Quadripartite Select Committee Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)

MR GARETH THOMAS MP, MR KENNY DICK AND MS KATE JOSEPH

1 MARCH 2007

  Q80  Sir John Stanley: Do you think everybody understands the definitional distinction between "dumb" cluster bombs and cluster bombs that are not in the "dumb" category? Indeed the definition of that was made by the Foreign Secretary in her statement. Could I ask you again: is the British Government's policy objective to achieve a ban on all types of cluster bombs or is this treaty a ban on "dumb" cluster bombs?

  Mr Thomas: Our policy objective is to arrive at a situation where there is the prohibition of the production and the stockpiling and the transfer and the use of those cluster bombs that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. That is the policy position. As I have said, we want to use the CCW process and the Oslo process to try to reach that end.

  Q81  Sir John Stanley: I hope, Minister, the Government will reflect on making that definition in terms of civilian harm. It is all about the use to which cluster bombs are put. Given the fact that operationally it is never possible to determine exactly on who the cluster bomb is going to fall, is it not the case that the Government should be defining their policy objectives in terms of either all cluster bombs or simply, as the Government's wish, "dumb" cluster bombs only?

  Mr Thomas: I think I have set out our policy objective. As I say, we do want to make progress on the issue of those cluster munitions that do cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. There are two processes underway and we want to work through both processes to try to make progress. We have a substantial number of allies in that process but there are also governments that remain to be persuaded.

  Q82  Chairman: What is the Government going to do with its own cluster bombs?

  Mr Thomas: We have said that we want to eliminate from use or to withdraw from use the "dumb" cluster munitions we have by the middle of the next decade.

  Q83  Chairman: Why wait until the middle of the next decade?

  Mr Thomas: We have thought through the government, across departments. We recognise that cluster munitions have significant military advantages on occasion and we want to make sure that if our forces are not able to take advantage of those cluster munitions that others are similarly not able to exploit those cluster munitions. There are processes under way to move forward. We have demonstrated our commitment to try to make progress by going along to and taking as active a part as we did in the Oslo meeting. We are very committed to move forward on both the CCW process and the Oslo process.

  Q84  Chairman: Let us move on. Since 2003, France has refused 42 applications for export licences on the grounds of incompatibility with Criterion 8 and the UK has refused one. What is the reason for this difference?

  Mr Thomas: I would suggest that if you compare Britain's record to the record of all other European allies, our process, arrangements and record stacks up very well in comparison to those other countries. There is a difference between the way in which Criterion 8 is interpreted in some countries. It is not a completely harmonised process, as you will be aware, and it is our view that our French colleagues have a slightly different interpretation of Criterion 8 from ours. I would be happy, if the Committee were to go into private session, to give you my view as to what it is that is different about the way in which our allies interpret Criterion 8, but I would say to you that I think if you look at most other European countries they have a similar role to us in terms of the number of licences refused.

  Q85  Chairman: If we have time at the end, possibly. If not, as an alternative, would it be possible for you to inform the Committee in writing in the strictest confidence on this disparity? It does seem a little odd. We know that the reasons for refusals are circulated by the European Union. We are supposed to have a common Code. I am not sure why it cannot be in the public domain that there is this difference. We would like to pursue it because it does appear to be of some interest. Since you confirm that there is a DFID approach to applying Criterion 8, we would like to understand that better.

  Mr Thomas: I would be very happy to write to you in confidence if that is needed.

  Q86  Chairman: Thank you.

  Mr Thomas: There is a common Code. However, there are some slight differences. It is not completely harmonised. We are working to get greater clarity, greater harmonisation. That process is perhaps better demonstrated by the fact that we led on the section of the EU Users' Guide which refers to the Criterion 8.

  Q87  Peter Luff: Let us turn, Minister, to a practical example of Criterion 8. Its apparent failure leads me to ask what purpose it actually serves. Do you agree with the former Secretary of State, Clare Short, who, a month ago, during a debate on the floor of the House of Commons said about the Tanzanian radar system, "It seems to me... that if the contract did not breach Criterion 8, Criterion 8 is not worth having. There is no question but that the decision damaged the development of Tanzania, and if the provision can be read in a way that allows such a decision through, it needs rewriting."?

  Mr Thomas: I do not agree with that assessment. If you look at what has happened to the economy in Tanzania and Tanzania's record since the purchase of that particular radar system, the evidence also does not stack up to support that contention. The economy in Tanzania has continued to grow at an average of about 6% a year. The number of children in primary school has virtually doubled since 2000. I do not think the purchase of that particular radar system did seriously undermine the economy of Tanzania. The fact that it is still in use is an indication that it was well-used and it was, as the Tanzanians believe themselves, an appropriate purchase.

  Q88  Peter Luff: Despite the recent press publicity about the contract in The Times there are no lessons to draw from the case as far as your department is concerned?

  Mr Thomas: There were lessons to be drawn and they were drawn at the time. They did lead to the adoption of a methodology by government across the whole of government to interpret Criterion 8. One of the things I would be happy to acknowledge is that it is now some four years since we reviewed and had a detailed look at how the implementation of that methodology is working. As a department, we are going to be shortly reviewing our use and our implementation of that methodology to see whether there are further improvements we could make to the implementation of that methodology.

  Q89  Peter Luff: I am grateful for this document, which I am not allowed to quote from. It does seem a bit odd to me that those wanting to make exports do not know what the tests are they have to meet.

  Mr Thomas: I think most arms' exporters do have a pretty good idea of what would constitute a serious threat under the Criterion 8 to the long-term economic prospects of that country.

  Q90  Peter Luff: I find it very difficult to understand why the document is not a public document.

  Mr Thomas: I am happy to say on the record that I think there is a risk as to how that document would be used.

  Q91  Peter Luff: Risk of use by whom?

  Mr Thomas: Potentially unscrupulous arms dealers.

  Q92  Mr Hoyle: Minister, who do you really think benefited the most: Tanzania or BAE Systems by the delivery of the radar system?

  Mr Thomas: I am not in a position to make that judgment. As a department, we were required to assess whether the export was likely to threaten the long-term economic prospects of Tanzania. We took a judgment, as a department, that it was not likely to seriously undermine the economic position of Tanzania and I think the evidence backs up that assessment.

  Q93  John Barrett: During that same debate, the Government Minister, Mr Wicks, said that we had to strike a balance between the criteria and the independence of the sovereign nation. He then quoted the Tanzanian President, who said, "it's a bit insulting to suggest that we need to wait for the World Bank to prescribe what's best for us." Is the Tanzanian Government or any other government in the best position to decide whether it has the necessary technical and economic capacity for an export from the United Kingdom or does it need an independent assessment from here, outwith the state the export is going to?

  Mr Thomas: I think any country, including developing countries, has the right and should be expected to try to protect their citizens. The sad reality is that on occasions weapons are going to be needed to achieve that purpose. I think developing countries do have the right to try to allow for arms exports into their country. In general, I think it is their sovereign right to determine whether particular arms are imported or not. I think we have a judgment to make about whether there is a serious threat to the long-term development of a country's economy. That is the element of the balance that Mr Wicks referred to in the debate. It must be the sovereign right of a country to import arms, but our responsibility is to make sure that the arms are not going to have a serious impact on the long-term economic prospects of that country. That is under Criterion 8. There is obviously a whole series of other criteria on which we make a judgment about the appropriateness of a potential arms export or not as well.

  Q94  John Barrett: Would you accept that the sovereign state has the right to have its view but it does not have the right to have the final say.

  Mr Thomas: It certainly has the right to have its view. If an arms export is going to be allowed to go ahead, it would ultimately be up to that country whether or not to go ahead with the purchase but I do think we have a responsibility to check that that particular arms export is not going to seriously undermine the economy of a particular country. That is under Criterion 8 of the judgment.

  Q95  John Battle: I sit here representing the International Development Committee. Our job really is to make sure that the whole focus is on poverty reduction, as it is for your department. In the application of Criterion 8 I would like to ask you about the relationship and the conversation with the international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Criterion 8 says, of course, refer to their sources of information and I am interested to know how you do that. Do you just read the IMF financial statistics year book and the World Bank's indicators, or do you go further than looking at the books and have conversations with personnel at the IMF and the World Bank on particular individual events?

  Mr Thomas: It will vary from situation to situation. We do have access in many developing countries to extensive information from the World Bank and IMF because of the various support that they give in those countries, so there is considerable data which we are able to draw from and, if necessary, we can get further information from their personnel as appropriate, but, ultimately, the decision on whether or not to move forward with a particular arms export where there is an issue about a serious threat to the long-term economic prospects of that country is ours. We do not contract out that decision, as such. We will seek to use data from the international financial institutions where it is available but the decision ultimately is ours.

  Q96  John Battle: I can understand that you do not ring up the World Bank or the IMF for the sale of every individual washer or nut on the wheel of an aircraft or bullet, for example, but what about contracts over £1 million, a threshold, so that any large-scale contracts should be subject to intense discussions with the international financial institutions so that you get some dialogue and feedback which might also suggest that they take this issue seriously as well.

  Mr Thomas: I know they take the issue seriously. We have a methodology which we use which generates a particular value threshold. If that value threshold is exceeded it will trigger concerns. Many of the further indicators raise alarms as well. That will cause us to have a proper look at whether or not the particular export is justified or not. Obviously to help us make and implement that methodology, we do, as I say, draw on data from the international monetary institutions.

  Q97  John Battle: It would involve conversations with them occasionally.

  Mr Thomas: On occasion.

  Q98  Richard Burden: As I understand it the World Bank's IDA borrowers' list is a pretty important thing you use in order to determine which countries' licences to examine in most detail. Is that right?

  Mr Thomas: It is. The International Development Association list is the list of low income countries. It is updated on an annual basis. The World Bank generates it and we think it is the most appropriate guide for us to use.

  Q99  Richard Burden: Why is it the most appropriate to use for determining Criterion 8 capability? For example, Guyana has a GDP per capita of $4,700 and it is included on the list. Morocco has a lower GDP than that, $4,400, but Morocco spends around 5% of its total GDP on military expenditure, which ranks it 18th in the world. It would appear that that would be a good one to look at but it does not appear on that list. I am struggling a bit to see why that list should have such significance in your decision as to which licences to examine.

  Mr Thomas: That list contains, essentially, the world's poorest countries. It is the list that is updated most frequently and with any list you have to make a decision about where to draw the line on that list. Having looked at the list, we judged that list to be most appropriate of those that are available. I should say as well that we do look at all licence applications for Iraq, Sudan and Nepal where they go beyond the value threshold using the methodology that we produce, and we have recently taken a decision to extend still further the list of countries for which we look at all the licence applications in those circumstances. We do use the IDA list in general terms; we do not use it as a hard and fast rule book on occasion. I do think it is the most appropriate list that is out there of the world's poorest countries and therefore it is appropriate for us to use it to make a judgment on Criterion 8.


 
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