Conclusions and recommendations
1. We
conclude that the FCO's failure to provide us with a timely response
to basic administrative questions has hampered our ability to
scrutinise the Government's approach towards the Middle East.
We further conclude that the FCO needs to reconsider its approach
towards confidentiality of documents. We recommend that when parts
of a document can be released without classification, a crude
blanket approach should not be applied to that document. (Paragraph
9)
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
2. We
conclude that the Temporary International Mechanism has played
a limited, but important, role in mitigating the economic and
humanitarian crises in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This
crisis has been severe and its impact on the political and security
situation, in particular in the Gaza Strip, should not be under-estimated.
(Paragraph 23)
3. We conclude that
the decision not to speak to Hamas in 2007 following the Mecca
agreement has been counterproductive. We further conclude that
a national unity Government could and should have been established
much earlier than the spring of 2007. We recommend that, in its
response to this Report, the Government set out when it began
to actively support the establishment of a national unity Government
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. (Paragraph 36)
4. We conclude that
the unwillingness of the EU to modify the financial boycott of
the Palestinian Authority following the Mecca agreement was very
damaging. The international community failed to prepare and implement
rapid economic solutions to reward those elements within the national
unity Government that respected the three Quartet principles.
We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government
provide an assessment of whether it believes in hindsight that
the EU and the rest of the international community acted with
sufficient urgency to create conditions in which direct aid could
be restored as soon as possible. We also recommend that the Government
in its response to this Report should clarify the extent to which
difficulties in restoring aid to the national unity Government
in 2007 were due to the impact on the institutions of the Palestinian
Authority of the suspension of aid in 2006. (Paragraph 41)
5. We conclude that
the actions of both Hamas and Fatah militia forces in the Gaza
Strip were deplorable and should be condemned by all. However,
the escalation of violence in June 2007 should not have come as
a surprise to the UK Government or any of its international partners.
We conclude that the decision to boycott Hamas despite the Mecca
agreement and the continued suspension of aid to the national
unity Government meant that this Government was highly likely
to collapse. We further conclude that whilst the international
community was not the root cause of the intra-Palestinian violence,
it failed to take the necessary steps to reduce the risk of such
violence occuring. (Paragraph 50)
6. We conclude that
the Government was right to make contact with Hamas in its efforts
to secure the release of Alan Johnston. We welcome the role of
Hamas in his release. (Paragraph 59)
7. Given the failure
of the boycott to deliver results, we recommend that the Government
should urgently consider ways of engaging politically with moderate
elements within Hamas as a way of encouraging it to meet the three
Quartet principles. We conclude that any attempts to pursue a
'West Bank first' policy would risk further jeopardising the peace
process. We recommend that the Government urge President Abbas
to come to a negotiated settlement with Hamas with a view to re-establishing
a national unity Government across the Occupied Palestinian Territories.
(Paragraph 60)
8. We conclude that
the Temporary International Mechanism needs to be replaced by
a more permanent solution that can meet the profound humanitarian
crisis in the Gaza Strip. We recommend that the Government continue
to press Israel to ensure full humanitarian access to Gaza. We
further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government
set out its interpretation of Israel's obligations under international
humanitarian law and the responsibilities of the international
community to ensure humanitarian provision for Gaza. (Paragraph
64)
9. We welcome the
appointment of the former Prime Minister as the Quartet Representative.
We recommend that he engage with Hamas in order to facilitate
reconciliation amongst Palestinians. We further recommend that
his mandate be broadened to include explicitly working with Israel,
the Palestinians and regional states to advance peace negotiations.
(Paragraph 67)
10. We conclude that
the Roadmap for Peace has largely become an irrelevance in the
dynamic of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The unwillingness of the
Quartet to challenge robustly the failure by both sides to meet
their obligations has undermined its usefulness as a vehicle for
peace. However, we recommend that whilst the process of the Roadmap
has failed, its objectives—an independent, democratic and
viable Palestinian state peacefully co-existing with a secure
Israel and an end to the occupation that began in 1967—must
remain the basis for a solution to this conflict. (Paragraph
73)
11. We conclude that
the Arab Initiative for Peace is a positive proposal that deserves
serious consideration by all parties. We recommend that the Government
continue to support the Initiative, and that it facilitate where
possible discussion between the parties on contentious issues
such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees. (Paragraph
79)
12. We conclude that
the Government's focus on developing an economic roadmap for peace
in the Middle East is to be strongly welcomed. However, we further
conclude that the expansion of Israeli roadblocks and the growth
of illegal settlements in the West Bank are among the factors
that have had a very damaging impact on the economic situation
in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. We recommend that, in
its response to this Report, the Government provide the Committee
with an update on what progress has been made on implementation
of the Agreement on Movement and Access. We recommend that the
Government also provide its objective assessment of whether the
removal of checkpoints and roadblocks would present a credible
threat to the security of the State of Israel. (Paragraph 83)
Lebanon
13. We
conclude that those who assassinated Lebanon's former Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri must be brought to justice. The Government and its
international allies have taken appropriate and measured steps
at the UN Security Council to ensure that the tribunal is established.
We further conclude that the tribunal process has brought to the
surface important questions regarding the under-representation
of the Shi'a population in Lebanon's political system. We recommend
that the Government work with its international allies to help
the Lebanese parties find consensus on a more representative and
democratic political system. (Paragraph 94)
14. We conclude that
the Government's decision not to call for a mutual and immediate
cessation of hostilities early on in the Lebanon war has done
significant damage to the UK's reputation in much of the world.
As the Minister admitted to us, the option of a dual track diplomatic
strategy could have succeeded. We believe that such an approach
could have led to reduced casualties amongst both Israeli and
Lebanese civilians whilst still working towards a long-term solution
to the crisis. We recommend that, in its response to this Report,
the Government clarify on what date the first draft resolution
calling for an immediate ceasefire or cessation of hostilities
was presented to members of the Security Council, and what the
Government's response to this draft was. (Paragraph 102)
15. We conclude that
the failure rate of 'dumb' cluster bombs could be as high as 30%,
much higher than the Government's estimate of 6%. We further conclude
that the failure rate of 'smart' cluster bombs could be as high
as 10%, again significantly higher than the Government's estimate
of 2.3%. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the
Government state whether it is prepared to accept that the failure
rate of 'smart' cluster munitions could be as high as 10%, and
if so, how it justifies continuing to permit UK armed forces to
hold such munitions. (Paragraph 106)
16. We accept that
Israel has an inalienable right to defend itself from terrorist
threats. However, we conclude that elements of Israel's military
action in Lebanon were indiscriminate and disproportionate. In
particular, the numerous attacks on UN observers and the dropping
of over three and a half million cluster bombs (90% of the total)
in the 72 hours after the Security Council passed Resolution 1701
were not acceptable. We recommend that, in its response to this
Report, the Government explicitly state whether it believes that,
in the light of information now available, Israel's use of cluster
bombs was proportionate. (Paragraph 108)
17. We conclude that
both arms smuggling to Hezbollah and Israeli overflights into
sovereign Lebanese territory threaten to undermine and embarrass
the Government of Lebanon, as well as the UNIFIL forces operating
in the south. We are concerned that the Government's calls on
Israel to halt overflights are having little impact on its behaviour.
We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government
set out what progress has been made on addressing both of these
issues. This should include the most up-to-date figures on overflights
as well as any new evidence of arms smuggling from Syria and Iran
to Hezbollah. (Paragraph 112)
18. We conclude that
the international effort to decontaminate south Lebanon from unexploded
cluster bombs is of the utmost importance. We further conclude
that the Government has made a good contribution to this work.
We strongly welcome the brave work of the Manchester-based Mines
Advisory Group as part of this effort. We recommend that the Government
continue to support those working on cluster bomb clearance in
south Lebanon and that it accelerate its financial contribution
to enable the UN deadline for cluster bomb clearance of south
Lebanon by December 2007 to be met. We are deeply concerned that
the UN feels it does not have sufficient data from Israel on this
issue. It is inexcusable that Israel is not providing full co-operation
almost a year on from the conflict. We recommend that the Government
apply strong pressure on Israel to provide the necessary information
to the UN as soon as possible. (Paragraph 115)
19. We conclude that
Hezbollah is undeniably an important element in Lebanon's politics,
although its influence, along with Iran's and Syria's, continues
to be a malign one. We further conclude that, as the movement
will realistically only be disarmed through a political process,
the Government should encourage Hezbollah to play a part in Lebanon's
mainstream politics. We recommend that the Government should engage
directly with moderate Hezbollah Parliamentarians. The Government
should continue to refuse to engage with the military wing of
Hezbollah. (Paragraph 120)
Syria
20. We
conclude that Syria plays a significant role in most of the key
areas in the Middle East and that this role may slowly be changing
for the better. The support of Syria will be of great assistance
to efforts to promote stability in the Middle East, in Lebanon
and in Iraq in particular. This cannot be ignored when the Government
and the international community engage in diplomacy with the Syrian
authorities. (Paragraph 139)
21. We conclude that
the Government's decision to send Sir Nigel Sheinwald to Damascus
in October 2006 was the correct one. In our view, the EU ban on
ministerial contact with Syria is not helpful in the context of
engaging constructively with the Syrian Government. We recommend
that the Government resume such contacts without delay. We further
recommend that the Government continue to support the work of
Javier Solana as part of the EU's engagement with Syria. (Paragraph
144)
22. There is no excuse
for Syria not to co-operate fully with the international tribunal
over the death of Rafik Hariri and in no circumstances should
this be negotiated away. However, we conclude that more can be
done to reassure Syria that efforts to build a workable democratic
state in Lebanon are not aimed at destabilising the regime in
Damascus. (Paragraph 148)
23. We conclude that
the European Union Association Agreement with Syria presents a
powerful incentive for President Assad to remedy his country's
political behaviour, particularly given Syria's current efforts
towards economic reform. We recommend that in its response to
this Report, the Government set out the list of conditions that
Syria would have to fulfil if the European Union is to ratify
the Agreement. (Paragraph 149)
24. We conclude that
a peace settlement between Israel and Syria would help to transform
the political dynamics of the region. We recommend that the Government
place much greater emphasis than at present on finding a settlement
that will end Syrian support for Palestinian Islamist groups and
the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights. (Paragraph 150)
Egypt
25. We
conclude that there are serious concerns about the progress of
democratic reform in Egypt. We recommend that the Government should
use its close relationship with Cairo to maintain pressure on
the Egyptian Government to widen participation in its political
system. We further conclude that the Muslim Brotherhood is a powerful
and important force in Egypt. As long as the Muslim Brotherhood
expresses a commitment to the democratic process and non-violence,
we recommend that the British Government should engage with it
and seek to influence its members. (Paragraph 161)
26. We conclude that
Egypt has an important role to play in the Middle East Peace Process.
We recommend that the Government set out its policy on the Rafah
crossing, and that it continue to work with Egypt and other parties
to seek the re-opening of the crossing as soon as possible. (Paragraph
165)
Iraq
27. We
conclude that it is too early to provide a definitive assessment
of the US 'surge' but that it does not look likely to succeed.
We believe that the success of this strategy will ultimately ride
on whether Iraq's politicians are able to reach agreement on a
number of key issues. We recommend that, in its response to this
Report, the Government set out what actions it is taking to facilitate
political reconciliation in Iraq. (Paragraph 174)
28. We recommend that,
in its response to this Report, the FCO set out its key policy
objectives in Iraq and how these objectives will be measured.
This should include a section on how the Government is working
to ensure the Iraqi Government meets its human rights obligations
and makes a fair allocation of oil and gas revenue. (Paragraph
175)
29. We conclude that
any intervention into Iraq by neighbouring countries would have
an immensely damaging impact on regional security. We recommend
that the Government urge Turkey in the strongest possible terms
to refrain from carrying out or threatening to carry out such
actions. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report,
the Government set out what evidence it now has that points towards
the complicity of the Iranian Government in supporting terrorism
in Iraq. (Paragraph 180)
30. We conclude that
it is welcome that regional states and key international players
are now engaged in formal discussions on the situation in Iraq.
We note that it has long been the policy of the Government to
engage with Iran, and we are encouraged by signs that the US Administration
is now accepting the wisdom of this approach. We recommend that,
in its response to this Report, the Government set out the key
agreements of the International Compact for Iraq and what progress
has been made towards them. (Paragraph 184)
31. We conclude that
the Iraq refugee crisis requires urgent attention. We are concerned
that the Government does not appear to have provided any financial
support to the UNHCR to assist the plight of refugees between
2004 and 2006. We recommend that, in its response to this Report,
the Government set out how much of the money provided to the ICRC
in these years was earmarked for refugees outside of Iraq's borders.
We further recommend that the Government provide financial assistance
to Syria and Jordan to help them cope with Iraqi refugees, but
that this assistance should be conditional on these countries
keeping their borders open to Iraqi asylum seekers. We welcome
the Government's proposal to resettle a small number of very vulnerable
Iraqis and recommend that it accelerate its discussions with the
UNHCR on this issue. (Paragraph 189)
Iran
32. We
conclude that Iran is rapidly increasing its influence and power
across the Middle East. It has demonstrated that it is able to
generate or exploit crises in a range of countries, thus furthering
its own interests. We conclude that it is vital that the UK and
the international community engage constructively and coherently
with Iran on these difficult issues. We will consider the challenge
of engagement, in particular on Iran's nuclear programme, in greater
depth in our report on Global Security: Iran. (Paragraph 209)
British Diplomacy and the Region
33. We
conclude that the use by Ministers of phrases such as 'war on
terror' and 'arc of extremism' is unhelpful and that such oversimplifications
may lead to dangerous policy implications. We agree with the Minister
for the Middle East that these phrases cause unnecessary resentment.
We recommend that the Government should not use this or similar
language in future. (Paragraph 216)
34. We conclude that,
when measuring its performance on conflict prevention and combating
global terrorism, the Government should pay closer attention to
the impact of its foreign policy in the Middle East than it has
done under the 2004 Public Service Agreement targets. We recommend
that the indicators for the 2007 Public Service Agreement target
on Conflict Prevention reflect the impact of conflicts in the
Middle East, including Iraq, the Occupied Palestinian Territories
and Lebanon, on broader global security. (Paragraph 222)
35. We conclude that
the FCO should continue to have a Departmental objective on relations
with the Islamic World. This should, however, give sufficient
weight to the impact of British policy in Iraq, Lebanon and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories. We are concerned that the damage
done to the Government's reputation in the Arab and Islamic world
may affect its ability to influence the political situation in
the Middle East. We recommend that, in its response to this Report,
the Government set out what action it is taking to improve its
influence and reputation in the Arab and Islamic world. (Paragraph
230)
36. We recommend that
the Government publish a public strategy paper on its relationship
with the Middle East. This paper should set measurable targets
for progress, and consider the political situation in different
countries as well as addressing important cross-cutting themes
such as democratisation, good governance and the rule of law.
We believe that such an approach will help ensure the Government
continues with a holistic approach to the region, improve the
public's confidence in the Government's approach to the Middle
East, and increase the opportunity for effective scrutiny of its
engagement in this area of multiple crises. (Paragraph 233)
| 
