Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report


3  Treatment of detainees

Conditions of detention

40. The image of Guantánamo that prevails is of inmates kneeling in the dirt, shackled and hooded at Camp X-Ray in 2002. Although such images are still used to illustrate articles about Guantánamo in the press, on the evidence of our visit they are no longer an accurate picture. Detainees in Camps V and VI are housed in accommodation which is comparable to that at modern high-security prisons in the USA. The accommodation in Camp IV is reminiscent of a basic military barracks from national service days, with a series of single-storey dormitory huts surrounding a recreation area. The accommodation at Camps I to III, which we describe at paragraphs 23 to 25 above, has no real equivalent in other modern institutions. However, the facilities, as distinct from the physical fabric, are no worse than those in Camp V.

41. Food, sanitation, medical care and psychiatric care all appeared to us to be of a high standard. Facilities for worship are provided, including in each cell and in each exercise area an arrow pointing to Mecca, for every detainee a copy of the Quran and other religious items, and for compliant detainees a traditional Islamic prayer rug.[11] The call to prayer is broadcast at the appropriate five times daily, although we were told the prisoners prefer to be called by their own mullahs, and that they make a point of responding to the mullahs' calls and not to those provided by the camp authorities.

42. Amnesty International told us that, in their view, the conditions in which detainees are held at Guantánamo breach international law.

While some detainees have been transferred to a section where they have more out-of-cell time and contact with other detainees, most continue to be confined to small cells with little contact with other inmates and minimal opportunities for exercise. Some detainees are held in extreme isolation in Camp V: a segregation block apparently modelled on 'supermaximum' security prisons in the USA. The Committee against Torture is concerned about the 'extremely harsh regime imposed in detainees in 'supermaximum prisons''. Inmates in Camp V are reportedly held for up to 24 hours a day in solitary confinement in small concrete cells. They are allowed out of their cells three times a week for a shower and exercise, although reportedly this is often reduced to once a week. Such conditions fall short of UN minimum standards which provide that prisoners should receive at least one hour of exercise daily. Prisoners in Camp V are reportedly subjected to 24 hour lighting, which US courts have held to be 'cruel and unusual' in US mainland segregation units.[12]

43. In fact in one respect the situation is worse than described by Amnesty. As noted above, 24-hour lighting applies throughout Camp Delta, not just in Camp V, although it is dimmed at night in Camp IV. When we raised this, we were told that it was to allow guards to verify at all times of the day that a prisoner is alive, and thus to prevent suicides. In other respects, however, our impression is more favourable than Amnesty's. We would not describe Camp V as holding prisoners in "extreme isolation." When we visited Camp V, detainees were conversing loudly and constantly. They were separated, but not isolated. We were assured—although we could not verify this—that all prisoners at Guantánamo are given opportunities to exercise for at least two hours daily, and we noted that every cell has its own washing facilities.

44. In order to provide ourselves with a reference point in relation to the conditions at Guantánamo, we visited Belmarsh maximum security prison in London in November 2006. Belmarsh provides the closest comparison in the United Kingdom to Guantánamo, as it was used between late 2001 and early 2005 to house up to twelve detainees, who like those held at Guantánamo were imprisoned without trial. The prison has a High Security Unit, which usually holds 35 category 'A' prisoners who have been assessed as presenting a heightened risk of escape.

45. The Prison Service told us that:

After a short spell in the High Security Unit, the detainees were located at Belmarsh on Houseblock 4. They were subject to the same regime applicable to all prisoners on the Houseblock. This regime permitted daily exercise (with others) in the open air subject to weather conditions permitting, association, attendance at education, attendance at religious worship, attendance at the library etc. On average the detainees were out of their cell for around seven hours per day.[13]

Prisoners at Belmarsh also had access to the print and broadcast media, although not to the internet. It is the case, therefore, that although the physical conditions in which detainees were held in Belmarsh were broadly similar to those in which detainees are held in Camp V at Guantánamo Bay, the detainees at Belmarsh enjoyed substantially more time and space for exercise, greater opportunities for association, and greater access to education, library and news facilities.

46. We conclude that, having visited both Guantánamo and Belmarsh, the facilities at Guantánamo are broadly comparable with those at the United Kingdom's only maximum security detention facility, but the conditions are not. Guantánamo scores highly on diet and on health provision; but it fails to achieve minimum United Kingdom standards on access to exercise and recreation, to lawyers, and to the outside world through educational facilities and the media.

Interrogation of detainees

47. We spent considerable time during our visit discussing the US forces' use of interrogation techniques. Interrogations at Guantánamo may be carried out by personnel from a range of US agencies and have allegedly been carried out by members of other countries' agencies too.[14]

48. On 6 September 2006, the US Department of Defense published Army Field Manual FM2-22.3, on Human Intelligence Collector Operations.[15] The manual is a very detailed document, which runs to 384 pages. Chapter 8 describes the interrogation techniques that may be used by US Army personnel. We were assured that interrogations by the Joint Task Force at Guantánamo are currently conducted in full accordance with the manual.

49. The manual does not, however, apply to interrogations carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency, which we were told practises additional techniques. These techniques have not been published, but their existence has been referred to in court documents deposited by the Administration.[16] The CIA's previous 'High Value Terrorist Detainee Program' has been acknowledged by President Bush[17] and by intelligence chief John Negroponte,[18]—both of whom noted the vital intelligence thereby gained—and the right of the CIA to run such a programme in future has been given statutory effect by Congress in passing the Military Commissions Act 2006.[19] Senior members of Congress were briefed on the past use by the CIA of techniques other than those in the field manual, and we were told that they will continue to be briefed on any future use of such techniques.

50. The Army Field Manual sets out eighteen permitted interrogation techniques, which it refers to as "approach techniques." We summarise these techniques below, using only the terms in which they are described in the manual.

  • DIRECT APPROACH: In using the direct approach, the HUMINT [human intelligence] collector asks direct questions … a HUMINT collector might offer the source coffee or cigarettes to reward his cooperation.
  • INCENTIVE APPROACH: The incentive approach is trading something that the source wants for information. … On one extreme, the exchange may be a formal cash payment for information during some contact operations while on the other extreme it may be as subtle as offering the source a cigarette.
  • EMOTIONAL APPROACHES: The HUMINT collector employs verbal and emotional ruses in applying pressure to the source's dominant emotions. He then links the satisfaction of these emotions to the source's cooperation. … The following are types of emotional approaches.
    • Emotional Love Approach: The HUMINT collector focuses on the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds himself, his isolation from those he loves, and his feelings of helplessness.
    • Emotional Hate Approach: The HUMINT collector must clearly identify the object of the source's hate and, if necessary, build on those feelings so the emotion overrides the source's rational side.
    • Emotional Fear-Up Approach: In the fear-up approach, the HUMINT collector identifies a preexisting fear or creates a fear within the source. He then links the elimination or reduction of the fear to cooperation on the part of the source. The HUMINT collector must be extremely careful that he does not threaten or coerce a source. Conveying a threat may be a violation of the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice]. … It is often very effective to use the detainee's own imagination against him. The detainee can often visualize exactly what he is afraid of better than the HUMINT collector can express it. … The 'fear-up' approach is frequently used in conjunction with the emotional love or hate approaches.
    • Emotional Fear-Down Approach: In the fear-down approach the HUMINT collector mitigates existing fear in exchange for cooperation on the part of the source.
    • Emotional-Pride and Ego-Up Approach: In this technique, the source is flattered into providing certain information in order to gain credit and build his ego.
    • Emotional-Pride and Ego-Down Approach: The HUMINT collector accuses the source of weakness or implies he is unable to do a certain thing. … The objective is for the HUMINT collector to use the source's sense of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness.
    • Emotional-Futility: In the emotional-futility approach, the HUMINT collector convinces the source that resistance to questioning is futile. This engenders a feeling of hopelessness and helplessness on the part of the source.
  • OTHER APPROACHES: There are numerous other approaches but most require considerable time and resources. Most are more appropriate for use with sources who are detainees, but some, such as change of scenery, may have application for elicitation or MSO [military source operations].
    • We Know All: In the 'we know all' approach technique, the HUMINT collector subtly convinces the source that his questioning of the source is perfunctory because any information that the source has is already known.
    • File and Dossier: The file and dossier approach is a variation of the 'we know all' approach. The HUMINT collector prepares a dossier containing all available information concerning the source or his organization. The information is carefully arranged within a file to give the illusion that it contains more data than actually there.
    • Establish Your Identity: In using this approach, the HUMINT collector insists the detained source has been correctly identified as an infamous individual wanted by higher authorities on serious charges, and he is not the person he purports to be. In an effort to clear himself of this allegation, the source makes a genuine and detailed effort to establish or substantiate his true identity. In so doing, he may provide the HUMINT collector with information and leads for further development.
    • Repetition: The repetition approach is used to induce cooperation from a hostile source. In one variation of this approach, the HUMINT collector listens carefully to a source's answer to a question, and then repeats the question and answer several times. He does this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored with the procedure, he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the HUMINT collector and gain relief from the monotony of this method.
    • Rapid Fire: The rapid-fire approach is based upon the principles that everyone likes to be heard when he speaks [and that] it is confusing to be interrupted in mid-sentence with an unrelated question. This approach may be used by one, two, or more HUMINT collectors to question the source. In employing this technique, the HUMINT collectors ask a series of questions in such a manner that the source does not have time to answer a question completely before the next one is asked. This confuses the source, and he will tend to contradict himself as he has little time to formulate his answers.
    • Silent: The silent approach may be successful when used against either a nervous or confident source. When employing this technique, the HUMINT collector says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source but force him to break eye contact first. The source may become nervous, begin to shift in his chair, cross and re-cross his legs, and look away. He may ask questions, but the HUMINT collector should not answer until he is ready to break the silence.
    • Change of Scenery: The change of scenery approach may be used in any type of MSO to remove the source from an intimidating atmosphere such as an 'interrogation' room type of setting and to place him in a setting where he feels more comfortable speaking.
    • Mutt and Jeff: The goal of this technique is to make the source identify with one of the interrogators and thereby establish rapport and cooperation. This technique involves a psychological ploy that takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt that a source has as a result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique requires two experienced HUMINT collectors who are convincing actors. The two HUMINT collectors will display opposing personalities and attitudes toward the source. … The Mutt and Jeff approach may be effective when orchestrated with Pride and Ego Up and Down, Fear Up and Down, Futility, or Emotional Love or Hate.
    • False Flag: The goal of this technique is to convince the detainee that individuals from a country other than the United States are interrogating him, and trick the detainee into cooperating with US forces. For example, using an interrogator who speaks with a particular accent, making the detainee believe that he is actually talking to representatives from a different country, such as a country that is friendly to the detainee's country or organization. The False Flag approach may be effectively orchestrated with the Fear Down approach and the Pride and Ego Up.

51. An additional, nineteenth technique—Separation—is also permitted, but requires special authority as its use contravenes the Geneva Conventions:

  • Separation: As part of the Army's efforts to gain actionable intelligence in the war on terrorism, HUMINT collectors may be authorized, in accordance with this appendix [Appendix M], to employ the separation interrogation technique, by exception, to meet unique and critical operational requirements. The purpose of separation is to deny the detainee the opportunity to communicate with other detainees in order to keep him from learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to support a cover story; decreasing the detainee's resistance to interrogation. Separation, further described in paragraphs M-2 and M-28, is the only restricted interrogation technique that may be authorized for use.

52. We were told that for at least the last sixteen months only the 'rapport-building approach' interrogation technique has been used at Guantánamo Bay. We were assured that this technique is fully compliant with the new Army Field Manual. It is a matter of record that other techniques were used previously.[20] It is also a matter of record that, in 2002, the then JTF Commander asked for and on 2 December was given permission by the then Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to use techniques which would not normally be permitted.[21] We were told that the additional techniques were not used. Mr Rumsfeld rescinded his decision on 15 January 2003.[22]

53. Interrogating officers are required to draw up a plan for each interrogation, which has to be approved before the interrogation may take place. Most interrogations last for between two and four hours, although the detainee being interrogated is permitted to end the interrogation at any time. No interrogations are permitted between the hours of midnight and 6a.m.. At the time of our visit, about one third of detainees were subject to interrogation. We were told that the remainder were not interrogated, either because they refused to cooperate or because they had nothing of value to say.

54. The publication by the Department of Defense of its Army Field Manual for Human Intelligence Collector Operations is a welcome step, placing on the record as it does the interrogation techniques that US military personnel—including those at Guantánamo—are permitted to use. We fully recognise that human intelligence gathering can play a valuable role in counter-terrorist operations. Interrogation techniques should be permitted if they do not contravene the United Nations Convention against Torture or the Geneva Conventions. We find it significant that, so far as we are aware, the International Committee of the Red Cross has not disputed the legality of the techniques listed in the US Army Field Manual. We were also reassured by the very clear statements to us by Admiral Harris, JTF Commander, that interrogation methods used at Guantánamo Bay are fully consistent with the manual. However, we remain concerned that:

  • failure by individual interrogators to adhere to the safeguards set out in the manual, or the use of techniques in combination, could result in abuse of detainees, particularly in the field;
  • the US Administration is still working to definitions of torture and of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment which differ from those used by the United Kingdom and by other responsible countries;
  • the CIA may be permitted to resume the use of interrogation techniques which have not been published and which may contravene international law.

55. We conclude that publication of the US Army Field Manual for Human Intelligence Collector Operations is a very positive development. We recommend that the Government work both bilaterally and through international fora to press the US Administration to ensure that its interrogation practices do not contravene international law.

Allegations of ill treatment and the US response

56. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies in circumstances of an armed conflict not of an international character to, inter alia, "those placed 'hors de combat' by … detention."[23] The US Supreme Court has ruled that it applies to US detainees held at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere. In particular, Common Article 3 explicitly prohibits "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment." The British Government considers that these are "the minimum legal standard that should be applied to those detained by the US."[24]

57. There is considerable debate about what constitutes an outrage upon personal dignity. We were told that the US military would prefer to have a checklist of acts which fall within the definition, but this would of course be difficult as an act which might outrage one person, such as the desecration of a religious item, might have no effect at all on another. Nonetheless, if a guard at Guantánamo were deliberately to treat a detainee's copy of the Quran with disrespect—which a US military inquiry in 2005 found had happened on five occasions[25]—that would clearly and understandably outrage the detainee and it is not unreasonable to expect any guard to know that such an act would have such an effect.

58. Such breaches of Common Article 3 are not yet explicitly recognised in United States law. The Military Commissions Act 2006 equates "grave breaches" of Common Article 3 with "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" as already defined in US law.[26] It does not define, nor does it provide for prosecutions in relation to, lesser breaches of Common Article 3. Under the Act, the President may interpret the provisions of the Geneva Conventions in secondary legislation.[27] Until such regulations are made by the President, then, as Human Rights Watch told us, the Act effectively,

… narrows the scope of the offences for which interrogators and other officials could be prosecuted under the War Crimes Act, most notably by decriminalizing humiliating and degrading treatment that does not rise to the level of cruel and inhuman treatment.[28]

59. As for more serious abuses, the Committee has set out in some of its previous Reports a number of allegations of mistreatment and even torture of detainees at Guantánamo Bay.[29] The British former detainees have been particularly vocal in their claims to have been tortured, and fresh allegations continue to be made. Three of the released British detainees, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed—the 'Tipton Three'—released a dossier in which they claimed that at various times while held at Guantánamo they were abused or suffered from neglect.[30] The allegations include beatings, disrespect for their religion, lack of food, prolonged exposure to loud noise or to extreme temperatures, and aggressive interrogations. In their dossier they name several US personnel, whom they accuse of this abusive behaviour. They also allege that abusive interrogations were witnessed by FCO and MI5 personnel, although this has never been accepted by the Government.

60. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have previously told us that they regard mistreatment of the type described by the Tipton Three as amounting to torture.[31] In a report published jointly with the Center for Global Rights and Justice and Human Rights First in April 2006, Human Rights Watch referred to at least 50 cases of abuse at Guantánamo.[32]

61. The US authorities refer frequently to the 'Manchester document.'[33] This document was found on a computer when police raided a house in Manchester in May 2000. It is a comprehensive terrorist manual, parts of which have been translated and released by the US Department of Justice. In a section on how to behave when brought before a court, the manual advises 'brothers' to claim they have been tortured and mistreated while in prison.[34] Chapter seventeen, which has not been published, is said to contain advice on how to resist interrogation.[35]

62. We have discussed in previous Reports the differing interpretations placed by the United States and other countries, including the United Kingdom, on the term 'torture.'[36] This is a question we raised with those whom we met during our visit. We were left with the strong impression that the US authorities are very aware of the potential advantages to them of aligning their definitions of torture and of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment with those used by other countries. We are less certain that all parts of the US Administration accept that combinations of what one might term low-grade abusive treatment, such as exposure to loud music, bright light, extreme temperatures, deprivation of food, water, exercise or company, could cumulatively amount to inhumane treatment or have an effect similar to torture.

63. We questioned senior State Department and Pentagon officials, as well as personnel at Guantánamo, about allegations of abuse. They confirmed that a number of guards had been disciplined for abusing detainees. We were also provided with a copy of an investigation into allegations made by FBI personnel who had been stationed at Guantánamo and who claimed to have witnessed abuse by military personnel in the course of interrogations.[37] The senior US Army officers who conducted that investigation found that three out of 24,000 interrogations had violated authorised techniques; that the then Commander of the Joint Task Force had failed to monitor the interrogation of one high value detainee in late 2002; that the interrogation of this same high value detainee resulted in degrading and abusive (but not inhumane) treatment; and that the communication of a threat to another high value detainee was in violation of official guidance.

64. Among the interrogation techniques the inquiry found to be acceptable were "playing loud music, manipulating the air conditioning to make a detainee uncomfortable during interrogation, and carefully controlled acts of sexual humiliations."[38] The investigating team found no evidence of torture or of inhumane treatment at Guantánamo. Further allegations that guards at the camp bragged about mistreating detainees were raised by a US Marine Sergeant, Heather Cerveny, in September. These allegations, too, have been investigated and, according to the US media, the Army Colonel appointed to inquire into the allegations has submitted his report.[39]

65. Another senior US military figure, retired General Barry R McCaffrey, visited the detention centre just three months before we did. In a report for the US Military Academy, General McCaffrey concluded that:

During the first 18 months of the war on terror there were widespread, systematic abuses of detainees under US control in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantánamo. Some were murdered and hundreds tortured or abused. This caused enormous damage to US military operations and created significant and enduring damage to US international standing. We have been routinely condemned by the international community. … Although some low level officers, NCOs, and soldiers have been administratively punished or prosecuted—the public denial of wrong-doing by DOD [Department of Defense] has created a widespread belief in the world community that the US has unilaterally walked away from Federal and international treaty restrictions on torture.[40]

66. The various investigations by the US authorities into allegations of abuse—which we welcome as evidence of the determination of the US to apply rigorously the standards it has set—have not satisfied public opinion. Neither, as General McCaffrey observes, has the "public denial of wrong-doing" by the US Administration convinced the rest of the world that no wrong has been done. Guantánamo Bay has become what the Foreign Secretary recently called a "discrediting influence."[41] Whether torture as well as lesser forms of abuse has occurred at Guantánamo—and we are no more able to be certain on this point than are others who have not been directly involved—the damage to the reputation of the US has been done, and is severe.

67. The evidence on how the US authorities deal with allegations of mistreatment is contradictory. On the one hand, we were repeatedly told by the authorities in Washington and in Guantánamo that all credible allegations are thoroughly investigated and that where US personnel have been found guilty of abuse, they have been punished. On the other hand, although we were told that the allegations made in the dossier produced by the Tipton Three had been investigated and found to be groundless, there is no published record of that investigation; nor have the punishments of those who have been found guilty of committing other abuses at Guantánamo been published.[42] What does seem clear is that those allegations that have been most thoroughly investigated have been raised by US personnel who claim to have witnessed their colleagues engaging in acts of abuse, whereas there is little evidence that uncorroborated allegations made by detainees who claim to have been victims of abuse, or to have witnessed it, have been taken as seriously.

68. The frequent references by US officials to the Manchester Document and in particular to the advice contained in that document for detained terrorists to make false claims of abuse and mistreatment have not led us to conclude that all such claims must therefore be bogus, although some surely are. It is for those investigating claims of abuse to determine if they are well-founded. In the case of Guantánamo, of course, those who investigate allegations of abuse wear the same uniform as those accused and, fairly or unfairly, this reduces confidence in the outcomes. We have no doubt that some of the claims of ill treatment at Guantánamo are unfounded or exaggerated; we are no less certain that abuse of some detainees has taken place.

69. However, it appears that many if not most of the allegations of torture or severe abuse at Guantánamo relate to the first two years of the facility's operation, from 2002 to 2004. While this does not make the allegations any less serious—nor does it reduce the need to inquire into them properly—it does suggest that conditions there may have improved over time. Certainly, those of us who visited in September 2006 felt that the present leadership both in the Joint Task Force and in the Pentagon's Office for Detainee Affairs is serious about preventing abuse. No doubt individual officers will from time to time fail to adhere to official policy—as will happen in any prison—but the systematic cruelty alleged to have been practised on detainees in the first two years, and which has still not been satisfactorily investigated, is in our view probably absent from Guantánamo today.

70. We conclude that abuse of detainees at Guantánamo Bay has almost certainly taken place in the past, but we believe it is unlikely to be taking place now. Although violence and low-level abuse are endemic in any high-security prison situation, it is the duty of the detaining authority to strive to its utmost to minimise them. We recommend that the Government continue to raise with the United States authorities human rights concerns about the treatment of detainees.

Forced feeding of hunger strikers

71. In its written evidence, Amnesty International drew our attention to the treatment of hunger strikers at Guantánamo:

… there have been serious allegations of ill-treatment of hunger strikers during force-feeding. Although Amnesty International has no position on force-feeding per se, it considers that if forcible feeding is done in such a way as deliberately to cause suffering this would constitute torture or other ill-treatment. Detainees have alleged having nasal tubes roughly inserted into their noses without anaesthetic or gel, causing choking and bleeding. Some of the hunger strikers have alleged being placed in punitive restraints during force-feeding and being subjected to verbal and physical abuse by guards.

72. We raised the question of forcible feeding with the Pentagon and with the Camp Delta authorities. They told us that, although at one stage more than 30 detainees were being forcibly fed, at the time of our visit (September 2006) just two detainees who had been on long-term hunger strike were being fed using a tube inserted through the nose (enteral feeding). This procedure has to be authorised by the Commander personally. Such authorisation is generally given only when a striker's weight goes down to 85 percent of ideal body weight, or food has been refused at 21 consecutive mealtimes. We saw the equipment used for feeding hunger strikers, which is the same as that used in US federal prisons. Restraining chairs are used if necessary.

73. The US authorities apply the same forcible feeding policy to hunger strikers in their mainland prisons, regarding it as their duty to preserve life. The Red Cross, however, regards forcible feeding as breaching the World Medical Association's Malta Declaration of 1991 (reaffirmed at its annual meeting in October 2006), which states:

Forcible feeding is never ethically acceptable. Even if intended to benefit, feeding accompanied by threats, coercion, force or use of physical restraints is a form of inhuman and degrading treatment.[43]

We were told that the two prisoners being artificially fed in September 2006 were co-operating with the procedure.

Violence by detainees

74. Those of us who visited Guantánamo were shown a number of weapons fashioned by inmates from items available to them even in the tightly-controlled environment in which they are detained. These included stabbing weapons fashioned from metal, plastic or glass, and rope garrottes. JTF personnel have been attacked using such weapons and we were told they are routinely spat at or struck. We were also told that some have had 'cocktails' of urine, blood and semen, or faeces, thrown over them. We do not doubt the veracity of these statements.

75. Detainees have also carried out violent assaults on each other, and some have committed suicide. The need to prevent suicides—which on the most recent occasion were portrayed by the base Commander as "not an act of desperation, but an act of asymmetric warfare against us"[44]—is cited as one reason for constant surveillance of detainees, necessitating 24-hour lighting, and as a reason for restricting the items they may have in their cells.


11   See "Joint Task Force Respects Detainees' Religious Practices", American Forces Press Service, 29 June 2005. The Committee was told that only one detainee professes not to be a Muslim. Back

12   Ev 6 Back

13   Ev 13 Back

14   See the 'Tipton 3' dossier at www.ccr-ny.org Back

15   The full text of the manual is available at www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-3.pdf Back

16   "US Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons", Washington Post, 4 November 2006 Back

17   In his speech of 6 September 2006; see www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html Back

18   See www.dni.gov/announcements/content/TheHighValueDetaineeProgram.pdf Back

19   See "President Bush Signs Military Commissions Act of 2006", www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061017-1.html, 17 October 2006 Back

20   See "Alleged Guantánamo Abuse Did Not Rise to Level of 'Inhumane'", US Department of Defense News article, 13 July 2005 Back

21   See "DoD Provides Details on Interrogation Process ", US Department of Defense news release 596-04, 22 June 2004; see also Ev 6. Back

22   See "DoD Provides Details on Interrogation Process ", US Department of Defense news release 596-04, 22 June 2004 Back

23   Full text available at www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/375-590006 Back

24   Ev 11, para 5 Back

25   Enclosure 1 to US Southern Command news release dated 3 June 2005, available at www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/pr050603a.pdf Back

26   Military Commissions Act 2006, section 6 Back

27   "Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales on the Military Commissions Act of 2006 at the German Marshall Fund", 25 October 2006, available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_061025.html Back

28   Ev 1, section 2 Back

29   Appendix 2 Back

30   The dossier is available at www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/Guantánamo_composite_statement_FINAL.pdf Back

31   Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 573, para 34 Back

32   By the Numbers: Findings of the Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project, April 2006, available at www.hrw.org Back

33   See http://fas.org/irp/world/para/manualpart1.html Back

34   See www.fas.org/irp/world/para/manualpart1_4.pdf Back

35   "Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behavior at Guantánamo Bay", American Forces Press Service, 29 June 2005 Back

36   Appendix 2 Back

37   The report is also available on the internet, at www.defenselink.mil/news/jul2005/d20050714report.pdf Back

38   "Alleged Guantánamo Abuse Did Not Rise to Level of 'Inhumane'", US Department of Defence News article, 13 July 2005 Back

39   "Col. submits Guantanamo investigation", Associated Press, 10 December 2006 Back

40   The full report is available at www.fas.org/man/eprint/mccaffrey.pdf Back

41   Foreign Secretary's speech on publication of the Human Rights Report 2006, available at www.fco.gov.uk Back

42   In June 2005, the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee was told that ten US uniformed personnel had been disciplined for "inappropriate" acts; see www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/20050629_1909.html Back

43   "World Medical Association Declaration on Hunger Strikers", WMA, available at www.wma.net/e/policy/h31.htm Back

44   "Three Detainees Commit Suicide at Guantanamo", Washington Post, 11 June 2006 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2007
Prepared 21 January 2007