Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)
MR GARETH
THOMAS MP, MR
KENNY DICK
AND MS
KATE JOSEPH
1 MARCH 2007
Q80 Sir John Stanley: Do you think
everybody understands the definitional distinction between "dumb"
cluster bombs and cluster bombs that are not in the "dumb"
category? Indeed the definition of that was made by the Foreign
Secretary in her statement. Could I ask you again: is the British
Government's policy objective to achieve a ban on all types of
cluster bombs or is this treaty a ban on "dumb" cluster
bombs?
Mr Thomas: Our policy objective
is to arrive at a situation where there is the prohibition of
the production and the stockpiling and the transfer and the use
of those cluster bombs that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm.
That is the policy position. As I have said, we want to use the
CCW process and the Oslo process to try to reach that end.
Q81 Sir John Stanley: I hope, Minister,
the Government will reflect on making that definition in terms
of civilian harm. It is all about the use to which cluster bombs
are put. Given the fact that operationally it is never possible
to determine exactly on who the cluster bomb is going to fall,
is it not the case that the Government should be defining their
policy objectives in terms of either all cluster bombs or simply,
as the Government's wish, "dumb" cluster bombs only?
Mr Thomas: I think I have set
out our policy objective. As I say, we do want to make progress
on the issue of those cluster munitions that do cause unacceptable
humanitarian harm. There are two processes underway and we want
to work through both processes to try to make progress. We have
a substantial number of allies in that process but there are also
governments that remain to be persuaded.
Q82 Chairman: What is the Government
going to do with its own cluster bombs?
Mr Thomas: We have said that we
want to eliminate from use or to withdraw from use the "dumb"
cluster munitions we have by the middle of the next decade.
Q83 Chairman: Why wait until the
middle of the next decade?
Mr Thomas: We have thought through
the government, across departments. We recognise that cluster
munitions have significant military advantages on occasion and
we want to make sure that if our forces are not able to take advantage
of those cluster munitions that others are similarly not able
to exploit those cluster munitions. There are processes under
way to move forward. We have demonstrated our commitment to try
to make progress by going along to and taking as active a part
as we did in the Oslo meeting. We are very committed to move forward
on both the CCW process and the Oslo process.
Q84 Chairman: Let us move on. Since
2003, France has refused 42 applications for export licences on
the grounds of incompatibility with Criterion 8 and the UK has
refused one. What is the reason for this difference?
Mr Thomas: I would suggest that
if you compare Britain's record to the record of all other European
allies, our process, arrangements and record stacks up very well
in comparison to those other countries. There is a difference
between the way in which Criterion 8 is interpreted in some countries.
It is not a completely harmonised process, as you will be aware,
and it is our view that our French colleagues have a slightly
different interpretation of Criterion 8 from ours. I would be
happy, if the Committee were to go into private session, to give
you my view as to what it is that is different about the way in
which our allies interpret Criterion 8, but I would say to you
that I think if you look at most other European countries they
have a similar role to us in terms of the number of licences refused.
Q85 Chairman: If we have time at
the end, possibly. If not, as an alternative, would it be possible
for you to inform the Committee in writing in the strictest confidence
on this disparity? It does seem a little odd. We know that the
reasons for refusals are circulated by the European Union. We
are supposed to have a common Code. I am not sure why it cannot
be in the public domain that there is this difference. We would
like to pursue it because it does appear to be of some interest.
Since you confirm that there is a DFID approach to applying Criterion
8, we would like to understand that better.
Mr Thomas: I would be very happy
to write to you in confidence if that is needed.
Q86 Chairman: Thank you.
Mr Thomas: There is a common Code.
However, there are some slight differences. It is not completely
harmonised. We are working to get greater clarity, greater harmonisation.
That process is perhaps better demonstrated by the fact that we
led on the section of the EU Users' Guide which refers to the
Criterion 8.
Q87 Peter Luff: Let us turn, Minister,
to a practical example of Criterion 8. Its apparent failure leads
me to ask what purpose it actually serves. Do you agree with the
former Secretary of State, Clare Short, who, a month ago, during
a debate on the floor of the House of Commons said about the Tanzanian
radar system, "It seems to me... that if the contract did
not breach Criterion 8, Criterion 8 is not worth having. There
is no question but that the decision damaged the development of
Tanzania, and if the provision can be read in a way that allows
such a decision through, it needs rewriting."?
Mr Thomas: I do not agree with
that assessment. If you look at what has happened to the economy
in Tanzania and Tanzania's record since the purchase of that particular
radar system, the evidence also does not stack up to support that
contention. The economy in Tanzania has continued to grow at an
average of about 6% a year. The number of children in primary
school has virtually doubled since 2000. I do not think the purchase
of that particular radar system did seriously undermine the economy
of Tanzania. The fact that it is still in use is an indication
that it was well-used and it was, as the Tanzanians believe themselves,
an appropriate purchase.
Q88 Peter Luff: Despite the recent
press publicity about the contract in The Times there are
no lessons to draw from the case as far as your department is
concerned?
Mr Thomas: There were lessons
to be drawn and they were drawn at the time. They did lead to
the adoption of a methodology by government across the whole of
government to interpret Criterion 8. One of the things I would
be happy to acknowledge is that it is now some four years since
we reviewed and had a detailed look at how the implementation
of that methodology is working. As a department, we are going
to be shortly reviewing our use and our implementation of that
methodology to see whether there are further improvements we could
make to the implementation of that methodology.
Q89 Peter Luff: I am grateful for
this document, which I am not allowed to quote from. It does seem
a bit odd to me that those wanting to make exports do not know
what the tests are they have to meet.
Mr Thomas: I think most arms'
exporters do have a pretty good idea of what would constitute
a serious threat under the Criterion 8 to the long-term economic
prospects of that country.
Q90 Peter Luff: I find it very difficult
to understand why the document is not a public document.
Mr Thomas: I am happy to say on
the record that I think there is a risk as to how that document
would be used.
Q91 Peter Luff: Risk of use by whom?
Mr Thomas: Potentially unscrupulous
arms dealers.
Q92 Mr Hoyle: Minister, who do you
really think benefited the most: Tanzania or BAE Systems by the
delivery of the radar system?
Mr Thomas: I am not in a position
to make that judgment. As a department, we were required to assess
whether the export was likely to threaten the long-term economic
prospects of Tanzania. We took a judgment, as a department, that
it was not likely to seriously undermine the economic position
of Tanzania and I think the evidence backs up that assessment.
Q93 John Barrett: During that same
debate, the Government Minister, Mr Wicks, said that we had to
strike a balance between the criteria and the independence of
the sovereign nation. He then quoted the Tanzanian President,
who said, "it's a bit insulting to suggest that we need to
wait for the World Bank to prescribe what's best for us."
Is the Tanzanian Government or any other government in the best
position to decide whether it has the necessary technical and
economic capacity for an export from the United Kingdom or does
it need an independent assessment from here, outwith the state
the export is going to?
Mr Thomas: I think any country,
including developing countries, has the right and should be expected
to try to protect their citizens. The sad reality is that on occasions
weapons are going to be needed to achieve that purpose. I think
developing countries do have the right to try to allow for arms
exports into their country. In general, I think it is their sovereign
right to determine whether particular arms are imported or not.
I think we have a judgment to make about whether there is a serious
threat to the long-term development of a country's economy. That
is the element of the balance that Mr Wicks referred to in the
debate. It must be the sovereign right of a country to import
arms, but our responsibility is to make sure that the arms are
not going to have a serious impact on the long-term economic prospects
of that country. That is under Criterion 8. There is obviously
a whole series of other criteria on which we make a judgment about
the appropriateness of a potential arms export or not as well.
Q94 John Barrett: Would you accept
that the sovereign state has the right to have its view but it
does not have the right to have the final say.
Mr Thomas: It certainly has the
right to have its view. If an arms export is going to be allowed
to go ahead, it would ultimately be up to that country whether
or not to go ahead with the purchase but I do think we have a
responsibility to check that that particular arms export is not
going to seriously undermine the economy of a particular country.
That is under Criterion 8 of the judgment.
Q95 John Battle: I sit here representing
the International Development Committee. Our job really is to
make sure that the whole focus is on poverty reduction, as it
is for your department. In the application of Criterion 8 I would
like to ask you about the relationship and the conversation with
the international financial institutions like the IMF and the
World Bank. Criterion 8 says, of course, refer to their sources
of information and I am interested to know how you do that. Do
you just read the IMF financial statistics year book and the World
Bank's indicators, or do you go further than looking at the books
and have conversations with personnel at the IMF and the World
Bank on particular individual events?
Mr Thomas: It will vary from situation
to situation. We do have access in many developing countries to
extensive information from the World Bank and IMF because of the
various support that they give in those countries, so there is
considerable data which we are able to draw from and, if necessary,
we can get further information from their personnel as appropriate,
but, ultimately, the decision on whether or not to move forward
with a particular arms export where there is an issue about a
serious threat to the long-term economic prospects of that country
is ours. We do not contract out that decision, as such. We will
seek to use data from the international financial institutions
where it is available but the decision ultimately is ours.
Q96 John Battle: I can understand
that you do not ring up the World Bank or the IMF for the sale
of every individual washer or nut on the wheel of an aircraft
or bullet, for example, but what about contracts over £1
million, a threshold, so that any large-scale contracts should
be subject to intense discussions with the international financial
institutions so that you get some dialogue and feedback which
might also suggest that they take this issue seriously as well.
Mr Thomas: I know they take the
issue seriously. We have a methodology which we use which generates
a particular value threshold. If that value threshold is exceeded
it will trigger concerns. Many of the further indicators raise
alarms as well. That will cause us to have a proper look at whether
or not the particular export is justified or not. Obviously to
help us make and implement that methodology, we do, as I say,
draw on data from the international monetary institutions.
Q97 John Battle: It would involve
conversations with them occasionally.
Mr Thomas: On occasion.
Q98 Richard Burden: As I understand
it the World Bank's IDA borrowers' list is a pretty important
thing you use in order to determine which countries' licences
to examine in most detail. Is that right?
Mr Thomas: It is. The International
Development Association list is the list of low income countries.
It is updated on an annual basis. The World Bank generates it
and we think it is the most appropriate guide for us to use.
Q99 Richard Burden: Why is it the
most appropriate to use for determining Criterion 8 capability?
For example, Guyana has a GDP per capita of $4,700 and it is included
on the list. Morocco has a lower GDP than that, $4,400, but Morocco
spends around 5% of its total GDP on military expenditure, which
ranks it 18th in the world. It would appear that that would be
a good one to look at but it does not appear on that list. I am
struggling a bit to see why that list should have such significance
in your decision as to which licences to examine.
Mr Thomas: That list contains,
essentially, the world's poorest countries. It is the list that
is updated most frequently and with any list you have to make
a decision about where to draw the line on that list. Having looked
at the list, we judged that list to be most appropriate of those
that are available. I should say as well that we do look at all
licence applications for Iraq, Sudan and Nepal where they go beyond
the value threshold using the methodology that we produce, and
we have recently taken a decision to extend still further the
list of countries for which we look at all the licence applications
in those circumstances. We do use the IDA list in general terms;
we do not use it as a hard and fast rule book on occasion. I do
think it is the most appropriate list that is out there of the
world's poorest countries and therefore it is appropriate for
us to use it to make a judgment on Criterion 8.
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