1 Introduction
1. The Foreign Affairs Committee first commented
on the United States detention centre at Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, in its June 2002 Report on Foreign Policy Aspects of the
War against Terrorism.[1]
At that time, the camp had been in use for a matter of months.
Over the following four years, the Committee has continued to
take a close interest, commenting in nine further Reports and
culminating in a visit to Guantánamo by a group of seven
Members in September 2006. Extracts from the previous Reports,
and from the relevant government responses, are appended to this
Report.[2]
2. The purpose of this Report is to place on the
record a summary of what the group who visited Guantánamo
saw and heard and to make a further contribution to the debate
on a number of issues relating to the US authorities' continued
detention at that base of men classed by it as 'unlawful enemy
combatants.' In reaching our conclusions and recommendations,
we have drawn on the first-hand experience of those of us who
visited Guantánamo and on the extensive body of documentation
available on US government web sites. We have also made use of
our back catalogue, and have received further evidence from Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO).
3. This Report does not deal with the detention or
interrogation of terrorist suspects in the field, or by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); nor does it consider the practice of
extraordinary rendition.
4. A number of us visited Afghanistan in November
2006 and were given a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding
between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government
of Afghanistan on the transfer of detainees which was signed on
30 September 2006. The Memorandum is published with this Report.[3]
It contains some important safeguards, including that in paragraph
3.2 whereby: "The Afghan authorities will ensure that any
detainee transferred to them by the UKAF [United Kingdom Armed
Forces in Afghanistan] will not be transferred to the authority
of another state, including detention in another country, without
the prior written agreement of the UK."
5. We conclude
that the Government was right to ensure that persons detained
by UK Armed Forces in Afghanistan and transferred to the Afghan
authorities cannot be further transferred to the authority of
another state, or detained in another country, without the prior
written agreement of the United Kingdom. We recommend that the
Government in its response to this Report state whether the requirement
for such prior written agreement would apply to the transfer to
Guantánamo Bay of any person originally detained by UK
Armed Forces in Afghanistan including any who may be transferred
directly or indirectly to US Forces or agencies. We further recommend
that the FCO also set out in its response what steps it is taking
to ensure that those detained by UK Armed Forces in other countries
cannot be transferred to Guantánamo Bay without the prior
written agreement of the United Kingdom.
6. Shortly before our visit to Guantánamo,
President Bush acknowledged for the first time that a small number
of suspected terrorists had been detained, held and questioned
outside the United States in a separate programme operated by
the CIA.[4] He announced
that 14 CIA-held detainees had been transferred to Guantánamo,
but their whereabouts or treatment before then are not known to
us andalthough a matter of great concernlie outside
the scope of this Report. Extraordinary rendition, as distinct
from rendition, involves the removal of suspects to countries
where they may be subject to interrogation techniques not approved
for use by US personnel. Again, this is a matter of great and
legitimate concern, on which we have previously commented and
into which the Intelligence and Security Committee is currently
inquiring,[5] but it lies
outside the scope of this Report.
7. We may return to all these issues in our next
Report on Human Rights, due in early 2007.
1 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session
2001-02, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism,
HC 573, paras 137 to 145 Back
2
Appendix 2 Back
3
Appendix 3 Back
4
See "President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions
to Try Suspected Terrorists", www.whitehouse.gov Back
5
Cabinet Office, Intelligence and Security Committee Annual
report 2005-06, Cm 6864, para 104 Back
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