|
Conflict Studies Research Centre Advanced Research and Assessment Group UK Defence Academy
MATERIAL OFFERED IN EVIDENCE TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
May 2007
The Conflict Studies Research Centre's remit is to analyse and give early warning of the potential for conflict and its likely nature, in order to further understanding of the military-political environment. Its research is conducted from open sources, and the views expressed in this paper do not reflect official thinking or the policy either of Her Majesty's Government or of the Ministry of Defence. Some of its recent papers have been referenced in this document: publications are available at http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/
SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS
· The image of the West in Russia is radically different from that which the West seeks to project. · Similarly, Russian responses to Western initiatives have been misinterpreted. · A comprehensive reassessment of Western thinking about Russia is therefore needed. · Russia's newly assertive foreign policy highlights the primacy of the United Nations and the dangers of US hegemony. · At the same time Russia seeks to develop alternative international groupings, seeing itself as a Eurasian power as well as a European one. · To this end Russia is prepared to exert leverage when it perceives advantage in doing so, particularly through economic means in Europe and the former Soviet states. · This domestic popularity of this policy strengthens the Kremlin's incentives to pursue it. · Over the short-to-mid term, it will prove difficult to persuade Russia that this approach needs adjustment, because of: § the dynamics of the succession process; § the lessons drawn from 'coloured revolutions' and their apparent failure; § the illusions of energy dominance.
CONTENTS
Introduction How is Russia governed? Energy security Demography and security Environmental security International security and foreign policy The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization Russia's relations with Transcaucasian countries Defence The Russian security and intelligence apparatus INTRODUCTION
1. It is our view that a reassessment of Western thinking about Russia is overdue. Until recently, its dominant motif was partnership. It needs to be replaced by a motif of realism. Realism is not the same as pessimism. It rests on a mature understanding of differences between Russian interests and our own, as well as a dispassionate acceptance of differences of political culture and values. Only by adopting a prudent set of expectations and hopes will we succeed in overcoming misunderstanding, limiting tension and identifying areas where we can cooperate to mutual advantage.
2. This reassessment should not be hindered by fears of reviving the Cold War. The Cold War was an ideological confrontation. Russian policy under Putin has been emphatically unideological and 'pragmatic': motivated by 'the strict promotion of Russian national interests' in cooperation with any country-be it liberal, authoritarian or despotic-which can advance these interests. Seen through Russian eyes, it is the West which is ideological: evangelical, even aggressive, in promoting democracy and wont to pronounce upon and intervene in other countries' internal affairs. The Cold War was also a militarised confrontation. Today, the 'military instrument' in Russian policy, albeit present, has taken a back seat to the economic instrument. The Kremlin unabashedly regards trade, investment and energy supply as means of securing political influence as well as profit. The degree of economic interdependence and the intensity of economic interaction that exists between Russia and Europe constitutes a powerful impediment to the revival of Cold War thinking and practice. Finally, the Cold War was a global confrontation. Today, Russia does not seek recognition as a global superpower, but as a regional great power. Even outside its declared 'zone of special interests'-the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union-its ambitions are limited, although (as we can see in Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Kosovo) its policies may often be at variance with our own. Despite the uncertainties and potential hazards of the presidential succession process, there are sound reasons to hope that these post-Cold War realities will remain.
3. Nevertheless, we should not be complacent about the more prosaic reality confronting us: a disagreeable relationship. There has been a process of disillusionment on both sides, and it is important to understand the sources of this disenchantment before considering what lies ahead.
4. First, the post-Cold War partnership was established during a time of profound disorientation in Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union was not a simple 'triumph of democracy', but in equal or greater part, the product of economic disintegration and national revival, Russian and non-Russian. After 1991, Russians had to adjust to the collapse of the political system, the economic system, the defence and security system and the state itself. Those briefly at the helm of policy (e.g., Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and, initially, Boris Yeltsin himself) had extravagant expectations about the willingness and capacity of the West to cooperate with Russia on an equal basis, to incorporate Russia into the West's economic and security organisations and legitimise Russia's primacy in the former Soviet republics. In practice, the West's far more modest terms and rules of partnership were accepted out of weakness. By the mid-1990s, this weakness had compromised these 'romantics' in the eyes of the wider Russian policy elite and a large part of the country's population.
5. Second, this elite did not represent, in ethos or composition, a clear break from the Soviet elite. Unlike Germany in 1945, Russia had neither been defeated and occupied, nor had its institutions been overhauled by foreign authorities and administrators. Unlike, for example, Poland and Estonia in 1989-91, there was no counter-elite in the wings and no civic culture underpinning it. Instead, a combination of the most adaptable and the most opportunistic manoeuvred for wealth and power, which in these Darwinian conditions soon became synonymous. Therefore, the comparison drawn by some at the time between Yeltsin's Russia and Adenauer's Germany was misconceived on two counts. It overlooked the tenacity of power networks, the legacy of weak civic instincts and the prevalence of strong habits of mind: deference to authority, disregard for the feelings of juniors, subordinates and ordinary people, manipulation of outsiders, cultural insecurity and national ambition. The comparison also bred unfounded hopes that the brutalising dislocations of post-Soviet Russia would prove to be 'birth pangs of democracy' rather than a process that would discredit it.
6. Third, and for these very reasons, the basis of a new consensus in foreign policy emerged well before Putin came to power. When in February 1993 President Yeltsin called upon the UN and other international bodies to 'grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability' in the former Soviet Union, he anticipated that the call would be taken up by his Western partners. Yet by April 1994, he was warning the Foreign Intelligence Service that 'ideological confrontation is being replaced by a struggle for spheres of influence in geopolitics'. In October 1994 he warned the OSCE that NATO enlargement would lead to a 'cold peace' in Europe. Our ability to overcome these obstacles to our satisfaction made it easy for some to conclude that we had overcome them to mutual satisfaction. They had confused Russian weakness and acquiescence with consent and agreement. They had (in the words of a Russian parliamentarian to the House of Commons Defence Committee in 1999) given insufficient thought to the consequences of the 'moral humiliation of a major state'.
7. The advent of President Putin, his broad popularity and the legitimacy of his brand of 'managed democracy' need to be understood against this backdrop. In social terms, Putin represents the coming of age of a new post-Soviet class: moneyed, self-confident, impressed by the virtues of a strong state, uncowed by the West and totally without nostalgia for Communism. In political terms, Putin represents the revival of the state. Under Yeltsin, Russia functioned less as a state than as an arena upon which powerful interests competed for power and wealth, often at Russia's expense. Under Putin, centres of power-the security services, the armed forces, the defence-industrial complex, the energy sector-have become instruments of national power: the first of these, reshaped but with an institutional dominance not seen in decades; the latter, after a spell of privatisation under Yeltsin, largely resubordinated to state control or management.
8. There was also a concerted attempt to ensure that policy 'conform[ed] with the general capabilities and resources of this country' [Sergey Ivanov in 2000]. Where capabilities and resources were weak (as they then were in comparison with the West), the leadership sought new openings and common ground; where they were strong (as in Ukraine), policy became, in the words of its Kremlin adherents, 'cold', 'harsh' and 'much tougher'.
9. The radical breakthrough in relations following the events of 9/11 was as brief as it was because it reflected both sides of this Russian policy. President Putin immediately grasped that the tragedy in New York and Washington had changed the coordinates of world politics, and he rose to the occasion. But whereas Western governments viewed these changes with foreboding, he viewed them as an opportunity. It was the West that now needed Russia. Confident that this was so, Putin prevailed against internal opposition over the stationing of US military forces in Central Asia: both in order to demonstrate Russia's value but also in the calculation that a US dominated Afghanistan would pose fewer problems for Russia's security than a Taliban dominated Afghanistan and the spread of Islamic radicalism in Central Asia. Putin resumed cooperation with NATO (whilst maintaining 'principled' opposition to NATO enlargement), and warmly embraced Prime Minister Blair's initiative to establish what became the NATO-Russia Council. Yet in exchange, he anticipated major political trade-offs. With fair justification, he assumed that the new partnership would untie his hands against 'Islamic extremism' in the north Caucasus, which was juridically part of Russia. With less justification, he assumed that the West would acquiesce in Russia's dominance over newly independent states, which were not. He also assumed that by conceding Russia's 'right' to its own policy in Iraq and Iran, the West could not object to this policy or ask how it furthered partnership. By late 2003, a fresh round of recriminations and disillusionment was under way.
10. If these cycles of disillusionment are to end, then so must the illusions that fuel them. a. Russian Democracy. It goes without saying that the internal evolution of Russia and its political culture will play a large part in defining the 'art of the possible' in our relationship. But the art of the possible lies in judging where we can and cannot be effective. In countries which have set their sights on NATO and/or EU membership, internal affairs have a legitimate place in our discourse, and this is accepted by our official interlocutors in the western Balkans, Ukraine and Georgia. But in Putin's Russia, where no such goals have been declared, no such legitimacy is conceded, and such discourse arouses resentment. That resentment is felt by a convincing majority of ordinary people, a large part of whom perceive that our partnership with Yeltsin's regime was a partnership with those who had ruined their lives. The fact that much critical Western commentary coincides with Russia's recovery-when incomes are growing and pensions paid-has a counterproductive effect: it persuades Russians that we simply prefer their country's weakness to its strength. Therefore it would be unwise to 'continue to assume that if [we] speak loudly and insistently, Russia will heed [us] and change its ways'. [Dmitri Trenin, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006]. Speaking 'loudly and insistently' is counterproductive in a second respect. It diminishes our credibility where it is needed most: in questioning and, where necessary, opposing Russia's external policy in areas that bear upon our legitimate interests: relations with newly independent states, energy security, nuclear proliferation, anti-missile defence and arms control. If we blur the issues, so will Russia.
b. The culture of security. With difficulty but conviction, the EU and NATO have replaced a Cold War view of European security with a post-Cold War view, emphasising 'common security' and an extensive post-modern agenda of common challenges, including: state weakness, institutional incapacity, interdependence, integration and devolution, multi-culturalism, illegal migration and transnational organised crime. Russia, in contrast, has replaced a Cold War view with a pre-Cold War (i.e. pre-1914) view of security, based on the 'balance of power', great power prerogatives, 'zones of influence' and geopolitics. Its traditional emphasis on nation, state and power sits uneasily alongside a European Union committed (at least rhetorically) to 'moving beyond' these defining features of the modern world. In this schéma, President Putin's distinctive innovation has been the transmutation of geopolitics into geo-economics: the use of economic levers for political as well as financial gain. Whilst Russians are careful to stress the purely economic side of this equation with their Western interlocutors, in the post-Soviet 'near abroad', the politics of energy and trade is unabashed and harsh. More than once, Georgia's government has been told that if it reconsiders its relationship with NATO, it will pay one price for energy but that if it continues on the path to membership, it will pay another. In essence, the West and Russia inhabit different coordinates of time. Were Disraeli and Bismarck still in power in Europe, many Russians would understand us better than they do now. We need to reconcile ourselves to the fact that these differences are unlikely to recede soon.
c. NATO. By planning and programming standards-joint exercises conducted, joint forums established, the volume of meetings and exchanges-NATO-Russia cooperation functions at a high level. But in political and psychological terms, it is at one of its lowest ebbs since the end of the Cold War. The notion that NATO is anything other than a classical military alliance is regarded as risible by Russia's military establishment. The notion that NATO is not what it used to be-an anti-Russian alliance-is, in Russian eyes, made equally risible by NATO enlargement. NATO's determination to maintain an 'open door' to further enlargement, without excluding Georgia (the back door to Russia's troubled north Caucasus) or Ukraine (whose capital is regarded as the 'mother of Russia') has clinched the argument across virtually the whole political spectrum. Discussions about the stabilising effects of NATO membership, the benefits to internal security, destruction of surplus weapons and toxic materials, force reductions and professionalisation, the demilitarisation of police and border services, democratic control of the security sector and the right of independent states to choose their own models and partners are worthy but fall on deaf ears. Since the mid-1990s, the premise of Russian military planning and policy has been that any activity undertaken by NATO near Russian territory is a threat to Russia. Within recent months, that sentiment seems to have grown rather than diminished, and appears to shed at least some light on several recent developments: i. The discernable rise in official as well as covert Russian activity against NATO interests in Ukraine. Last summer's dramatic protest against the UK-Ukraine PfP exercise 'Sea Breeze'-which had taken place in Crimea without controversy over the past ten years-unfolded according to the classic template of Soviet style Cold War 'active measures' campaigns, with apparent input from Russian special services. The protest, which appeared to benefit from intelligence and prior planning, was adroitly inflated by the Russian dominated mass media into a far larger event than actually took place. It arrived at the high point of other Russian efforts to exploit the very real shortcomings of Yushchenko's pro-NATO presidency and equally evident divisions of 'orange' forces on the eve of a new (but soon to be aborted) pact of unity. ii. The astonishingly destructive and systematic rioting in Tallinn (and attacks on diplomatic personnel in Moscow) following the government's relocation of the Red Army monument. Evidence linking Russian special services and active measures professionals to these events is growing. Like the episode in Crimea, the protests coalesced around a symbolic event, well publicised in advance, that could be expected to mobilise people with real divisions and grievances. One motif of Russian internal propaganda during these protests has been that when Russia decides to act, NATO is powerless.
d. The campaign against the basing of 10 missile interceptors in Poland and a tracking radar in the Czech Republic as part of the US Global Integrated Missile Defence programme. Despite years of joint modelling and exercises on missile defence under the NATO-Russia Council, two full briefings on the deployment, in-depth technical expertise, Russian specialists' knowledge of the physics and geography of the deployment, an increasingly strong relationship between US and Russian missile defence professionals and invitations to participate in the programme itself, the Kremlin has plainly decided to treat any US and NATO explanation as null and void. Russia is concerned that, whatever the current explanation, such bases once established can in future be used to undermine Russian strategic defences. Yet the Russian campaign also fits a political pattern. The immediate announcement following the visit of US Secretary Gates that Russia would suspend observance of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was an obvious insult. The campaign astutely exploits the concerns of those who were not so assiduously consulted: the publics and parliaments of NATO members affected by the decision-and the Ukrainian President and MOD, who were initially preparing a negative response until a belated briefing from the US Missile Defence Agency persuaded them to endorse the programme. Moscow is concerned that this system could in the future be used to undermine the potential of Russian strategic forces. The missile programme also provides the long sought excuse to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and Russia's obligations under the 1999 Istanbul commitments, and also to threaten withdrawal from the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) - while creating uncertainty as to what these steps actually mean, apart from NATO powers losing their knowledge of where Russian forces are, how many there are and the right to carry out challenge inspections. Finally, it plays smartly into the agenda of generals who wish to see missile budgets increased, of Kremlin power brokers who wish to ensure that Putin is replaced by an equally tough successor and other power brokers who want him to stand for a third term.
11. To date, the UK and most of its EU and NATO partners have concluded that if the price of reconciliation with Russia is the acceptance of a new division of Europe, then the price is too high. This is a sound conclusion. A 'grand bargain' at the expense of small states would rupture the cohesion of the EU and NATO and undercut the legitimacy of the European project; it would create demoralisation, uncertainty and instability across the Black Sea and Caspian regions; it would also vindicate a Russian paradigm of security that is outmoded, distrusted, damaging to Russia's neighbours and harmful to every tendency in Russia that we seek to encourage. In answer to the charge that we are isolating Russia, we can reply that Russia is at risk of isolating itself.
12. Nevertheless, we need to weigh the consequences of every action before we take it, and we need to understand the perils of inaction as well. If NATO had been enlarged in 1995 instead of 1999, then Yeltsin's warning of a 'cold peace' might have come to fruition. But if we had failed to enlarge NATO at all-and, by default, conceded to Russia the very veto it sought-the states of the former Warsaw Pact would not form part of the liberal, democratic and relatively secure system that exists in Europe today; they would constitute a domain of anxiety, intrigue and sadness. In today's world of resource scarcities, insecurities in energy supply and dangerously armed, virulently anti-Western movements and states, we have a major interest in ensuring that the Black Sea region, the Caucasus and the Caspian do not become domains of anxiety, intrigue and sadness. For this reason, we cannot concede to Russia a prerogative to make choices for others. For the same reason, we need to act in ways that stimulate Russians to see their own choices clearly and, in time, realise that the real threats to their security are not altogether different from our own.
13. Over the short-to-mid term, this will prove difficult for the reasons set out in this document. In essence, there are three: a. the dynamics of the succession process; b. the lessons drawn from 'coloured revolutions' and their apparent failure; c. the illusions of energy sufficiency and dominance. We perceive that the interaction of these factors could make it very difficult to persuade Russia that its approach needs adjustment.
HOW IS RUSSIA GOVERNED?
14. On the basis of an unprecedented concentration of political and economic power; and competition within the Kremlin. Russia has moved from a system where (in Yeltsin's time) 50% of GDP was controlled by seven relatively independent bankers to one where 33% of GDP is controlled by companies chaired by five senior Kremlin officials. This has resulted in: a. The dominance of senior officials with backgrounds in security/intelligence services and 'militarised structures'. b. Limited transparency: the ability to know what decisions are made, where they are made, by whom and why, a lack of democratic oversight, insufficient checks and balances, little public accountability. c. Less flexibility: dysfunctional decision-making with limited feedback mechanisms and strong disincentives to bring bad news. d. A multiplicity of inter-sectoral links and rivalries, coupled with weak regulatory institutions; e. hence, multiple, overlapping agendas, very difficult to disentangle. This pattern of collusion and rivalry not only has adverse effects on foreign countries; it also has adverse effects on Russian interests abroad and at home.
15. President Putin's successor may struggle for authority over the rest of the elite. Russian experts warn that, during this period, 'we should be ready for all sorts of political conduct, including a possible crisis scenario'. [Aleks Arkhangelsky, <russiprofile.org> 1 April 2007] Between now and when Putin goes might there be a sharpening of inter-ethnic and communal tensions? Manipulation of disorder to mobilise support behind a strong, 'centrist' candidate? Are such scenarios controllable, or will they get out of hand? The risk of tensions is heightened by the weakness of democratic political culture. Most of the middle class appears to believe that authoritarianism is an acceptable price to pay for prosperity, order and international 'respect'. National and international human rights monitoring are condoned but not encouraged by the federal authorities.
16. The belief is prevalent that foreign powers (particularly the USA) are giving strong financial backing to pro-western forces in former Soviet states, and thereby bringing to power anti-Russian leaderships (the 'coloured revolution' syndrome). The Rose Revolution in Georgia of 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of 2004 were seen by the Kremlin as US special operations (a view supported by the majority of the Russian population), not the product of civil society. Shortcomings and setbacks in the post-revolutionary order, most visible in Ukraine, merely confirm this dubious perspective. Hence, there arises the a belief that Western (particularly US) concern about democratization and human rights is merely a political weapon to expand western influence and to delegitimize both the Russian political system and Russian conduct in the international arena. The Russian leadership appears to believe that foreign powers may attempt to back a coloured revolution in Russia in March 2008, when presidential elections are due to take place. In his State of the Nation address in April 2007, Vladimir Putin stated: 'There has been an increasing influx of money from abroad being used to intervene directly in our internal affairs. ...we recall the talk about the civilising role of colonial powers during the colonial era. Today, 'civilisation' has been replaced by democratization, but the aim is the same - to ensure unilateral gains and one's own advantage, and to pursue one's own interests.' Paranoia about western subversion has become more pronounced in recent months.
17. The Kremlin cannot afford to be insensitive to public opinion, because it fears it. Most Russians fear disorder and weakness, but also extremism. Therefore, a candidate's image matters. Although 43% of people have already said they will vote for Putin's candidate, this will not eliminate elite anxiety about what the electorate think about the anointed successor; hence a continued bias towards electoral manipulation.
18. Putin has received credit for real improvements (e.g. the steady rise in disposable income), but those will be difficult to sustain given worsening structural problems (endemic crime and corruption, ossified bureaucracy, energy shortages). How will his successor acquire credit? Can he address these problems without attacking powerful elite interests (as Putin previously attacked Yeltsin's 'family')? Where will his allies come from? Will the country's now politicised force structures maintain their cohesion during this struggle, or will they divide? Most importantly in terms of UK policy, given these uncertainties, can we assume that Russia maintains its present direction irrespective of how the succession process plays out? None of these questions can be answered today
19. Like Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Putin came to power confronting foreign policy failure. This created a disposition for flexibility in foreign affairs and a determination to address underlying problems at home. But his successor will inherit at least the appearance of success: in Chechnya, in seeing off coloured revolutions and in using energy to recover lost influence. Misguided as these appearances might be, what are the implications if the new president perceives he is dealing with a divided West, NATO/US failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, systemic crisis in the EU, a more inward looking USA and the end of Euro-Atlantic enlargement?
ENERGY SECURITY
20. Much recent speculation has focussed on Russia's propensity to use its position as an energy supplier and transit country as a point of political leverage. The official Energy Strategy of Russia to 2020 describes Russia's energy complex as 'an instrument for the conduct of internal and external policy' and states that 'the role of the country in world energy markets to a large extent determines its geopolitical influence'. Nevertheless, the greater concern to customers should be that Russian energy companies are seeking the quick wins of acquisition of upstream resources in Central Asia and downstream facilities in former Soviet Union/EU rather than making longer-term investments in domestic exploration, exploitation and capacity-building. There are justifiable concerns about the sustainability of Russia's reserves, and given the murky and chauvinistic business climate in Russia, foreign investment and expertise cannot be relied upon to redress this balance. It is this that leaves Western countries' energy security vulnerable in the long run, not simply the customer-supplier relationship or company ownership. Russia is possibly over-confident, and certainly inefficient, in declaring its ability to develop new sources of production and solve complex technological problems (e.g. Liquefied Natural Gas) on its own.
21. Lack of consensus in the EU and our negotiating style and strategy give Moscow much room for manoeuvre in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Furthermore, Russia's domestic energy needs are growing much faster than anticipated by the Kremlin. Russia's natural gas transportation network is ageing and insufficient for sustained exports to all potential customers. Even with widespread domestic conversion from natural gas to coal consumption, as envisaged by the Russian government, Russia will find it increasingly difficult to fulfil all its export obligations without risking discontent at home.
22. Impending shortages of gas even for domestic purposes, let alone export, will continue to increase pressure on former Soviet neighbours and present new risks of supply disruption to EU. For the same reason, Russia will seek to maintain a stranglehold on Central Asian supplies and transport routes-and will treat diversification schemes with hostility. Gas shortages serve the financial interests of some Kremlin insiders, but damage the interests of others. The Kremlin fears public unrest, but rather than seeking to avert a sudden crisis, repression of public dissent is more likely. The consequences of gas shortages in 2015 may parallel those of bread shortages in 1905.
23. The EU's March 2007 Action Plan, if implemented, will have far-reaching consequences. It will bring the EU into partnership with countries seeking to develop energy transport routes independent of Russia. They will address the most acute energy security problem faced by several other new member states: energy isolation, brought about by the eastward orientation of pipeline infrastructure and the absence of electricity connections to the rest of the EU. The EU's national energy 'champions' and their supporting governments are beginning to find themselves on the defensive politically and legally. A growing number of regulators and officials are insistent that the EU's competition rules be enforced, even in the face of determined opposition from Russia and powerful interests within the EU itself
24. Russia's combination of overweening confidence and congenital insecurity, of ambition and vulnerability makes partnership with Russia difficult. Where energy is concerned, this difficulty is felt in four respects: a. Divergent economic cultures. Russia under Putin has experienced a considerable re-nationalisation of economic power with a strong security service component. Like the defence sector in Soviet times, the energy sector is now seen by many as the engine of growth and modernisation. This has brought short-term prosperity and the appearance of international success, which makes it difficult for the EU to speak to Russia with authority, let alone persuade it that its approach needs adjustment. To Russia's energy mastodons, 'markets' exist wherever money-commodity relations exist, however unbalanced, inequitable or monopolistic they are. To Russia, energy security is guaranteed by a strong vertical of integration and control, rather than diversification, liberalisation of markets, transparency and choice b. The emerging deficit. Without major restructuring and market liberalisation, Russia will not meet projected energy demand at home or abroad. Production at three of Gazprom's four major fields is already declining. Even to maintain current levels of production, the International Energy Agency calculates that 200 bcm [bn cubic metres] per annum will need to be produced in new fields by 2015: a project which qualified experts believe demands $11 bn p.a. in investment. But such investment is not taking place. In the oil sector, the picture is no more encouraging. c. An aggressive rather than productive pattern of investment. Gazprom's current investment strategy appears to be focused on compensating for Russia's emerging gas deficit rather than remedying it. It also seems determined to use every means at its disposal to derail new energy projects that exclude Russia, such as Nabucco and the South Caspian Gas Pipeline. By acquiescing in the policy, the EU risks making itself hostage to Russia's energy deficit and whatever steps Russia takes, or does not take, to address it. d. Geo-economics in the 'Near Abroad'. Inter-elite ties, similar bureaucratic and business cultures, as well as the multiplicity of economic linkages and dependencies mean that energy will continue to provide Russia with opportunities for geopolitical tradeoffs and inducements to limit the sovereignty and independence of former Soviet neighbours. Upon whom will the scissors close as Russia's resource constraints mount? The answer is inescapable: energy dependent neighbours. This surely will not diminish the risks of tension and instability in the former Soviet Union.
25. The pattern of Russian energy investment is patchy and does not inspire confidence;; Russia's international economic ambitions and business culture are still collusive and opaque, close to the state, and monopolistic in ethos. This does not apply solely in the energy sector, or only on Russian territory. It impacts on the conduct of Russian business abroad and the interests and conduct of their foreign partners. The EU Action Plan is eminently sound, but dogmas, habits of mind and narrowly construed national interests may stand in the way. Clarity is therefore needed from the UK and the EU. We must ask how Ukraine, the countries of the South Caucasus and the Caspian could help us achieve our energy goals and we need to ask what we will contribute to these countries in order to secure them.
Supporting material already published: 07/10 Energy Security: At Last A Response from the EU, Mar 2007 James Sherr 06/48 Gazprom in Crisis, Oct 2006 Michael Fredholm 07/02 Russia and the Security of Europe's Energy Supplies: Security in Diversity? Jan 2007 Andrew Monaghan
DEMOGRAPHY AND SECURITY
26. Russia rightly views its declining population as a national security issue, and has sought to address it by offering incentives to families, and encouraging immigration, particularly of ethnic Russians from the former soviet states. Neither of these measures has had marked success in the face of alcoholism, a decrepit system of national health care and poor living conditions. Reversing the decline will demand significant changes in the political and cultural environment, to one where the state is accountable to citizens rather than vice versa. There is no sign that this is happening. Migrant workers from the Caucasus and Central Asia are liable to suffer discrimination and physical abuse, and the 'threat' of Chinese immigration in Siberia and the Russian Far East is much hyped.
27. The north Caucasus is a jigsaw of religions, ethnicities and competing territorial claims. Violence, human rights abuses and manipulation of constitutional processes for the benefit of political elites are endemic throughout the region, and not confined to Chechnya. It is hard to see how further trouble can be avoided. Russians equate their own anti-terrorist struggle with a heavy-handed approach to law and order. Not surprisingly, many ethnic Russians are leaving the north Caucasus.
28. The Muslim component of the Russian Federation - currently around 10% of the total - has a far higher birth rate than the Slavic component. This will have a profound effect on Russian society, politics and foreign policy, not just in the north Caucasus, and is likely to be a growing source of tension. Currently the Muslim population is not highly politicised; there is no Muslim lobby. The influence of militant Islam outside the northern Caucasus is limited, although it does exist. Violent Slav chauvinism, by contrast, is already in evidence.
29. Despite the demographic downturn, Russia intends to halve the term of conscription into the armed forces from two years to one in 2008, while retaining the overall size of the forces. This means doubling the number of conscripts drafted each year at a time when there are not enough healthy 18-year olds for enlistment. Recruitment and retention on contract service have been insufficient to fill the gap. The timing of the change-over to one-year conscription pose a risk of disruption and upheaval in the armed forces, at or around the time of the 2008 presidential election. The 18-month transition period has just begun, and the authorities have acknowledged difficulties..
Supporting material already published: 06/53 Islam in the Russian Federation, Nov 2006 Dr Mark A Smith 06/47 Where Have all the Soldiers Gone? Oct 2006 Keir Giles 06/39 Russia's 'Golden Bridge' is Crumbling: Demographic Crisis in the Russian Federation, Aug 2006 Dr Steven J Main 05/36 North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching Destabilisation, Aug 2005 C W Blandy
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
30. Russia inherited a grave environmental legacy from the Soviet Union. Air and water pollution are extremely high and have a deleterious effect on health. Spending on environmental protection is inadequate, and most major projects are funded by international institutions. Efforts to uncover information regarding pollution at nuclear and military facilities is hampered by аn obsession with security and secrecy. . Since 2000 environmental controls and monitoring capacity have in fact been reduced. The state places more emphasis on economic growth than countering pollution. Public awareness of environmental issues remains low despite efforts by NGOs to raise it, as well as lobby for environmental conservation and controls. The leadership however is generally averse to such activities, particularly those carried out in collaboration with foreign partners.
Supporting material already published: 06/41 Russian Environmental Problems, Sep 2006 Dr Mark A Smith
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
31. Russian foreign policy presents a mixed picture after seven years of Vladimir Putin's presidency. The changed tone of recent statements draws attention to Russia's increased self-confidence, although the power disparity with the USA remains considerable. Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, which depicted US foreign policy as a major destabilising factor in international relations, was a reflection of Russian frustration at the USA's continued adherence to acting unilaterally, and to using military force without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Moscow is now seeking to pull other states towards its own sphere of influence, particularly anti-US powers such as Iran and Venezuela, where Russia's new relationship is also a form of revenge for US support of Georgia and Azerbaijan. This is likely to be a strong feature of Russian foreign policy over the next few years.
32. Moscow demands recognition as a European great power, as well as a Eurasian one. Russia will attempt to encourage the emergence of a less Atlanticist Europe: the EU is seen as a major strategic partner, and Moscow is not opposed to EU enlargement. The Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2007, also places much emphasis on bilateral relations with individual European powers. It lists the most important partners as Germany, France, Spain and Italy, and argues for the development of partnership with Germany and France in particular. Significantly, the United Kingdom is not included in this list. It may be that Moscow sees the UK as too closely aligned to Washington to be an attractive partner.
33. Russia proceeds from the position that it is fated to be a great power, with a right to sit at the top table of a multipolar international system. This has been a consistent theme of Russian foreign policy since 1991. Consequently it also opposes what it sees as attempts by the USA to establish a unipolar system, in which the rules of the game are largely decided by Washington and imposed on the rest of the world. Moscow fears that a US led system will marginalise its influence in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region. As the Russian analyst Dmitry Trenin argued in summer 2006 in Foreign Affairs: 'Until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the centre but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia's leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centred system. The Kremlin's new approach to foreign policy assumes that as a big country, Russia is essentially friendless; no great power wants a strong Russia, which would be a formidable competitor, and many want a weak Russia that they could exploit and manipulate. Accordingly, Russia has a choice between accepting subservience and reasserting its status as a great power, thereby claiming its rightful place in the world alongside the United States and China rather than settling for the company of Brazil and India.'
34. Russia now does have confidence in its ability to survive outside the Western solar system. This is reflected in the Review of Foreign Policy, whose opening paragraph notes that: 'In world politics the significance of the energy factor has risen, mainly in access to resources. Russia's international position has become significantly firmer. A strong more self-confident Russia has become an important constituent part of positive changes in the world.' It argues that we have now come to a 'defining moment, when it is necessary to think about a new architecture of global security, based on a rational balance of the interests of all the subjects of the international community. In these conditions Russia's role and responsibility have qualitatively risen.'
35. President Putin's Munich speech reflected an increasingly harsh attitude towards the USA that has developed since May 2006. Although criticism of American unipolarity has long been a standard feature of Russian foreign policy, the hard-hitting tone is now quite different from that which prevailed in 2001 and 2002. Putin characterised the USA as a lawless power, which although it constantly lectures Russia about democracy, behaves in a very undemocratic way in the international system. He accused the USA of the almost unrestrained use of force in the international arena, and of consequently engendering further conflicts. Putin considers that the consequence of this policy is the undermining of global security, as no-one feels safe; this leads to nuclear proliferation, as states seek to safeguard their security.
36. The president also found fault with the current tendency towards violence rather than diplomacy in international affairs. He criticised the Italian Defence Minister for allegedly naming NATO and the EU as bodies which could legitimise the use of force: 'The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN'. The possibility of US military action against Iran continues to be the subject of much speculation in the Russian press.
37. Putin contrasted Russia's openness to investment with other countries' protectionism and with aid programmes 'that are linked with the development of...donor country's companies', which 'not only preserves economic backwardness but also reaps the profits thereof. The increasing social tension in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of radicalism, extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts.' To redress these inequities, Russia is seeking to 'interact with responsible and independent partners,' as Putin said in his peroration, and will act with 'a realistic sense of [its] own opportunities and potential'. Russia's international great power status is undoubtedly popular at home.
38. Russia's re-establishment as a great power rests on its ability to influence neighbouring states. Throughout this process, the West has shown inattention and a slow, reactive attitude, although there are visible changes in the approach of Germany, France and the US. Western 'sensitivity' in negotiation is interpreted by Russia as weakness. Russia is not deterred by US disapproval from developing closer relations (particularly in the form of arms sales and energy deals) with states such as Venezuela and Algeria. Putin's February 2007 visit to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar also signalled the development of a more active phase in Russian diplomacy. At the same time, Russian confidence in its ability to shift the international orientation towards multipolarity stems from its increasing energy wealth. As Putin mentioned, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries' GDP surpasses that of the EU, and 'there is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence...'
39. The Russian leadership remains concerned about continued NATO enlargement into former Soviet states. The possibility of Georgia and in particular Ukraine joining NATO in the next few years increases Russian feelings of encirclement. The Russians still remember the promise made to Gorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not extend any further eastward than the territory of the former East Germany, and feels that it has been deceived. The US interest in developing oil pipeline routes from Central Asia and Transcaucasia that bypass Russia is seen as part of this encirclement.
40. Partnerships with China and India are also seen as one of the means of promoting Russia as independent actor in the international arena. Both nations are important customers for Russian armaments (these two nations account for about 70% of Russian arms sales (Feb 2006 figures)), and China is becoming an important consumer of Russian energy, as well as an increasingly important security partner. Russia is also likely to promote itself as an anti-NATO power centre, and will continue to press for reform of the OSCE which it sees as a subversive organisation, largely because of its role in encouraging transparent electoral processes in former Soviet states.
THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY ORGANIZATION
41. Russia has in the last few years again worked to regain influence in central Asia which it once took for granted. In this it has been largely successful, given the common language, military and political background which the leaderships share. In the Caucasus, however, only Armenia remains firmly in a Russian alliance - albeit with some reluctance.
42. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has recently gained visibility in the West. Originally intended by China as an economic and confidence-building partnership, its member states' main shared concerns are extremism, terrorism and separatism, followed closely by organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration. China will continue to be the unofficial 'senior partner' in the organisation. Russia obviously finds this a useful vehicle for dialogue and influence, and has recently floated the idea of closer links between the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which shares much of its membership and whose multinational exercises appear to specialise in counter-terrorist training, with Russia as the senior partner.
43. It is a continued point of aggravation to the Russians that NATO has set its face against an institutional relationship with either body, on the grounds that bilateral relationships are perfectly adequate. Russia's relationship with China continues to be one of mutual respect rather than enthusiastic friendship.
RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH TRANSCAUCASIAN COUNTRIES
44. The Caucasus - both north and south - constitutes an area of direct and vital concern to Moscow, in particular to the Russian military, who remain sensitive to penetration by influence and threats to the territorial integrity of Russia from the other two regional powers, Turkey and Iran. The spectre of NATO expansion, increased Western activity in the Caspian Basin and a diminution of Russian influence in the region remain constant irritants to Moscow.
Azerbaijan 45. As well as continuing disturbances in Chechnya and Ingushetia, Moscow is also faced with a serious upsurge of violence in Dagestan and therefore wishes to see beyond its southern border a stable state prepared to assist the Russian counter-terrorist campaign. This was probably why Azerbaijan was able to come to an early arrangement with Russia on the question of migrant workers; remittances from the Azeri diaspora in Moscow provide a large slice of income for people in Azerbaijan.
46. However Russia will strive to prevent independent access to energy resources in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and thus seeks to stop Baku becoming a major energy transit hub through the laying of oil and gas pipelines on the Caspian's seabed. Russia and Iran are adamantly opposed to the concept of pipelines under the Caspian.
47. For Azerbaijan the most important point in its relationship with Russia (and with the USA) is the return of Nagornyy Karabakh (NK) to the vertical subordination of Baku together with the seven districts currently occupied by Armenians. To achieve this, Baku needs the efforts of both Washington and Moscow. At some stage Armenia will have to relinquish the occupied territories, if international law and United Nations resolutions are to be observed. However, there are doubts over the efficacy of Russia in the OSCE Minsk Group's mediation of the NK peace process.
Armenia 48. With the removal of Russian troops from Georgia to Armenia, Russia still has forces stationed in the South Caucasus. Almost 10 years ago small, landlocked Armenia sought security through a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Russia which incorporated a Russian military presence to discourage any intentions which Azerbaijan and Turkey might harbour against Armenia. There are regular high level military meetings between Moscow and Yerevan.
49. Armenia is 80% dependent on Russia for energy. Russia has a virtual monopoly in Armenia for the production and supply of electricity. Through its pipeline monopoly Gazprom supplies gas to Armenia via Georgia. The aggravations in Russo-Georgian relations interrupted this supply, and Armenia has now diversified supplies to Iran, under severe Russian constraints on further export. The rise in the price of energy has been a major factor in beginning to raise doubts amongst the Armenian population about Russia's attractiveness as their single ally.
Georgia 50. The relationship with Russia is one of the most important factors in Georgia's struggle for survival as a state. The 200 year-old Russian legacy and its overwhelming presence have tended to limit Georgian efforts and aspirations. Gas supplies to Georgia are under Russian control. A Russian utility conglomerate is in charge of providing electricity to households and industry. Russia has been quite ruthless in the use of the energy lever to influence Georgian policy. Georgia's long border with Russia includes Abkhazia and South Osetia, both currently outside Georgia's control, and these breakaway districts have in several ways facilitated Russian efforts to exert leverage upon the Georgian government.
Supporting material already published: 07/09 Who's Afraid of the SCO? Mar 2007 Henry Plater-Zyberk 07/05 Putin on International Security, Feb 2007 Mark Smith & Anne Aldis 06/33 Azerbaijan: Permanently between Scylla and Charybdis? Aug 06 C W Blandy 06/31 Russia and Central Asia: Current and Future Economic Relations, July 2006 Dr Vladimir Paramonov & Dr Aleksey Strokov
DEFENCE
51. The windfall revenue from the high international price of oil and gas has allowed the Russian leadership to spend money on the state apparatus, as well as an assertive foreign policy. Whilst Russia does not aim at reclaiming its old military superpower status, it has begun once again to invest heavily in defence and security, partly to redress the neglect of the 1990s. President Putin is an enthusiastic Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and has several times castigated them in public for failures and shortcomings. His recent appointment of Anatoly Serdyukov, the former head of the federal tax agency, as defence minister signalled a desire to enforce improved financial discipline within the defence ministry. Poor accountability, corruption and inefficiency within the ministry and its relations with industry have probably been identified as the main obstacles to defence capability building, in particular on the procurement side. The defence industry's almost total reliance on foreign arms sales over the last decade or more (declared at about $6bn annually) is now slowly being reversed. Other scandals such as conscript deaths, quartering shortages and low-quality contract manpower continue to impact on military readiness and public support, however.
52. Although none of the officially released figures can be taken at face value, there have been dramatic increases, quadrupling or more over recent years, in all indices of defence spending. According to some estimates (and depending on widely varying assessments of China), overall Russian defence expenditure is now the second highest in the world after the USA. In addition to ambitious plans for procurement of more advanced and capable equipment and weapons systems, immediate and obvious effects have already been seen: for instance in aviation units which are reporting substantially increased levels of flying training hours for pilots - admittedly from a very low level - thanks to increased supplies of fuel, and improved personal equipment for airborne troops.
53. It should be noted that although defence expenditure is notionally debated and approved by the State Duma, the equipment shopping list and spending plans are in effect presented to the Duma by the military as a fait accompli. This lack of civil control extends into the Defence Ministry itself: Anatoliy Serdyukov may be the first truly civilian Minister of Defence, but in the absence of any kind of civilian secretariat, increased control over policy and direction for the Armed Forces has been promised to the General Staff.
54. Russia's 2000 military doctrine stated that Russia had generic threats rather than specific enemies, and many of these threats stemmed from non-state factors such as internal and international terrorism. Today, plans for reformulating military doctrine hinge once again on the perceived threat from NATO, and the USA in particular. According to the General Staff, Russia sees a specific and deliberate threat in the course of the USA towards world leadership and its desire to entrench itself in regions of Russia's traditional presence, and the use of military force to circumvent international law. President Putin concludes that 'this requires the steady improvement of the country's military organisation, including the maintenance of high combat readiness for the nuclear deterrence forces'.
55. Putin's Munich speech in February 2007 caught widespread attention, but his statement that 'NATO expansion has nothing to do with... security in Europe, on the contrary it is a serious provocative factor that diminishes the level of mutual trust, and we are fully entitled to ask against whom this expansion is aimed?' did no more than summarise previous complaints over breaches of commitments by NATO and over the perceived destabilising influence of the USA. These concerns, and his references to a new Iron Curtain, are strongly echoed in popular media within Russia: the image, familiar from Soviet times, of a map of Russia surrounded on all sides by hostile missile systems is appearing more and more frequently - with the key difference that NATO facilities on these maps are now at the borders of Russia itself.
56. Senior Russian attitudes to the possession of strong and capable Armed Forces have also developed from seeing them as an essential attribute of great power status, to a tool for specific tasks. In May 2006, President Putin set the task of creating more permanent-readiness units to serve as a basis for mobile and independent groups of forces 'in any area of potential danger'; there could be no return, he said, to the situation on the resumption of intense conflict in Chechnya in 1999, when of 1.4 million men in Russia's armed forces, only 55,000 could be fielded in conflict.
57. The frequency, intensity and scale of conventional forces exercises has increased substantially, and is now at its most intensive level since Soviet times. In 2006, compared to 2005, both the number of parachute jumps carried out by the Airborne Assault Forces and the number of exercises held in conjunction with foreign military forces increased by 50 per cent year on year. The Airborne Forces in particular have been practising airborne operations on regimental and brigade scale, while at the same time restructuring with an explicit task of 'being ready to stop threats arising, even abroad'. The Ground Forces are once again carrying out divisional live-firing exercises, and practised mobilisation of reservists 700 times in 2006. The Air Force is promised a further 30 per cent increase in the number of exercises in 2007.
THE RUSSIAN SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS
58. In a short biographical documentary "Man's work" made in 1996 during the electoral campaign in St Petersburg, Vladimir Putin described at length his devotion to the KGB and his former colleagues. By the time he began to run the country, it was evident that he would wish to strengthen the state apparatus, suppress Chechen separatism, stem the crime wave and be far less accommodating to foreign countries than his predecessor. To do all that he had to put in top positions - not just in the security apparatus - people he could trust. Most of these were from St Petersburg and many of them served in the KGB. This is a 50+ generation of men which regards the disappearance of the USSR as a great tragedy and blames the West for many of the problems which Russia has failed to address. They remain a close-knit community, whether inside or outside officialdom.
59. The security and intelligence organisations play an important role in both Russia's domestic and foreign policy. The principal organ responsible for domestic security is the Federal Security Service (FSB). After many reforms, the FSB has reclaimed most of the components of the old KGB, including the Federal Agency of Governmental Communication and Information, the Federal Border Guard Service and two specialist anti-terrorist teams: Alfa and Vympel. The FSB is very capable, and is headed by Army General Patrushev, one of Vladimir Putin's closest colleagues. There is no "fresh blood" in the leadership of the service, who all began their careers in the Soviet KGB. Today, the FSB performs its traditional tasks, which include all forms of counterintelligence and security duties, guarding the national borders and conducting signals intelligence operations. The service also coordinates anti-terrorist operations and national and international anti-fraud operations. In combating terrorism and fraud in Russia the FSB is assisted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Its foreign operations are led and supervised by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
60. The MVD's main task is policing the country. Army General Rashid Nurgaliev, another former KGB officer and subordinate of Gen Patrushev, is in charge of the Interior Troops units stationed around the country to deal with large scale internal problems, and the local rapid response teams. Like the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs the MVD is a 'presidential ministry' controlled by the head of state, a custom introduced by Bois Yeltsin. This status has not been challenged by the Russian parliament.
61. In addition to standard security and law enforcement duties and combating terrorism, the FSB's and MVD's main tasks include close monitoring of public manifestations of discontent, including non-violent, legal protests. It became clear during the first conflict in Chechnya that the Russian special services, the MVD Troops and the military were neither able to penetrate the Chechen community nor to prevent terrorist attacks. Since then much attention has been focussed on making these services work effectively together. The problem of Russian organised crime groups had also to be addressed. Criminal organisations grew rapidly in the 1990s, and their activities became 'internationalised'. The MVD was not trained to address the problem, since all crimes involving foreigners had previously been the province of the KGB.
62. Russia's two main intelligence services, the SVR and the Defence Ministry's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) are facing new tasks as well as some of the old ones, which for economic and political reasons were abandoned or scaled down for more than a decade. The Russian intelligence services can be expected to show renewed interest in the technological achievements of other countries to speed up or shortcut Russia's own process of technological modernisation. The civilian SVR's remit includes tracking down terrorist and criminal suspects wanted by the Russian judicial system. After the Beslan events it was authorised by President Putin to physically eliminate terrorists operating against Russia abroad. Recent Russian legislation empowering the pre-emptive use of force overseas refers specifically to Defence Ministry assets rather than to the FSB or SVR.
63. The events of 9/11 and the Beslan school siege played an important role in encouraging the president to strengthen the Russian security structures. Few in Russia question the need for this, or the way the process has been conducted. There has been no public or media debate on what sort of security and intelligence services Russia needs. The general consensus is that the bigger and stronger they are, the better. There is little public interest in democratic accountability, quality control, or the techniques used, as long as they kill terrorists, arrest criminals and recover money from controversial oligarchs.
64. Sometimes confused and frustrated by the legal procedures of liberal democracies, the Russian special services can be expected to become more aggressive in tracking down and taking drastic measures against enemies abroad, especially amongst the foreign-based Russian community. The growing Russian diaspora includes many rich people who may have abused the Russian legal system. They will be expected to hand over what they have stolen from the state, or encouraged to reach some ongoing accommodation with it. In the most serious cases, like Chechen terrorist suspects living abroad, they may become targets of kidnapping and physical elimination.
65. As Russia grows in strength so will her intelligence and security organs. Even when he ceases to be the head of state, Putin and former KGB officers of his generation will have enormous influence on how and against whom these organs will operate. They will continue to play an important role in maintaining internal security and fighting for Russian interests abroad. Their actions are likely to reflect the needs and attitudes of Russia's leaders: semi-democratic, non-liberal, rich, intolerant of dissent and respecting only the strong. At the same time, Russia's special services can be valuable partners when it serves their interests, in pursuit of terrorists, criminals or sharing information. The UK is likely to remain an area of high intelligence interest for Russia. Nevertheless, British agencies should continue to cooperate with them when it is appropriate.
Supporting material already published: 05/50 Russia's Special Forces Sep 2005 Henry Plater-Zyberk C108 Vladimir Putin & Russia's Special Services August 2002 Gordon Bennett
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this paper do not reflect official thinking and policy either of Her Majesty's Government or of the Ministry of Defence |