House of Commons - Foreign Affairs - Fifth Report

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fifth Report

Annex: Notes of the Committee's visit to Turkey

1. Our interlocutors felt that UK-Turkey relations are in good shape. There is much investment in Turkey by British companies. For example Vodafone has invested heavily in the country, and Tesco is the biggest supermarket chain in Turkey.

2. Turkey is a major route for drug trafficking, and there is close co-operation between the UK and Turkey on counter-narcotics measures.

3. Turkey is also a major actual and potential conduit for energy supplies to Europe, including the UK. A new post has recently been created at the Embassy, dealing with energy and environment issues.

CONSULAR ACTIVITY

4. The Consular side is also busy. Turkey receives 2 million UK visitors a year, and many British people are now buying property in Turkey. The Consulate-General at Istanbul remains one of the FCO's busier subordinate Posts.[1]

Consular Enquiries Consular Assistance

Personal Callers Telephone Enquiries Post, E:mail and fax Advice and Self Help New Detainee Cases Contacted Deaths requiring Consular Action Other cases

3,183 6,420 1,095 250 2 3 23

5. Istanbul issued 759 passports and 80 emergency passports during 2005-06. It registered 47 births and 3 deaths, achieving a 100% success rate against the FCO's Public Service Agreement targets.

6. After the bombing of the Consulate-General in November 2003, when two members of staff were killed, the Consular Section operated from the Hilton Hotel. Consular staff moved back to Pera House in January 2005. The Committee visited Pera House to view the restoration work and the visa issuing section.

Turkish politics

7. Turkey is modernising quickly. 2007 is an election year, with Presidential elections in April and Parliamentary elections in November. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) has a large majority. The current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is widely expected to run for President.

8. The AKP administration has achieved impressive economic growth, brought inflation under control and reduced unemployment. It is popular in business circles.

9. The Turkish government is hoping to reduce the threshold for representation of political parties in the Turkish parliament from 10% to 7% of the vote. This will allow representation of a wider range of opinion in Parliament.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN TURKEY

10. The present government has been in office for 4 years and 2 months. In that time it has introduced many political, social, economic and financial reforms. This has led to a sustained period of economic growth. A tight fiscal policy and a prudent monetary policy have produced annual growth of 7 to 8%, with low interest rates. The EU accession process has been beneficial for the economy, providing investors with predictability.

11. The period 2002-04 was one of intensive reform to enable Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Since 2004, Turkey has sent many high-level teams to the United Kingdom to gain information on the acquis. The scale of the task of adjusting its laws to the requirements of the acquis should be completed within no more than 4 years.

12. Turkey's per capita income is now comparable to those of Romania and Bulgaria. Within a few years, Turkey expects to have overtaken several existing member states on this measure.

13. The number of educational exchanges between Turkey and EU countries is high and Turkey is increasingly a destination of choice for EU citizens. Many countries in the Middle East and in North Africa are following Turkey's progress with close interest. There is an intense interest among Islamic countries in the Turkish reform model. Turkey sees itself as an example to Islamic countries of how they could develop successfully. Its accession will have a very positive effect on perceptions of the EU throughout the Islamic world.

14. In late 2004, Prime Minister Erdogan visited 14 of the longer-standing member states to underline his commitment to real change in Turkey. Since then, Turkey has been working hard not only to reform its laws but to implement change on the ground. The Minister and his team have powers to investigate shortcomings and to recommend changes. Erdogan himself was imprisoned for reading out a short poem which was held to offend against Turkey's secular status; Turkish officials assured us that his government's commitment to reform cannot be in doubt.

15. The European Commission's progress report on Turkey reported a slowing-down in the pace of reform in 2006, but Turkish authorities say that this is because the focus now is on implementation rather than on legislative change. Implementation takes time: attitudes among prosecutors, the judiciary and other groups have to be changed.

ISLAM IN TURKEY

16. Turkey remains a generally secular state. British tourists holidaying on the coast can behave as they would in any European resort. However, Turkey is urbanising. Istanbul is expanding and there is a new generation of urban poor, who may be susceptible to the attractions of radical Islam. There is little evidence of this happening so far, but it is an area of potential concern.

17. There are Islamist political parties in Turkey, but they have to be careful not to undermine the secular state. Turkish accession to the EU would be unlikely to affect this, although some see accession as a potential guarantee of religious freedoms. Some Islamists have brought cases before the European Court of Human Rights, but so far none has succeeded.

18. Islamic fundamentalism poses a threat to Turkey and to the entire region. It is likely to increase in severity over the next ten years. Not only al Qaeda but the Taliban and the continuing conflict between the Shia and Sunni factions of Islam contribute to this threat. There are strong concerns in Turkey about the growing strength of Shia militias in Iraq and elsewhere.

Human rights in Turkey

19. Some Turkish groups feel that the situation has not improved much in the last 2 years. For example, the number of reports of torture being made to the Human Rights Foundation in 2006 was no lower than 2005. Large numbers of protestors were arrested following the riots in the South East. Many claimed that they were tortured.

20. There is some evidence that attitudes in Turkey are changing. For example, more people are prepared to report human rights violations. And in rural areas, people used to talk about the 'father state', in the expectation that the state would assist them. The phrase is no longer used—people know they have to try to solve their problems themselves.

21. The global human rights situation has affected the reform process in Turkey. The war against terror has led to a restriction of human rights worldwide and this has reduced the incentive for the Turkish government to improve its own record.

22. Reform in Turkey is made more difficult by the violence and instability in Iraq. Some Turkish politicians support direct intervention in northern Iraq in order to disrupt the PKK. This and the Cyprus issue foment growing nationalism in Turkey, which is increasingly likely to be a factor in Turkish politics as the elections approach.

MINORITY RIGHTS

23. Minority rights have improved slightly, but the general view is that they still have a very long way to go. There is now a free Kurdish press, but very limited broadcasting in the Kurdish language, and very little teaching. The state does not fund any Kurdish language activities. Curious anomalies exist: for example, it is permitted to use Kurdish in a court of law, but not to use it in political discourse.

24. Five to six years ago, the Kurdish language was effectively banned. Materials in Kurdish are now freely available. However, the medium for all education remains the Turkish language. It is suggested that some Kurds prefer this as it improves their employment prospects.

25. Turkish public opinion was strongly against the US-led intervention in Iraq. They suspect that the US is working towards an independent Kurdish state based on Iraqi Kurdistan. They conflate this theory with the minority rights issue and in particular they see any move towards devolution as a step towards such a state.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

26. Article 301 of the penal code, which criminalises 'insults against Turkishness', was passed in 2005. It is not in essence all that dissimilar to laws in some EU member states. The problem is not so much to do with the law as with the way it is enforced. The judiciary takes a hard line on this. There is no consensus in Turkey on how Article 301 should be amended, but the message is getting through that it needs to be used in a more sensitive way.

27. However, the European Council's Decision of December 2006 to suspend action on parts of the acquis has hardened the mood in parliament, which will now be even more unlikely to be willing to amend the law than it would anyway have been, 2007 being an election year.

28. The legal framework for women's rights has recently been improved. The problem is implementation. For example, it is compulsory for girls to attend school to eighth grade (13/14 years old) and it is a criminal offence for parents who fail to allow this. But in practice, many do not go and their parents go unpunished.

29. The EU reform process has strengthened the hand of women's groups in Turkey. Turkish women's groups have worked had to get their concerns onto the agenda and to ensure that the EU gives sufficient weight to the importance of women's rights.

Turkey's EU accession process

30. The decision of the December 2006 European Council to suspend talks on 8 of the accession chapters and to freeze the closing of others was deeply disappointing for Turkey. There is bewilderment that the decision allows most chapters to be opened but not closed; this has been portrayed as gratuitous ill will. Turkey nonetheless hopes to open several chapters in the coming months and to make substantial progress. As for the 8 chapters on which all progress is suspended, it was suggested that the delay could work to Turkey's advantage. By linking the 8 chapters to full implementation by Turkey of its obligations towards Cyprus under the Ankara Protocol, the EU has effectively created a package of measures to be implemented on accession; there is now no real incentive for Turkey to ratify the Protocol before then.

31. The Republic of Cyprus has raised 'technical objections' to the opening of 3 chapters, including those on economic policy and financial controls. The education and culture chapter is blocked by France. The statistics chapter is under negotiation. The chapter on industrial policy is ready to open. All these chapters have been cleared for opening by the Commission but are held up by member states.

32. The acquis is huge, but Turkey believes that it can harmonise all its laws with it. Much of Turkey's law—about 80 to 85%—is already compliant. On the foreign, security and defence policy chapter (chapter 31), Turkey is 94% compliant. The main areas in which further work is required are agriculture and the environment. The 2012 date for full compliance is realistic, if the EU shows goodwill. Turkey has very well-established structures for implementing EU law; it has been working on this since 2000 and it knows what it has to do.

33. Foreign Minister Gul's recent speech has underlined Turkey's commitment to reform and has shown it is willing to set the pace, even if the EU drags its feet. Turkey will certainly be ready to move swiftly if the climate improves. It was suggested that in fact Turkey may be ready for the EU before the EU is ready for Turkey.

34. There were expectations that Turkey would struggle to harmonise with the acquis; its better-than-expected progress has meant that Turkey's opponents have had to find other reasons to frustrate accession.

35. Turkey believes that the decision on its accession will be political, rather than objective. Turkey needs to convince the sceptics that it will make a positive contribution to the EU. Turkey is concerned that, even if the Cyprus problem is dealt with in the next 3 to 4 years, its detractors will find other reasons to oppose accession.

36. Turkey is aware that on accession to the EU, it will lose some of its autonomy. This will be a big step for Turkey, but not an entirely unfamiliar one as it is already pools resources as a member of NATO.

37. Turkey thought it would open and close a few more chapters than it did in 2006, and expected more from the Finnish Presidency. However, from June 2006, Turkey's accession became an overtly political issue. Turkey feels that it has been treated differently from other candidate countries. No other Member state has gone through a suspension of the accession process such as that now faced by Turkey.

THE EUROPEAN UNION: TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION

38. Turkey feels that existing member states should play their part to improve popular understanding of what Turkey could bring to the EU. The political landscape could be quite different by 2014, when Turkey's role in relation to countries such as Syria and Iran could be crucial for Europe. But it is also difficult to predict where public opinion in Turkey itself will be by 2014. The trend is increasingly towards Euroscepticism, as people come to know more details about the obligations of EU membership, rather than vague notions of economic prosperity. The prospect of EU membership may become less attractive to people as they look more closely at the issues.

39. Turkey was bruised by the events of the last couple of months of 2006. There is a growing belief in Turkey that the country will be prevented from joining the European Union through, for example, referendums in existing member states such as France. This may happen however hard Turkey strives to meet the criteria for accession. However, there are generational and geographic differences. Younger people are more pro-EU, as are the Kurds in the South East who believe it will improve job creation and cultural rights. The main opposition to the EU comes from Nationalist groups.

40. Turkish business is very pro-Europe and very vocal. The Turkish military is torn both ways; on the one hand, the military sees EU membership as a positive factor in resisting Islamisation, but on the other it fears that EU membership will reduce its influence.

41. People in Turkey think of joining the EU principally in terms of economic prosperity and becoming part of the 'European Club.' Turkey is not Euro-sceptic as such, but if joining means 'giving in' on Cyprus then most people would not be in favour. Turkey wants to join the EU, but not at any cost. At the moment, Turkey is not thinking of a 'middle way' like Switzerland, and the concept of a privileged partnership would be seen as an insult.

42. Turkey's economy is being transformed and in 8 to 10 years it could be the 'dynamo' of Europe. Its energy role will expand greatly, in part reflecting its status as the bridge between East and West.

43. Turkey feels the main reason it is not welcome in Europe is religious or cultural, not political. The public statements of some politicians in France, Germany and other EU member states have fuelled these attitudes. European coolness towards Turkey has provoked anger. Some in Turkey see the EU's championing of minorities as an attempt to undermine the Turkish state.

44. Turkey would not have reformed at the pace it has over the last couple of years without the prospect of EU accession. When the time of accession comes, Turkey may have its own referendum. The outcome of such a referendum would not necessarily be a 'yes'.

45. There is considerable scepticism about opposition in existing member states to Turkey's EU membership. Some say that human rights issues are being used as an excuse for opposing Turkey's accession and that in fact, EU countries don't want to accept Turkey because it is a large, poor, Muslim country, but prefer not to say so. But whether or not Turkey eventually joins the EU, it will have gained many benefits from the accession process.

Turkish perspective on Cyprus

46. Turkey would like to get a UN process started again over the Cyprus problem and believes that the Republic of Cyprus is stalling on this. Turkey feels that the EU has failed to meet a commitment to 'end the isolation' of the Turkish Cypriots because it has still not implemented the Regulation on trade with northern Cyprus. Direct flights to northern Cyprus are seen as the key issue, but there are other aspects of isolation as well: for example, sporting and educational links with the European Union.

47. Turkey's lack of trade with the Republic of Cyprus does not represent a lack of respect for another EU country. But Turkey resents the continued isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, who are unable even to hold an international football match.

48. Turkey is fed up with the proposal that it should take the first step in the Cyprus problem and withdraw some of its troops from the island as a goodwill gesture. Both sides need to take steps and to get round the negotiating table.

49. With 2007 being an election year in Turkey, there is unlikely to be early movement on the opening of ports in northern Cyprus and, therefore, on ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.

50. Turkey expects the UN to take the lead once again regarding Cyprus when the new Secretary General has settled down in his new role. Cyprus is a commitment of the UN and has been on the UN's agenda for years and it is in the interests of everyone to solve this issue. It would be a mistake to move the issue entirely into the realm of the EU. Turkey believes that the Greek Cypriots want to move the Cyprus issue away from New York to Brussels. Turkey counts on its friends, for example the UK, to support it in finding a solution through the United Nations.

51. Turkey is taking steps to ease tensions; for example, by relaxing visa restrictions for Greek Cypriots visiting Turkey. However, Turkey finds it difficult to trust the Greek Cypriots and their intentions.

THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AS A FACTOR IN TURKEY'S ACCESSION PROCESS

52. Turkey is frustrated by the way the Cyprus problem has held up its own accession process. Turkey believes it has done the right thing with Cyprus, for example encouraging Turkish Cypriots to vote 'yes' to the Annan Plan, which Greek Cypriots rejected.

53. Turkey is concerned that the Greek Cypriots will exercise their veto on Turkey's accession to the EU. If this happens and Turkey does not enter the EU, Greek Cypriots and Greece itself will suffer, because a solution to the Cyprus problem will be more difficult with Turkey out of the European Union.

54. It appears to Turkey that the Cyprus question is being used as an excuse by some member states who are looking for ways to frustrate Turkey's accession process. Turkey is responding by developing its own 'roadmap' for accession. Turkey will continue its work on the acquis—including on the 8 suspended chapters—regardless of obstructions placed in its path. Turkey appreciates the UK's support for accession. The UK is seen as taking a strategic view; it understands Turkey.

TURKISH FORCES ON CYPRUS

55. Turkey does not believe it would help to solve the Cyprus problem if Turkey unilaterally reduced its forces on the island. The reduction of troop numbers has to be made as part of a comprehensive settlement; it is not possible just to take out one piece of the problem and to leave the others. The Turkish troops would have been withdrawn if the Annan Plan had been adopted. The Greek Cypriots will have to accept that if they want a comprehensive settlement it will look something like the Annan Plan. Turkey is prepared to move forward so long as it can see good intentions from the Greek Cypriot side.

Turkish Military

56. The military remains influential, particularly on the Cyprus question and in relation to the Kurdish South East. The current constitution was written by the military and embeds a role for it in society that it intends to preserve. Turkey still has conscription and senior members of the ruling party have served in the military and retain links with it. Also, much of the senior hierarchy in the Turkish military was involved in the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. People in Turkey expect the military to have views and to express those views.

57. The role of the military is regarded by many as a guarantee of a secular society, and this can be seen as in the interests of the EU and its existing member states. If the role of the army is seen as a major block on EU membership, a balance can be found.

58. Reform of the role of the military in society was seen by one senior Turkish interlocutor as the most important question before Turkey's political classes.

Turkey's strategic value

59. Turkey feels it will be able to make a positive contribution to the EU. For example, Turkey is in a geographic area that controls the Black Sea passage from Ukraine and Georgia to the European Union. Pipelines are being constructed via Turkey to Austria, and Russia may also pump gas through Turkey. Turkey receives gas from Iran and will start to receive gas from Egypt in 2007. Oil pipelines are also being constructed. In addition, by cooperating with Turkey, it could be easier for the EU to have a presence in, for example, Iraq.

60. There is felt to be good cooperation between the UK and Turkey on strategic issues.

TURKEY'S EXTERNAL BORDERS

61. Turkey has long borders with countries that pose significant challenges for the EU, for example in terms of illegal immigration and drug trafficking. It would be an enormous task to police those borders. The borders are porous at the moment; for example there is no visa arrangement between Turkey and Iran.

62. Turkey has a well-established border with Iran and there is much trade between the countries, also large numbers of border crossings by visitors. Turkey also has a dialogue with Iran and has told the Iranian government that it does not support Tehran's nuclear weapons programme.

63. Turkey has learned to live with an autonomous Kurdish region (of Iraq) on its doorstep, but it is very worried by the prospect of the disintegration of Iraq. A fully independent Kurdish state in Iraqi Kurdistan would be very difficult for Turkey to tolerate and it is working hard to avoid such an outcome.

64. Turkey has a strong interest in Central Asia, with much of which it has close cultural ties. It cannot afford to give the region as much aid as it would wish, but relationships with most countries are good. Turkey sees itself as a counterweight to Russia in the region. It is potentially able to provide alternative energy supply routes from the 'Stans to the West—for example, through the Transcaspian pipeline. Greater prosperity from energy exports to the West would enable the 'Stans to resist Russian influence. Turkey is also hopeful that higher standards of democracy will soon come to the region.

1 Figures taken from Istanbul's 2005-06 Consular Annual Return Back

© Parliamentary copyright 2007
Prepared 9 May 2007