Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
RT HON
MARGARET BECKETT
MP, RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SIR
JOCK STIRRUP
GCB AND MR
NIGEL CASEY
11 JANUARY 2007
Q40 Andrew Mackinlay: The nervousness
of people in this room, both legislators and others, must be that
the surge, I think the word is, or what the United States are
triggering from today, will not be sufficient and then a little
way down the road there will be arguments for the United States
primarily but the United Kingdom as a junior partner in the coalition
to go along with a further surge, and incrementally this will
just be putting more and more assets to it almost with the hope
or the belief or the assurances from various folk that we need
one more heave and we will get on top of this and then the Iraq
government's writ will run and it will be able to control its
own areas through its own armed forces etc. To be candid, all
of us are nervous that we are going to be here in a few months'
time and it will not have worked.
Des Browne: This is, of course,
a difficult and challenging environment and if you want to draw
analogies from other conflicts then of course you can say, "Look
at what happened", as you did, Mr Mackinlay, earlier in an
interjection. The fact of the matter is that we are where we are.
The scale of the challenge is, I think, properly recorded not
just in the Iraq Study Group but realistically assessed by the
President in what he said, and never at any stage have the Foreign
Secretary or I in evidence here or in anything else sought to
play that down or be complacent about it, but we are entitled,
I think, to say that there is evidence in all of this of the ability
to be able to make progress and to hold it. Of course you are
right to say that only time will tell if that proves to be durable,
but at the end of the day there are lots of other things about
which we have to take into account, like, for example, the fact
that this government, after decades of tyranny and oppression
and exploitation of their people and brutality, has been set up
democratically with all its laws for all of eight months. We have
to understand the scale of the challenges that we are putting
to these people and the experience and ability that they have.
Q41 Linda Gilroy: Foreign Secretary,
you have made much of the increasing willingness of the Iraq government
to take on responsibility but one of the weak points has been
that Sunnis remain outside of the political process, in particular
those that lost out following the de-Ba'athification of Iraq after
Saddam Hussein's removal. Why do you think the Iraq Prime Minister
Al-Maliki has so far been unable to bring the Sunni population
of Iraq fully behind the Government and what do you think the
prospects will be following the announcement yesterday for improving
on that?
Margaret Beckett: We would take
the view that although there is a policy of pursuing reconciliation
perhaps there has not been quite the vigour in pursuing that policy
that would be required to bring about the sorts of results that
you are talking about. However, there are indications that that
is recognised increasingly within the Iraqi government and in
fact I have now found my text of an interview that Prime Minister
Al-Maliki gave a couple of days ago on Al-Arabiya television.
One of the points that he makes is to speak very strongly about
the importance of reconciliation, about it being what he called
a strategic option from which there is no retreat and the importance
of bringing all groups together in the Iraq of the future. The
Secretary of State for Defence and I have made the point a couple
of times about the short period of time during which this government
has been in office. Of course, there has been as I understand
it no experience at all before in Iraq of trying to govern with
the consent and the involvement of all of the different groups.
This is something of which they have no past experience on which
to draw, so they are trying to create from scratch, if you like,
the kind of cohesive approach to all communities which, as you
have got evidence of even closer to home, is not always easy,
and certainly it is a difficult task for them. The recognition
on their part of the need for this to be an important part of
what they are doing is very clear. Incidentally, the Committees
may be aware that one of the things that we have been doing lately
is to get people here who have been engaged in the Northern Ireland
peace process to share with them some of their experience and
understanding.
Q42 Linda Gilroy: I think there is
a big difference between the talk and walking the talk and we
hope that it will encourage them to go on because they have got
some really difficult situations to deal with going way beyond
just the difficulties that are involving people in the political
a process and the way in which in the early months, for instance,
the NGO International Crisis have described the Interior Ministry
as thriving on violence and counter-violence and gradually becoming
warlords. Do you have information in the Foreign Office that supports
the situation I have just described?
Margaret Beckett: I have not seen
that particular set of observations, but certainly there has been
a particular problem in the Interior Ministry; I do not think
there is any question about that, and there are individuals there
who have been involved in the sort of activities that one would
never countenance, and it is one of the areas of considerable
importance for the government of Iraq to tackle and deal with.
Q43 Linda Gilroy: It is all-important
to reconciliation. What do you think the impact will be of the
circumstances of the execution of Saddam Hussein on achieving
reconciliation?
Margaret Beckett: It is quite
interesting. I would actually recommend to the Committees, who
may not have had a chance to see it, the transcript of this interview
with Prime Minister Al-Maliki because he talks about the execution
of Saddam Hussein and says that there is a good deal of evidence
that although, obviously, there are sectors of the community which
reacted strongly and are very unhappy about it, there is not strong
evidence that it has caused a huge problem across the board and
across all the communities in Iraq, and he makes very strongly
indeed the point in this interview that every community in Iraq
suffered under Saddam in very similar ways, that although there
is a perception, and understandably so, that there were some communities
which suffered more than others, there was no community which
was left unscathed.
Q44 Chairman: Please would you let
us have copies of that transcript?
Margaret Beckett: I would be very
happy to.[2]
Q45 Andrew Mackinlay: I received a letter
from you this morning where you indicated that, I think the words
were, "at the highest level" you have personally made
representations on the eve of Saddam's execution expressing the
United Kingdom Government's view on capital punishment, but also,
I think, counselling against the prudence of the execution. You
have sent me that letter so it is on the record, but are we doing
a similar thing today, bearing in mind that there could be further
executions? I am mindful of the fact that one execution might
have the consequences which Prime Minister Al-Maliki referred
to but a series of them could start creating a martyr situation,
a 1916 type of scenario.
Margaret Beckett: We have continued
since the execution of Saddam Hussein to express our concerns
and our opposition to the implementation of the death penalty.
My understanding is that the government of Iraq continues to take
the view that this is a matter for them.
Q46 Andrew Mackinlay: But the consequences
are a matter for us.
Margaret Beckett: I take the point.
Q47 Mike Gapes: Foreign Secretary,
in November you were quoted as saying that it was important to
draw Iran and Syria into being part of the solution instead of
part of the problem. The Prime Minister presumably, when he gave
evidence to the Iraq Study Group by video, was arguing a similar
line, and the Iraq Study Group's report actually called on the
Bush administration to engage directly with Iran and Syria without
pre-conditions. Are you therefore disappointed that President
Bush in his speech has completely rejected that approach?
Margaret Beckett: One of the phrases
that you quoted at the end there, "without pre-conditions",
is perhaps key. We continue to maintain contacts with both Iran
and Syria and to recognise the potential they have to contribute
to the solution. Equally though we continue to recognise, and
we referred to this before in my answer to Mr Keetch or in his
question, that they have the capacity and continue in many ways
to play a very negative role. There is a very clear strategic
choice before Iran and Syria. As to whether or not one should
express disappointment as to where the American government is
now, you will recall, I know, Mr Gapes, that part of the package
of proposals that the EU-3 plus 3 put before the Iranian Government
to incentivise them to move into negotiations about their use
of nuclear power and the way in which they are developing their
research and development on the use of nuclear materials, was
indeed an offer to Iran on negotiations, not just on that issue
but on a whole range of issues and that the United States would
be a participant in that. I understand that since President Bush
spoke today in the United States in a press conference, Dr Rice
has said that if Iran would suspend their process of reprocessing
and enrichment she would "go anywhere, any place, any time"
to talk to the representatives of the Iranian Government.
Q48 Mike Gapes: But, Foreign Secretary,
can I put it to you that the whole language of President Bush
is very blunt and hostile towards Syria and Iran, and there are
understandable reasons because of the role that you have referred
to. However, that is totally contrary to what the Iraq Study Group's
language was and it is also contrary to the approach that our
Government has been pursuing for many months, in fact for years.
Can I put it to you that this is a watershed and that President
Bush has taken the position of the American Enterprise Institute
rather than a large body of people from his father's administration
and from the Clinton administration and many other people in the
US, and this does not augur well for trying to get a solution
in the Middle East or the engagement of the neighbours to try
and solve the problem in Iraq?
Margaret Beckett: With respect,
we have, as I say, and have had for a long time greater direct
engagement with Iran and Syria, but the messages that we are conveying
are not different. As for the messages of hostility to their interference
in ways which actually affect our troops and our involvement in
Iraq and in Afghanistan and others across the region, their involvement
in the Middle East peace process, everyone is giving Iran and
Syria the same messages about this. Depending on the circumstances
and the occasion one may stress more the problems and the hostility
to the problems that they are causing or on the other hand the
real opportunities that there are if they decide to be more collegiate
in their approach to the international community, so I do not
detect the stark difference that you are identifying in the approach
of anyone, and that again includes the government of Iraq who
have had some extremely robust exchanges, from what they tell
me of late, both with the government of Iran and with the government
of Syria about the role that they are playing in Iraq.
Q49 Mike Gapes: Let me try another
angle on it then. The speech last night does not mention Israel
and makes only passing reference to the Palestinians. In a 20-minute
speech there is nothing about the importance of reactivating the
Middle East peace process, the emphasis that we have been putting
that is in the Iraq Study Group's report. Are you disappointed
that the American administration, although they might be sending
Condoleezza Rice to the region, is actually not seriously engaging
with some of these wider regional issues which are related to
the complexity of the difficulties that we have got in the Arab
and Muslim world?
Margaret Beckett: I would be disappointed
if I thought that that were the case but first, as I think you
recognise, President Bush did refer to the fact that Dr Rice is
to go to the region shortly. She and I have discussed on a number
of occasions recently what she hopes to achieve by doing so and
I know that it is her view that there should be a greater degree
of engagement and that that is part of what she wants to be able
to pursue, not obviously in one visit but to identify what are
the ways in which engagement can indeed make a difference in the
future. I repeat: if I thought that the American government had
put on one side the issue of the Middle East peace process and
Israel/Palestine and all of that, then I would indeed be extremely
disappointed, but they have not.
Q50 Mr Purchase: Forgive me for pressing
virtually the same point, but can I read to you precisely what
President Bush said last night and ask whether you can condone
in any way his statement in talking about Syria and Iran: "We
will disrupt the attacks on our forces, we will interrupt the
flow of support from Iran and Syria", and, crucially, he
then says, "We will seek out and destroy the networks providing
advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq". Given
the efforts that the British Government has made on the diplomatic
front and the recent foray of Nigel Sheinwald into the area, how
on earth is that kind of—well, is it hyperbole? I wish it
were just hyperbole. How is that compatible with the approach
that we have been taking in order to bring about, as you have
said, the position where Iran and Syria are part of the solution,
not part of the problem? This is language which is absolutely
outwith any diplomatic understanding I have ever had.
Margaret Beckett: With respect,
Mr Purchase, do I understand, because this is the second or third
question from the Committees that draws on this area, that the
Committees are opposed to tackling the interference and the actions
of Iran and Syria?
Q51 Mr Purchase: He says, "We
will seek out and destroy".
Margaret Beckett: Yes.
Q52 Mr Purchase: Does this mean invading
Syria?
Margaret Beckett: Yes, I am in
favour of that.
Q53 Mr Purchase: Invading Syria?
Margaret Beckett: No. I am not
speaking on behalf of the American Government but I think I can
be pretty confident in saying they are not proposing to invade
Syria. Destroying the networks that are—what is the phraseology?—providing
advanced weaponry to our enemies in Iraq: well, that is what our
troops are trying to do. That is what we are looking for various
ways to do, surely. This is something that we want to achieve.
Q54 Mr Moss: Following on that, are
you saying that the British forces in their sectors in southern
Iraq are indeed preventing the flow of material support, in President
Bush's own words, for the Shi'ite regimes and Shi'ite militias
in southern Iraq?
Margaret Beckett: I would not
claim they are totally successful but they are doing their best.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
Yes, they are.
Q55 Mr Moss: So at the moment they
are being successful. If you then downgrade the presence and you
move out of Maysan province, for example, which borders Iran,
should there not therefore be an increase in the movement of material
support across that border if you reduce your troops there?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
There are two things. First of all, I may have misunderstood your
question. If your question was are we successfully reducing all
supplies from outside Iraq to those who want to cause mischief,
the answer of course is no. Nobody is 100% successful in this
but are we doing it? The answer is yes. Clearly we would be derelict
not to. The second part of your question seems to imply that we
are going to be withdrawing from Maysan and as far as I am aware
nobody has ever made such a proposition.
Q56 Mr Moss: My understanding is
that several thousand troops are coming out of Maysan province
and it is being handed over to the Iraq security forces.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
We withdrew from the fixed base in Maysan where we were achieving
very little in the way of military effect, in large part so that
we could concentrate our forces to much greater effect carrying
out the kinds of tasks that we have just been discussing. There
is no proposition at all that we should stop doing that. Let me
just re-emphasise that the intention, of course, is for the Iraqi
security forces, the Iraqi army in this case and the Iraq border
force, to take on responsibility for their own security and their
own country, so our key effort is in developing their capacity
to be able to achieve those effects.
Q57 Mr Moss: But is it not true also
that the Iraqi forces in the south will be Shi'ite forces because
there is not any movement of Iraqi forces cross-border or region
to region, and if there are Shi'ite forces and Iraqi forces will
they not therefore be predisposed to helping out their Shi'ite
brothers across the border?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
I think that is a non sequitur.
Margaret Beckett: I will just
ask Mr Casey to add something on Syria.
Mr Casey: In respect of Syria,
if I may, since Nigel Sheinwald was in Damascus there have been
some positive signs of movement. The Syrian Foreign Minister visited
Baghdad, re-established full diplomatic relations with Baghdad,
the Iraqi Interior Minister has since been to Damascus and they
have had detailed talks to an Iraqi agenda about precisely this
issue, disrupting what the Iraqis perceived to be the flow of
people and material across the Syrian/Iraqi border, so this is
not just about our perceptions.
Q58 Mr Hancock: I am interested in
two things. One is the success of stopping infiltration from Iran
in the south. What evidence is there that you have been successful
in doing that, and you said you were, Air Marshal? I would like
to know if there was evidence, and, Foreign Secretary, who is
it, if it is not us or the Europeans and the Russians, who would
be most capable in your opinion of influencing the Iranians to
change their stance or do you believe that is an absolute lost
cause?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
On the first part I would not want to address that operational
intelligence detail in open forum but we can certainly let the
Committees have some classified information.[3]
Q59 Mr Hancock: That would be helpful;
thank you.
Margaret Beckett: With regard
to your second question about influencing the Iranians on the
whole nuclear issue, funnily enough that is a knock-on effect
of the degree to which the Iranians have isolated themselves from
many in the international community. It is quite hard to think
of people who have real influence with them. This whole concern
about developing the enrichment and reprocessing seems to be very
much a domestic concern. Indeed, there are those who argue that
it is a deliberate diversion from the economic problems of Iran
and so it is very much a domestic issue. As to the wider question
as to who might influence them, paradoxically it is possible that
among those who might have influence with them are indeed the
Iraqis as their relationships, hopefully, improve. Nigel has referred
to some of the moves for greater contacts with the government
of Syria and the government of Iraq but also there are greater
contacts, and I know that there are going to be more in the next
week or so, between the government of Iran and the government
of Iraq, and I think the government of Iran has been reluctant
to accept that anyone else thinks there is a problem with what
they are doing and actually I think has been astonished on every
occasion when the Security Council has stayed united and carried
a resolution, as we did again the other day, because they keep
thinking, and indeed they keep saying, that it is only the government
of the United States or it is only the Government of the United
Kingdom who are worried about this. Not so; everybody is worried
about it.
2 Not printed. Back
3
Not printed (classified). Back
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