Korea or Iran—such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Japan and South Korea—to those countries' nuclear programmes may be to start their own nuclear weapons programmes. Whilst other responses may be more likely, the nuclear response cannot be ruled out. Further and rapid weakening of the regime would appear, therefore, to be likely in the short term unless the cases of both North Korea and Iran can be resolved successfully.

The merit of the recent decision by the UK government to replace the Trident nuclear deterrent is outside the scope of this report. However, it should be noted that within the context of the non-proliferation regime, the decision is not necessarily to be welcomed. Under the NPT the UK is of course entitled to possess nuclear weapons, but it is also supposed to work towards nuclear disarmament, although not within a given timeframe.[69] The decision to replace Trident could be used by states such as Iran to justify nuclear weapons programmes of their own. Moreover, the decision will diminish the UK's ability to dissuade current non-nuclear states from starting their own nuclear weapons programme. It will also lessen the ability of other parties, such as the United States, to persuade states such as Japan that nuclear weapons are not militarily or politically effective; this issue is of particular concern given the current weakness of the non-proliferation regime outlined above.

EFFECT ON ACADEMIC RESEARCH

Summary:

It would appear that little scientific research has been affected by the UK's export controls for two reasons: firstly, few scientists are aware of 2002 Export Control Act and its implications on research and, secondly, those that are aware do not alter their research programmes to take the Act into account. This is not a satisfactory state of affairs. It is recommended that, as a matter of some urgency, the relevant Research Councils be made aware of the 2002 Act and its implications for academic research and that they are asked to disseminate this information to universities.

Research was carried out in order to ascertain the affect that the recent UK Export Controls legislation has had on academia. A number of high level UK academics were contacted from a range of scientific disciplines whose research remit was likely to fall within UK Export Controls. The particular institutions contacted included: the Department Physics, Oxford University; the Department of Physics, Imperial College London; the Department of Physics and Astronomy, Birmingham University; the Computer Laboratory, Cambridge University; and the Biochemistry and Computer Science Departments, King's College London. In addition to the aforementioned individual universities the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and Universities UK were also contacted.

UK scientific research comes under the "UK Export Control Act" within the "control list" and "end-use" sections of the "UK Export Control Act". For example under category 3 (Electronics) of the "UK Export Control Act" Control List a number of items of technical equipment (eg mass spectrometers, various equipment for epitaxial growth used in the manufacture of semiconductor devices; high energy capacitors etc.) commonly used by researchers in the physical sciences. "End-use" controls can potentially apply to a much wider range of scientific research, although these include exceptions for "basic scientific research" and technology or software in the "public domain".

As stated above, it would appear that little scientific research has been affected by the UK's export controls for two reasons: firstly, few scientists are aware of 2002 Export Control Act and its implications on research and, secondly, those that are aware do not alter their research programmes to take the Act into account. Evidence to support these conclusions was obtained through conversations and email exchanges with a variety of senior UK scientists, the results of which are cited with their permission in the following paragraphs.

Dr. Richard Nickerson[70] a senior physicist from Oxford University and a member of the ATLAS project stated that his group were unaware of the existence of the Act. A similar response was received during correspondence with a number of other Universities, such as the Biochemistry Department at King's College London. Indeed the majority of scientists contacted appeared to be unaware of the Act and how it could potentially impact upon their research.

Dr Nickerson also believed that it would be difficult to implement a pro-active scheme designed to make individual UK academics aware the specific details of the Act. Instead he suggested that the implications of the Act should be addressed at the funding/research council level. He proposed that research councils should be given the responsibility of raising the Act with the principle investigator of any experiment that they deemed to fall under its remit.

Professor Ken Peach[71] is a former Director of Particle Physics at the Council for the Central Laboratory of the Research Councils (CCLRC), and as he was responsible for the in-year management of the UK particle physics programme. When asked about the Export Control Act Professor Peach indicated that he was aware of the general issue of collaborating with sensitive states although he was unaware of the potential impact that the Export Control Regulations could have on research because of the very wide range of technologies controlled under the Act (he was specifically aware that access to certain chemical agents was controlled under the Act.)

In terms of the wider particle physics community Professor Peach suspected that few members of the UK particle physics community would be closely aware of the precise details of the Act and how their scientific research could potentially be encompassed by it. More specifically Professor Peach did not believe that fellow UK particle physicists would be aware of the section of the Act that restricts the transfer of certain types of expertise or software. In relation to this particular area of the Act Professor Peach expressed his view that it was difficult to see how a research programme could be pursued within the context of an international experimental collaboration if some of its members had restricted access to the technical information about the experiment, for example in sensor technology, advanced electronics or Grid technology.

Professor Ross Anderson[72] a member of the Cambridge University Computer Laboratory Security Group is acutely aware of the details and potential implications of the Act and the affect it could potential have on UK scientific research[73]. In the past he has campaigned, in his role as chairman of the Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR)[74], for amendments to be made to the Act.[75]

Members of FIPR are concerned that the Act in its current form could damage UK scientific research by seriously limiting non-EU collaborations across a range of disciplines.

An active researcher in the field of Cryptography (which comes under Section 5 of the dual-use list) Professor Anderson was a member of the international collaboration which developed the Serpent encryption algorithm. Professor Anderson emphasised that during the development of the project an essential activity was the frequent email exchange of code fragments with non-EU groups. This type of exchange of information is prohibited under Category 5, Section 5A2 of the dual use list as the Serpent algorithm uses a key length of 128 bits (the Act only permits symmetric algorithms with key lengths of 56 bits or less). It should be noted, however, that this particular project did not contravene the Act because the email exchanges took place before the Act came into force.

Professor Anderson is of the opinion that certain scientists, who are aware of the Act, will at times have no choice but to ignore its implications. This is because he believes that a strict adherence to the Act would render the formulation of exciting scientific collaborations impossible.

TRANSFER OF SOFTWARE

Summary:

It would appear from the research conducted for this report that the area of software transfer where UK Export Controls are most contentious and possibly at their least adequate. The controls are frequently flouted because of their impracticability. It is suggested that they should be reviewed as a matter of urgency.

The physical export or electronic transfer of software is covered in the UK Export Control Act under both the "control list" and "end-use" sections. Within the "control list" different types of applicable software are largely referred to in very general terms. It would appear from this that software exchange in a wide range of scientific disciplines could potentially be affected. It should be noted, however, that there are exemptions within the Act for software which is available in the public domain or software which is used for basic scientific research.

A number of the senior academics interviewed in this study expressed concern over the potential implications of the Act for collaborations in software development projects with non-EU groups. In order to develop a piece of source code in an international collaboration it can be necessary to transfer frequently (usually via email) fragments of code from one group to another. This type of exchange was emphasised by Professor Anderson in the previous section as being essential to the development of the Serpent encryption algorithm (see previous section on academia). Under the Act it would appear to be necessary to apply for separate export license to sanction each separate email exchange (with non-EU colleagues). If this is indeed the case, the effectiveness of any collaboration with non-EU groups would be seriously inhibited.

It is possible that the public domain exemption may help to circumvent this course of action, as in many cases the final source code produced in an academic collaboration is made freely downloadable on a university website (ie placed in the public domain). Although at the time of the email exchanges the code fragments would not have been available for public consumption. It is unclear to academics as to whether the public domain exemption could apply retrospectively in this case.

CLARITY OF THE LAW

The laws on export controls appear to be clear, the main exception to this being two definitions. The first is in the area of how to make a practical distinction between basic and applied scientific research. Basic scientific research is covered under the end use section of the act whereas applied research comes under both dual-use and end-use. It does not appear to be clear as to how a distinction is made between the two, which raises the question as to whether researchers in the basic sciences should be made aware of the dual-use list? For example, it is not clear how collaborative work on theoretical nuclear and particle physics by a UK citizen with a group outside the European Union (EU) would be judged? In order to avoid such queries, it is recommended that UK export controls include some additional clarification as to what constitutes a basic science project and what constitutes an applied science project.

A second area where lack of clarity is apparent is that of the definition of the "public domain", where it is not clear as to what would be the ruling on the grouping of a number of papers/sources which individually would not come under the control list because they are available in the public domain. An example of this might be a list of technical manuals and scientific papers that gives all the necessary information to build an explosive lens system could be grouped together and the emailed to a colleague outside the EU. Again, in order to avoid such queries, it is recommended that UK export controls include some additional clarification as to what constitutes the public domain.

A third and much broader area of concern is likely to be the public dissemination of the laws relating to export controls. Due to time constraints, this area was not able to be examined in depth, but given the evident lack of knowledge amongst UK academics it is possible that UK companies may also be unaware of the full implications of the country's export controls.

FUTURE PROOFING

Since the Act game into force in 2002 there have been a number of IT developments and changes in common practice which have increased the ease with which information can be transferred and shared globally. Thanks in part to increases in computer power and ease of access to the Internet, use of resources such as blogs, podcasts, wikis and online forums[76] have become increasingly mainstream. In addition the use of e-mail as a primary means of communications has become even more widespread.

In terms of online resources such as blogs, podcasts, wikis and online forums these are, by there definition of use, available in the public domain. Any information posted using these resources will come under the public domain exemption of the Act. The increasing use of e-mail as a means to transfer large documents in electronic format is perhaps of more concern, with most e-mail servers now able to easily cope with attachments of 10Mb or more. This is of a large enough size to facilitate the instant transfer of entire software packages or detailed technical manuals between groups. Developments in this area have substantially increased the ease in which the Act could be circumvented.

CONCLUSION

Current UK export controls do appear to be adequate in general. As regards issues relating to state proliferation and non-state proliferation networks, the export controls do seem to be quite tight and any further tightening may result in unnecessary difficulties for UK companies. Areas do exist, however, where weaknesses are evident and immediate reform should perhaps be carried out. These areas are as follows:

— Transfer of software.

— Lack of awareness of the UK's export controls amongst UK academia.

— Lack of clarity of some definitions used in the export controls.

UK export controls would be strengthened further if the various multilateral export control arrangements were themselves strengthened. Therefore, it is recommended that the UK government both supports these arrangements and attempts to broaden compliance with them internationally as vigorously as possible. Such action would also serve to reinforce the overall non-proliferation regime which would be a welcome development, given the mounting challenges to it.

February 2007

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49 The authors would like to acknowledge the help of Ben Rhode of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in preparing this report. Back

50 Report carried on the website of the Federal Government of the United Arab Emirates, Back

51 "Dubai: Major (non-oil) trade partners-re-exports", Department of Economic Development, Government of Dubai Back