Written evidence submitted by Saferworld
A. SUMMARY
The publication of the Government's 2006 Annual
Report on Human Rights revealed that the Government has continued
to export military equipment to all but one of the top 20 countries
identified as "major countries of concern" for human
rights abuses.
Concerns remain over whether the Government
is sufficiently taking into account the human rights record in
countries when making export licensing decisions.
Saferworld's most recent annual comparison of
the Human Rights Report with the Governments arms exports report
highlighted how British equipment is being authorised for exports
to countries where it might be used for internal repression or
abuse of human rights.
B. KEY QUESTIONS
How does the Government justify the large value of
military exports to countries identified as human rights abusers
given that such military equipment may be used to commit human
rights abuses?
What steps is the Government taking to tighten its
export licensing policy to countries identified as human rights
abusers?
What impact has the 2006 Annual Report on Human Rights
had on export licensing decision?
Can the Government explain the purpose behind the
embargo to China, and explain how the continued authorisation
of strategic exports is consistent with this purpose?
What is the Government's position with regard to
changing or ending the EU arms embargo on China?
In view of the ongoing and systematic abuse of human
rights in China, as identified in the 2006 Annual Report on Human
Rights, how is the current UK policy and the licensing of such
a large quantity of equipment serving to pressurise the Chinese
Government to have greater respects for human rights?
What measures is the Government taking to establish
a formal system of end-use monitoring to ensure arms exports are
not being used to commit human rights abuses?
How many arms export licences currently in existence
have conditions attached to the use of equipment and do they apply
to any of the top 20 countries identified as "major countries
of concern" for human rights abuses?
Does the Government agree that by not seeking guarantees
regarding the use of Heads-Up Display Units—exported to
the US for incorporation into F-16 aircraft for subsequent export
to Israel—that the Government is effectively endorsing Israel's
failure to respect the human rights of Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories?
C. EXPORTING
UK MILITARY EQUIPMENT
TO REGIONS
IDENTIFIED AS
COMMITTING HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES
During the past 12 months, of these 20 countries,
exports of equipment which could be used in the commission of
human rights abuses were approved to the following countries.
The quoted descriptions of each country's human rights record
are drawn from the 2006 Human Rights Report:
— China—"The Chinese authorities
continue to violate a range of basic human rights. The use of
the death penalty remains extensive and non-transparent; torture
is widespread".
Export licences to the value of £68.5 million
were granted for inter alia: technology for the production of
combat aircraft, components for tanks and military communications
equipment. This despite an EU arms embargo on China—see
below.
— Colombia—"Serious human
rights abuse remain a tragically common occurrence in Colombia...
Illegal armed groups continue to carry out attacks on both military
forces and the civilian population, and the incidence of murders,
forced disappearances and kidnappings remains high."
Export licences to the value of £4.5 million
were granted for inter alia: armoured all wheel drive vehicles
and military communications equipment.
— Israel—"Progress on improving
the human rights situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories
has been limited... the UK remains concerned about Israel's failure
to respect the human rights of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories."
Export licences to the value of £15.5 million
were granted for inter alia: armoured all wheel drive vehicles,
components for military utility helicopters, components for military
training aircraft, components for submarines, components for unmanned
air vehicle control equipment, components for air-to-surface missiles,
components for airborne electronic warfare equipment and technology
for use of combat aircraft.
— Russia—"human rights defenders
continue to be gravely concerned by actions taken by authorities...
The North Caucasus... remains one of Europe's most serious human
rights issues."
Export licences to the value of £10 million
were granted for inter alia: military cargo vehicles, military
utility vehicles, sniper rifles, gun silencers, shot guns, components
for military aircraft navigation equipment and technology for
the use of military aircraft navigation.
— Saudi Arabia—"there is
still cause for serious concern about human rights in Saudi Arabia."
Export licences to the value of £26 million
were granted for inter alia: combat shotguns, sniper rifles, grenade
launchers, heavy machine guns, military helmets, night vision
goggles, body armour, tear gas/riot control agents, components
for sniper rifles, components for submachine guns, components
for heavy machine guns, components for anti-aircraft guns and
components for body armour.
D. ARMS EMBARGO
ON CHINA
Despite the fact that there is an EU embargo
on arms sales to China, in 2005 the Government continued to authorise
strategic exports. During 2006 the EU has been debating whether
to lift the arms embargo; following US pressure the UK has recently
argued to continue the embargo. However, the Government's record
on licences granted to China undermines this position. From January
to September 2006, the Government issued 215 standard individual
export licences to the value of £89 million.
E. DIVERSION
AND MISUSE
In the case of several of the countries identified
in the human rights section above the risk of diversion of goods
licensed to them is also a concern. The UK Government does little
to check what happens to arms exports once they leave the country.
There is little way of knowing whether the arms find their way
to other users, such as criminal gangs, pariah states, terrorists,
paramilitaries or warlords or other rebel forces. A number of
these states have reputations as conduits of arms to other irresponsible
parties. For example, concerns have long been held over the links
between the Colombian Government and right-wing paramilitary forces
within the country. Israel has in the past failed to honour explicit
end-use undertakings, while China, Israel and Pakistan have all
been identified as significant producers of military equipment
or technologies.
F. INCORPORATION
Also of concern has been the willingness of
the Government to issue export licences for equipment for "incorporation"
(ie components that will be incorporated into weapons systems
in the recipient country for onward export). Over £6 million
worth of incorporation licences were granted to the United States,
including components for combat aircraft and components for military
aircraft Heads-Up display units. The US has previously incorporated
UK-made Heads-Up Display units into F-16 fighter jets, which have
been subsequently exported to Israel. Under current UK law, such
equipment would be denied a direct transfer to Israel.
Incorporating countries also include China,
Israel, Russia and Turkey—none of which would be regarded
as having export control standards equivalent to that of the UK.
Sonia Rai
Advocacy and Policy Officer, Saferworld
Jacqueline Macalesher
Arms Transfer Controls, Saferworld
(1) The Annual Human Rights Report covers
the period from 30 June 2005 to 31 July 2006. The statistics for
arms exports were taken from 4 Quarterly Reports on Strategic
Exports over July 2005 to June 2006 and include:
(2) Strategic Export Controls Quarterly
Report, April-June 2006
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, January-March
2006
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, October-December
2005
Strategic Export Controls Quarterly Report, July-September
2005
(2) The statistics for arms exports to China
for this period were taken from three Quarterly Reports on Strategic
Exports over January 2006 to September 2006.
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