Examination of Witnesses (Questions 53-59)
DR. ROSEMARY
HOLLIS AND
NOMI BAR-YAACOV
28 FEBRUARY 2007
Q53 Chairman: Good afternoon and
welcome, Dr. Hollis and Ms. Bar-Yaacov. We know you both very
well; you have given evidence to the Committee before, so it should
be less of an ordeal for you than for those who come here for
the first time. You heard the previous session and we would like
to explore the same areas with you. May I begin by asking for
your assessment of the Mecca agreement between Hamas and Fatah?
Dr. Hollis: I shall give mine
and then Nomi will give hers. My assessment is that it is a welcome
development because—I can substantiate this—although
all the possible scenarios on the Israeli and Palestinian fronts,
and the latter in particular, might be unattractive, this is the
best of those scenarios—a unity Government. The alternatives
included, first, the complete collapse of the Palestinian Authority;
secondly, an internal Palestinian war, which we have seen a bit
of already, and which would result in a very chaotic situation
in the West Bank and Gaza; and thirdly, a dysfunctional situation
in which Hamas struggles on.
I would like to point out that new elections
now would be illegal under Palestinian Basic Law and that, therefore,
it would be difficult for the international community to call
for something that undermines the Palestinian constitution. In
conclusion, a functioning Palestinian Authority involving both
factions is a positive step, because the Quartet, including the
European Union in particular, would otherwise find themselves
literally with a trusteeship on their hands that they never asked
for.
Ms. Bar-Yaacov: I would like to
add a couple of words, although I might be a little more blunt
than Rosemary. The alternative to the Mecca agreement was civil
war in Gaza. I think that we saw that coming. It happened at the
moment when Hamas managed to overrun Fatah's preventive security
force. Hamas showed that it potentially has the upper hand in
terms of force. Both factions are arming rapidly via tunnels from
Egypt in order to fight each other, and but for Mecca, we would
be in a dreadful place.
I also think that it is very important
to note that it is a terrific achievement for Saudi Arabia, which
is part of the so-called Arab quartet, which you discussed in
the previous session. That comprises of Egypt, Jordan, the United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Given that Israel and Palestine
are in the Middle East, that is a welcome development for further
engagement with the Arab world in order to resolve the conflict.
It can have a positive role, as opposed to the ambiguous, more
difficult one that it played in the past.
I would also like to remind the Committee
that Saudi Arabia also proposed what is today known as the Arab
initiative adopted by the Arab League in Beirut in 2002, which
is a very welcome peace initiative. We are increasingly seeing
Saudi Arabia playing a very constructive role. Personally, I welcome
the agreement and see it as a very positive step forward. If the
national unity Government is formed—there is no given that
Haniya will succeed in forming such a Government, but I certainly
hope that he will—I think that it should be viewed as an
interim Government. I do not think that the Government would necessarily
last for very long, because of internal differences between Hamas
and Fatah.
Q54 Chairman: Is the arming that
you talked about still going on despite the agreement?
Ms. Bar-Yaacov: The arming is
going on, but there is no use of the arms. That is what has stopped.
The arming is certainly going on, because there is a lot of tension
between the two factions. There are a lot of unsettled scores
in Gaza: more than 100 deaths earlier this month; and many of
the powerful families have taken serious losses. Unsettled scores
are not usually solved by peaceful means. If the national unity
Government does not succeed and does not get the international
community's backing and recognition, we will see a return to violence
very quickly.
Q55 Chairman: How long do you think
we can have what Dr. Gooderham referred to as the "wait-and-see
approach" to this agreement?
Ms. Bar-Yaacov: Not too long,
because the guns are back. The euphoria of the Mecca agreement
did not last very long in Gaza. We saw the celebrations—the
media are always where the spotlight is. Today, we see that the
guns are back in the streets. We see the executive force of Hamas
displaying its arms and flexing its muscle, particularly in the
evacuated settlements. We also see the presidential guard, Abbas's
force, displaying its armour in the streets. There is a lot of
tension in Gaza at the moment. I would not describe the situation
as calm and I think the wait-and-see policy should be turned into
a rather more proactive policy of seeing how we can support the
formation of a national unity Government and how we could work
with them, given that the alternative is dire.
Q56 Chairman: But the Quartet itself
is not united, is it? There are divisions within the Quartet as
to how to react to this situation.
Ms. Bar-Yaacov: Yes, the Russians
have already reacted, saying that they are calling to lift the
boycott on the Palestinian Authority and on Hamas more specifically.
The French made similar noises. However, so far, the position
of the Quartet is what it came out with in a very weak statement
at the end of the Berlin meeting, which was what Peter Gooderham
described as a kind of wait-and-see policy. Not much has come
out of the Quartet policy (post-Mecca) thus far. However, it has
decided to meet in an Arab country soon and to conduct talks with
the so-called Arab quartet, which I have just discussed. Again,
that is a very welcome move, and I think that the Arab influence
is extremely positive. The Arabs clearly know what the dynamics
are. Their interest is certainly peace, or, rather, stability,
as peace is not really on the horizon at present.
Dr. Hollis: I simply mention that
last year, when Hamas won its victory, in January, the Quartet
and, more to the point, the European Union adopted a wait-and-see
policy, waiting until the Palestinians had formed a Cabinet—in
fact, until June—before they had the temporary international
mechanism for paying the salaries of doctors, teachers and so
on around the edges of the PA. In other words, it took six months
to adjust to the election of Hamas. If another six months are
spent adjusting to the unsatisfactory, inconclusive nature of
the deal done in Mecca, an insufficient signal will be sent to
the Palestinians—by that I mean both Fatah and Hamas.
Fatah needs to know that there are rewards
for working with the status quo. So far it has had signals that
if it waits on the sidelines, the international community will
bring down Hamas and then Fatah can come back to power. That has
not been a very productive signal to send. Both factions need
to know that there will be rewards for coming to a more practical
and more moderate position on this issue of accepting precedent.
Down the line, there could be an expectation of recognition of
Israel at the same time as contemplating a peace deal with Israel
that would be a two-state solution. That would be the moment at
which Hamas would have to choose. A lot of Palestinians would
expect it to choose in favour of the two-state solution rather
than sticking to its principles. I am advocating that signals
be sent. Fortunately, divisions within the Quartet are sending
some signals that there may be light at the end of tunnel.
Q57 Mr. Keetch: It is interesting
that, when I asked Dr. Gooderham about the Quartet, he talked
of it being united and staying together. Clearly, you do not share
that view. I tend to be more on your side of that argument than
his.
I asked Dr. Gooderham about the reaction
to the Mecca agreement in the United States and Israel. Unless
they sign up to it, it ain't going to go very far. Did Israel
and the United States react how you expected them to react? Do
you think that it was generally helpful or are there signs that
it could be improved, specifically in the case of the United States
given that we are looking at a certain change of President in
a couple of years? Will that be helpful?
Dr. Hollis: I will say something
about the US; I would rather Nomi answered about Israel. If you
do not believe that anything is worth doing unless the US is on
board for it, we will not do anything. There has been a tacit
division of labour between the US and the EU many times in the
past, when the EU has had the encouragement of the United States
to hold a situation because politically it was impossible for
US politicians to do so. If handled skilfully, there could be
similar acceptance of the Mecca process. Signs need to be given
to the Palestinians of both factions that there will be benefits
for them to come up with a better joint position than they have
at the moment.
Otherwise there will be a repeat of what
happened with Iraq. The United States and Condoleezza Rice, in
particular, were supposed to have said, "Wait a minute. Who
was it who decided to create a vacuum in Iraq? Who was it who
made the decision to dismantle all the Government institutions
that we now have to build up from scratch?" My concern would
be that, while fiddling around waiting for everybody to agree
or to get a better position out of Hamas or the Palestinians,
events move on and two years down the line somebody will be asking,
including in America, "Whose decision was it to let this
situation drift so that we have no Palestinian Authority?"
Ms. Bar-Yaacov: I will reply about
the US as well as Israel. In the US, unfortunately the reaction
was quite predictable. One has to look at who the decision makers
are in the US. The National Security Council plays a very important
role there and the role on Palestine-Israel policy is led by a
neo-con, Elliott Abrams. He is very powerful and accompanies Condoleezza
Rice on all her trips. He was present recently during the Quartet
meeting. He opposed the Oslo agreement; he opposed the idea of
exchange of land for peace; and his hardcore approach has been
very detrimental to the (peace) process for a long time. He is
part of the reason why the Road Map is so watered down.
As Rosemary was saying, there have been
tremendous efforts on the part of the Quartet to move the process
forward. There have to be some incentives and some rewards, and
one of the reasons why Abbas was pushed to Mecca and why he signed
to the deal in its current shape and form was that he did not
get anything from the US in return (for their demands of him).
He really did not. He had to go to Mashal with something and say,
"Okay, come my way. Come closer to my position and, in return,
I will give you one, two, three or four." But he got zero.
That unfortunately is where the US's role stands.
However, the recent developments that Condoleezza
Rice announced in respect of talks on Iraq that will include Iran
and Syria are welcome. I should be very surprised if, in the sideline
of those talks—not officially but unofficially—the
question of how to deal with Israel and Palestine does not come
up. Let us consider the proximity and the mere dialogue. The fact
that there will be a meeting at a fairly high level at which Syrians
and Iranians will be present is, of course, welcome.
As Simon McDonald said in the previous
session, the current Israeli Government is very weak. It was dealt
a heavy blow after the debacle in Lebanon and has very little
support, so it is not really in a position to come out with any
great peace moves. So in that sense, yes, unfortunately, the reaction
was quite predictable.
Q58 Mr. Hamilton: May I return to
internal Israeli politics and ask you both to comment on what
is actually happening in Israel? As you say, Dr. Bar-Yaacov, the
Kadima Government of Ehud Olmert have been considerably weakened
by the Lebanon conflict last year. We know that they are now down
to 14% in the polls—even worse than the Labour Government
in Britain—and that Binyamin Netanyahu, the former Prime
Minister, who is a hard-liner, is increasing in popularity and
is getting quite substantial backing financially from certain
Israeli businessmen. Is there a danger that Olmert's Government
could collapse altogether, even though they had quite a mandate
from the electors just a year ago? Even if that does not happen,
will the drift in leadership, with Olmert simply trying to survive
in government and as Prime Minister, detract from the Israeli
Government's concentration on the peace process?
Ms. Bar-Yaacov: I think that you
have summed it up. I think that the Government's weakness has
detracted from the peace process, because Olmert, unfortunately,
is dealing with his own political survival. If you look at the
current composition of the coalition, you will see that Avigdor
Lieberman, who is a settler himself and a staunch advocate of
the settlement policy, joined it recently. Shas, which is also
not a moderate party, is in the coalition, as are the pensioners.
Labour has also lost face after the war, with a Defence Minister
who did not do a particularly good job either. It is a very weak
Government, as you stated, and it is not going to make any bold
peace moves—not only not at this time, but sooner or later
it will collapse. The question is when.
Olmert is also under criminal investigation
and the Vinograd Commission interim report is due next month.
That commission is looking into the conduct of the Prime Minister,
and that of other senior Ministers during the Lebanon war, and
is unlikely to have any kind words about it. It is really just
a question of time as to how long he will last. Once he goes,
legally Tzipi Livni, the current Foreign Minister, will become
the Prime Minister. Although she has a lot of popularity with
the public, she does not have much political force and support
within Kadima, her own party. Plus, Kadima's political platform
has gone. The party won the election on a platform of unilateral
disengagement and, because that (policy) failed in Lebanon and
in Gaza, it (unilateral disengagement) is unlikely to happen again
in the near future. The question is what is it (the party) standing
for. I do not think that Kadima is going to be there for that
much longer—certainly not as the leading power in Israeli
politics.
Q59 Mr. Hamilton: And Netanyahu.
Ms. Bar-Yaacov: Yes, Netanyahu—very
much so. He is racing ahead in the polls. He has got so much more
support. He has five times more support—four to five times,
depending on the polls—than Kadima or any other party at
the moment. We all know who he is and what he stands for. He is
a quite hardcore, right-wing politician. He stayed with Likud
when Sharon split into the centre, into Kadima. He not only has
a lot of financial support, but has a lot of public support.
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