Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-79)
RT HON
MARGARET BECKETT
MP, RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, AIR CHIEF
MARSHAL SIR
JOCK STIRRUP
GCB AND MR
NIGEL CASEY
11 JANUARY 2007
Q60 Chairman: Foreign Secretary,
please could you comment on my summary of the position? The United
States and the United Kingdom agree that Iran is behaving extremely
badly in relation to nuclear development and in relation to its
relations, for example, with Israel. However, the Iraq Study Group
suggested a policy of constructive engagement with Iran and with
Syria. Britain believes in a policy of constructive engagement
with Iran and Syria, but from President Bush's last night's speech
it would seem that he does not. Is that accurate?
Margaret Beckett: With respect,
I am not sure it is wholly accurate. With regard to all of the
first part, yes, we are concerned, and, as I say, not only the
United States and the United Kingdom but the whole international
community right across the board and all the other players in
the region are extremely concerned and alarmed at what they fear
are Iran's intentions. There is also great concern at their approach
to Israel and indeed to Lebanon, to that whole area of policy
concern. Yes, you are right that the Iraq Study Group suggested
constructive engagement and it is true too that we have sought
to pursue it. I take your point, and indeed I take Mr Purchase's
point about the strength of the language President Bush used yesterday,
but (a) he is in that context talking about the negative side
of Iran and Syria's involvement in the region and it is bound
to be addressed in strong terms because it is very damaging indeed,
but (b) again I say that not only is President Bush party to the
offer that was made to Iran of widespread negotiations. If you
look at the proposals that were put to the government of Iran
by the six of us it is widespread engagement across the board,
including, for example, an offer to discuss issues of reasonable
security with the government of Iran on the grounds that they
are important players potentially. Dr Rice has indeed publicly
restated that willingness today, so I do not think one can say—it
is the policy of the United States Government to engage with Iran
if Iran creates the opportunity for them to do so.
Chairman: Okay, thank you. I will get
no more out of you on that, I suspect. We will move on to Basra.
Q61 Richard Younger-Ross: I want
to talk about the security situation in the south east area. However,
if I just might follow on slightly from the last question, the
language the President used was very strong, and certainly there
will be people outside and in this room who interpret that as
a threat of a military strike on Iranian or Syrian territory if
there is a clear and visible terrorist target. What would be the
diplomatic impact of such an attack?
Margaret Beckett: Any diplomatic
or other impact of such an attack would obviously be very substantial,
but I know of no evidence to support the suggestion that that
is what the wording in President Bush's statement implies.
Q62 Richard Younger-Ross: I might
beg to differ. On the situation in south east Iraq could you give
us a briefing of what the current security situation is, and could
you say whether that has improved over the last six months or
is static, and in particular what were the consequences of both
the PISA and THYME operations?
Des Browne: In relation to the
specific consequences of individual operations I will defer to
the CDS to the extent that we are prepared to discuss the operational
aspects of them, but the fact of the matter is that Basra, as
everyone knows, saw a significant level of violence in the summer
and in the autumn of last year. This has recently reduced but,
in order to keep things in their proper perspective, even at its
peak it amounted to 2% of the attacks that there were in Iraq.[4]
We acknowledge that there has been a worrying increase in the
level of indirect fire upon our bases and we continue to address
this at a number of levels including air cover and indirect fire
patrolling, and the struggle between the Shia groups for power
and money continues to dominate the security environment in the
south east. That is the nature of the violence that is there and
it is a struggle for political power and economic power. The positive
points from our operations, including Operation SINBAD and the
operations that you refer to, were all part of that context, that
we have improved at least effectiveness throughout Operation SINBAD.
Against the metrics of improvement that we use to try to assess
whether the Iraqi security forces are capable of looking after
the security of the area we have the benchmark for the capability
of police stations in a particular province, and I use this as
an example. There are many others but I have already used, incorrectly
actually, statistics about reported murders because it was 149
in the month of June and 29 in the month of December, which is
an indication of an improving effect, albeit, and to be entirely
candid about it, there is a seasonal effect which is discernible
in violence in Iraq and we would have expected it to reduce but
not by that significant proportion. If we go to the effect of
our operations, including the operation at the al-Jameat police
station, our current assessment is that well into 60-odd per cent,
perhaps 69% of police stations in Basra province are at operational
capability and we are 50-odd per cent of those in Basra City itself.
We were starting in both places at 50 and 25 respectively before
we embarked upon these operations, and 72% is the metric for provincial
Iraqi control, so we have made some significant progress, but
there is still a lot of work to be done and it is the ability
of the Iraqi security forces themselves to hold what we have achieved
and the ability of the government's economic development that
has gone with what we have been doing to hold that which will
test whether we have been successful.
Q63 Richard Younger-Ross: One of my colleagues
will come back to the policing situation in a minute. What I was
after was whether there was a reaction. When the Foreign Affairs
Select Committee was there a year ago there had been some arrests
and the consequence of that was that we were not allowed outside
of the base because it was no longer safe. With these operations
is there still that kind of reaction where there are increased
attacks upon British personnel?
Des Browne: Generally Operation
SINBAD has been welcomed into areas, not just by the police and
by the security forces themselves, and I have already told the
Committees that in the last two pulses the Iraq security forces
took the lead and by and large did all the work and we were there
with them, but it has also been welcomed by the people and, as
has been reported to these Committees and reported otherwise in
any event, while we were in the early stages of the pulses of
SINBAD people were coming to us from other areas and saying, "When
are you coming to us?", so generally the approach of the
people of Basra has been positive. That is not to overplay this,
that you can by these processes clean up and leave it. It has
to be sustained and it has to be built on. We are talking about
creating opportunities here, in particular opportunities for Iraqi
indigenous forces and their government to build on that, to create
the opportunity for them to put the investment in that needs to
be put in. We can create short term thousands of jobs, and have,
in clearing up areas and in other projects. We can put millions
of pounds of investment in, as we have been doing, some of our
money, some of the American money, but this needs to be sustained
and the Iraqis need to be able to build upon that, and that is
the challenge, but in relation to the al-Jameat police station
operation, that was an operation that we of course planned to
do to clean up the Serious Crime Unit. We not only had to be able
to get the capability and the capacity to be able to do it ourselves
and then the Iraqi Security Forces, but we needed the political
support. When we got the political support we went and did it.
We did it very overtly, we did it very overtly in a way that sent
a very strong message to the people of Basra, that the icon of
their oppression was being destroyed, and it had that effect on
a significant number of people but it undoubtedly caused some
of the politicians who had been supporting us to get cold feet.
Chairman: Can we come back to that in
a few minutes?
Q64 Richard Younger-Ross: If I could
move on to the provinces we have moved out of, could you tell
us where we are in terms of Muthanna and Dhi Qar? Has the security
situation there remained stable, improved or got slightly worse?
Des Browne: Our assessment is
that the security situation in Dhi Qar and Muthanna where the
Australians, if I am correct, with the Romanians are providing
the over-watch since they have been passed to provincial Iraqi
control, and both of them are doing a very good job, and I have
to be careful that the record shows that it was both the Australians
and the Romanians because I have been criticised in the past for
forgetting about the Romanians who are doing this work. There
are still elements in both areas that will seek to promote instability
and the Iraqi security forces need to act decisively on occasion
and have done so, and I will give you an example. In Samawa within
a couple of weeks the security forces had to demonstrate their
ability to deal with militia, and they did, and the situation
was dealt with entirely by the Iraqi security forces and offers
of MNF support were politely but firmly declined by them. They
said that they could deal with it so while, in the words of my
predecessor, "They are not exactly Hampshire", we have
sustained the position.
Q65 Richard Younger-Ross: That is
going fairly well. What is the situation in Maysan and in Basra?
Des Browne: The situation in Maysan
is that there was a force I think some months ago now in the main
city of Maysan. There was an attack on the police station. The
test, of course, of whether or not the security forces are capable
of dealing with the threat, which is part of the two conditions
of the transfer, although it has not been passed over, is whether
their security forces can deal with it. That test was responded
to within 24 hours by their own domestic security forces without
our help, although we were there available to them if they had
wanted us, but they did not need us, but importantly I say to
you that it was done not just with the deployment of security
of military force but with the engagement of local politicians,
and it worked.
Q66 Richard Younger-Ross: So when
can we pull out?
Des Browne: We have a continuing
problem on the border there that we have discussed and we have
deployed a battle group there on that border that continues to
patrol with some degree of success, which we will let the Committees
have the detail of privately, and I have to say, with respect,
Chairman, that we have been discussing quite a lot about Basra
province and Basra City and I would be in danger of repeating
myself. I am quite prepared to do but I would be in danger of
repeating myself.
Chairman: I am sure you would not, Secretary
of State.
Q67 Mr Borrow: Could we briefly move
on to the political situation in Basra in the south? Have we got
any information on the likelihood and dates of local elections
to be held in Basra? I would also be interested in your views
on the apparent tension between the government in Baghdad and
the various arms and governments in Basra City and Basra province?
Margaret Beckett: First of all
I certainly do not have any dates for potential provincial elections,
but I think we do anticipate that they will be held in the not
so very distant future.
Mr Casey: There is no set date.
They would have to happen at the same time all over Iraq. That
requires a new election law to be passed by the Council of Representatives
which we hope will be passed soon. We hope that will enable provincial
elections to take place some time in the autumn.
Margaret Beckett: And with regard
to your question about tensions between the political elements
in the capital and in Basra, actually it is our impression that
that has eased quite substantially of late and that things have
settled down to quite a fair degree, and I think this may be one
of the reasons why—and I do not know which comes first—we
are seeing a degree of consent to the process of Operation SINBAD
because things have become both calmer and more co-operative in
general.
Q68 Mr Borrow: Certainly in the past
there have been examples of military operations in Basra which
have been supported strongly by the central government that led
to statements from the governor and local politicians in opposition.
Margaret Beckett: That has improved.
Q69 Mr Borrow: Are you saying that
as the process of Operation SINBAD etc. goes ahead that in itself
changes the political dynamic?
Margaret Beckett: I do not say
there have been no problems but what I would say is things are
an awful lot better than they were.
Des Browne: It is no secret that
we had our concerns about co-operation with the governor and,
indeed, with the provincial council in Basra, those concerns are
on record. On visits to Basra twice now I have met the governor
to make it plain to him what his responsibilities as the leader
of local government there are and what the expectation will be
and also, I might say, as a politician reminding him of the effect
that an improved province could have on his abilities to be able
to be re-elected when the elections come round. I do not claim
that significantly affected him, it may have done, but our observation
is the combination of the operational effect of SINBAD and the
conduct of SINBAD has won over the governor and the provincial
council and they have been co-operating. That is not to say there
are not occasions when they wobble and after the al-Jameat police
station operation they did wobble. Part of the consequence of
that has been that the later pulses of SINBAD we have had to conduct
without the level of co-operation from the police that we would
have expected, but we believe that we will get through that, we
have had these problems before, they are a function of the nature
of the violence that is associated with some of the politics of
that part of Iraq and we have to work through them. I am confident
that our commanding officer there, who is our interlocutor on
these issues, will be able to work his way through them. We have
made improvements but things can go back depending on what the
sense of threat is that local politicians feel.
Chairman: It is now 10 to five and we
have got little time left. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Dai
Havard.
Q70 Mr Havard: I looked at the Whitehouse
website and looked at the key elements document and it goes through
the various sections, not least of which is economic. We have
got the Petraeus doctrine mixed together with unfortunate parts
of the Kagan doctrine, it seems to me, but nevertheless a conceptual
shift. The National Security Council itself is saying they have
got a series of key tactical shifts here, not least of which is
actually trying to deal with what has traditionally been, and
what we have perceived in the past as being, a particularly dysfunctional
set of activities in terms of dealing with how you create a situation
with things like we were operating, and still are as I understand
it, Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They are talking about doubling
this, they are talking about embedding people, they are talking
about in the doctrine the PRTs within manoeuvre groups of brigade
combat teams and so on, much more integration. What I really want
to know is what is the effect of all of that as far as our sector
is concerned because when we visited Basra it was quite clear
it is largely an economic engine for the country, there is good
work going on in relation to that as far as the British are concerned,
but traditionally that has been hampered to some extent by a lack
of understanding perhaps in the centre. I understand that some
co-ordinator is going to be appointed in order to do all of this
for the US and what I want to know is that we are not going to
see Bremmer rewritten in another form. Can you answer that?
Margaret Beckett: I do not think
that is the intention.
Mr Casey: We have to find out
more from our US colleagues in the coming days but I think that
the intention of the announcement last night is that the extra
PRTs will be focused with the extra troops that will be deployed
in Baghdad and Anbar. I do not expect it to have a direct impact
on our PRT in Basra.
Q71 Mr Havard: Can I just ask one
question then. Does that mean there is going to be more of a flow
of money for this sort of activity in our sector because if that
is just going to be confined to the areas that they are going
to operate in in and around Baghdad and Anbar where does that
leave the distribution of similar monies for reconstruction elsewhere?
Margaret Beckett: The money that
has been identified and that was referred to is, I understand,
money that is already in the budget for this kind of work. I do
not think we are talking about new money.
Mr Casey: So it is the existing
money.
Q72 Mr Havard: That is not my understanding,
but there we are. I thought they were committing seriously additional
amounts of money.
Margaret Beckett: That is already
there.
Des Browne: My understanding of
it is that there is a commitment from Prime Minister al-Malaki
and his government to invest in the context of this changed approach
an additional $10 billion of their money. It is money which is
already in the Iraqi budget.
Q73 Mr Havard: Matched by additional
American money.
Des Browne: I do not understand
that to be the case but it does not detract from the point which
is that the engine of the economy of Iraq, particularly in terms
of the oil, is substantially in the area that we have responsibility
for and that is starved of investment, and has been and was quite
deliberately starved of investment as an area by Saddam Hussein,
which is why these two cities are so dramatically different when
you look at them and fly over them in particular in terms of investment.
It is the case that the ability of the Iraqi Government to be
able to put money down into the south is an important part of
our plan for that area. That is our hope, and indeed and that
was why in the visit of the Chancellor of the Exchequer he went
to Basra and asked Barham Saleh to meet him there, and he did,
and he discussed the economic regeneration of that area. Our focus
is consistently on reminding the Iraqis that they have a responsibility
to invest money south of Baghdad and in particular in that area,
not just in the interests of the investment that we have put in
terms of people and money in that area but in the interests of
their own economy since a substantial part of their GDP is either
generated through or in it.
Margaret Beckett: If I could just
add very briefly, part of the work that people in our PRT and
some of the technical people we have got there are helping to
do is in Iraq is much less a question of money being available,
it is using the money, it is the actual delivery of capacity.
Q74 Mr Havard: It is where it has
gone.
Margaret Beckett: That is one
of the things that we are seeking to work on and develop.
Chairman: We have still got a lot of
ground to cover.
Q75 Mr Jones: Can you clarify one
thing, Secretary of State. According to President Bush's statement,
he is going to ask Congress for $6.8 billion for the new deployment
and then $1.2 billion for rebuilding and development with the
emphasis on job creation. Will any of that money actually be diverted
to the south or is that just for Baghdad?
Mr Casey: I think that money,
again, is specifically earmarked for the Baghdad and Anbar extra
effort but we will have to find out for you. We are already benefiting
from substantial US money through our PRT. The main focus, as
the Secretary of State has said, is on unlocking Iraqi resources
and our PRT has helped them in recent months to approve over 220
of their own projects for which they need funding from Baghdad.
Our focus has been on helping in that respect.
Mr Havard: When he says commanders and
civilians will have greater flexibility to spend this money, we
have seen our military saying our commanders' funds are small.
We can spend this money, we can put reconstruction teams together,
but if there is going to be more flexibility and more money washing
around for it in that area I would like us to make sure that we
are getting that money to do what we need to do as well and consolidate
the position where we are.
Q76 Chairman: Mr Casey, when you
find out the answer to that question please would you let us know
as to whether any of this money is going to go south.
Mr Casey: Yes.[5]
Des Browne: Just very quickly
can I say one sentence because I would not want to move off from
this with the impression that the Americans do not allow us access
in MND(SE) to their resource in order to invest; they do. If the
joint committee does not have this information it may be that
we need to get it for them. I would not want people to move away
from this question on the basis that the Americans spend all their
money in one area.
Chairman: Thank you very much. David
Crausby.
Q77 Mr Crausby: Thank you, Chairman.
Turning back to Armed Forces personnel, there are currently just
over 7,000 UK Armed Forces personnel in Iraq, so can you update
us on where these are based and how their footprint has been affected
by the transition to provincial Iraqi control in Muthanna and
Dhi Qar?
Des Browne: May I ask the CDS
to deal with this.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
They are substantially based, as far as the UK military personnel
are concerned, in and around Basra. We have a battle group allocated
of course to Maysan but it is no longer based in Camp Abu Naji
as it used to be but is more mobile and acts very much to secure
and interdict the border with Iran. As far as the two provinces
that have been handed over to British Iraqi control are concerned,
Muthanna and Dhi Qar, as the Secretary of State has indicated,
operational over-watch is being provided by the Australians and
the Romanians with a small element of UK forces providing the
command element. At the moment the UK troops are essentially in
bases in and around Basra City itself, the air base and Shaibah
Logs Base.
Q78 Mr Crausby: How would you describe
the UK Forces' purpose in South East Iraq? More importantly, how
is that likely to change as a result of the transition process?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
This was one of the fundamental purposes of Operation SINBAD.
Operation SINBAD sought to do two things: to improve the security
situation in Basra City but also to increase the capacity of the
10th Division of the Iraqi Army to deal with that security situation
and to bring those two elements to intersection.[6]
It is important to remember both sides of that particular coin.
The Secretary of State earlier referred to some of the successes
in SINBAD and it has had a substantial effect on the ground. I
think it is just worth pointing out, because we did not get a
chance to earlier, what the Basra people themselves think about
Operation SINBAD. In December the polling showed that 92% of the
people in the city felt secure in their own neighbourhoods and
that only 2% of them had suffered some form of intimidation in
the preceding month. Interestingly, 70% of them perceived the
financial situation to be manageable or better. I think these
next statistics are important in answering your question. 50%
of them believed that the Iraqi Police Service are very effective
at protecting their neighbourhoods and that is up from 39% at
the beginning of the operation. 75% of them believed that the
Iraqi Police Service will be better this year and 67% believed
that the Iraqi Police Service are capable and professional, up
from 49% at the beginning of the operation. So it has had a substantial
impact not just on the security situation on the ground but also
on the perception of the Basrawis themselves. As far as 10 Division
is concerned, they have made substantial progress over the course
of Operation SINBAD to the extent that, as the Secretary of State
said, they have been in the lead in the latter pulses of the operation
and as the operation draws to a close it can truly now be described
as an Iraqi operation, not a UK operation. We started off SINBAD
with the UK forces providing security on the ground assisted by
10 Division Iraqi Army; we are now in a position where 10 Division
is providing that security with the UK support. So the role of
the UK military in MND(SE), as has always been planned, will transition
from delivering security to supporting the Iraqi Army principally
through mentoring, training and logistics support.
Q79 Chairman: CDS, would it be possible
for you to give us the full results of that opinion survey?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup:
Certainly.[7]
Chairman: Thank you.
Mr Crausby: Just one last question, Chairman.
Sir Richard Dannatt was reported in October as saying that the
presence of UK Forces in Iraq were exacerbating the situation.
Was he right then and has that changed?
4 Attack levels in Basra between May and December 2006
peaked at around 3%. They have now reduced to around 2%. Back
5
See Ev 22 Back
6
The aims of Op SINBAD are twofold. The first objective is to make
Basra a safer place-a responsibility which is increasingly being
taken on by the Iraqi Security Forces. The second aim is to improve
living conditions for the people of Basra. A programme of projects
is underway including street clean-ups, repairs to infrastructure,
assistance of schools, healthcare facilities and other key service
providers, as well as long term projects in and around the city. Back
7
Not printed (classified). Back
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