Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)
RT HON
MARGARET BECKETT
MP, RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SIR
JOCK STIRRUP
GCB AND MR
NIGEL CASEY
11 JANUARY 2007
Q20 Mr Hancock: Were you aware, Foreign
Secretary, of the final plan before it was announced?
Margaret Beckett: Yes.
Q21 Mr Hancock: When?
Margaret Beckett: I cannot remember,
a few days ago.
Des Browne: Can I answer this
question in some detail but it is not exhaustive so although it
is going to take a bit to answer it is not exhaustive, but it
is descriptive and Members can explore elements of it if they
want. I may ask the CDS to deal with some of the detail of that.
I have regular meetings and discussions with my US counterparts.
As people will know of course, my US counterpart has changed recently
and I was not able to have any discussions with the new Defense
Secretary until such time as he had been properly in post and
then people know what he did and his availability. As a matter
of fact, I spoke with him just yesterday and I expect to meet
him in person within the next few days. In addition to all of
that I think it is important for people to remember in terms of
our contribution to the coalition that every single day in terms
of this coalition at the military level we punch well above our
weight. Every senior member of the US-led coalition has a UK military
officer as their deputy. This includes General Casey, who is the
Head of the Multi-National Force in Iraq and whose deputy presently
is General Lamb, the deputy to General Dempsey, who is the Head
of the Multi-National Security Transition Command, and the deputy
to General Odierno who is Major General Mayall, who is the Head
of the Multi-National Corps in all military operations in Iraq.
Daily we have on-going contact with them, which is reported back
to the Department through the appropriate military channels because,
bear in mind, our Department is a military headquarters as well
as a department of state. CDS can speak for himself but he has
regular contact with the joint chiefs of staff and indeed with
all of his equivalents in all of the other countries.
Q22 Chairman: Secretary of State,
I want to keep you to the plan rather than to the general contact
that we have.
Des Browne: The point is of course
that as the plan was being discussed and evolving, all of these
people were involved in the considerations and in the discussions.
Officials met with the Iraq Study Group, whose work was the prompter
of some of this plan, when they were in Baghdad. Our officials
met with them and I know that the Prime Minister gave evidence
to them. Every single aspect of the structure of the way in which
this coalition operates at a military level is reflected in agreements
and in joint committee documents and we have a continuing role
in the consideration of them and in the revision of them. All
of this is on-going all the time.
Q23 Mr Hancock: Have you asked at
any time during those negotiations—and maybe the CDS can
answer—whether or not it would be possible to deploy British
troops in other parts of Iraq?
Des Browne: We were never asked
that but the CDS can answer.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
I was never asked.[1]
Des Browne: I am glad I got it
right!
Chairman: Thank you, that is helpful.
It is no surprise that we are already falling behind. You have
to be away by 5.30 and we have got a lot to pack in before then,
so David Heathcoat-Amory?
Q24 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: President
Bush has announced not just a substantial increase in troop numbers
but also a change of tactics. He is now talking about pacifying
neighbourhoods and going into areas at present denied to Allied
troops, so this is a very significant change of tactical policy.
British policy has all been about drawdown and removing troops
and handing over to the Iraqis. How can this be other than a clear
division, a split of tactics between the two main allied forces?
Margaret Beckett: It is not.
Des Browne: In military terms
it is not. I have before me the words that the President himself
used. He described the difference between the operations that
they are proposing and earlier operations and the Foreign Secretary
has already said that the attempts in Baghdad to clear, to improve
and to hold were defeated by their inability to be able to hold
these areas that they had cleared. He goes on—you are perfectly
right—to say in earlier operations political and sectarian
interference prevented Iraqi and American forces from going into
neighbourhoods that are home to those fuelling the sectarian violence.
He says that this time Iraqi and American forces will have a green
light to enter these neighbourhoods et cetera. You say that that
somehow distinguishes what he is proposing to do from what we
are doing, which you characterise as being drawdown. In fact,
our policy up until now has been the same as that strategy which
is to build the Iraqi security forces, build the capacity, transition
to Iraqi control, support economic regeneration, do it again in
a conditions-based approach, and in particular in Basra, which
is the city and the urban environment that we have responsibility
for, to do it neighbourhood by neighbourhood and not to accept
that there were neighbourhoods in Basra which were denied to us.
We had the political support to do it there through the Provincial
Council and through the Governor (who took a bit of persuading
but came along) and we had the political support to do that there.
It would have appear a much more challenging environment from
what President Bush has said that he did not have the political
support to be able to do it in the way in which we did but he
now believes he has it.
Q25 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: You talk
about Iraq as though it is divided between the area around Baghdad
where the problems are and a pacified province around Basra, but
Basra has continuing violence of sectoral divisions within the
Shi'ite population and this is a coalition effort to secure the
whole of Iraq, so it is very important that the policy overall
is seamless, but it clearly is not. Here is President Bush going
further into Iraq when we are trying to get out. Surely this is
a very damaging difference and more dangerously it is of real
substance? Therefore can you undertake, following what you have
just said, that British troops will not be withdrawn from Iraq
during the coming year because it would obviously be absurd if
the Americans are reinforcing and we are withdrawing?
Des Browne: I cannot of course.
I do not accept the summary analysis that you have given of what
the position is fundamentally. Your question is based on, with
respect Mr Heathcoat-Amory, a fundamental misunderstanding either
of what I am saying, which will no doubt be my fault, or alternatively
of what is happening. What we are saying is, and I have already
said this, I accept that Basra and Baghdad are part of the same
country. That is implicit in the question that Mr Keetch asked
and in my response to him that there is an acceptance that things
that happen in other parts of the country can have an effect in
the area that we have responsibility for. It would be a dereliction
of our duty if we did not take that into account. That having
been said, I cannot accept an analysis which requires me to pretend
that the security challenge in Basra is exactly the same as the
security challenge for 30 miles around about Baghdad and Baghdad
itself when it is not, so no matter how much persuading you try
to bring to bear I cannot accept that the reality is not the reality,
they are different.
Q26 Chairman: Secretary of State,
we will come back to the issue of British troops and numbers in
due course.
Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Can I get
an answer about troop level because I did specifically ask?
Des Browne: And I answered very
specifically.
Q27 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: For the future
for this year?
Des Browne: You will know that
I made a long, detailed speech on 24 November about our military
strategy in relation to Iraq and said in terms that our expectation
was that if we continued to make the progress that we were making,
we would get Basra and MND (SE) to the stage where our deployment
there was such that we would be able to drawdown troops within
the next 12 months, and indeed I said thousands.
Q28 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: That was
the phrase I used—drawdown.
Des Browne: Well, that was the
one accurate part of the question. The premise on which the question
was based was, with respect, a fundamental misunderstanding of
the difference and the nature of the difference and the nature
of the different security challenges that we face.
Margaret Beckett: Can I just remind
the Committee that in President Bush's statement last night one
of the things he said was specifically if we increase our support
at this crucial moment and help the Iraqis break the current cycle
of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming home.
That is not a fundamental difference in our approach.
Q29 Andrew Mackinlay: LBJ said exactly
the same thing.
Margaret Beckett: With respect,
that was a slightly different conversation.
Chairman: We will come back to Vietnam
no doubt in due course.
Q30 Mr Jenkin: Sir Jeremy Greenstock
said on Radio Four at lunchtime today that effectively the future
of Iraq will be won or lost in the suburbs of Baghdad. Does the
British Government agree with that statement?
Margaret Beckett: Certainly if
you cannot make headway in Baghdad then obviously you have very,
very serious difficulties but that is exactly what these proposals
are intended to achieve.
Q31 Mr Jenkin: And does the British
Government now believe that the Americans have a winning doctrine,
having adopted this new plan for taking the suburbs of Baghdad—the
take, clear, hold and build strategy—do we believe that
is going to work?
Margaret Beckett: Again, as I
think we have already made plain, what clearly has happened is
that there has been a reassessment of what has been done hitherto,
the flaws and the difficulties that have beset it, and what have
been the obstacles, and these proposals are intended to overcome
these obstacles. If they do overcome those obstacles then clearly
they have a prospect of success, which I would hope we would all
wish to see.
Q32 Mr Jenkin: We certainly all wish
to see it and I do not suppose there is an alternative plan available.
Could I press the Chief of Defence Staff on this question of doctrine.
We have the new Petraeus doctrine which seems to reflect something
of the British military experience of 50 years counter insurgency
warfare. The Petraeus doctrine talks about the need to apply yourself
for the long-term, the need to be very persistent, the need for
public support from your home country, the need to deny the enemy
a home base. All these ingredients seem to be lacking. This is
a short-term commitment. Iran and Syria provide safe havens for
the terrorists to operate from. This is not helped by the fact
that one of the key targets of the counter insurgency, the Shia
militia in Sadr City is in fact one of the factions that keeps
Nouri al-Maliki in power in the Iraqi Government. They hold the
balance of power. If this was put up as an exercise at staff college
on how to conduct a counter-insurgency war, how many marks would
you give it?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
Are you talking about the Petraeus doctrine?
Q33 Mr Jenkin: I am talking about
comparing the Bush plan with the Petraeus doctrine and our own
experience of conducting counter-insurgency warfare.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
I think the first thing I would say is that you have got to be
very careful in applying doctrines as a simple template which
will tell you how to carry out every operation. Basically doctrines
set forth a series of principles and you have got to apply those
in the particular circumstances in the particular environment
in which you find yourself, so the solution to each individual
case is itself going to be individual, even though the principles
may be common across them. I think the work that has been done
under General Petraeus on counter-insurgency in the United States
has been extremely valuable and of course we have been privileged
to engage in the debate and in the evolution of that work because
we have been anxious to learn from it as well, so it is a very
good piece of work. In terms of how it is to be applied in the
Baghdad Security Plan, I think that there are important elements
of that doctrine which you are emerging in the bones, which is
all we have had at the moment, of what has been announced, but
for me—and I have listened to the exchanges so far with
some interest—the critical part in all of this is that it
is not purely a military operation as everyone has said this time
and time again, but we tend to forget it too easily. Somebody
asked who is going to claim credit for this if it is a success.
It will have to be everybody because everybody is going to have
to do their part effectively if it is to be a success. It is not
just about military operations, it is not just about providing
the security space within the various suburbs of Baghdad; it is
creating the effect on the ground, the sort of thing we have sought
to do on operation SINBAD which is going to enable the Iraqi security
force to take over that responsibility and allow on-going economic,
social and political development.
Q34 Mr Jenkin: But we have got a
very narrow window before the rising violence overtakes the consent
for coalition forces to continue operating in Iraq.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
I think there is a fairly narrow window in that the President
himself last night said that he still expects all provinces in
Iraq to have transitioned to Iraqi control by November, so we
are talking about quite a narrow window from that perspective.
Q35 Mr Holloway: On the wider terrorist
threat, clearly it was there before 9/11 but if you speak to tens
of millions of people around the world they would probably argue
the threat is worse now despite some successes. Do we and our
allies have a coherent, long-term global plan of campaign?
Margaret Beckett: Certainly part
of the problem with the present direction of the activities of
terrorists is that although they use the same tactics and they
clearly learn from each other—spreading best practice I
think we usually call it—in how they operate and there are
similar characteristics, it is quite clear that the thing can
spring up all over the place in different ways with different
groups involved even if, as I say, they are to quite a large extent
learning from each other and from each other's example. You asked
about a global plan. You have to deal with initial explosions
of terrorism, if I can put it that way, where they occur in the
circumstances of the particular country that is affected, in terms
of the particular region and what the overall impacts are, so
you can have an overall approach to be opposed to such tactics
and strive to counter for example the general narrative.
Q36 Mr Holloway: My question is do
you have a coherent, long-term global plan with our allies in
how we are going to deal with this over the next five, ten, 20,
50 years?
Margaret Beckett: This is certainly
an issue which is much discussed but if you are asking me is there
some kind of blueprint—
Q37 Mr Holloway: — I was not
suggesting that and you know I was not.
Margaret Beckett: —The answer
to that question will certainly be no but there is a very widespread,
very strongly shared concern and people are looking to see what
can be done, who can tackle problems in particular areas and so
on. Increasingly I think a greater degree of international co-operation
than perhaps we have seen in the past in a whole variety of ways
with different players and partners again than we have sometimes
seen in the past.
Q38 Andrew Mackinlay: The US Iraq
Study Group warned us that if the situation in Iraq continued
to deteriorate it could—and I use the words used by the
ISG "trigger the collapse of the Iraqi Government and cause
a humanitarian catastrophe." What is your assessment as of
this afternoon about the gravity of the situation in Iraq a) politically
and b) militarily?
Margaret Beckett: It is a grave
situation; no-one disputes that. I would not myself argue that
we have seen a substantial deterioration from the point at which
they made those comments. The situation continues to be extremely
difficult but I for my own part take quite a bit of heart from
the fact that the government of Iraq is showing this increased
acceptance of the need to act and this increased willingness to
play a more vigorous part than sometimes all elements of it have
played in the past in trying to help to tackle and resolve some
of these problems, because ultimately, no matter whether all provinces
are handed over in November, no matter what happens in terms of
the continuing involvement of members of the multinational forces,
this is an issue and these are problems for the people and the
government of Iraq. The fact that they are showing this greater
willingness and preparedness to come to grips with them can only
be a good thing.
Q39 Andrew Mackinlay: And the military,
the gravity of the situation this afternoon?
Des Browne: The Committees, of
course, have the advantage that when the Iraq Study Group report
was published I was within a comparatively short period of time
in the House answering questions and said in response to both
the publication of the group's report and to questions that I
shared broadly the analysis of the nature of the security situation
in Iraq. Candidly, we can all see how serious it was in particular
in certain parts. I have to qualify that by saying of course that
not all of Iraq is like that, and we should remember that and
it is important, and I have not seen anything since then in December
to suggest that there has been a radical difference in that assessment
or in my acceptance of that assessment, so I am still about the
same place as I was then, although I can say, and you will understand
why I want to point the Committee in this direction, that in,
for example, Basra City the reported murder rate, which was quite
substantial; I think it was 84 or thereabouts some months ago,
is down to 29 per month and the number of kidnappings reported
has halved, and that is an improvement. I think that our troops,
the commanding officers, those who have designed and implemented
the SINBAD operation, are entitled to a significant amount of
the credit for that, and importantly that includes Iraqi security
forces because in the two completed pulses of Operation SINBAD
the Iraqi security forces have taken the lead. It seems to me,
although there is still much more to be done, one does not want
to be complacent about it; one does not want to overestimate how
long that situation will be sustained, that that is an indication
that you can build the capacity and deploy the capacity of Iraqi
security forces in a difficult and challenging situation to effect
over a period of time that progress. While I recognise the scale
of the challenge, I say, and this is part of the difference that
we face as opposed to what the Americans face, that the scale
of the challenge is not as great where we are and that is a function
of our ability to be able to address it.
Chairman: We will come back to this specific
situation in Basra shortly.
1 UK troops are in the main, deployed within the UK's
area of operation in Multi-National Division (South East). There
are also a number of UK military personnel based in Baghdad, some
of which are embedded within the Multi-National Force-Iraq headquarters. Back
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