Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)

RT HON MARGARET BECKETT MP, RT HON DES BROWNE MP, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR JOCK STIRRUP GCB AND MR NIGEL CASEY

11 JANUARY 2007

  Q80  Andrew Mackinlay: What did he say?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I am not here to talk about what other people have said but I will tell you my own view.

  Q81  Andrew Mackinlay: You are in charge, are you not?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: When you deploy on these sorts of operations you always have a certain level of consent to start with and that level of consent over time tends to decline because people really would rather get on with their own lives and not have other forces there. That is absolutely a natural consequence in any environment you care to name. At the same time, of course, the forces you have deployed there are doing some important things in developing security and helping that country back onto its feet, so it is always a question of balance of cost and benefit. There will always be a downside to having our forces there and there will always be an upside and the question is are you getting more benefit than you are not. So far we are still continuing, as I think I have demonstrated with the statistics from Operation SINBAD, to contribute far more than we are causing a problem.

  Q82  Mr Crausby: As time goes on, as you say, if they are there longer will they exacerbate the situation more?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: As time goes on the level of consent inevitably declines and it is important to finish the job before you get to that stage. That has always been the case, it is not news, we knew it and we said it when we started the operation.

  Q83  Willie Rennie: What is the projected drawdown of UK Forces in Iraq this year and next year?

  Des Browne: The situation in relation to drawdown is that we are still operating on a conditions-based approach to this and I think it is important to say, without going through all of the conditions, our position is that we will make an assessment against the conditions that are now well-known and everybody who has an interest in Iraq is able to repeat in terms of threat, the ability to be able to deal with threat, the nature of government and our ability to be able to respond to any requests for support. When we get to that stage we will be able to move to provincial Iraqi control as we have done in two of the four provinces. When we get to that stage that will have consequences for the number of troops. But there is the additional consideration that we plan to redeploy our troops from a number of different bases in Basra to one. It is well-known that we plan to do that and that we are intending to do that over the immediate future. Other than to say what I said in November, which was that it is my expectation that we will be able to see that process through and that over the course of the coming months in this year that we are now in we can expect to see a reduction in our troops by a matter of thousands, at this stage I am not prepared to say any more. There are a number of reasons for that. One is that when the work is done and we have made the assessments then I will be able to report fully to the House and it does not seem to me to serve the operational security of those who are working and doing a very dangerous job there if we give people who have a malign attitude towards our troops some kind of framework within which to work. In particular, I am very reluctant to give them the opportunity to claim that they have achieved what we plan to do. I may just say in answer to the earlier point that was being made that my understanding of the concept of presence exacerbating is a function of that particular problem.

  Q84  Willie Rennie: Assuming there are thousands, as you say, getting drawn down, what will happen to those troops? Everywhere I go when I do defence business I get complaints from all the forces who complain about not really having any guidelines—you would call it stretch, I would call it overstretch—the real pressure upon training, which is having an effect on morale. What is anticipated for those troop numbers? Will they go off to Afghanistan to support there? Will they be brought back? Will the pressure be taken off? What is anticipated?

  Des Browne: At the risk of getting into this, with respect, somewhat tedious discussion about what is the definition of "stretch" as opposed to "overstretch", we all know what the situation is and there is no doubt that if we were able to reduce our commitment to Iraq then bringing those troops home we would be able to reduce the pressure on our own Armed Forces at the moment in order to serve these two substantial commitments which have been going now in each case for a period of time. The deployment of troops into any operational theatre is in response to the assessment made by the military of what is necessary to carry out the task that is asked of them. That is an evolving process. Even in the eight months that I have been the Secretary of State I have seen the need to make changes, to announce to the House that I am responding to circumstances that come back, operations change, but these assessments will have to be made in each theatre in relation to each theatre. At the end of the day our ability to be able to deploy troops relies on our having them to deploy, there is no question about that, and people understand that. For example, in the near future we are bringing troops back from Bosnia because the troops that we have presently deployed in Bosnia are, in fact, doing policing work there and that has moved on and it will not be necessary for us to do that. Hopefully this year with the political process in Northern Ireland we will look forward to being able to reduce our commitment in relation to Operation BANNER and, indeed, perhaps bringing it to a conclusion. If we continue to move along the path we have been moving along we look forward to being able to reduce our commitment in terms of numbers to Iraq and all of that will have an effect on our ability to do other things that we need to do.

  Q85  Willie Rennie: Is it the intention to learn the lessons about over-commitment? Is that the intention and not to actually stretch our forces in the way that we have been doing?

  Des Browne: To learn the lessons of over-commitment, the fact of the matter is our forces are being asked to do what they are able to do. There is no doubt that if we were to sustain that level of commitment over a period of time then that would have a long-term effect on our ability to be able to deploy forces at some time in the future. With respect, what I have already said suggests that it is not our intention nor our plan to continue with that level over the long-term, not even over the next year. It is our plan and our intention to be able to relieve some of that commitment and, of course, then to be able to allow those troops who have been committed to rest, recuperate and retrain and avoid the very dire consequences that some people want to concentrate on rather than what we are asking our troops to do at the moment.

  Chairman: Moving on to the infrastructure of Basra.

  Q86  Willie Rennie: What progress has been made in developing the facilities at Basrah Air Station and are you satisfied with the level of protection provided?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: There is a very comprehensive and detailed programme of work to bring the infrastructure at Basrah Air Station to the level that is needed for its projected future occupation and, indeed, to provide the appropriate level of protection for our troops. I am absolutely satisfied that people are working 100% to do that as soon as is possible.

  Q87  Willie Rennie: What about the Shaibah Logistics Base, when do you expect that to be handed over to Iraqi control?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I cannot give you a precise date at the moment because it is a complex series of moves to relocate staff from Shaibah and one or two of them have had to be delayed for a number of reasons, but it will be in the not too distant future put it that way.

  Q88  Chairman: Are we talking weeks or months?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: We are talking certainly not more than a couple of months at the moment.

  Q89  Willie Rennie: When do you expect all the UK Forces in South East Iraq to move to Basrah Air Station?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: We do not have a date for that at the moment.

  Q90  Willie Rennie: Roughly?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I would not want to speculate at the moment on a precise date because the plans are currently being drawn up and we must let the commanders on the ground do the detailed work rather than impose arbitrary timescales on them.

  Des Browne: Can I just say that we also have to have discussions with the other members of the coalition because there are other countries represented in the area who work with us, we have to have discussions with them but, most importantly, we have to have discussions with the Iraqi authorities, the provincial government, the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi security forces, all of these processes have to be gone through and until they are we will not be in a position to make any announcements. As soon as I am in a position to be able to say to Parliament what we are doing then I will do that.

  Q91  Mr Havard: It is heavily trailed in the press today that you are going to have an assessment in February of all of these sorts of aspects, is that right? Is that when it is roughly going to happen, so from that we will get a rough idea, or is the press being the usual press and it will be tomorrow's chip paper?

  Des Browne: If you had been present at Prime Minister's Question Time yesterday you might have—

  Q92  Mr Havard: I was not, no.

  Des Browne:— had some indication from the Prime Minister's answer that when it comes to the end of Operation SINBAD there will be a process of assessment and he himself said that he will make a statement to House. With respect to Mr Harding in The Telegraph, it did not take a genius to work out that something might be happening and a process of assessment might be going on. It does not help until we have done the preparatory work and in particular, and I am very conscious of this, for the operational security of those who are deployed in the South East for us to be speculating or suggesting because, apart from anything else, there are people there who will take advantage of that very set of circumstances to create a level of attack so that they then can claim that they achieved it, is not helpful. I cannot stop people speculating, I cannot stop people guessing. There is quite a lot of information in the public domain, people can work things out for themselves, but there are no announcements about this and no decisions have been made.

  Chairman: Can we now move on because we have very little time left?

  Q93  Mr Jones: Can I turn to security sector reform? One of the important points about that transition is going to be the effectiveness of the Iraqi Army and security services. When we were there in June, we met General Latif who is the commander of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army and one of the criticisms he had was lack of equipment and fire power. Can you just give us an overview of where we are in terms of both training and the reform, particularly ensuring that the Iraqi Army is not just Shia but represents all the different parts? One of the things which has been reported is the fact that various groups will not operate outside their home areas and I wonder if you could give us a response to that?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: I will speak about Ten Div in the MND South East area. First of all, they are very well positioned with regard to the rest of the Iraqi Army. They are well manned, they are 103% manned, but there are of course some shortages, particularly of officers where they are about 17% short and NCOs where they are about 39% short. These reflect long-term structural problems which flow from the history of the army itself and there is no way these can be fixed overnight, it is a question of developing the skills and capacities over time. Ten Division has in excess of 100% of each item on its equipment table with the exception of one heavy water tanker which is for expeditionary operations and so is not a serious weakness for them at the moment. There are two further areas of equipment development. The first one is in terms of protective mobility and they have now taken delivery of 142 out of a total of 242 armoured humvees which they will be equipped with. They should get the remainder of those by March of this year. They do have an aspiration for some further heavy weapons but it is an aspiration and it is not actually part of their equipment table at the moment and the Iraqi Army is looking at what they ought to do in terms of scaling that. There is one additional point which is of course that the Iraqi Army is being increased in size overall and a fifth brigade is being recruited as we speak for the division itself. So overall Ten Division is extremely well placed. The Iraqi Army has on average greater shortfalls than we experience in Ten Division. With regard to the levels of training, as I said earlier, the experiences of Operation SINBAD have shown an increasing capacity in Ten Div to take on increasingly complex tasks. There are still weaknesses, they still require substantial mentoring in terms of overall leadership, particularly for the complex operations, and they still require a great deal of assistance in terms of logistic support. With regard to the issue of deployability, we have to remember the even-numbered divisions were originally recruited purely as territorial forces and had no expectation of being employed other than in the area in which they were recruited. However, there have been a number of measures put in place including additional training, including consideration of bonuses for deploying out of your base area, and so the intention is to move the Iraqi Army over time to a posture where all divisions will be deployable across Iraq.

  Q94  Mr Jones: In the Government's response to our report last year, it was envisaged that operational command would be transferred to Iraqi ground forces by December 2006. Has that happened?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: They are in the process of transferring command. The Iraqi Army believes that it is able to take operational control of Ten Division but that has still to go through all the formal processes before it is done and dusted.

  Q95  Mr Jones: What is the problem and what is the timescale for transition?

  Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup: It should be in the near future, but there are certain processes which have to be gone through both in terms of the coalition and in terms of the Iraqi Army itself and these can be somewhat bureaucratic, but it is going through the process at the moment. It is on the cusp, is how I would describe it.

  Q96  Ms Stuart: One political rather than military question. Since the war in March, April 2003, we have gone through a whole series of stages from writing a constitution to having elections, forming a government and handing over to a government. In response to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Foreign Secretary, when we asked how long our troops would be there, you gave what on the face of it was a very straightforward answer, you said, "Until the job is done." I fully agree with what you have said about artificial deadlines and datelines, but what are your parameters for determining when the job is done as viewed from the outside? What are the kind of things we are looking for where we could tell that security has been established to such an extent? Or is simply that we are there until the Iraqis ask us to leave?

  Margaret Beckett: Actually I had forgotten that I said that but I think the answer should have been, until the job is done or indeed until the Iraqi Government decide they do not feel they need our support any more, whichever comes first. As the Secretary of State for Defence said in some of his earlier evidence, there are the parameters that we use to assess the process of handover of provinces, and they are in part the kind of parameters we use for how long we are involved. This is also something on which they may have something to say. Basically, we are expecting that they will want us to continue to help and support them even when the provinces have been handed over to their formal control for a period of time. That certainly seems to be their view at the present time and it is something I think we should be willing and prepared to do. I cannot say to you what the time line is for that. As to the judgment about what we hope to be able to have achieved, it is that Iraq has a properly functioning government, that it has a far greater degree of security and stability than has been the case actually for a very long time, not just in the recent past, and that we have seen the process of repair of infrastructure, in the health service, education, seeing the provision of electricity and water and all of that and economic development all gradually taking effect. I would hope too that one of the things we will see is the passage of the hydrocarbons law which will give scope for new investment, which is much needed in the Iraqi oil industry, and also will give scope for some sharing of revenue of a kind which has not happened before. I know many of those who are particularly engaged with economic development in Iraq feel that this is a very crucial step which could be key not only to a better future for Iraq but to shaping that Iraq in a way which is much more positive than in the past. It has been put to me, for example, that one of the things which allowed Saddam to take control in the way he did was he was able to get his hands on all the oil revenue and control it. A fair process of revenue-sharing would mean that nobody could do that in the future and that would be a very good thing.

  Q97  Ms Stuart: When we went to Iraq what was quite clear was that to have fair revenue sharing what would also be required would be the establishment of a functioning taxation system. Do you have any information as to the extent that is actually coming into place?

  Margaret Beckett: I do not have it at my fingertips. I will look at that, if I may.[8]

  Q98 Mike Gapes: Can I ask you what the implications will be for the withdrawal of our forces and the running down of our forces in the south? Do you think it will lead to an increase in Iranian influence? In that context, have you been concerned at some recent reports, emanating from Saudi Arabia, that they are involved in an internal debate—and some personnel have been removed, including the ambassador in Washington—about support for the Sunni community in Iraq after the reduction or withdrawal of the coalition forces?

  Margaret Beckett: First of all, do I think there will be an increase in Iranian influence? I would say it probably depends very much on how Iran plays it. I mentioned earlier that different ministers, a number of ministers, in the Government of Iraq have made plain to me that they have robust exchanges with the Government of Iran at what they see as a very negative role that Iraq has been playing in some respects. I think there was a question earlier about whether or not there would be a natural Shia to Shia sympathy which people in the south would be likely to welcome. My impression is that people in the south of Iraq, like people in the north or anywhere in Iraq, are very much Iraqis and they have no greater desire to see another country running their affairs than most countries in the world do. I think that is an element which is perhaps overlooked and under-estimated. My answer to you is that if the Government of Iran comes good on the positive steps they have made about ceasing to interfere negatively in Iraq, about being supportive of the Iraqi Government—which actually we would argue is very much in their own long-term interests; for the whole region and particularly for Iraq's neighbours, an unstable, undamaged and insecure Iraq is not good news—maybe they will have a friendly influence. But I do not necessarily assume they will in some way behind the scenes be running Iraq.

  Q99  Mike Gapes: If not, is there not a real danger, as King Abdullah of Jordan said when he spoke to both Houses in November, of neighbours of Iraq intervening, whether it is the Saudis or the Turks, coming in because they feel a disintegration, a conflict, internally will lead to outside regional intervention in Iraq? Is that not a real danger at this time?

  Margaret Beckett: That presumes that all the predictions and anxieties, which are understandable, of the different communities in Iraq splintering apart do actually begin to take place. It is my view as well as my hope that there is actually a very strong recognition, perhaps an increasing recognition, in all communities in Iraq that actually their best interests lie in working to maintain a unified country and to support their government. Some months ago I recall that it was felt there was an imperative for us to encourage other elements in Iraqi society to recognise that their best interests lay with supporting and working with the government that they have. Certainly it is my impression that that message has actually been accepted and understood and that people are trying to work in the overall interests of their country, as indeed one would hope they would.


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