The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia
48. The FCO Report outlines the United Kingdom's
contribution to the ICTY, which includes the provision of documentary
and eye-witness material in addition to financial support. Furthermore,
the United Kingdom is one of the main sources of funding for initiatives
which complement the work of the tribunal and has a sentence enforcement
agreement with the ICTY.[61]
The ICTY has made steady progress this year having by June 2006
completed proceedings against 94 individuals, 47 of whom have
been found guilty and sentenced. In April 2006, it began the first
of three multi-accused trials which it is confident will lead
to major efficiency gains.
49. In March 2006, former Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic died of natural causes while still in custody, an event
which has led some to doubt the effectiveness of the ICTY with
accusations that it offered too many opportunities for the former
leader to use his trial to grandstand. Although no sentence was
passed, Human Rights Watch do not doubt that the ICTY is bringing
justice for victims in the ravaged Balkans: "Nevertheless,
he died in prison."[62]
50. The death of Slobodan Milosevic makes the capture
and trial of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and of Serb
General Ratko Mladic even more urgent. The former is believed
to be in hiding in Republica Srpska and the latter in Serbia.
However, the timetable that has been laid down by the ICTY suggests
that the tribunal will 'wind down' in 2010, raising fears that
the fugitives merely need to remain in hiding before walking free.
Amnesty International were direct on this point and said "the
tribunal needs to remain effective in some form until Karadzic
and Mladic are brought to account."[63]
Ian McCartney added "there can be no timelines for crimes
against humanity."[64]
51. Indeed, Amnesty International went on to point
out that capturing these two high profile figures would have wider
implications for the region, especially in light of the Ahtisaari
proposals for Kosovo: "In establishing effective approaches
to justice in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, it has to
be seen that such people are brought to account and that good
and effective justice systems can be set up in the aftermath."[65]
In addition, Amnesty was not persuaded by the case for passing
lower profile cases to domestic courts in the states of the former
Yugoslavia, citing a lack of political will and legal capacity
as barriers to an effective judicial process.
52. Concerns that the UN Security Council is keen
to stick to the 2010 deadline have led to growing frustration
that Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are not doing all they can
to find Karadzic and Mladic and release them to the ICTY. Amnesty
International explained that when the EU put pressure on Croatia,
linking the release of wanted persons hiding on Croatian soil
to any future EU accession, it "improved the way that it
was handling them." Amnesty continued, "pressure must
be exerted on Serbia."[66]
We were therefore encouraged to hear from Ian McCartney that both
Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been put in a similar position:
They want to have a normalised relationship with
Europe, and when NATO made the decision to agree with them a Partnership
for Peace, that came with the strong obligation for them to co-operate
to put those two people in front of the Tribunal.[67]
53. We recommend that, in its response to this
Report, the Government make clear what requirements have been
made of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia under the NATO Partnership
for Peace agreements and that it provide its assessment of whether
these are being fulfilled.
The Special Court for Sierra
Leone
54. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) has
made good progress this year, most notably with the transfer of
Charles Taylor from Nigeria to The Hague to face trial. The former
Liberian president is accused of funding and arming Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) rebels who were infamous for recruiting, drugging
and arming child soldiers during the Sierra Leonean conflict.
The FCO Report explains that the United Kingdom played a critical
role in this operation, most notably by putting pressure on President
Obasanjo of Nigeria, who had been harbouring Charles Taylor. In
offering to try the former Liberian president, the Netherlands
requested that any consequent sentence be served elsewhere and
the United Kingdom has offered to fulfil this demand. The trial
is expected to commence in June.[68]
A sense of genuine optimism surrounds this capture, as Ian McCartney
outlined: "the international community delivered a major
advance in combating impunity against those accused of war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide."[69]
55. The SCSL goes further than bringing justice to
the perpetrators of horrendous crimes during the 1990s conflict,
as Amnesty International explained: "you see the tremendous
impact that it has had and the great legacy that it will leave
in the Sierra Leone justice system."[70]
However, due to major security concerns it has proved impossible
to house the trial of Charles Taylor in Freetown, therefore disconnecting
the Sierra Leonean population from the process and its developments.
Despite expressing understanding of the security concerns, Human
Rights Watch did make it clear that they "have concerns about
the fact that the trial of Charles Taylor is now going to take
place so far from the region…it is very important that these
cases should actually have relevance to the communities where
the abuses were committed."[71]
56. We welcome the Government's constructive role
in helping to bring Charles Taylor to justice. We recommend that
the Government work with its international partners to ensure
that Charles Taylor's trial in The Hague remains accessible to
the population in Sierra Leone.
54 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights
Annual Report 2006, Cm 6916, October 2006, p 220 Back
55
Ibid, p 221 Back
56
Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 2005-06, Human
Rights Annual Report 2005, HC 574, paras 23-28 Back
57
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report
2006, Cm 6916, October 2006, p 221 Back
58
Q 4 Back
59
Q 4 Back
60
Q 62 Back
61
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report
2006, Cm 6916, October 2006, p 222 Back
62
Q 8 Back
63
Q 7 Back
64
Q 63 Back
65
Q 10 Back
66
Q 15 Back
67
Q 64 Back
68
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report
2006, Cm 6916, October 2006, p 223 Back
69
Ev 51 Back
70
Q 11 Back
71
Q 13 Back
