Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Second Report


5  Judicial process

Combatant Status Review Tribunals and Administrative Review Boards

93. All detainees at Guantánamo are subject to two procedures: Combatant Status Review; and Administrative Review. The Department of Defense defines these as follows:

Combatant Status Review is a formal review of all the information related to a detainee to determine whether each person meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant. (Enemy combatant is defined as an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.)

Administrative Review is an annual review to determine the need to continue the detention of an enemy combatant. The review includes an assessment of whether the enemy combatant poses a threat to the United States or its allies in the ongoing armed conflict against terrorist [groups] such as al Qaeda and its affiliates and supporters and whether there are other factors bearing on the need for continued detention (e.g., intelligence value). Based on that assessment, a review board will recommend whether an individual should be released, transferred or continue to be detained. This process will help ensure no one is detained any longer than is warranted, and that no one is released who remains a threat to our nation's security.[64]

Detainees who are found to have committed an act which "violates the laws of war" may be tried by a Military Commission.

94. We were told that in the period July 2004 to January 2005, 558 Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) were held. These classified 520 detainees as enemy combatants; the other 38 were released or transferred. At the time of our visit, the fourteen former CIA detainees, then recently arrived at Guantánamo, had yet to go through the CSRT process. In the period 14 December 2004 to 23 December 2005, the Administrative Review Board (ARB) released a further fourteen detainees, approved the transfer of 119, and renewed the detention of 330. Since then, 249 'phase two' ARB reviews have been completed, producing another 33 recommendations for transfer and 58 for renewed detention (decisions on the remainder were pending at the time of our visit). The Deputy Secretary for Defense, Gordon England, has the final say on the ARB's recommendations.

95. As the US Department of Defense points out, the CSRTs are an opportunity for detainees to contest their detention, by demonstrating they do not deserve 'enemy combatant' status.[65] The tribunals are intended to satisfy the requirement under the Geneva Conventions for "competent tribunals" to determine the status of those detained in a conflict situation, such as the present conflict in Afghanistan. The need for such tribunals was established by the US Supreme Court in its judgment of June 2004; they were given effect initially by administrative order, and the Detainee Treatment Act 2005 gave them statutory force. CSRTs are composed of three military officers, none of whom has had any previous involvement with the detainee. One serves as a judge advocate, and the senior ranking officer chairs the Tribunal. The Tribunal's proceedings are on the record, but it deliberates in closed session. Detainees are provided with: personal representation; interpretation if necessary; copies of the unclassified evidence against them; the opportunity to question any witnesses testifying against them; and the opportunity to call witnesses in their defence (in the unlikely eventuality that any are available to be called).[66] Detainees are not represented before the Administrative Review Board.

96. Amnesty International told us that "the CSRTs and subsequent annual Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) are inadequate and in no way a lawful or appropriate substitute for judicial review."[67] Amnesty cited a case where a detainee was informed by the Tribunal hearing his case that an alias allegedly used by him had been found on a computer hard drive associated with an alleged senior al Qaeda member. Neither his own alias, nor the name of the senior al Qaeda member, nor the location where the computer hard drive was found were revealed to him. He was thus unable to rebut the charge.

97. The Military Commissions Act 2006 has been criticised for failing to reform the CSRT process. It is, however, the military commission process itself which has been the subject of most disquiet.

Military Commissions

98. The US established military commissions at Guantánamo in 2004, for the purpose of trying enemy combatants accused of war crimes. However, following a legal challenge by one detainee, the commissions were effectively ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court in July 2006.[68] It was necessary, therefore, for the Administration either to abandon the commissions or to regularise their status. President Bush chose the latter option. The Military Commissions Bill was going through Congress at the time a group of us were in Washington, in September 2006. We were able to discuss its provisions with Senator Lindsey Graham, one of the three prominent Republican Senators who were in negotiation with the Administration about aspects of the Bill which they felt undermined civil liberties.

99. In summary, the Act as passed by Congress and as signed into law by the President:

  • Provides for military commissions composed of at least five and up to twelve US armed forces officers to hear cases against enemy combatants;
  • Requires at least two-thirds of the commission members to support a conviction;
  • Stipulates that for a sentence of death, which may only be sought if the defendant's actions resulted in fatalities, all twelve commission members have to agree, and gives the final decision on carrying out the sentence to the President;
  • Provides the accused with the presumption of innocence and requires proof of guilt to be established beyond reasonable doubt;
  • Protects the accused from being forced to testify against himself and allows him to be represented by both a military lawyer and a civilian one (although such lawyers will require high security clearance);
  • Allows the accused will be able to be present for the proceedings unless he is ruled disruptive, to present evidence and witnesses in his defence and to cross-examine any witnesses against him;
  • Provides for commissions to sit in public unless that jeopardises the safety of individuals or intelligence (but they will sit in Guantánamo Bay);
  • At the discretion of the commission, allows hearsay or evidence obtained by coercion (but not evidence obtained by torture);
  • Does not allow the accused to challenge the basis of classified information relied upon by the prosecution;
  • Allows a convicted person to appeal to the United States Court of Appeal;
  • Bars US courts from hearing applications for a writ of habeas corpus made by detainees who have been classified as enemy combatants;
  • Prohibits any person from invoking the Geneva Conventions or their protocols as a source of rights in any action in any US court.

It is also important to note that acquittal by a military commission does not mean release. A person acquitted by a commission will remain an enemy combatant and thus will remain subject to detention. Also, after a sentence has been served, the convicted enemy combatant will be liable to be returned to detention.

100. In Washington DC, we were told that military commissions established under the new Act will commence work in 2007. It was suggested that they will hear between 25 and 50 cases of detainees who are believed to have committed war crimes, although in one conversation the potential number was put as high as 80. Up to four commissions are expected to sit at any one time, but the process will clearly take some years.

101. In some ways, the Military Commissions Act is welcome: it sets out the rights of detainees, and it includes important safeguards, such as a right of appeal. In other respects, the Act is quite troubling. It provides for the continued use of aggressive interrogation techniques, limits defendants' rights to challenge evidence, prevents actions for habeas corpus, and creates a revolving door in which detainees may be trapped, whether convicted or acquitted.

102. The Government appears to share some of our apprehension. In its evidence, the FCO states that,

The Government will study the details of the procedures proposed by the Military Commissions Act, any subsequent elaborations and the implications for those who might not be subject to trial.[69]

103. We conclude that, although some aspects of the Military Commissions Act are welcome, others give cause for concern. We welcome the Government's undertaking to study the procedures proposed by the Act. We recommend that the Government carry out that study without delay and that it share the full findings of the study with this Committee. If the Government's study finds that the procedures proposed in the Military Commissions Act or in any subsequent elaboration are inconsistent with international law or human rights norms, it should make strong representations to the United States Administration.


64   Taken from "Guantánamo Detainee Processes", US Department of Defense, October 2006 Back

65   "Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Issued", US Department of Defense news release 651-04, July 2004 Back

66   Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 14 July 2006, www.defenselink.mil/news/Combatant_Tribunals.html Back

67   Ev 5 Back

68   Hamdan v Rumsfeld, for full judgment see www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf Back

69   Ev 11, para 6 Back


 
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Prepared 21 January 2007