Written evidence submitted by Human Rights
Watch
INTRODUCTION
Human Rights Watch thanks the Foreign Affairs
Committee for the opportunity to comment on the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office's Annual Human Rights Report. We look forward to answering
further questions from the committee at the oral session on 24
January 2007.
Every year the FCO's report on human rights
plays an important role in highlighting some of the worst human
rights abuses in the world. This is an important exercise for
two reasons. Firstly, by publishing these annual reports, the
FCO helps to expose the behaviour of human rights abusing states
and this exposure can serve to shame abusers into changing that
behaviour.
Second, these annual reports help to underline
the need for the UK and its international partners to be honest
with themselves in dealing with abusive governments around the
world. British diplomats can and do still argue that engaging
the governments of countries like China, Russia or Pakistan may
be important to the national interest, despite their poor human
rights record. But they cannot deny the abusive nature of those
states if the FCO's own human rights report states otherwise.
As in previous years, the 2006 FCO report contains
much useful and factually accurate material. Human Rights Watch
welcomes the FCO's stated commitment to upholding human rights
and the rule of law. We also welcome the government's operationalisation
of that commitment through the programme of human rights work
outlined in this report.
The following comments do not represent a comprehensive
critique of the report or of the FCO's approach to human rights
as a whole. Rather this submission seeks to highlight two important
areas where HRW feels the report falls short, and where the government's
rhetoric on human rights does not match its conduct, policies
and positions:
1. Human Rights and Counterterrorism.
2. The role of the EU in promoting Human
Rights.
1. HUMAN RIGHTS
AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
The FCO says that it has a good story to tell
in respect of observing human rights and the rule of law in pursuit
of its counterterrorism aims. Indeed it says in this report (in
our view rightly) that human rights must be a central component
of any successful counter-terrorism strategy. However HRW believes
that the UK is in fact undermining its counterterrorism strategy
by failures in at least three areas:
— Selective criticism and inaccurate
reporting of human rights failings of states in the Middle East,
North Africa and South Asia.
— Shortcomings of the UK's own positions
and policies, including the FCO's efforts to deport security detainees
to countries where they are at risk of torture.
— Reluctance or failure to criticize
the United States for abuses carried out by US forces in pursuit
of counter terrorism aims, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Selective criticism and inaccurate reporting of
human rights failings of states in the Middle East, North Africa
and South Asia
In many parts of the Middle East, North Africa
and South Asia an epidemic of human rights violations has been
continuing for many years now fuelling grievances which underlie
the conflicts, instability and political/religious extremism of
these regions. Abuses and violations include routine denial by
governments of political freedoms, severe shortcomings in the
application of the rule of law, and brutal government persecution
and harassment of political opponents.
Success in addressing the conflicts and extremism
of these regions—now seen as so vital to the UK's own national
security—depends in great part on success in addressing
the human rights abuses and the long history of impunity which
lie at the roots of these conflicts and crises. But these issues
must be addressed in a consistent, non-selective way. Ultimately,
the momentum for democratic accountability and rule of law that
is required to create sustainable stability and respect for human
rights will have to come from within these regions themselves.
But outside powers including the UK are already deeply implicated.
Unfortunately the approach adopted by the UK
government to the human rights dimensions of several of these
conflicts and crisis appears to be selective, and some of its
reporting of the human rights issues at play in these conflicts
is inaccurate, misleading or incomplete. This is serving to undermine
the UK's political credibility and leverage, contributing to widespread
perceptions of Western double standards in its dealings with the
Muslim World.
Iraq and Afghanistan are good
examples. Alongside the US and other Western allies, the UK is
playing a leading role in seeking to bring stability to Iraq
and Afghanistan. Both of these important strategic projects
have suffered serious setbacks in the course of 2006 and in both
countries human rights and the rule of law have suffered serious
deterioration. The British government has been reluctant to acknowledge
the extent of the failures in these countries. This is reflected
in the report's discussion of human rights in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The report lists its current human rights concerns
in Afghanistan (pp 30-36) as freedom of expression, women
and children, the death penalty and economic and social rights.
While it is important to highlight these concerns (which we share),
HRW believes it is also important to address squarely human rights
aspects of the actions and policies of US forces in Afghanistan
and of the British led NATO force, ISAF. In the struggle against
the Taleban the Afghan government and its international allies
are currently pursuing a counter-productive policy of relying
on war criminals, human rights abusers, and drug-traffickers.
These people should instead be prosecuted. In particular it is
essential to: focus NATO's security operations on protecting Afghan
civilians; ensure maximum protection of civilians from the effects
of combat operations, particularly the effects of aerial attacks;
ensure that detainees are treated in accordance with international
standards and address insecurity caused by warlords and illegal
armed groups throughout the entire country (ie not just Taleban
related insecurity). Respect for human rights on the part of international
forces as well as Afghan actors must be an important and necessary
component of any counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
The report paints a wildly optimistic view of
the human rights situation in Iraq (pp66-77), stating that
"progress is being made" in building "a culture
of respect for human rights". Compare this to this assessment
from Jan Egeland, the top UN aid official, shortly before he left
office at the end of 2006: "One hundred or more dead people
every day and night is an outrage... I know of no other place
on Earth where so many people are killed, massacred and tortured
to death as in Iraq." The UK, together with its US ally,
now finds itself in a position in Iraq where it is propping up
a government that is deeply implicated in escalating sectarian
violence, massacres and torture.
With regard to the conduct of coalition forces
in Iraq, the FCO's report is particularly defensive and misleading.
For example on the impact on civilians of major military operations
carried out by coalition forces in Iraq, the report takes at face
value assurances by the US that "all possible steps are taken"
to ensure the safety and well-being of civilians in areas where
such operations take place. There is no evidential basis for such
a position. Equally the report takes at face value assurances
by the US with regard to the treatment of detainees. The report
states that "allegations of abuse by coalition forces against
detainees have been thoroughly investigated". However HRW
has collected evidence suggesting that prisoner abuse by US forces
in both Iraq and Afghanistan has not been properly investigated
nor, in the few cases where convictions have been secured, adequately
punished. There has also been an almost total failure on the part
of the US authorities to pursue prosecutions of higher ranks under
the principle of command responsibility, thus perpetuating the
myth that detainee abuse is the work of "a few bad apples"
rather than part of a systemic failure.
The FCO report notes that the UK has contributed
funds toward the training of judges and other advisers for the
Iraq High Tribunal (IHT) "to ensure that the IHT can
maintain high standards so that the accused can be given a fair
trial". HRW monitored most of the trial of Saddam Hussein
and his co-defendants—the Dujail trial—which ended
in November 2006 with a conviction and death sentences for Saddam
and two others. In a report published shortly afterwards—Judging
Dujail: the first trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal http://hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq1106/—HRW
concluded that the trial was so deeply flawed that the verdicts
were unsound and should be overturned. We found that the IHT was
undermined from the outset by Iraqi government actions that threatened
the independence and perceived impartiality of the court. Other
shortcomings included: regular failure to disclose key evidence,
including exculpatory evidence, to the defense in advance; violations
of the defendants' basic fair trial right to confront witnesses
against them; lapses of judicial demeanor that undermined the
apparent impartiality of the presiding judge; and important gaps
in evidence that undermine the persuasiveness of the prosecution
case, and put in doubt whether all the elements of the crimes
charged were established.
The Dujail trial was an opportunity squarely
to address the fundamental and long standing problem of impunity
in a Middle Eastern state through a rigorous judicial process.
It was also an opportunity to establish a legal and factual record
of the egregious human rights abuses carried out under the regime
of Saddam Hussein and to demonstrate, in a high profile case,
that the invasion had resulted in the establishment of the rule
of law in Iraq. These opportunities were squandered. Instead,
an unfair trial and appeals process and a fast tracked, cruel
and televised execution most likely turned a brutal dictator into
a hero and martyr for many Arab nationalists and Islamists.
The FCO's report correctly draws attention to
the deteriorating human rights situation in Iran (pp63-66)
since the election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in June 2005 brought
an end to the reformist presidency of Mohammed Khatami. However,
lack of international leverage on Iran means that there is very
little that can be done to address this deterioration. Indeed
one can plausibly argue that UK-backed US policies in the region
(particularly in Iraq) have inadvertently helped to empower the
Iranian regime at home and to increase its regional influence,
especially in Iraq. This in turn has further reduced the extent
to which the UN, the EU and others can bring pressure to bear
on Iran to improve its record on human rights. Furthermore the
focus of UK policy towards Iran on counter-terrorism and Iran's
nuclear programme comes at the expense of efforts to promote political
reform and respect for human rights.
Strategic and political concerns appear to colour
the report's treatment of Israel. The report's description
of human rights violations by both sides in the conflict between
Israel and the Palestinians (pp77-84) is generally
balanced and accurate. It rightly draws attention to the deteriorating
humanitarian situation in Gaza since the Israeli military redeployment
there. However while it calls on the Palestinian Authority to
"reform the security sector so that it can take action against
groups and individuals responsible for armed violence," it
does not draw attention to the manner in which Israeli actions
and policies—including the perpetuation of the military
occupation and the expansion of settlements in the West Bank—have
undermined the ability of the PA to carry out such reform. Furthermore
it fails to call on Israel to address the serious and systemic
failure of its own justice system to prosecute and punish Israeli
military personnel responsible for human rights abuses or to provide
redress for victims of abuses. The picture one gets from reading
this report is that the main stumbling block to addressing the
human rights crisis in the OPT is as much the Palestinians' resistance
to Israeli occupation of their lands as the occupation itself.
An even more serious concern is the report's
treatment of the July/August 2006 conflict between Israel
and Hezbollah in Lebanon. During the fighting the British
government rightly joined the United States in condemning Hezbollah
for its attacks on civilians in northern Israel. But it refrained
from serious criticism of Israel for its more lethal (and likewise
illegal and reprehensible) indiscriminate attacks harming civilians
in Lebanon. On Israel's behalf, the UK also resisted calls for
a humanitarian ceasefire and gave a green light to the transfer
of American weapons to Israel through the UK, leading many Lebanese
to see the UK as complicit in the violence they suffered at the
hands of the Israelis. This lack of balance is perpetuated in
the FCO report. The report correctly mentions (in the section
on Syria on p 105) that Hezbollah's indiscriminate rocket attacks
killed over 40 Israeli civilians. But in a section on the July/August
2006 conflict (p 215) there is no mention of the Lebanese death
toll of as many as 1,000 civilians or of the thousands of maimed
and injured. The massive destruction to Lebanese property and
infrastructure is alluded to in the context of the reconstruction
effort but there is no mention of how this destruction came about
and no analysis of the human rights dimensions of the destruction
and its clear contravention of international humanitarian law.
Furthermore there is nothing on the deadly legacy of tens of thousands
of cluster sub munitions which Israel fired on Southern Lebanon
in the last days of the war.
Saudi Arabia (pp98-101) is one of the
few friendly Middle Eastern states which the FCO human rights
report includes in its section on the "major countries of
concern". The report lists numerous very serious concerns,
including state sanctioned discrimination against women, foreigners,
non-Muslims, non-Sunni Muslims, restrictions on workers' rights,
press freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom
of religious and the extensive use of the death penalty. However
the report ignores one of the most serious human rights abuses
in the kingdom—namely the continued use of torture—and
gives little evidence for its statement that "the overall
situation continues to improve" in Saudi Arabia. Indeed,
to our knowledge, no such evidence exists.
HRW welcomes the inclusion of Syria (pp104-107)
among the major countries of concern in this year's report. Certainly
on grounds of Syria's human rights performance it merits inclusion.
But on the same grounds several other important Arab countries,
including Egypt, which has seen a serious deterioration
in the human rights environment in the past 18 months, also merit
inclusion. The impartiality of the report is thus undermined by
the suspicion that the inclusion of Syria, but not other equally
poor human rights performers in the region, is politically motivated
by the UK's opposition to Syria's regional policies with regard
to Israel, Lebanon and Iraq.
Also inexplicable on the basis of its human
rights performance is the exclusion of Pakistan from the
list of major countries of concern (though it does get mentioned
in other sections). The human rights environment in Pakistan has
deteriorated dramatically under the military government of Pervez
Musharraf and in particular in the past two years as the situation
in the border region with Afghanistan has deteriorated. It seems
reasonable to suppose therefore that the reluctance to highlight
human rights abuses in Pakistan stems from the Pakistani regime's
perceived importance as an ally in the war on terror. For the
same reason Prime Minister Tony Blair refrained from any public
or, as we understand it, any private criticism of the Musharraf
regime on his visit to Pakistan in November 2006.
Shortcomings of the UK's own positions and policies,
including the FCO's efforts to deport security detainees to countries
where they are at risk of torture
HRW welcomes the report's categorical statement
on torture: "Torture has no place in the 21st Century.
It is one of the most abhorrent violations of human rights and
human dignity. Its prohibition is absolute" (p 187). HRW
also welcomes the international work the FCO is doing to cement
the global ban on torture. There are sound practical and strategic
as well as moral reasons for pursuing an uncompromising approach
to torture. However, as HRW pointed out in a report published
in November 2006—Dangerous Ambivalence: the UK's attitude
to torture http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/uk1106/—we
believe that in at least four important respects the government
is actually undermining international efforts to eradicate torture.
First the government has sought (and so far
failed) to allow evidence obtained under torture in other countries
to be used in British courts. Second the government is seeking
to find ways around the prohibition on the deportation of terrorism
suspects to countries which routinely practice torture by
obtaining diplomatic assurances from those countries. Third it
is seeking to undermine Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights by arguing that when it comes to deportation
of terrorism suspects the risk of torture should be balanced against
national security concerns. And fourth it has failed squarely
to challenge the egregious failures of the United States
to protect detainees from serious abuse, including torture and
death, either when they are in US custody or when they are "rendered"
to other countries, sometimes with the express purpose of extracting
information from them under coercion.
The first issue (regarding the use of evidence
obtained under torture) does not fall within the remit of the
FCO and is not covered in this report. With regard to the other
three issues, the report inadvertently reveals the extent of the
UK government's failures—which are spelt out in detail in
the HRW report alluded to above.
On deportations, the report makes several
unfounded or misleading statements. The government's policy hangs
on the validity of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with countries
such as Jordan, Lebanon and Libya to which it wishes to deport
terrorism suspects whom it is unable or unwilling to prosecute
in the UK. HRW has studied this issue in detail and arrived at
the conclusion that the diplomatic assurances contained in these
MoUs that the suspects will not be mistreated are ineffective
and do not provide adequate protection against torture. In torturing
political opponents these countries already stand in gross violation
of international law. It is therefore completely implausible to
argue, as the FCO does, that non-binding bilateral "diplomatic
assurances" will provide protection against torture. Furthermore
the monitoring mechanisms which the MoUs envisage will not work
as a safeguard. The argument put forward by the government, and
in this report (p 180), that MoUs will actually help to improve
the human rights situation in Libya, Lebanon and Jordan (and in
other countries with which the UK is seeking to sign similar MoUs
such as Egypt) is quite fanciful and misleading—this is
neither the purpose of MoUs and nor will it be a spin off consequence.
No evidence is put forward to support this argument—whereas
the dismal record of all these countries on human rights points
very clearly in the opposite direction.
On Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights the FCO report seeks to justify the government's
misguided efforts to introduce the principle that risk of torture
and ill-treatment should be balanced against the threat to national
security when considering the deportations of terrorism suspects.
So far, the European Court of Human Rights has valiantly resisted
efforts to introduce the principle of balance when it comes to
torture and ill-treatment—for example in the ruling on Chahal
v UK in 1996. Now the UK is intervening to support the Netherlands
in the case of Ramzy v the Netherlands. "We believe,"
says the FCO report (p 181), "that the current heightened
security threat means that it is proper for the court to revisit
the issue." It is hard to escape the conclusion that the
government is involved in an effort to water down Article 3 and
the global prohibition on torture and ill-treatment, including
the ban on returns to risk of such abuse.
Reluctance or failure to criticize the United
States for abuses carried out by US forces in pursuit of counter
terrorism aims, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq
We have already noted the reluctance of the
UK government (and of the FCO human rights report) to criticize
the failures of the United States government with regard to human
rights and international humanitarian law in its pursuit of its
political and military objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
report is also symptomatic of the government's reluctance to criticize
the United States government's practices in the wider effort to
combat international terrorism, especially the policy of rendition
and the systemic abuse of detainees at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, and in other US detention facilities.
Human Rights Watch has already made its concerns
clear to the FAC regarding the treatment and legal status of detainees
in Guantánamo Bay and other US detention facilities in
a separate submission to the FAC[14].
The FCO's report says that "the government has long made
it clear that it regards the circumstances under which detainees
continue to be held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as unacceptable."
In fact it was not until mid 2006 that the UK government summoned
up the backbone to express firm criticism of Guantánamo
Bay. And the UK has done little to back up its words with actions.
Despite the growing pleas for help, the UK long refused to provide
a safe haven for the British residents who are still being held
in Guantánamo Bay and continues to refuse to help find
a safe haven for those detainees the US wants to release but is
unable to because of fears of torture. Moreover, the government—like
this report—has failed completely to criticize the US for
stripping the Guantánamo detainees of access to courts
to challenge the legality of their detention though habeas corpus
proceeding or of their treatment, even if they have been tortured
and even after they have been released. These court-stripping
provisions threaten to return Guantánamo to a black hole,
where the US government can act with impunity, and set a dangerous
precedent that the UK should have been quick to condemn.
2. THE EU UNDERPERFORMING
ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
The FCO's Annual Report says rightly that "with
its 450 million inhabitants, and its economic and political strength,
the European Union has enormous potential to promote the
human rights and fundamental freedoms it seeks for its own citizens
through its political, trade and development relationships with
the wider world" (p 127). It is also clear, as the report
suggests, that the UK's best hope of leveraging better protection
of human rights in the world lies in working through the EU as
one of its leading member states.
What the Annual Report does not say is that
the EU is failing to fulfill its potential with regard to protection
of human rights. On the contrary it is punching well below its
weight in this area, and this needs to change—especially
given the decline of US leadership and credibility on human rights
in recent years.
The weaknesses of the EU with respect to promoting
human rights are particularly evident in its policies on China,
Russia, and the United States; on crises such as
Darfur and other human rights problems in the global south;
and on human rights issues within the EU itself, especially
those related to immigration and asylum.
The FCO report's extensive section on China
(pp 42-49) raises important human rights concerns from a UK perspective.
But there appears to be little political will at the EU or bilateral
(UK) level to raise those concerns at a high level. Most public
EU comments are weak and lacking in conviction. The EU and the
UK both maintain "dialogues" with China on human rights,
but these are at a low-level, they use no clear benchmarks to
measure progress from meeting to meeting, and they produce no
obvious results. During the EU-China summit in September 2006
Finland's ambassador to Beijing, Antti Kuosmanen, stated on behalf
of the EU presidency that human rights would "not be a dominant
point" at the summit and that human rights were a "sensitive
and delicate issue... because we are dealing with values."
Instead business and security issues dominated the agenda, as
they did during Wen's latest meetings with Prime Minister Blair
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as French President
Jacques Chirac's visit to Beijing. Similarly, in October, the
EU's External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson urged a "comprehensive
reframing" of the EU's relations with China but never mentioned
human rights.
One area where this lack of pressure on human
rights has been felt is Internet freedom. This issue is briefly
mentioned but not addressed in any detail in the FCO's report.
With no help from the EU to resist pressure, Internet companies
such as Google, Microsoft and Yahoo are giving in to the demands
of the Chinese government for censorship, surveillance and control.
Curiously, one positive development with regard
to the role of the EU on human rights in China is not noted in
this report. Despite Chinese lobbying, the EU resisted lifting
its arms embargo on China imposed after the Tiananmen Square massacre
in 1989. This was one example where the EU consensus rules facilitated
a strong human rights position because the embargo, originally
imposed without a time limit, required a common position to lift.
But with China eager to have the embargo ended before the 2008
Olympic Games, the EU still has not articulated the benchmarks
that must be met, such as a transparent and credible investigation
into the Tiananmen killings, and thus has lost an opportunity
for leverage on human rights.
UK concerns about human rights abuses in Russia,
especially in Chechnya, are well put forward in this report (pp
86-98). Voicing these concerns at the EU level is clearly a more
promising approach for the UK than working bilaterally. But EU
policy toward Russia appears to regard energy security—understandably
a major European priority—as being incompatible with challenging
Russia's behaviour as a violator of human rights. The EU has held
semi-annual "consultations" with Russia on human rights.
But, as with China, these are at a low diplomatic level and have
been unproductive in terms of improving Russia's human rights
record. And human rights have not featured prominently on the
higher level EU-Russia agenda. From time to time, the EU responds
to individual cases or events such as the new Russian law on NGOs,
but human rights rarely enter the public discourse of senior officials.
Atrocities in Chechnya, rightly highlighted in the FCO report
as the worst crisis of human rights in Europe, have been relegated
from high level diplomacy, with no public demands for accountability
or even information on the fate of those who, according to well
documented evidence collected by HRW and others, have been tortured
or "disappeared" by agents and allies of the Russian
state.
On several occasions in 2006 the European Court
of Human Rights found Russia responsible for violating the right
to life because of the role of Russian troops and their proxies
in the forced disappearance of people in Chechnya. This is not
mentioned in the FCO's report. HRW believes that European leaders
are missing an important opportunity presented by the court rulings
to press Russia to curb abuses and end impunity.
The EU has a mixed record in its attitude towards
the United States. US detainee operations in Europe made
some European governments (especially their intelligence agencies)
complicit in torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and
forced disappearance. Strong indications suggest that Poland and
Romania allowed "disappeared" suspects to be held on
their soil. While the US Congress did nothing to investigate these
operations, the European parliament launched an inquiry. The temporary
parliamentary committee (TDIP) found it "utterly implausible"
that these activities could have occurred without the knowledge
of European intelligence or security services. It found similar
official complicity in the apprehension of suspects on European
soil and their rendition to countries where torture and ill-treatment
are routine, while also finding the US Central Intelligence Agency
"clearly responsible."
Political and judicial actors in Italy and Germany
have been most vigorous in seeking accountability for these illegal
practices, in stark contrast to the EU (and indeed to the UK as
well). An Italian court has issued arrest warrants for CIA agents
and their Italian accomplices who were allegedly responsible for
the 2003 abduction in Milan of Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr, known
as Abu Omar, and his rendition to torture in Egypt. In November
2006, in what it described as a "natural rotation,"
the new government of Prime Minister Romano Prodi replaced the
head of the military intelligence services SISMI, who is under
investigation for his role in the abduction. The real test for
Italy will be whether the government forwards the court's extradition
requests to the United States, and whether it releases information
regarding its possible prior knowledge of the kidnapping.
In Germany, Federal prosecutors opened an investigation
in February 2006 into Germany's possible complicity in the abduction
and rendition of Khalid el-Masri, a German citizen apprehended
in Macedonia in 2003, handed over to US operatives, and subsequently
held in secret detention in Afghanistan (his case is also the
subject of the European Parliament investigation mentioned above,
and a US federal court proceeding). El-Masri has claimed that
he was beaten in detention and interrogated by a German official
in Afghanistan. As well, a full parliamentary committee of inquiry
is underway, investigating the possible complicity of the German
government in abuses by US agents in the context of counterterrorism,
including whether the Federal Criminal Police Office questioned
terror suspects being held abroad, and the cases of Khalid El-Masri
and Mohammed Haider Zammar, another man subjected to rendition
to torture. The committee is also investigating media reports
that German security agencies have known about US-run secret detention
sites in Europe and abusive practices therein since late 2001.
These efforts to hold government and other actors accountable
are laudable, given that Germany assumed the presidency of the
Council of the European Union in January 2007 and is particularly
susceptible to criticism regarding its own human rights practices.
As for US conduct outside of Europe, the EU,
like the UK (see above), has not offered any high-level public
comment on the findings of the UN Committee against Torture about
US complicity in torture and other abusive interrogations. And
it took the EU years—not until the EU-US summit in June
2006—to call collectively for the closure of the US detention
facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Furthermore, the EU has
refused to make the humanitarian gesture of taking in Guantánamo
detainees whom the US is willing to release but who cannot be
returned to their native lands for fear that they might be tortured
there. It was only non-EU member Albania that ultimately agreed
to resettle five Uighur detainees who were freed from Guantánamo
but could not safely be returned to China, as well as ethnic Egyptian,
Algerian and Uzbek detainees. Another 16 Uighurs remain stuck
in Guantánamo, as well as several others who are slated
for release but cannot be returned to their home countries because
of legitimate fears of torture, and have nowhere else to go.
In addressing the crisis in Darfur (which
is set out in the FCO report's section on Sudan—pp
101-104), the EU underlines how much it has spent to support the
African Union force (AMIS). However, considering the seriousness
of the crisis and its potential implications for the region and
for the future of the north-south peace agreement in Sudan, the
EU has done little to persuade Khartoum to accept the better equipped
and staffed UN protection force that the UN Security Council approved
in August in SC resolution 1706. The EU imposed an arms embargo
on Sudan during the north-south civil war, but has done nothing
to enforce the embargo since the Darfur conflict began. Preferring
engagement, EU members have resisted freezing assets and banning
travel for senior Sudanese officials responsible for the Darfur
slaughter. Far from matching US trade sanctions toward Sudan,
the EU has seen its, and particularly France's, trade with Sudan
increase massively as Sudan has joined the ranks of oil producers.
Khartoum failure to disarm the murderous Janjaweed militia, to
hold accountable those responsible for atrocities, or to co-operate
with the International Criminal Court, as the EU and UN have demanded,
was not been met with nearly vigorous enough action throughout
2006 in spite of some tough talk from Prime Minister Blair and
some other European leaders.
Part of the problem is that Britain and France,
as permanent members of the UN Security Council, have insisted
that EU policy on Darfur be set in New York rather than Brussels.
To its credit, the EU—especially Germany—played the
key role in the council's establishment of a commission of inquiry
to examine atrocities in Darfur and the later referral of Darfur
to the ICC. But the important task of achieving justice for victims
is no substitute for immediate action to stop the crimes that
are being committed now. The EU's effort to enlist China and Russia
in pressuring Khartoum to accept a UN protection force and reverse
its brutal policies in Darfur has not been sufficiently sustained
or intensive to make a difference on the ground, where Khartoum
and its Janjaweed proxies persist in attacking civilians with
impunity.
There are many other countries where the EU
has underperformed on human rights. Sometimes business interests
have played an important role.
— In November 2006, Germany succeeded
in its aggressive push to get the EU to ease even the modest sanctions
it imposed on Uzbekistan following the Andijan massacre
of May 2005 despite no meaningful steps by the Uzbek government
to meet the conditions originally set for lifting the sanctions.
Rather than allow an independent investigation into the massacre,
as required, Uzbekistan has offered only "dialogue"
and an "expert seminar" on Andijan. Meanwhile, its crackdown
on those who dare to voice their dissent has been ruthless, with
a dozen human rights defenders convicted and imprisoned on politically
motivated charges in 2006 alone. Germany argued that the sanctions
had failed to produce positive results—despite Germany having
done everything in its power to undermine the sanctions from the
moment of their adoption—and the rest of the EU went along
with the German position. The UK articulated a principled position
on human rights abuses in Uzbekistan in the FCO annual report
and elsewhere. But somehow this was not translated into firm action
in its negotiations at the EU level.
— Germany has also prevented a firm
EU position on Kazakhstan by lending its unequivocal support
to the country's bid to chair the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe in 2009, rather than using Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbaev's desire for the leadership post as an opportunity
to push for long-overdue, concrete political reforms that would
strengthen the rule of law and protection of basic human rights.
— In Nepal following the February
2005 royal coup, the Nordic governments wanted to condemn the
coup forcefully and stop the military government from using EU
aid. But other EU governments, including France and Germany, weakened
the EU consensus. All EU ambassadors were recalled to their capitals
to protest the coup, but the French and German ambassadors returned
before the end of a month. Britain also pursued an accommodationist
policy, citing a historic relationship with Nepal, a fact that
is not properly reflected in the FCO's report. The discord among
EU members also threatened to derail efforts to deploy a UN human
rights monitoring mission, which has since played an important
role (as is acknowledged in the FCO report) in curbing abuses
and facilitating a return to civilian rule.
— In Thailand, the EU responded
firmly to the military coup in September that overthrew Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. But during Thaksin's five-year tenure,
the EU expressed concern only quietly about deteriorating rights
conditions—some 2,500 extrajudicial executions in Thaksin's
war on drugs, suppression of media freedom, brutal counter-insurgency
in the south, and the downgrading of refugee protection. Meanwhile,
the EU sought a free trade agreement with Thailand.
— In the Middle East, the EU,
which has human rights clauses in its trade-and-cooperation agreements
with most countries, should have played a much more active role
on human rights.
— In Ethiopia, the EU strongly
protested against government abuses in the course of the hotly
contested 2005 elections in Ethiopia. It also backed those words
with some action, withholding or re-channeling more than $375
million in direct multilateral budget support to the Ethiopian
government. The UK also suspended direct budget support. However,
there has been no visible EU follow-up in addressing Ethiopia's
continuing major human rights problems such as the repression
of political opponents and the beatings, rapes, and extrajudicial
killings of the Anuak ethnic group in the Gambella region and
the brutal suppression of dissent and human rights abuses carried
out by security forces and state authorities in Oromia.
— The government of Tunisia,
intolerant of any entity that criticizes its record, has for years
blocked a series of grants that the EU approved to the independent
Tunisian Human Rights League, as well as grants that the EU wishes
to make to other independent human rights organizations. Yet the
EU has failed to publicly protest this ongoing practice except
in the mildest terms.
EU policy on human rights has been particularly
disappointing with respect to the treatment of migrants and
asylum seekers. This important topic is covered in the FCO's
Annual Human Rights Report only under the broader heading of "Human
Rights and Conflict" (pp 225-231). What the report does not
reflect is the fact that the EU's (and the UK's) determination
to stem the flow of migrants at all costs has led it to ignore
migrants' rights and narrow their right to seek asylum in Europe
from persecution in their homeland. In January 2006, the Asylum
Procedures Directive entered into force with its requirement that
member states turn back asylum seekers from countries identified
on an EU-wide list as "safe countries of origin." Lack
of consensus about which countries should figure on the list—many
of the proposed ones offer dubious safety—has so far held
up implementation, but several member states already follow their
own national lists of safe countries.
In its effort to "internationalize"
migration management, the EU has allied itself with other repressive
regimes, such as Libya, a launching pad for hundreds of
migrants seeking protection and work in Europe. Libya-EU cooperation
on migration is one-dimensional, focusing exclusively on blocking
access to Europe, with little concern for the rights or asylum
claims of the migrants. On the eastern border, the EU signed a
readmission agreement with the Ukraine in October requiring
it to readmit third country nationals seeking protection in the
EU, despite continuing concerns about Ukraine's abusive detention
practices and barely functioning asylum system. The two-year "grace
period" before such returns commence is hardly enough time
to set the Ukraine's beleaguered system right. Spain, which receives
the lion's share of arrivals by sea, is pursuing readmission agreements
with countries such as Senegal and Mauritania.
None of this is to deny that sometimes the EU
plays a positive role in the promotion of human rights. As the
FCO report rightly underlines, the EU can be a strong force for
human rights through the accession process, where the requirement
of unanimity for action tends to raise the bar for human rights
performance of the candidate state—since any EU member can
object that the candidate has not done enough to improve its human
rights record—rather than stymie the projection of EU influence.
That positive influence was felt most forcefully over the past
year in the Balkans. In the recent past, it has been felt
in Turkey as well, although the increasing reluctance of
several EU governments to admit Turkey on any terms has now undermined
much of the power of the stated human rights criteria for accession.
There are other examples where the EU has played
a positive role especially when it comes to fielding operational
missions. It has played a key part in forging a peace agreement
in Aceh and mobilizing a monitoring team, although it has
not pressed the Indonesian government to leave open the
option of bringing those responsible for atrocities during the
war to justice. A European force sent to the Democratic Republic
of Congo ahead of the October 2006 elections provided an important
boost to the efforts of the UN peacekeeping force to maintain
security. Six thousand EU troops keep the peace in Bosnia,
where the EU is expected to take sole responsibility for a scaled-down
international civilian presence in mid-2007. In Kosovo,
the EU is planning to take the lead in the international civilian
mission that is expected to deploy in 2007 when the territory's
status is determined. Its focus will be justice and policing.
However, these positive exceptions do not substitute
for the lack of policy coherence that handicaps the EU's response
to some of the most important human rights challenges facing the
world today. Finding a firmer and more consistent voice on human
rights is essential if the EU is to play a much-needed global
leadership role.
CONCLUSION
As stated at the beginning of this submission,
Britain's policy in a number of areas around the world deserves
praise. Likewise, within the 350 pages of the report, there is
much to commend.
But the potential impacts of the failure to
incorporate a strong human rights component into the UK's counter-terrorism
strategy, and of the failure to strengthen the role of the European
Union in promoting and protecting human rights within the EU and
in its external relations are serious and damaging. A weakening
of human rights principles by any powerful government—including
the UK and the United States—creates a more dangerous world
for us all, whatever the justification. And the failure of the
EU to match its influence in economic, commercial and development
relations with a strong line on human rights is a terrible missed
opportunity.
We thank the committee for their interest in
these important issues.
Tom Porteous
London Director, Human Rights Watch
January 2007
14 Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session
2006-07, Visit to Guantánamo Bay, HC44, Ev 1-2. Back
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