Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Fifth Report

Cyprus

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Bilateral

65. The British High Commission in Cyprus promotes the United Kingdom's strategic objectives, particularly its EU agenda, and supports British nationals in Cyprus and the 1.5 million British tourists who visit Cyprus every year. It also has a public diplomacy role. The High Commission maintains seven buildings on three sites, one of which is in the Turkish Cypriot area.

66. The UK gives £500,000-£600,000 a year in aid to help northern Cyprus bring itself up to EU standards, with a focus on judicial and civil service reform.

67. There is a warm relationship between British and Cypriot nationals. At a political level, however, the UK's relationship with the government of the Republic of Cyprus is mixed, and is strongly affected by Greek Cypriot perceptions of the UK's role in efforts to solve the Cyprus problem and by the UK's firm support for Turkey's EU accession.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

68. The British Council, from its new premises in central Nicosia, works on education reform and promotion. It works with both communities and administrations on the island. Since 2004, there has been an increase in Cypriots studying in the UK, with 5,500-6,000 people studying there at the moment. There are four times as many students going to the UK as to America from Cyprus. Greece is the only country that takes more students from the island.

69. There are 55,000 British examinations sat on Cyprus each year, half of which are school exams, ie GCSEs and A levels, and half of which are professional or vocational exams. Cypriots are interested in these exams as they are considered to be prestigious. They can open doors in Cyprus and are perceived as a badge of quality. They run parallel to the education system that exists in Cyprus, with the majority of people studying for them at private institutions at afternoon sessions. These exams are self-funded and do not cost the British taxpayer anything.

70. The Council does not teach English to walk-in customers as this is offered by the state. The provision for English language classes on Cyprus is already good and there are English language teachers in both communities.

THE SOVEREIGN BASE AREAS

71. There is now a light permanent military presence in the UK's Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). The main role of the SBAs is communications, but it is also a valuable 'forward mounting base' for operations in the region and a stopover for aircraft supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some theatre reserves are held in the SBAs.

72. Cypriot civilians resident in the SBAs find that their day-to-day lives are no different from those of their fellow Cypriots. They are able to vote in local, national and European elections. Although the 1972 Treaty of Accession specifically excluded the SBAs from the territory of the EU and this did not change when Cyprus acceded, a protocol provides for application of some EU programmes within the SBAs.

73. There is occasional friction with elements of the Greek Cypriot population who are opposed to the bases, but in general relations are good. The SBAs are dependent for their day-to-day power, water and other supplies on the Republic of Cyprus.

74. The UK's offer to cede sovereignty over a large part of the SBAs—mostly in the East and predominantly to Greek Cypriot administration—was made in the context of the Annan Plan and it is thought that it would only be resurrected as part of an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The UK perspective on the Cyprus problem

75. Since the Committee's last visit in 2005, Cyprus has seen no real progress towards a settlement to the Cyprus problem. On the Greek Cypriot side, there has been a demonisation of the Annan Plan and those who supported it, especially the UK and the United States.

76. President Papadopoulos met Tony Blair in July 2005, during the UK's EU Presidency. The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw have all visited Cyprus. However, Jack Straw received a hostile reception and President Papadopoulos asked him not to meet the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr Talat, in his 'presidential' office. When Mr Straw did meet Mr Talat, President Papadopoulos then refused to see Mr Straw.

77. With the passage of time, the division of the island becomes more permanent. The property ownership issue is an example of one that is becoming more difficult to resolve as time passes. The increasing number of settlers in the north is another: after 5 years' residence in the 'TRNC', Turkish immigrants may qualify for 'citizenship'. This affects the political climate in the north as the settlers, unlike Turkish Cypriots, feel they have nothing in common with Greek Cypriots.

78. Opinion surveys on the island show bicommunal majority support for at least one possible solution to each of the outstanding issues identified by one community or the other as a barrier to a settlement. There has to be compromise in order to make progress. This will be painful, but less painful than a permanent division of the island.

79. The Turkish Cypriots were desperate for a solution in the run-up to Cyprus's accession to the EU in 2004. They are less desperate now, and in time the settlers from the mainland may become a majority in the north, which could dramatically affect its outlook. Such is the pace of change in the north that no-one can really predict what will happen there. There is also a risk that Turkey may become more assertive in relation to Cyprus, especially if its hopes of EU accession are dashed.

80. Turkey could withdraw thousands of troops without compromising the security of the Turkish Cypriots. But the Turkish military has a strong attachment to Cyprus. Withdrawal of Turkish forces is bound up with wider questions of reform of Turkish society and governance.

Greek Cypriots on the Cyprus problem

81. Some Greek Cypriots feel their leadership needs to articulate their concerns and their goals more clearly, using the Annan Plan as the basis for further progress on the Cyprus problem. Opposition politicians in particular feel that President Papadopoulos needs to take the initiative. Instead of playing to the public gallery, he should present specific proposals to the UN, to the EU and to the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

82. However, Greek Cypriots are unlikely to support a solution unless it is recommended by their government. To be sure of success, both the government and other political groups will have to campaign in favour of any proposal that is put to a referendum. Public opinion in Cyprus is led by the political parties, and especially by whoever holds the office of President. The parties presently in government control most of the newspapers in the south.

83. Cyprus as a full member of the EU could use its present leverage over Turkey to achieve an acceptable solution. It could also ask the EU to guarantee implementation of such a solution. This could allay one of the Greek Cypriots' greatest concerns—that Turkey will not honour its obligations. It should be possible to agree a solution and to obtain binding commitments from Turkey, but this cannot happen until after this year's elections in Turkey.

84. Greek Cypriots do not expect any significant steps on a solution to the Cyprus Problem during 2007 because of the Turkish elections this year and the elections in Cyprus in 2008. But progress could be made on confidence building measures and discussions on the detail, based on the 8 July agreement between the two leaders. On the day of the Committee's visit, the leader of AKEL—the main Greek Cypriot political party—Dimitris Christofias (who is also Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives), and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart, CTP leader Ferdi Soyer (who is also 'Prime Minister of the TRNC'), met and reached agreement on 3 principles:

• Implementation of the agreement of 8 July
• Demilitarisation of the Green Line, including of the Ledra Street area, on the same basis as existing crossings. Doubts remain as to the willingness of the Turkish army to facilitate this, but it can take place only with their consent.
• Regular meetings and an end to the war of words on both sides; an end to public attacks and the resumption of direct contacts.

85. Opening the Ledra Street pedestrian crossing in central Nicosia would be of mainly symbolic value, but was seen as none the less important for that.[2]

86. Some Greek Cypriots feel their political leadership needs to take a longer term view. There are all sorts of dangerous possibilities for the future of Cyprus—including imposition by the international community of a Kosovo-type solution. They felt that the possibility of a precedent being set in Kosovo would be a major mistake, but Greek Cypriots also know that time is against them.

87. Greek Cypriots want more pressure to be put on Turkey. The greatest barrier to progress is seen as the deep state in Turkey, and particularly the army. Not even Erdogan can face down the army and there is no way Talat can defy them. Although the Turkish establishment is opening up and even to some extent changing as part of the EU accession process, the prospects for success are not seen as good.

88. Asked about the possibility of dialogue between the two military forces and the possibility that the UN might one day withdraw, Greek Cypriots were prepared to consider suggestions for confidence building measures provided there was no step towards recognition or granting status to the 'TRNC'. Withdrawal of UNFICYP would be seen by Greek Cypriots as part of an Anglo-American conspiracy to undermine them.

89. There is a lack of trust between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. But trust will not be achieved while the communities live separately. The Cyprus Government feels it has helped the Turkish Cypriots in various substantive ways, for example by providing free treatment in hospitals and by opening crossing points in the Green Line. However, in return Greek Cypriots have to show their passports to cross into the north of their own country.

90. Some Turkish Cypriots have sold Greek Cypriot land in the north to foreign investors. When Greek Cypriot refugees see this development of their land, they conclude that the Turkish Cypriots do not want a solution to the Cyprus dispute. It does not give a Greek Cypriot hope that one day he will be able to return to his house.

91. Greek Cypriots believe that the solution to the Cyprus problem is the reunification of the island; to have two separate communities is against the interest of the Cypriots. It is also anachronistic to have one of the smallest states in the EU divided into two. No solution would be without its problems but the new state should be flexible enough to absorb any shocks.

92. It sometimes seems to Greek Cypriots that for the UK Turkish accession to the EU takes priority over the need for a solution to the Cyprus problem. Some suggest that the effect of the UK's policies is to perpetuate the division of the island, and that this therefore make Turkey's accession less likely.

93. Most Greek Cypriots recognise that there is only one way to solve the Cyprus problem and that is through dialogue and mutual respect and compromise. The Greek Cypriots do not want to abandon the United Nations as the institution through which negotiations should occur. However, the experience of the Europeans will be useful to Cyprus, setting a good example of how a country can give up part of its sovereignty without the use of military force, rather by re-building after a tragic past, by faith. Cyprus could also be an example for Europe as it would be the first example of a country with two communities with two religions.

Turkish Cypriots on the Cyprus problem

94. There is still a pro-solution leadership in northern Cyprus but their support should not be taken for granted. There are worrying trends as most Turkish Cypriots feel they have not been rewarded for the 'yes' vote and that the EU has not delivered on its promises, particularly on direct trade. Turkish Cypriots feel sandwiched between the EU and Turkey and want to see early progress on the Cyprus problem using the United Nations, not the European Union. Turkish Cypriots want to make an honest living and develop their own economy, particularly in the area of tourism, rather than to rely on aid. They also want direct trade with the EU.

95. The two sides are at a stalemate. The Greek Cypriots are very comfortable with the status quo and have little incentive to move things along. This is unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots, whose fate depends on a solution to the Cyprus problem. Recognition and full legitimacy as part of a unified state of Cyprus is their goal.

96. Holders of passports issued by the 'TRNC' may enter the US, UK, France Pakistan and a few other countries, but are otherwise severely restricted in where they can travel.[3] Ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots would be an important step towards a comprehensive solution, but it is not an alternative to such a solution. It is nonetheless a very important issue in its own right. Ending isolation is not just about trade and direct flights, it is also about other issues such as sporting links, membership of international organisations, postal addresses and telephone codes. The 'TRNC' attaches importance to achieving Turkish Cypriot participation in the Bologna process.[4]

97. President Papadopoulos has still not set out his demands. It is not clear to Turkish Cypriots what he wants, and therefore Turkish Cypriots say they do not know what they need to do in order to meet Greek Cypriot concerns. The 'areas of concern' presented by Papadopoulos to Sir Kieran Prendergast in 2004 were too broad and too vague. He needs to be more specific.

98. Turkish Cypriots feel that the dynamic on the island is very negative. They do not think the Greek Cypriots really want a solution. It is therefore important for the international community to lift the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, particularly through direct flights. Turkish Cypriots feel they did the right thing in approving the Annan Plan, but they have not benefited. Turkish Cypriots are being blocked on trade to Europe, the Middle East and within the island. Only direct flights and trade will change Greek Cypriot attitudes. These issues have to be negotiated and discussed with the Turkish Cypriot community, not with Turkey.

99. Turkish Cypriots would not feel comfortable about the possibility of UNFICYP withdrawal, because they do not trust the Greek Cypriots. Nonetheless, there is no recent history of violence on the Green Line. The Turkish army should continue to provide guarantees for the Turkish Cypriot community while both communities work towards an agreed settlement. Any permanent reduction in Turkish troop numbers should take place as part of an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. The National Guard in the south includes a substantial mainland Greek component. In all, 80,000 Greek Cypriots have weapons, and all men in the south receive military training. The Turkish army presence in Cyprus is seen by 90% of Turkish Cypriots as essential for their security. For the army to leave, other guarantees will have to be in place.

100. There are 6 universities in northern Cyprus. Most of the students are from Muslim countries. Many of them are Palestinians, and there is also a large group from the Balkans. The exclusion of these universities from the Bologna process, and therefore from pan-European programmes such as Erasmus, is making them uncompetitive in the higher education market.

101. There is a lack of incentives for the two sides to cooperate—this is especially true in the case of the Greek Cypriots. A referendum now on the Annan Plan would be pointless as the Greek Cypriots would vote 'No'. A referendum should only be held when there is a strong probability that both sides will vote 'Yes'. In the north, support is growing for independence, but public opinion could still be won round for reunification on the right terms.

102. One Turkish Cypriot interlocutor suggested that President Papadopoulos' preferred outcomes to the Cyprus problem can be ranked as follows:

• 'Osmosis' (Greek Cyprus absorbs Turkish Cyprus)
• The status quo
• Negotiated partition
• A truly federal state

103. He said that most Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, would rank their preferences thus:

• A truly federal state
• Partition (ie, an independent Turkish Cypriot state)
• The status quo

THE 'SETTLER' ISSUE

104. There are at least 200,000 permanent residents in northern Cyprus, of whom 50,000 are of Turkish mainland origin. Most of the latter are economic migrants from poor areas of Turkey. There are also about another 100,000 short-term residents, mostly from Turkey, but some from the UK. Many of these (30,000) are students; others are labourers, or families of the military stationed on the island. A census was recently held in the north, but it was not internationally supervised and at the time of the visit publication of the full results had been delayed.

105. There is intermarriage between Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey. Under the Annan Plan, Turks married to Turkish Cypriots would have remained on the island, but a further 42,000 'TRNC' citizens who were not married to Turkish Cypriots would have been liable to leave. The recent census should produce a more accurate, up-to-date figure for this category of people.

106. Before 2004, it was very easy for settlers to gain citizenship of the 'TRNC'. Now, it is more difficult for this to happen. Most mainland Turks who come to northern Cyprus now do so on work permits and they are not eligible for citizenship.

107. Many of the settlers in the north have not integrated fully into Turkish Cypriot society. Many of them would probably be content to return to Turkey, given appropriate incentives. However, the settler issue is acknowledged to be one of those most in need of further discussion.

North-South contacts

108. There is no direct Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot official dialogue to follow up the Annan Plan, but UN Special Representative Michael Møller does meet with officials from both sides to discuss implementation of last July's Gambari initiative. Politicians from both sides have occasional contact, but normally in their party capacities, not in their official capacities.

109. There is no direct liaison between the police forces either side of the Green Line; this meant in one recent case that the Turkish Cypriot killers of a man in the Greek Cypriot administered south, who fled north and were arrested, could not be prosecuted as the Turkish Cypriot police refused to hand them over to the Greek Cypriot police, and the Greek Cypriot Police refused to share their evidence with Turkish Cypriot prosecutors.

110. There is some liaison between the two communities on public health, although this did not extend to measures to protect against avian flu.

111. There has never been a company registered jointly by Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Legally there is nothing stopping a Turkish Cypriot setting up a company in the south with a Greek Cypriot, but it was suggested that this has not happened yet for psychological reasons. It was also alleged that, if Greek Cypriots try to do business with the north, pressure is put on them not to do so.

112. There is a Greek Cypriot Chamber of Commerce in the south and a Turkish Cypriot equivalent in the north. Although there is no dialogue between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot companies, the Chairmen of the two Chambers of Commerce are personal friends. They meet once a month and have attended each other's annual general meetings.

113. About 6,000 Turkish Cypriots commute daily across the Green Line to jobs in the south. Free movement across the Line would be a feature of an overall settlement but is increasingly becoming a reality on the ground. About 80 to 90 thousand Turkish Cypriots have Republic of Cyprus identity cards (those Turkish Cypriots who lived in Cyprus before 1974 and their children are eligible; children of a mixed marriage between a Turkish Cypriot and a mainland Turk are not). The 'TRNC' leadership does not advocate Turkish Cypriots obtaining these, but neither does it try to prevent them.

114. At the time of the visit, the technical committees established under the July 2006 Gambari agreement were still not functioning properly. The lack of dialogue between the two sides is disappointing. The working relationship between the two sides at official level is largely non-existent, but even where it does function such as on the Committee on Missing Persons it is difficult. For example, for the purposes of official meetings the Committee has to find, or create from scratch, an English name for each place in Cyprus, as neither side will agree to use the other's place names.

115. President Papadopoulos is known to have strong reservations about meeting Mr Talat. The ground has to be prepared well—the meeting has to succeed, or it would be better for it not to happen at all. Official contacts between the two leaders cannot start yet, but they are an inevitable step in due course. If a first meeting goes well, others will follow.

116. There is dialogue between the two communities on a political level, between trade unions, and also on a social level. However, Greek Cypriots say that the Turkish Cypriots do not want official meetings between institutions and the Government. Turkish Cypriots will use meetings to try to 'upgrade' themselves and convince the Republic of Cyprus that there is a separate state in the north. The Turkish Cypriot 'government' represents the Turkish Cypriot community, but there is only one official government in Cyprus, and so the two sides have had informal meetings without using titles .

117. There is a big gap between the Greek Cypriots' and the Turkish Cypriots' ideas for a solution to the Cyprus problem. If there were to be a meeting today without any preparation at the technical level, then that meeting would result in failure. People in Cyprus would lose hope and it would give the wrong message to the international community. So any future meeting should be very well prepared.

118. The Turkish Cypriot view is that President Papadopoulos' refusal to meet Mr Talat is all part and parcel of Papadopoulos' contention that the Cyprus problem is actually a problem between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, not between the island's two communities. Papadopoulos would therefore prefer to speak to Erdogan, not to Talat. However, the UN-brokered agreement of 8 July 2006 was signed by Papadopoulos and Talat, not by Erdogan, although that only happened under strong UN pressure.

119. Papadopoulos and Talat are from different generations (Talat is 54, Papadopoulos is 72) and from completely different backgrounds; they have no history of contact. Last June, the UN decided to force the issue and Under Secretary-General Gambari was despatched to the island. He managed to get the two leaders together 3 times in a week and talks between officials were restarted.

120. Both sides actually seek a broadly similar outcome. However, the talks so far have been mainly talks about talks. On several occasions, they have come close to talking about more substantive issues, and both sides understand that time is against them. The UN is increasing the pressure, and together with the EU is bringing new momentum to the process.

The economies of Cyprus

121. The economy in the north is growing by about 10% annually and this removes some of the incentive from Turkish Cypriots to seek a settlement. As their prosperity improves, Turkish Cypriots are increasingly inclined to assert their separate identity. International institutions cannot invest in north Cyprus as it is not recognised as a state. This means that the Turkish Cypriots are dependent on local banks who charge high interest rates.

122. Financial and economic aid from Turkey is all that keeps the 'TRNC' solvent. Turkey is the 'TRNC's only significant trading partner. This gives Ankara great leverage over the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Howver, Turkish Cypriot leaders claim that, if it were a full member of the EU, an independent Turkish Cypriot state would be viable and less susceptible to Turkish influence.

123. The Republic of Cyprus is not dependent on Greece in the same way, but Greek politicians have to respect public sentiment, which is strongly pro-Greek Cypriot.

124. The economy is doing extremely well in the Republic of Cyprus and has grown by 4 per cent over the last year and the country is on track to join the Eurozone in January 2008. The economy is likely to do well over the next couple of years but there are questions about whether this growth is sustainable, for example with tourism looking like it is in trouble. There is improved tax collection which has improved the fiscal deficit but there is only so much tax that can be paid.

125. Some feel that the key to progress is economic cooperation between the two communities. The two sides' chambers of commerce meet monthly, but the technical committees also need to get to work. Joint business ventures could be set up in the buffer zone, which in places is several kilometres wide. The EU's Green Line Regulation on cross-border trade is not enough, but EU involvement in inter-communal trade and joint ventures is important.

The EU dimension

126. Under the 1999 Helsinki formula, a settlement of the Cyprus problem was not a precondition of entry into the EU for the Republic of Cyprus. When the Turkish Cypriots walked away from negotiations on Annan IV, and Turkey withdrew its cooperation in December 2002, Cyprus' accession became inevitable. The parliament of Greece would have vetoed the entire enlargement process if Cyprus had not been included among the ten countries due to accede in 2004.

127. Cyprus joined the EU in 2004 for political, not economic, reasons, but now there is a feeling among many Greek Cypriots that the EU is not what they thought it would be. The government will have an uphill battle persuading people that Cyprus should join the Eurozone, although there is no choice in the matter as Cyprus signed up to the Euro in its Treaty of Accession.

128. Since the 2004 referendums, the EU has proposed three regulations: the Green Line Regulation, the Direct Trade Regulation and the Financial Aid Regulation. Of these, the Direct Trade Regulation is still outstanding. The Financial Aid Regulation was passed but there have been difficulties in its implementation, which Turkish Cypriots blame the Greek Cypriots for. Turkish Cypriots allege that the Republic of Cyprus has sought to link the Direct Trade Regulation to unrelated issues such as the future of Varosha. The Cypriot Foreign Minister has offered to facilitate trade between the north of the island and the rest of the European Union through Greek Cypriot ports, but the Direct Trade Regulation itself does not include this provision and it is in any case unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots.

129. Turkish Cypriots say unification means political parity between the two communities. In order to achieve this, they say, northern Cyprus must be able to trade in the same way as everybody else in Europe. The 'TRNC's soil is in Europe, but its economy is not. The Turkish Cypriots say they have every right to claim direct access to European markets and to bring European tourists direct into the north of the country. The Turkish Cypriot economy is based on services, eg tourism and education, but the lack of direct flights to the north causes problems for them, especially regarding tourism. Turkish Cypriots consider themselves to be citizens of Europe and feel they should benefit in the same way as other European citizens.

130. The Republic of Cyprus wants Turkey's EU accession process to continue. This gives the Greek Cypriots potentially huge leverage over Turkey—Cyprus has at least 72 opportunities to veto Turkey's accession. The UK's support for Turkish accession is seen by many Greek Cypriots as a hostile attitude.

131. The EU counter-declaration of 21 September 2005 explicitly required Turkey to ratify the Ankara Protocol and stated that progress would be reviewed in 2006. That review confirmed there had been no progress towards ratification. There is no set-down timetable either for ratification of the Protocol or for agreement of the Regulation on direct trade with northern Cyprus. Most EU member states take a hard line on Turkey, but the Greek Cypriots feel that December's European Council let Turkey off the hook by agreeing to suspend work on only 8 chapters of the acquis.

132. It is not that Greek Cypriots feel the UK's support for the principle of Turkish accession to the EU is the problem. Cyprus supports Turkey's accession to the EU as it is in their interests to have an EU neighbour. If Turkey concludes it will never be able to join, it will not reform. So from Greek Cypriots' point of view, Turkey's full compliance with the EU's criteria for entry could only be a good thing. However, the UK is seen as bending over backwards to help Turkey more than Turkey deserves to be helped. If the UK were willing to bend the rules in order to get Turkey in, that would certainly be a problem.

TRADE

133. Europe was the 'TRNC's main trading partner until the European Court ruling of 1994 made direct trade difficult. Now 80% of goods leaving northern Cyprus do so through Turkey. This is creating economic dependency on Turkey. It also imposes high costs on Turkish Cypriot businesses, harming their competitiveness.

134. Trade over the Green Line has not developed to the level the Greek Cypriots had hoped for. Turkish Cypriots can sell their products to Greek Cypriots or export from legal ports. The Greek Cypriots have suggested ideas that would make trade between the two communities easier but they feel Mr Talat has taken measures that do not allow Turkish Cypriots to trade with Greek Cypriots.

135. The Trade Regulation does not specify any particular port. There was talk of opening Famagusta but that was linked with returning Varosha to the Greek Cypriots. The Finns put in a lot of effort to make progress on this front but they did not succeed.

136. Turkish Cypriots to not want to be obliged to export via Greek Cypriot ports like Limassol. Turkish Cypriots feel they should be able to use the ports in the north. They ask why the same documentation that is used to export goods across the Green Line cannot also be used to export direct to Europe from the north.

137. There is a report to Brussels each month detailing how many goods have moved across the Green Line. The Green Line Regulation has given the Turkish Cypriots the facility to export to the south and this has provided the north with some economic benefit. However, the amount of money that Turkish Cypriots are making from trading over the Green Line is not enough for their economy to develop.

138. Nevertheless, Turkish Cypriots would like Cyprus' sea-ports and airports to be used by everybody on the island. For example, if Limassol were more competitive the Turkish Cypriots should be able to use that, and Greek Cypriots should be able to use Famagusta. The Greek and Turkish Cypriots should cooperate with each other, rather than blocking each other. A united island would have been a win-win situation because the Greek Cypriots would have been able to benefit from proximity to Turkish ports, and the Turkish Cypriot economy would have been in a better position.

Direct flights to the north

139. The Republic of Cyprus does not exercise direct control over Ercan airport in the north of the island.[5] The Turkish Cypriots have obtained a QC's opinion to the effect that the legal position under the Chicago Convention on civil air movements is therefore unclear, but most experts have taken the view that direct flights to Ercan would run counter to the Convention.

140. It is for individual EU member states as signatories to the Chicago Convention to decide if they are able to authorise direct flights to north Cyprus; it is not a matter for the EU as a whole. It would also be for the Republic of Cyprus to identify an airport in the north under the Convention. An application for permission to schedule direct flights to north Cyprus from London has not yet been determined by the Department of Transport in the UK. If the Department does agree to such flights, the Greek Cypriots will challenge this and take the matter to judicial review. If the Department does not agree to the flights, the Turkish Cypriots will do the same.

141. The UK's support in principle for direct flights to northern Cyprus goes down very badly in the south. Greek Cypriots feel that direct flights would remove one of the most important incentives for Turkish Cypriots to support an overall settlement. It might even drive them towards independence.

142. Turkish Cypriots claim that allowing direct flights to Ercan airport will not mean that the Greek Cypriots are recognising the 'TRNC' as a separate state. There are direct flights to Taiwan, for example, even though it is not recognised as a state in its own right. If they cannot achieve direct flights, Turkish Cypriots claim they will be forced to become closer and closer to Turkey. If the north cannot compete on the same footing as the south, it cannot improve its economy and so will become more dependent on Turkey.

143. If Ercan airport were opened to direct flights it is estimated that north Cyprus would receive a million tourists who would generate $1 billion in revenue. With this income, north Cyprus could stand on its own two feet. Turkish Cypriots suggest that tourists flying into Ercan should be able to visit the whole island, which would benefit the Greek Cypriots as well. In addition, if Ercan were opened to direct flights not only would tourists fly in, but goods could be exported by air as well which would also make the economy stronger. However, the Greek Cypriots fear that if Ercan were opened to direct flights, the Turkish Cypriots would lose any incentive to reach a wider settlement.

The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

144. UNFICYP's mandate has to be renewed each 6 months. When the mandate was last renewed, in December, Kofi Annan said that the continued presence of UNFICYP should not be taken for granted. UNFICYP is presently commanded by an Argentine General. The UK contingent patrols the central sector, in Nicosia; an Argentine-led force patrols the sector to the West of Nicosia; and a Czech-Slovak-Hungarian contingent patrols the eastern sector.

145. UNFICYP's mission is to prevent a recurrence of fighting, maintain a stable environment and de-escalate the military presence along the Buffer Zone (BZ) in order to enable a just and lasting political solution to be found.

146. UNFICYP seeks to help create the conditions to install in the two communities and their political leaders, the will to engage in meaningful political progress leading to a comprehensive settlement. There are four "lines of operation" to achieve this:

• Promote UNFICYP sphere of influence.
• Confidence building.
• Consolidate UNFICYP control of BZ.
• Promote UN reputation and credibility.

147. UNFICYP has to deal with regular violations of the ceasefire:

• Over manning of guard posts
• New construction of defenses
• Heavy weapons or military aircraft close to the buffer zone
• Ill discipline
• Cocking and pointing weapons

148. UNFICYP has a set of 5 principles:

• Commitment to the unification of Cyprus based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions.
• Recognition of the fact that the status quo is unacceptable and that its prolongation would have negative consequences for the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.
• Commitment to the proposition that a comprehensive settlement is both desirable and possible, and should not be further delayed.
• Agreement to begin a process immediately, involving bi-communal discussion of issues that affect the day to day life of the people and concurrently those that concern substantive issues, both of which will contribute to a comprehensive settlement.
• Commitment to ensure that the right atmosphere prevails for this process to be successful. In that connection, confidence building measures are essential, both in terms of improving the atmosphere and improving the life of all Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

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2   The crossing was eventually opened in March 2007 Back

3   Note by the Clerk: So far as entry to the UK is concerned, Official Home Office guidance states that "The "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) is not recognised as a state by the United Kingdom Government and its passports must not, therefore, be endorsed by immigration officers. Holders of such documents should not be refused entry. Leave to enter, if granted, should be endorsed on another document, eg. a Declaration of Identity for Visa Purposes (also known as a GV3). If the person otherwise qualifies for entry, leave to enter should be given by endorsing that document.  Back

4   Note by the Clerk: The purpose of the Bologna process is to create the "European higher education area" by making academic degree standards and quality assurance standards more comparable and compatible throughout Europe. The Bologna declaration was made by ministers of education from Council of Europe countries in the Italian city of Bologna in 1999. It has since been opened up to other countries, but the 'TRNC' remains excluded (the 'TRNC' has only observer status at the Council of Europe). The next inter-governmental meeting of the process will take place in London in Spring 2007.

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5   'Ercan' is the Turkish name; the Greek name is 'Tymbou'. Back

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Prepared 9 May 2007